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1. 
Introduction 
This study is concerned with two related issues: 
Australian reactions to the German persecution of the Jews 
and to the resulting refugee problem, in particular the 
immigration of refugees into Australia. The Nazi regime's 
anti-Jewish measures began when it came to power in 1933 
and reached a pre-war peak in the pogrom of November 1938. 
Germany's occupation of Europe during the war enabled the 
Nazis to put into operation their plan to exterminate 
European Jewry. 
Jews were dead. 
By the end of the war, almost six million 
The aftermath came in 1945 when the allies 
liberated the few survivors and brought to trial those 
responsible for Germany's anti-Jewish policy as well as those 
immediately involved in the extermination campaign. 
German antisemitism affected the rest of the world 
when Jews tried to find refuge from their persecutors. 
~ustralia became involved in the refugee problem because 
it was one of the few countries in the world which was 
actively seeking immigrants. In the pre-war period, the 
admission of refugees to Australia became a controversial 
public issue. During the war, the broad problem was that 
of rescuing some of Europe's Jews from extermination. 
Australians were also involved with a proposal to establish 
a Jewish refugee settlement in the Kimberley region of 
north-west Australia. Once the war was over and Australia 
was about to embark on a large-scale immigration programme, 
the debate centred on the admission of surviving relatives 
of refugees who had come to Australia before the war. While 
the question of refugee immigration was often confined to 
theoretical di~cussion, Australians felt directly affected 
by the resulting presence of a small number of refugees in 
the community. 
A considerable amount has been written on Nazi 
antisemitism and the refugee problem but little research has 
been done on reactions to these two issues. The present 
study has some similarities to one undertaken in the United 
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Kingdom by Andrew Sharf, entitled The British Press and 
Jews under Nazi Rule. 1 Sharf studied the reactions of the 
British press, including newspapers representing different 
political and religious groups, to the German persecution 
of the Jews and to a lesser extent to the admission of 
refugees to Britain. No equivalent study has previously 
been undertaken in Australia. E.M. Andrews referred briefly 
to Australian reactions to the 1938 anti-Jewish pogrom and 
to the immigration of refugees in the pre-war period in his 
Ph.D. thesis on Australian reactions to the European crises 
between 1935 and 1939, published as Isolation and 
Appeasement in Australia. 2 Other Australian studiGs of 
refugee immigration have focussed on the refugees them-
selves. Ursula Wiemann's M.A. thesis 'German and Austrian 
Refugees in Melbourne 1933-1947' dealt with the refugees 
who settled in Melbourne before the war .and discussed, in 
general terms, their reception in Australia. 3 In his book 
From Assimilation to Group Survival, P.Y. Medding examined 
--- ... the Melbourne Jewish community from the 1920s to the 1960s. 
He included an analysis of the relations between refugee 
immigrants and the Australian Jewish community.4 
Unlike previous Australian studies, this thesis 
will concentrate on the reactions to refugee immigration, as 
well as to German antisemitism. The study of reactions to 
events, rather than the events themselves, can give insights 
into the attitudes and values of different sections of 
society. This study is concerned with two distinct types 
1. Andrew SharfJ The British Press and Jews under Nazi 
~' London, 1964. 
2 .. E.M. Andrews, Isolation and Appeasement in Australia, 
Canberra, 1970. 
3. Ursula Wiemann, 'German ·and Austrian Refugees in 
Melbourne 1933-1947', M.A. Thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1965. 
4. P.Y. Medding, From Assimilation to Group Survival, 
Melbourne, 1968. Medding's book was based partly on 
his M.A. thesis, 'The Melbourne Jewish Community Since 
1945: A Political and Sociological Study'; Uni~ersity 
of Melbourne, 1962. 
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of reaction. The persecution of the Jews was taking place 
twelve thousand miles away in Europe and had no immediate 
effect on Australians. They were reacting to an external 
situation - in this case a large-scale human problem. A 
second type of reaction was involved when this human 
problem became a domestic issue with a direct effect on 
the personal and communal interests of many Australians. 
As potential and actual immigrants, the refugees provoked 
reactions at two levels. First, they were foreigners, 
3 . 
entering a community which was traditionally hostile to all 
aliens. Second, they were Jews, a non-Christian religious 
group coming into an essential Christian society. 
This study will not attempt to assess so-called 
'public opinion' on the Jewish question but will examine 
the reactions of particular sections of the Australian 
community. It will be carried out on an Australia-wide 
basis, although the focus will be on Sydney and Melbourne 
as the centres of reaction and the cities in which the 
great majority of refugees settled. The official viewpoint 
is represented by the Federal Government and, to a lesser 
extent, state governments. Varying shade• of political 
opinion - from the communist extreme left and the labour 
movement to the extreme right - will also be discussed. 
Associated with these are the reactions of economic interest 
groups - working-class and professional - and organizations 
representing sectional interests such as ex-servicemen. 
The study will also examine the reactions of religious 
groups: Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. The greatest 
influence on most Australians was probably that of the 
general press and considerable emphasis will be placed on 
the reactions of-daily newspapers and weekly publications. 5 
5. The study of reactions ~f the daily press will con-
centrate on the ma_jor n"<:iwspapers of the s'tate 
capitals, three for Sydney and Melbourne and one 
for each of the other state capitals. One evening 
paper has been included for Sydney and Melbourne. 
All others are morning papers. The d~ily circulation 
of newspapers in 1941, near the mid-point 'of the 
study, were: (see page 4) 
••If 
All these will be supplemented by the published comments 
of prominent Australians and less prominent individuals 
who expressed their views in letters to the press. 
Despite the range of reactions to be examined, limitations 
are placed on the study by the use of historical, as 
opposed to sociological, method. 6 'Reactions' are limited 
to the published views of those groups and individuals who 
felt prompted to comment on the Jewish question. While 
these add up to a reasonable coverage of expressed 
4. 
Australian reactions, they take no account of the views of 
the 'silent majority' and may not be called 'public opinion?' 
Sydney 
Melbourne* 
Adelaide 
Brisbane 
Perth 
Hobart 
Daily TelegraJ2h 
sydnez Morning 
sun 
Age 
Argus 
Herald 
Advertiser 
Courier-Mail 
West Australian 
Mercury 
212,606 
Herald 225,000 
188,319 
99,000 
108,370 
232,131 
110,931 
85,426 
77,613 
23,915 
*Melbourne's highest circulation morning newspaper, 
the sun News-Pictorial (258 ,959), has been omitted 
in preference for the Age and Argus. Compared with 
these two newspapers, the Sun devoted little space 
to foreign affairs and made-few comments on public 
issues. 
The above figures are taken from Henry Mayer, The Press 
in Australia, Melbourne, 1964, p.40. 
6. P.Y. Medding, £12..cit., based much of his study on 
questionnaire material. Ursula Wiemann, £12.· cit., 
adopted a basically historical approach but 
supplemented published evidence with material 
obtained from a survey of a random selection of 
~•fugees. While these approaches could be used to 
advantage to obtain the ~ttitudes of refugee immigrants 
·and even Australian Jews, they were not practicable 
for this study because of: 
(a) the large range of viewpoints examineq; 
(b) the passage of .time, and the comparative 
insignificance of the Jewish question for most 
non-Jewish Australians, which would largely 
invalidate any views expressed now on reactions 
to events which occurred up to nearly thirty 
years ago. 
7. 'Public opinion' on Jewish refugee immigration was 
assessed on only two occasions by Australian Gallup 
Polls. See pp. 213-4, 278-9. 
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Th~ study is limited in scope, especially in 
relation to ~h~ refugee problem. It will not examine 
reactions to the Palestine quest~on and will ignore the 
Federal Government's role in the establishment of a Jewish 
state. No attempt will be made to analyse either the 
extent of support for Zionism from non-Jewish Australians 
or the Zionis~ controversy within the Australian Jewish 
community. Palestine and Zionism will be discussed only 
where they have a direct bearing on Australian reactions 
to the refugee problem and particularly to refugee 
immigration into Australia; for example, the effect of 
5. 
Jewish terrorism against the British in Palestine. nor 
will this study attempt a general examination of Australian 
attitudes to Jews in the community or to measure the 
extent of antisemitism in Australia. Antisemitism is 
discussed only· in association with views expressed on 
the German persecution of the Jews and on Jewish refugees. 
Australian Jewry is, in fact, treated as one of the groups 
reacting to Nazi antisemitism and refugee immigrants. 
Although Australian Jews were particularly concerned about 
these issues, they were only a small section of the 
Australian community and one of the many groups Whose 
reactions are being examined. Consequently, the conflicts 
within Australian Jewry and their sometimes differing 
reactions to the refugee question are not analysed in great 
depth. The relations between Australian Jews and refugee 
settlers in Melbourne have already been examined in detail 
by Ursula WiemannB and P.Y. Medding.9 
In examining.the reactions of Australians to the 
persecution of the.Jews and refugee immigration, a number 
of questions arise. How much impact did the Nazis' 
antis~mitic activities have on Australians, living on the 
other side of the globe? To what extent, especially during 
the war, did Australians comprehend what was happening 
to European Jewry? Did thay attempt to explain why the 
8. Ursula Wiemann, op.cit., pp. 233-274. 
9. P.Y. Medding, 9.£.Cit., pp. 147-171 
6 . 
Jews were being persecuted and whom did they think was 
responsible? Were the reactions of political interest 
groups determined basically by their sentiments towards 
the Jews or by their attitudes to fascism and the Nazi 
regime? Did the Christian churches regard the persecution 
of the Jews as simply contrary to Christian humanitarian 
principles or were other factors involved? 
The refugee problem had a more direct effect on 
Australians. How far were they prepared to contribute to 
its solution? Did they regard it as a large-scale 
humanitarian problem necessitating special policies or did 
they treat it only within the context of their domestic 
views on immigration? The refugee question arose at a time 
when Australians were adopting the 'populate or perish' 
slogan and when the Government was pursuing an active 
immigration programme. While most Australians agreed that 
British migrants should be welcomed to Australia, they had 
traditionally opposed the admission of aliens. 'Did 
Australians regard the refugees basically as foreigners, 
no different from other alien immigrants, or did they have 
special attitudes to them as Jews? Following on from this 
question: were there any signs of antisemitism either in 
reactions to proposed refugee immigration or to the 
refugees once they arrived in Australia? 
When the reactions to German antisemitism and to 
the refugee problem are combined, there is a general 
question: was there a correlation in attitudes on these 
two issues? Or was there a conflict between reactions to 
-
the per~ecution of the Jews and to the immigration and 
reception of some of the victims? 
In the broader context, did the persecµtion of 
the Jews, as an intensely.human problem, do anything to 
increase Australian awareness of the 'outside world'? 
' . 
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Did the direct experience of the refugee problem help to 
briak down the sense of isolation and enable Australians 
to relate more to major world events as well as to 
different national groups within their own society? 
7 . 
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PART ONE 1933-1939 
'The scenes which have been witnessed seem to belong, 
not to the present day, but to the Dark Ages of 
Europe.' 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 1938. 
'Australia, though her indignation is deep and her 
sympathy sincere, can absorb but a few thousand of 
them at most. It is in reality not a problem for 
Australia, but for Europe ... ' 
Argus, 17 November 1938. 
8. 
Chapter 1 
Persecution 
In 1933, when the Nazi regime came to power in 
Germany, the country's half million Jews were a well-
integrated group in the German population.l By the 
outbreak of war in 1939, they were social outqasts who 
had been systematically deprived of their livelitood, 
possessions and citizenship. Over 200,000 Jews h4d left 
Germany to seek refuge in other countries. 2 The J00,000 
9 . 
Jews of Austria and the German-occupied section of 
Czechoslovakia had met a similar, though more sudden, fate 
after the Nazis began their territorial expansion in 1938. 3 
The elimination of Jews from the Reich's social 
and economic life was a cumulative process. Between 1933 
and 1939 there were three.major phases of Nazi antisemitism, 
each commencing with an outburst of anti-Jewish violence 
and culminating in discriminatory legislation. The f icst 
phase followed the Nazi assumption of power in March 1933 
and chiefly affected intellectual, professional and 
cultural groups. The second began in mid-1935 and 
culminated in the Nuremberg Decrees which deprived Jewa of 
citizenship rights. The third, and most decisive, phase 
1. The Jewish population of Germany in January 1933 was 
estimated a.t 525,000. According to the Census of 
June 1933, there were 499,682 Jews in Germany. 
Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish 
Congress, Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews, New 
York, 1943, p.8. 
2. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, The Jewis~ 
Refugee, New York, 1944, p.32, estimate the total 
-number of Jewish refugees from Germany up to the 
outbreak of war at 215,000. .~-· 
3. The total number o~ Jews in Austria and German-
occupied Czechoslovakia was estimated at 322,000. 
Austria 180,000 (J.H. Simpson, The 
Refugee Problem, London, 
1939, p.154) 
Czechoslovakia.: 142,000 (Mark Wischnitzer, !.£ 
Dwell in Safety, . 
Philadelphia, 1948, p.I95) 
"' . 
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Chapter 1 
Persecution 
In 1933, when the Nazi regime came to power in 
Germany, the country's half million Jews were a well-
integrated group in the German population. 1 By the 
outbreak cf war ir1 1939, they were social outcasts who 
had be0n systematically deprived of their livelihood, 
possessions and citizenship. Over 200,000 Jews had left 
Germany to seek refuge in other countries. 2 The 300,000 
Jews of Austria and the Garmin-occupied section of 
Czechoslovakia had met a similar, though more sudden, fate 
after the Nazis began their territorial expansion in 1938 3 
The elimination of Jews from the Reich's social 
and economic life was a cumulative process. Between 1933 
.ind 1939 thE,re were three major phases of Nazi antisemit.:i. 
each commencing with an outburst of anti-Jewish violence 
and culminating in discriminatory legislation. The first 
phase followed the Nazi assumption of power in March 1933 
and chiefly dffected intellectual, professional and 
cultural groups. The second began in mid-1935 and 
s rn, 
culminated in the Nuremberg Decrees which deprived Jews Of 
citizenship tights. The third, and most decisive, phase 
1. The ,Jewish population of Germany in January 1933-wE<.f_ 
estimate~ at 525,000. According to the Census of · 
June 1933, there were 499,682 Jews in Germany. 
Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish 
Congress, Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews, New 
York, ;._9,13, p.8. 
3. 
Arie.h Ta~takower" and Kurt R. Grossmann, The Jewish 
Ref~~· New York, 1944, p.32, estimate the total 
number of Jewish refugees from Germany up to the 
outbreak of war at 215,000. 
The total number of Jews in Austria and German-
occupied Czechoslovakia was estimated at 322,000. 
F.ustria 180,000 ('J.H. Simpson, The 
• Refugee Problem, London, 
1939. p.154) 
Cze:cho:~lovakia: 142,000 (Mark Wischnitzer, To 
Dwell in Safety, • 
Philadelphia, 1948, p.195) 
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occurred in 1938 and reached its climax in the November 
pogrom and subsequent legislation which completed the .ruin 
of the Reich's Jews. 
The National Socialist Party gained political 
control of Germany early in 1933. On 30 January, Adolf 
Hitler became Chancellor of the German Reich. He called 
for new elections and on 5 March, after a massive Nazi 
propaganda campaign, 43.9% of the German people voted for 
the National Socialist Party. On 23 March the Reichstag 
passed the Enabling Law which granted Hitler dictatorial 
powers for four years. 4 Within a few days of the elections, 
the world's press began reporting a 'reign of terror' 
against German Jews.5 Nazi crowds, led b~ Storm Troopers, 
assaulted Jews in the streets, picketed Jewish-owned stores 
and drove Jewish judges out of the law-courts. Following 
the news reports, the German Government called for a nation-
wide boycott of all Jewish businessmen, doctors and lawyers, 
allegedly as a reprisal for the 'atrocity camp~ign' being 
conducted by the foreign press.6 The boycott commenced on 
1 April but was called off after only one day. 
Official legislation followed. 7 On 7 April, the 
Government announced the law 'for the restoration of the 
professional civil service', the basis of legislation which 
largely excluded non-Aryans from Germany's professional, 
intellectual and cultural life. All persons with at least 
4. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, London, 
1962, pp. 257-269 .· 
5. For example, New York Times, 9,10,11,13 March 1933. 
The Times, 10,13 March 1933. 
6. New York Times, 24,28 March 1933. 
7. The following is a summary of material contained in: 
Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish 
Congress, ~.cit., pp. 11-14. 
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one Je'.vish grandparent were defined as 'non-Aryan' 8 
The great 1najority of non-Aryan civil servants, university 
and school teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists and 
1nusicians were dismissed from employment. 'fhe livelihood 
of about 25,000 Jews, together with 23,000 dependents, was 
affected.9 At this stage, the Government took no 
legislative action against the country's 200,000 Jews who 
were engaged in commerce and industry because it feared 
that Germany's unstable economy would be completely 
disrupted. Any major interference with Jewish business 
was prohibited until the end of 1934. On 25 April, the 
law against the 'overcrowding of German schools and 
universities' limited the percentage of non-Aryans in 
educational institutions to their percentage of the 
total population. 
The Nazis made little effort to hide their 
antisemitic violence and legislation. International 
attention was focussed on the new Nazi regime and foreign 
press correspondents in Germany kept the world well-
informed of the latest developments. In Australia, both 
the press ana public condemned the Nazi antisemitic 
campaign. Press commentators referred to other instances 
of persecution in the history of mankind and drew parallels-·-·----
between the present situation and Nero's treatment of the 
Christians, the activities of the Arabs at Alexandria and 
the antis~mitic terrorism of the Middle Ages. 10 For more 
8. This definition became known as the 'Aryan paragraph' 
which is quoted in full in The Yellow Spot, London, 
1936, p. 130. 
9. Norman Bentwich, The Refugees from Germany, London, 
1936, pp. 29-30. 
10. D.T., 6 April 1933. 
S.M.H., 28 April 1933. 
1 2 • 
recent comparisons, they described the Nazi outbreak as 
'reminiscent of the worst antisemitic excesses under the 
czars•ll and accused the Nazi regime of 'taking a leaf out 
of RuBsia' s book of terrorist principles' .12 
Australian Jewry, the labour movement and 
Christian churches were the most vocal protesters. The 
strongest reaction came from the Australian Jewish community, 
whose spokesmen in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane passed 
resolutions of protest against the persecution. 13 Rabbi 
Freedman of Perth and M. Breckler, President of the West 
Australian Hebrew Congregation, sent a cable to Hitler, 
appealing to him to 'call off racial discrimination against 
a section of citizens most loyal and devoted to their 
national flag'. They implored Hitler to 'think of the 
future and save the word "Nazi" from being execrated in 
history' . 14 
The anti-fascist labour movement used the anti-
semiti6 outbreak to demonstrate the evils of Nazism and to 
support its condemnation of the Reich's concurrent campaign 
against German socialists. The Melbourne division of the 
Textile Workers' Union protested at Nazi actions against 
both Jews and German trade unionists 1 5 and the New South 
11. S.M.JL, 6 April 1933. 
12. D.T. 29 March 1933. 
13. S.M.H., 30 March 1933, reported Sydney meeting of 
29 March. 
Argus, 6 April 1933, ·reported Melbourne meeting. of 
5 April. 
Brisbane Courier, 31 March 1933, reported Brisb_ane 
meeting of 30 March. 
14. \LA. , 5 Apr i 1 19 3 3. 
Rabbi D.I. Freedman had been Rabbi of Perth since 
1874. He was active in a wide range of non-Jewish 
welfare organizations and was a past President of 
the West Australian Branch of the R.S.L. 
15. Age , 2 2 Apr i 1 19 3 3 . 
13. 
wales Trades and Labor Council passed a protest resolution 
against the Nazi antisemitic campaign.16 
Public protest meetings were convened by the 
Lord Mayors of Melbourne, Syd'"!e_y and Brisbane. 17 On 27 
April, more than one thousand peopl~ attended a meeting in 
the Melbourne Town Hall at which messager of sympathy were 
read from the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Baptist 
churches. 18 The meeting also had a practical result: 
[7,000 was collected for the relief of discressed German 
Jewish families. 19 The best reported protest meeting was 
held on 18 May in the Sydney Town Hall· On the following 
day, both the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph 
devoted double column articles to the meeting, which shared 
the day's headlines with Hitler's statement to the Reichstag 
that he was willing to accept President Roosevelt's 
proposals for world peace. The meeting was attended by 
B.S.B. Stevens, N.s.w. Premier and Leader of the U.A.P., 
members of the N.S.W. state parliaments, Anglican churchmen 
and other representatives of the Jewish and non-Jewish 
. . 20 
communities. 
. I 
Although most Australian commentators condemned 
Nazi antisemitism, they considered that the situation 
required some explanation. This was the twentieth century, 
not the Middle Ages. The persecution was not being under-
taken by a despotic medieval ruler or even an autocratic 
16. 
1 7 • 
s.M.H., 31 March 1933. 
Argus, 28 April 1933, reported Melbourne meeting of 
27 April. 
s.M.H., 19 May 1933, reported Sydney meeting of 18 May. 
Brisbane Courier, 9 June 1933, reported Brisbane 
meetih~ of 8 June. 
18. Archbishop Mannix had already written to Phillip Cohen, 
President of the Melbourne Hebrew Community, expressing 
his sympathy for local Jewry and assuring them that he 
shared their distress. 
c.F.J., 20 A1'>ril 1933. 
19. Argus, 28 April 1933. 
20. s.M.H.' 19 May 1933. 
Q.T., 19 May 1933. 
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Russian Czar but by a democratically elected government in 
a s~pposedly civilized Western nation. Could the current 
events be explained rationally? could they, perhaps, even 
be justified? Every commentator on the Jewish question 
was eager to explain why Nazi Germany Was persecuting 
the Jews. 
The German Government maintained that press 
reports of antisemitic activities were exaggerated and 
that the limited actions taken against the Jews were fully 
just.ified. According to Dr. Rudolph Asmis, German Consul-
General in Sydney, the limited measures taken in Germany 
had been directed 
solely against revolutionary, communistic, 
destructive, and anti-patriotic Jewish 
influences in the Political, cultural and 
economic life of the nation.21 
He alleged that the influence of Jewish capitalists was 
growing dangerou~ly and that the demoralization of 
theatrical life in Berlin was' due to the predominance of 
--Jewish directors. 
A minority pro-fascist element in Australia 
agreed with Dr. Asmis's interpretatio~ of the situation. 
Eric Campbell, leader of the New Guar~,22 declared after 
visiting Germany that there was no re~l suppression of 
the Jews in the Reich. In accordance With the New Guard's 
21. S.M.H., 21 July 1933. 
22. Eric Campbell, a solicitor and former colonel in the 
A.I.F., Kad formed the New Guard in 1931 at the 
height of the depression. The New Guard was a 
pro-fascist organization established on military 
lines and had the declared aim Of destroying 
communism. It opposed all forms of socialism, 
including the policies of the N.s.w. Premier, 
J.T. Lang. 
.. 
virulently anti-communist policy, he claimed that the 
German Government had merely taken action 'against many 
prominen·t Jews who were also prominent Communists'. 23 
The anti-communist Sydney Bulletin was a vocal 
supporter of the Nazi regime. A week after reports of 
antisemitic activity began appearing in the Australian 
press, the Bulletin asked: 'Who is Hitler?' It replied 
15. 
that he was an 'honest, straightforward, clean-living man, 
fervent patriot, great organizer, a man of vision•. 24 
The Bulletin justified the anti-Jewish campaign in terms 
of the Nazi 'capitalists and communists' argument. It 
. . ··---"-~l_-:_9_ect._tha 1: .~'3rl1\'3.ny had 0 be, en ' invaded by .... hordes of __ Jewish 
refugees from Eastern countries' after World War 1. These 
Jews were either capitalists who brought ruin to thousands 
of Germans during the inflationary period or Marxists who 
spread anti-patriotic internationalist communist doctrines.25 
The Bulletin declared: 'modern Germany can't afford to 
entertain Trotskys unawares' . 26 The persecution was 
appalling but it was necessary 'lest the worst fate of all 
befall Germany - namely, the fate which has befallen Russia•27. 
23. S.M.H., 3 Au~ust 1933. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Campbell later alleged that reports of anti-Jewish 
violence in Germany in 1933 were a deliberate mis-
representation of the truth. He stated that he went 
to Germany in June 1933 after reading reports in the 
English press of the 'slaughter of the Jews' but 
found the country peaceful and Jews in Berlin 'still 
trading under their own names'. Eric Campbell, 
The New Road, Sydney, 1934, p. 165. 
Bulletin, 22 March 1933. 
~letin, 24 May 1933. 
Bulletin, 3 May 1933. 
~· 
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Although the Bulletin's viewpoint was an extreme 
one, there was a strong current of anti-com~unist feeling 
in Australia and a tendency to suspect all European Jews 
of communist sympathies. When the Nazi Party came-to power 
at the March elections, most commentators considered that 
constitutional rule had proved impossible in Germany and 
that the only alternatives were fascism and communism. 
They agreed that fascism was the lesser of the two evils 
and hoped that the Nazis, having assumed the responsibilities 
of government, would restore stability to the country. 
Their first job was to eradicate communism. 28 Apart from 
labour and communist commentators, few people protested 
when the German Government took repressive action against 
-------------· .. ·-· ··-··· ·--------- -- . 
the country's communists and socialists. The Sydney 
Morning Herald considered that Hitler was 'fully justified 
in checking the menace of communism• 2 9 and the Hobart 
Mercury declared that 
the German Government, whatever may be thought 
of it otherwise, is doing a great service to 
the world j_n._p..T.:.e.:sLen.±in.g.___th_e____s_p.r..=u..c-'-'-'---'-~'-"'---------------­
dangerous doctrine and more dangerous practice.30 
Some commentators accepted the Nazi argument 
that Jews were being persecuted because of their 
communist sympathies. The West Australian pointed out 
that many German Jews were socialists and communists 31 
and the Mercury considered that a large number of the Jews 
imprisoned by the Nazis had probably played a laading role 
in the communist movement. 32 The Catholic church soon 
revealed its anti-communist sentiments. When Archbishop 
Mannix expressed his sympathy for German Jews, he said 
28. For example, S.M.H., 7 March 1933; Argus 2,11 March 
1933; ~· 13 March 1933. 
2 9 . S . M. H. , 4 May 19 3 3 . 
30. Mercury, 27 March 1933. 
31. ~., 29 March 1933. 
32. Mercury, 27 March 1933. 
.. 
-it was 'no wonder that there should be unrest, disorder 
and panic' in a country which was threatened with the 
'apread of revolutionary communism' .3 3 
Most Australians who attempted to justify the 
German Government's anti-Jewish activities insisted that 
their criticisms of European Jews did not apply to their 
Australian co-religionists. Australia's small Jewish 
population, concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne, had 
experienced little antisemitic prejudice compared with 
Jews in Europe.34 Even the Bulletin commented that, if 
there was 'one place on earth where Jews had been 
1 7 • 
completely happy and unmolested, it has surely been under 
the Southern Cross' . 35 Australian Jews stressed that they 
were first and foremost loyal Australians and only Jews by 
religion. 36 Their claim was validated by the contribution 
of leading Jews such as Sir Isaac Isaacs, currently serving 
as the first Australian-born Governor-General, and Sir John 
Monash, best known as Commander of the Australian Army Corps 
in France at the end ~f World War 1. 
When R.G. Casey spoke about the German situation 
at a Presbyterian church service in Melbourne, he claimed 
that people in Australia were 'unable to realise the 
problem of the Jews as it was presented to the Germans'. 
Revealing himself as a victim of Nazi propaganda, he 
maintained that 'Jews in Australia were Australians first 
and Jews second, but in Germany, Jews did not regard 
33. 
34. 
3 5 . 
36. 
Advocate, 11 May 1933. 
According to the 1933 Census, Australia had a Jewish 
population of 23,553. 
Bulletin, 17 August 1938. 
For example, article by Sir Samuel Cohen, President 
of the Australian Jewish Welfare Society, Truth 
(Sydney), 7 August 1938; . Alfred Harris, editor, 
Hebrew Standard, 15 September 1938; Rabbi L. Falk, 
S.M.H., 31 October 1938. 
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themselves as Germans' 37 The Bulletin alleged that German 
Jews, unlike Australian Jews, had 'anti-social and anti-
national' characteristics. It was hard, wrote the Bulletin, 
for a British community like Australia, whosa 
Jews have always been amongst its best and most 
patriotic citizens, to realize that.many Jews in 
other countries are different. 38 
Most Australian commentators denounced any 
attempts to justify the persecution of German Jews on 
economic and political grounds. Rabbi Francis Cohen 
maintained that there had not been a great influx of 
Eastern European Jews into Germany after Worl' War 1 and 
claimed that German statistics showed that the post-war 
Jewish population was smaller than the pre-war one.39 
W.P. Goodwin agreed th~t some of the immigrant Jews had 
37._.,S.M.H., 10 April 1933. 
38. 
R.G. Casey was later to become a member of the British 
War Cabinet, Go~ernor of Bengal, Australian Minister 
for External Affairs and Governor-General of · 
Australia. From 1931 to 1940 he was the U.A.P. 
member for Corio in Federal Parliament, becoming 
Assistant Federal Treasurer in 1933 and Treasurer 
in 193_5. 
Bulletin, 3 May 1933. 
Both Casey and the Bulletin exaggerated the 
differences between German and Australian Jews. Under 
the Weimar Republic, Jews were completely emancipated 
German citizens and played an integral role in the 
na.tion's economic, social and cultural life. 
39. Bulletin, 31 May 1933. 
Rabbi Cohen was Chief Minister of Sydney's Great 
Synagogue fr9m 1904 to 1934. 
Between 1910 and 1925 the Jewish population of 
Germany increased by approximately 29,00~ from 
535,000 to 564,00Q. The number of Jews who were 
not German citizens increased by approximately 
31,000, from 76,000 to 107,000. (G. Warburg, 
Six Years of Hitler, London, 1939, p. 29.) Warburg 
states. that not all immigrant Jews were fr'om Eastern 
Europe and that most were engaged in lowly trading 
occupations, not high finance. He dismisses as a 
'myth' the Nazi claim that there was a great 
post-war influx of Eastern European Jewish 
capitalists who brought financial ruin to many 
Germans. 
---1-_,, 
.. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
• ! 
I 
I 
II 
.;,.'!--~--
18. 
37 themselves as Germans'. The Bulletin alleged that German 
Jews, unlike Australian Jews, had 'anti-social and anti-
national' characteristics. It was hard, wrote the Bulletin, 
for a British community like Australia, whose 
Jews have always been amongst its best and most 
patriotic cit~zens, to realize that many Jews in 
other countries are different. 38 
Most Australian commentators denounced any 
attempts to justify the persecution of German Jews on 
economic and political grounds. Rabbi Francis Cohen 
maintained that there had not been a great influx of 
Eastern Rurapean ~ews into Germany after World War l and 
claimed that German statistics showed that the post-war 
Jewish population was smaller than the pre-war one. 39 
W.P. Goodwin agreed that some of the immigrant Jews had 
37. S.M.H., 10 April 1933. 
R.G. Casey was later to become a member of the British 
War Cabinet, Governor of Bengal, Australian Minister 
for External Affairs and Governor-General of 
Australia. From 1931 to 1940 he was the u.A.P. 
member for Corio in Federal Parliament, becoming 
Assistant Federal Treasurer in 1933 and Treasurer 
in 1935. 
38. Bulletin, 3 May 1933. 
Both Casey and the Bulletin exaggerated the 
differences between German and Australian Jews. Under 
the Weimar Republic, Jews were completely emancipated 
German citizens and played an integral role in the 
nation's economic, social and cultural life. 
39. Bulletin, 31 May 1933. 
Rabbi Cohen was Chief Minister of Sydney's Great 
Synagogue fro~ 1904 to 1934. 
Between 1910 and 1925 the Jewish population of 
Ge.rmany increased by approximately 29 ,000, from 
535,000 to 564,000. The number of Jews who were 
not German citizens increased by approximately 
31,000, from 76,000 to 107,000. (G. Warburg, 
Six Years of Hitler, London, 1939, p. 29.) Warburg 
states that not all immigrant Jews were from Eastern 
Europe and that most were engaged in lowly trading 
occupations, not high finance. He dismisses as a 
'myth' the Nazi claim that there was a great 
post-war influx of Eastern European Jewish 
capitalists who brought financial ruin to many 
Germans. 
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undoubtedly been involved in the post-war financial 
scandals but alleged that they were only a small proportion 
of the total number involved. The whole Jewish population 
could no~ be held responsible f0r the actions of a few.40 
As Rabbi Cohen pointed out, the economic argument was 
irrelevant to the present situation. The Nazi regime was 
not persecuting immigrant Jewish capitalists but 
intellectual, professional and cultural groups. Eminent 
native German Jews such as Einstein and the conductor 
Bruno Walter could hardly be classed as 'recent immigrants 
from eastern Europe, of hasty wealth, suspicionsly 
amassed'. 4l 
The allegation that Jews were being persecuted 
because they were communists was a more serious charge in 
view of the widespread anti-communist feeling in 
Australia. The West Australian explained that there were 
good reasons for the Jews' sympathy with communism. 
Because of their persecution by autocratic rulers, they 
had naturally supported-all reformist and revolut-ro!1""a~·----­
movements - whether liberal, social~st or communist - in 
an effort to gain equal privileges.42 Rabbi Cohen claimed 
that, even if some German Jews ~ revolutionary or anti-
patriotic, this was no excuse for persecuting 'the innocent 
majority as well as any acc~sed minority ... •43 
If the Nazi explanation was inadequate, then why 
were Germany's Jews being persecuted? 
40, W.P. Goodwin, The Jews and Germany - Historical Facts 
which explain the outburst of Anti-Semitism in 
Germany, the Nazi Hatred of the Jews and the 
significance of this for the World in general, Sydney, 
1933, p. 26. In his booklet, W.P. Goodwin, B.A., 
LL.B., systematically refuted the Na•i case against 
the Jews. 
41. Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1933. 
42. ~' 29 March 1.933 
43. S.M.H., 22 July 1933. 
20. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, which made more 
editorial comments on the Jewish question than any other 
metropolitan daily newspaper, denied that Nazi antisemitism 
could be explained rationally and denounced the feebleness 
of attempts made by other commentators to 'explain away 
these sinister events' .44 According to the Sydney Morning 
Herald, the German Government 'must have lost its head 
completely' . 45 The antisemitic campaign was the work of 
an 'unscrupulous gang, many of whose actions suggest actual 
insanity•. 4 6 Nazi antisemitism was merely another chapter 
in the age-old pe~secution of the Jews, 
an outbreak which in its essence is a recrudescence 
of hatred and intolerance against a race that has 
prevailed through the utmost adversity for nearly 
twenty centuries. 47 
Other commentators were not content to dismiss 
the Nazi antisemitic campaign as the irrational outburst 
of a group of madmen and tried to explain why such events 
were occurring in Germany. Perhaps the answer lay in the 
country's history. Goodwin put the current antisemitic 
outbreak in a wider context and traced the history of 
German antisemitism from the Middle Ages to Bismarck and 
thence to Hitler.48 According to the Hebrew Standard, 
'Germans were ever antisemites so it is merely reviving old 
passions'. 49 The Mercury considered that Germany's anti-
semitic history was due to the peculiar characteristics of 
the 'German mind'. The Germans were 
44. 
45. 
46. 
4 7 . 
48. 
49. 
50. 
to a ce·rtain extent an enigma. Regarded as a 
stolid, methodical race ... they are in a sense 
more extreme than the Latin races from which they 
seem to differ.SD 
S.M.H., 28 April 1933. 
S.M.H., 6 April 1933. 
S .M. H., 28 April 1933. 
S. M. H., 1 April 1933. 
W.P. Goodwin, £12.. cit .. , PP· 6-18. 
H. S. 
' 
24 November 1933. 
Mercury, 12 April 1933. 
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Such statements indicated that there was an 
undercurrent of antisemitic feeling in Germany but they 
did not explain why it had erupted into violence at this 
particular time. This was due, according to most 
21. 
commentators, to the country's current political situation. 
The Nazi Party had picked on the Jews as scapegoats for 
Germany's political instability, economic chaos and social 
decay. In its effort to gain the support of the German 
people, the Nazis blamed all the country's ills on the Jews 
- just as Czar Nicholas II had done almost thirty years 
earlier. The Argus wrote: 
There has been a burning determination to discover 
a common enemy and the ever-popular expedient of 
Jew-baiting has been resorted tn.5.1 
A letter-writer to the Sydney Morning Herald pointed out 
that the use of antisemitism for political purposes was not 
new in Germany. Bismarck had introduced modern political 
antisemitism to the country in an effort to discredit his 
political opponents. In essence, German antisemitism was 
merely the sordid byproduct of a greedy scramble 
for votes and support by politicians who have 
nothing to offer the German people but the seed 
of race-hatred.52 
Labour commentators agreed that Jews were being used as 
scapegoats, but limited their explanation to a single-cause 
Marxist economic argument. The Nazis were evil because 
they were capitalists; they had made Jewry 'the scapegoat 
for all the economic sins of which Capitalism is in danger 
of being found guilty' .53 
The dominant note being struck by Australian 
commentators was that the Nazis were arousing the latent 
antisemitic feeling in Germany for purely political 
purposes. If this was true, then there was some chance 
51. Argus, 15 March 1933. 
See also A.W. Hyman, letter to D.T., 31 March 1933. 
52. I.K. Sampson, letter to S.M.H., 20 April 1933. 
53. Labor call, 6 April 1933. 
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that Nazi antisemitism was only a temporary phenomenon; 
once the regime restored political and economic stability 
to Germany, it would no longer need to use the Jews as 
scapegoats. Some Australians were not so optimistic. 
They pointed out that antisemitism was a basic 
characteristic of Nazi nationalist ideology, not merely 
a temporary political expedient.s 4 This implied that 
antisemitism would be a permanent feature of Nazi rule and 
had much more foreboding implications for the future. 
The Nazi Party made no secret of the place of 
antisemitism in its nationalist ideology. 
Programme~ formulated in 1920, stated: 
The Party's 
None but members of the nation may be citizens of 
the State. None but those of German blood, what-
ever their creed, may be members of the nation. 
No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation.SS 
Gottfried Feder, author of the Programme, revealed that 
antisemitism was to be a basic feature of the Party's 
----·------___i_g_~_ology w1!.~'.1 he wrote: 'Antisemitism is in a sense the 
emotional foundation of our movement. Every National 
Socialist is an Antisemite ... 'S6 In Mein Kampf and 
numerous speeches Hitler elaborated the Nazis' antisemitic 
policy,57 But most Australian commentators (like their 
British counterparts and even German Jews) did not yet take 
the Nazi pronouncements seriously and preferred more 
rational explanations of the antisemitic campaign. The 
Daily Telegraph declared: 'Dr. Goebbels is a fool when he 
declares that ''German Jewry will be destroyed'' 0 • 58 
54. For example, statement by Executive of the Jewish 
National Library, 'Kadimah', (Melbourne), 
Age, 31 March 1933. 
See also P.H. Coates, letter to S.M.H,, 7 August 1933. 
55. Gottfried Feder, Hitler's Official Programme and its 
Fundamental Ideas, London, 1934, p.39. 
56. Ibiq_., p. 56. 
57. Adolf Hltler, Mein Kampf (translated James Murphy), 
London, 1942, pp. 170-187, 309-312. 
·Gordon w. Prange, _Hitler's Words, Washington, 1944, 
pp. 67-80. 
58. Q.:..!., 4 April 1933. 
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The Advertiser was the first metropolitan daily to attach 
any importance to racial ideology when it stated: 
... the offending of the Jews consists in their 
being a race apart from the Teutons ... The Jews 
are hated because they are racial stumbling-
blocks to the indivisibility of the Reich ... 59 
How could a modern, supposedly civilized, 
European state descend to crude antisemitic activities? The 
answer was that Germany did not, in fact, belong to the 
group of advanced twentieth century nations. 'I'he Advertiser 
pointed out that Germany had little experience of liberty, 
whereas in England people 'had learned how to agree to 
differ 1 because of the strength of the liberal tradition. 
All that Germany had done was 'merely to revert to the 
monarchical system under another name' .60 Seen in this 
light, Nazi antisemitism was a manifestation of the same 
autocratic political conditions which had existed in Czarist 
Russia and Bismarckian Germany, not a product of twentieth 
century democracy. According to Goodwin,' there was a 
'conflict between mediaevalism of present-day Germany and 
the modernity of the rest of the world'.61 
This early stage of Jewish persecution ·wa·s also 
marked by the beginning of a long debate about the 
responsibility for German antisemitism. Initially, the 
question centred on the extent to which the antisemitic 
violence was sanctioned by the German Government. The 
official Nazi line was that individuals had committed 
'isolated acts of violence' after the Nazi election victory. 62 
Goering ass11red foreign press correspondents that there was 
to be no official anti-Jewish discrimination in Germany 
under the new regime.63 Many Australian commentators 
accepted that much of the antisemitic violence was not 
59. Advertiser, 26 April 1933. 
60. Advertiser, 29 April 1933. 
61. W.P. Goodwin, op.cit., p. 30. 
62. Statement by Dr. Rudolph Asmis, German Consul-General 
in Sydney, s.M.H., 30 March 1933. 
63. ~·, 27 March 1933. 
24. 
condoned by the Government and suggested that the enthusiasm 
of Nazi Storm Troopers had got out of hand. According to the 
West Australian, it was 'easier to launch waves of popular 
passion than to control them'. 64 The Daily Telegraph 
alleged that the rulers of Germany were unable to restrain 
'the passions of the mob'. Nevertheless, it put the blame 
on the Government when it claimed that 
those really responsible for the excesses are those 
who first of all incited hatred ... Hitler is 
proving himself to be a dangerous clown.65 
There was a more fundamental question. How far was 
antisemitism supported by the mass of the German people? 
Although most commentators accepted that there was an under-
current of antisemitic feeling in Germany, they denied that 
the people actively supported the current antisemitic 
violence and legislation. The Sydney Morning Herald 
considered that Germans were passively acquiescing in the 
antisemitic campaign. They were 'a spiritless people, in 
whom the habit of obeying all orders whatsoev~r had reduced 
other feelings to insignificance' ,66 Rabbi Cohen was more 
eager to put the blame solely on the Nazis and claimed that 
the 'sober and kindly majority of the German people' were as 
opposed as any Australians 'to the vagaries of Hitler and 
his shouting followers' ,67 
Fascist sympathizers did not agree that the 
German people could be excused of responsibility. The 
Bulletin pointed out that Hitler was 'not an irresponsible 
tyrant' but the 'instrument which the German democracy had 
chosen to do"a job which he pledged himself to do if he 
was returned to power'. It declared: 'this isn't 
Hitlerism; for good or evil it is Germanism•. 6 8 The New 
Guard's leade~ Eric Campbell, stated on his return from 
Germany in August 1933 that 'the people of·Germany 
were unquestionably behind Herr Hitler'. If the Jews 
64. ~·, 13 April 1933. 
65. £.:...!•, 4 April 1933 
66. S.M.H., 28 April 1933. 
67. ~·, 7 April 1933. 
68. Bulletin, 3 May 1933. 
I 
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were being persecuted, which he doubted, then 'it was 
by the people, and not by the Government' ,69 
The Nazi regime maintained its pressure on the 
Jews after its legislation of April 1933 but it was over 
two years before the Jews' plight again became the focus 
of international attention. In mid-1935 the Nazi 
antisemitic campaign entered a new phase when violence 
against the Jews once more culminated in discriminatory 
legislation. At the Nuremberg Congress on 15 September, 
Hitler announced new decrees which, he claimed, would 
establish a 'tolerable relationship' between Germans and 
Jcwc.70 According ~n Warhurg, these so-called Nuremberg 
Decrees were 'the most decisive of the anti-Jewish laws 
25. 
in Germany from the point of view of principle'.71 Most 
important was the 'law respecting Reich citizenship' which 
deprived Jews of their German citizenship and reduced them 
to the status of subjects. Whereas earlier legislation 
had been directed at particular groups of Jews, this decree 
provided the legal basis for the complete removal of Jews 
from German society. A second law, 'for the protection of 
German blood and honour', introduced the concept of 'race 
defilement' (Rassenschande) and forbade marriage and 
sexual relations between Jews and Aryans. The Nuremberg 
Decrees were soon applied to the economic sphere. German 
businessmen dismissed Jewish employees. The public was 
pressured into boycotting Jewish-owned stores and many Jews 
were forced to sell out cheaply to Germans in accordance 
with the planned 'Aryanization'of Germany's economic life. 
69, S.M.H., 3 August 1933. 
70. Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish 
Congress, op.cit., p. 15. 
A translation-of the decrees appears'in The Yellow 
Spot, op.cit., p. 30. 
71. G. Warburg, op.cit., p. 191. 
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Australian interest in Hitler and Nazi Germany 
had declined during 1935 when the world's attention became 
focussed on Mussolini's activities in Abyssinia. Reaction 
to the latest Nazi antisemitic outburst was limited. The 
metropolitan press informed the Australian public of the 
anti-Jewish riots and the Nuremberg Decrees but made few 
editorial comments. 72 Nazi antisemitism had been debated 
in 1933 and commentators now appeared to regard it as a 
permanent feature of Nazi rule which needed little further 
elucidation. Even the SydneY--Mortlng .. Herald no longer 
considered that the German Government had only temporarily 
lost its sanity and commented that the combined pressure 
of legislation and persecution had destroyed any hope 
'that the storm will blow over' .73 
Although the German Government steadily increased 
its pressure on Jews after the Nuremberg Congress, its 
less sensational antisemitic activities had little news 
value. The chief commentators on the situation for the 
next two years were well-known Australians who, after 
visi ti~g---c.,~;m::;_-;;y-~--con.s'ldered-that they could wr: ±Le 
authoritatively on. the different a·spects ·of _Na_zi rule. 
Sir David Rivett went to Germany during the 
Olympic Games in August 1936. He later wrote two articles 
for the Argus and joined the multitude of commentators 
72. Reports of the latest antisemitic violence and the 
Nuremberg Decrees appeared, for example, in S.M.H., 
22 July, 10 August, 17 September 1935; Argus, 
22,30 Quly, 17 August, 17 September 1935. 
The W.A. was almost alone in commenting on the 
Decrees. 
~·, 17 September 1935. 
One Australian newspaper which felt prompted to mention 
the Decrees was Die Brucke. Published weekly in German 
and English, Die Brucke was the offi~ial organ of th~ 
German Alliance of Australia and the German-Australian 
Chamber of Commerce. It praised Hitler's performance 
at the 1935 Nuremberg Congress and quoted his 
statement that the Decrees aimed to ensure that 'the 
relations between the Aryan and non-Aryan members of 
the population were satisfactorily regulated by law'. 
Die BrUcke, 21 September 1935. 
73. S.M.H., 19 November 1935. 
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who had attempted to explain why Germany's Jews were being 
persecuted. 74 Unlike most Australians, Rivett accepted the 
Nazi argument that the Jews were to blame because of their 
behaviour in the community. He began with the premise that 
... there must be some ground for the general 
welling-up of anti-Semitism in Germany, a country 
where until recently little or no sharp racial 
antagonism was ever displayed.75 
Rivett echoed the Nazi line when he claimed that there were 
three main reasons for the upsurge of antisemitism - the 
post-war influx of 'very inferior Jews' from Bastern Europe, 
the disproportionate Jewish influence in commerce and the 
profess·ions, and the -e-x.p.l-0.itation of indecency, chiefly by 
Jews, in night club and cabaret life. He apparently did not 
feel that the additional Nazi argument that Jews were 
communists was worthy of comment. Rivett concluded: 
That the boiling-over of anti-Semitism has been 
deplorable in its excesses cannot be denied, 
but that there are two sides to the Jewish 
question can also not be denied.76 
Alfred Harris, Editor of the Hebrew Standard, 
jumped to the Jews' defence. He alleged that Rivett's 
deductions were 'full of evidence of bias, approaching 
bitterness'. Harris accused Rivett of making 'vague 
generalizations' and claimed that his comments were 'not 
worthy of a research worker of eminent status•. 77 
7 4. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
Argus (weekend magazine), 2, 9 January 1937. 
Sir David Rivett, formerly Professor of Chemistry 
at Meibourntl University, was Deputy Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Commonwealth Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (c.s.I.R.) 
from 1927 to 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he was Chairman 
of the C.S.I.R. 
Ar9us, 9 Janu<uy 1937. 
Ibid. 
~., 21 January 1937. 
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Stephen H. Roberts' book, The House that Hitler 
Built, was published in October 1937.7B Roberts had been 
in Germany from November 1935 to March 1937 and met many of 
its leaders. His book, which was written 'primarily fo~ 
the man in the street who wishes to have some idea of the 
German experiment•,79 went through ten editions by 1939 and 
exerted a powerful influence on Australian views of the 
Nazi regime. Roberts devoted one chapter to 'the present 
place of the Jews'. He outlined Hitler's arguments against 
the Jews: their domination of commerce, the professions, 
education and the press; their corr~pting cultural influence; 
their allegiance to communism. Without attempting to either 
justify or refute the Nazi case, he concluded that 'on 
analysis it waters down to very little except racial 
prejudice'. Politically bankrupt, Hitler had 'capitali~ed 
the lowest features of a traditional racial hatred'. The 
development of the racial aspects of National Socialism 
meant that the attacks oh Jews on cultural and economic 
grounds gave way to a 'wholesale attack on the Jewish race 
as a race' . BO 
Unlike most Australian commentators before and 
after him, Roberts maintained that the German people had 
completely succumbed to the pressure of Nazi propaganda 
and strongly supported the persecution of the Jews. He wrote: 
The traveller in Germany is impressed by the general 
consensus of opinion that such persecution is a 
good thing. I had expected many people to argue 
that it was an unwelcome necessity, forced upon 
them by propaganda or by the pressure of events, 
but th~s was not the case. They gloried in the 
persecution, they were proud of tteir achievements, 
and looked forward to the dav when not a Dingle Jew 
would survive in the Reich.Bl 
78. Stephen H. Roberts, The House that Hitler Built, London, 
1937. Roberts, an historian and commentator on current 
affairs, was Challis Professor of History at Sydney 
University 1929-1947 and Vice-Chancellor 1947-1967. 
79. ~., P· v. 
80. ~., P· 261. 
81. ~., P· 264. 
.. 
Roberts was disgusted with the filth of the antisemitic 
literature and the 'perversion of youthful idealism and 
enthusiasm' . 82 He considered that 
worst of all, worse even that the individual 
suffering of to-day amongst the Jews, is the 
creation of a national mentality bred on 
such hate as that which the German of to-day 
feels for the Jew.83 
The section of the chapter dealing with the 
amount of popular support for' German antisemitism had 
already been published as an article in the Sydney Mail 
in January 1937,84 Unlike Rivett, Roberts provoked a 
favourable re~~onse from the Hebrew Standard. It was 
'very· gratifying indeed', it wrote, to find Professor 
Roberts 'giving his impressions of his investigations 
29. 
made in every part of Germany ... ' The Hebrew Standard 
quoted the section of the Sydney Mail article which dealt 
with the sale of antisemitic literature and stated that 
it demonstrated 'the awfully wicked means used to inflame 
the people against the Jews ... i85 This completely changed 
Roberts' emphasis and shifted the onus back to the German 
Government. The paper did not mention Roberts' basis thesis 
that the German people, thoroughly indoctrinated with 
antisemitism, actually welcomed the campaign against 
the Jews. 
Foreign reaction to the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews had beep modified by the growth of antisemitism through-
out the world. The social and economic turmoil caused by 
82. Stephen H. Roberts, £.2.· cit., p. 265 .. 
83. Ibid., p.266. 
84. Sydney Mail, 27 January 1937. 
85. !:!..:._.§.., 4 February 1937. 
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world depression led to the growth of extremist movements, 
both fascist and communist, in the early 1930s. Fascist 
organizations came under the increasing influence of the 
successful Nazi model and adopted vigorous antisemitic 
policies. Antisemitic propaganda 
North and South America and South 
spread throughout Europe, 
Africa.BG In England, 
Oswald Moseley's Blackshirts stirred up hostility towards 
London's East End Jews,87 Australia had no organization 
like Moseley's British Union of Fascists to arouse hatred 
of the local Jewish population and even those commentators 
who attempted to justify antisemitism in Germany usually 
took care not to offend local Jews·.88 
But Australia was 11ot completely immune from the 
effect of antisemitic propaganda. As early as 1933, a 
number of viciously antisemitic pamphlets were published by 
groups calling themselves the Guild of Watchmen of 
Australia and Australia's Unity League. 89 Like antisemitic 
86. James Parkes, Antisemitism, London, 1963, pp. 104-107. 
Donald S. Strong, Organised Anti-Semitism in America, 
Washington, 1941. 
87. W.F. Mandle, Anti-Semitism and the British Union of 
Fascists, London, 1968. 
88. See pp. 17-18. 
89. The Guild of Watchmen of Australia was devoted to the 
'preservation of the British Race in Australia and 
New Zealand' and opposed to the efforts of 'alien 
and international interests to destroy the haven of 
the British race'. Statement on inside back cover of 
W.G; Selkirk, Wake Up Australia - A National Warning, 
Sandalwood, 1933. The Guild of Watchmen had its 
headquarters at Sandalwood, South Australia, and a 
branch in Sydney at 3 Castlereagh Street. 
Australia's Unity League (originally called 
Australia's League of Truth) was based in Sydney at 
the same ad~ress. The two organizations were 
synonymous so far as their antisemitic policies were 
concerned. Persons. who joined Australia's Unity 
League were given a free copy of Wake Up Australia -
A National Warning (issued by the Guild of Watchmen) 
and both groups advertised the same pamphlets. 
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movements throughout the world. the Guild of Watchmen issued 
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, which alleged 
that there was an international Jewish conspiracy to 
dominate the world. Even though The Protocols had been 
exposed as a fabrication, they remained the antisemites' 
major propaganda weapon. 90 The Guild of Watchmen also 
published Wake Up Australia - A National Warning by 
W.G. Selkirk. Ernest J. Jones, the founder of Australia's 
Unity League, wrote Hitler, The Jews and Communists in reply 
to W.P. Goodwin's The Jew and Germanv.9 1 B0th Selkirk and 
Jones expounded the standard antisemitic argument that Jews 
controlled international capitalism and communism. Selkirk 
claimed that the 'Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was purely 
92 
and simply a Jewish movement', that Jews monopolized trade 
and finance throughout the world and that the depression was 
the result of a 'carefully worked out plot' by Jews. 93 It 
did not matter which of the 'two evils of capitalism and 
socialism' people adopted: 
Whichever we choose, we merely walk into the 
outstretched arms of the waiting Jew. Both are 
Jew invented - both are Jew controlled.94 
Selkirk alleged that the tentacles of international Jewry 
90. On 16-18 August 1921, The Times revealed that 
The Protocols were not authentic. Almost half of 
the lines had been bodily lifted from a satire by 
a French lawyer, Maurice Joly, on Napoleon III. 
The Protocols had been fabricated by the Paris 
Office of the Russian Police between 1895 and 1900 
and published in Russia in 1905 by Sergei Nilus. 
The history of The Protocols is described in detail 
by Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide, 
London 1967. 
91. W.G. Selkirk, £12.·Cit. 
Ernest J. Jones, Hitler, The Jews and Communists, 
Sydney, 1933. Goodwin's arguments are discussed 
above, pp. 18-19, 23. 
92. 1'1.G. Selkirk, op.cit., p.19. 
93. ~., p. 1. 
94. ~., p. 23. 
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had reached as far as Australia, where already 'a big 
proportion of our industries are Jew controlled' ,95 Even 
Australia's Governor-General was a Jew, 'much to the disgust 
of our people•. 96 The only hope of salvation was the 
'immediate severance of every shackle which binds us to the 
Jew'.97 
Early in 1934, Julius Streicher's antisemitic 
newspaper, Der Sturmer, claimed that a fascist organization 
had been established in Australia and was successfully 
spreading antisemi~ic propaganda.98 P. Frankel, Past 
President of the Brisbane Hebrew Congregation, alleged that 
the comment had only been made as a reprisal for a 
threatened boycott of German goods by British and Australian 
Jews. He did not believe that there was any antisemitic 
feeling in Australia.9 9 By the end of 1934 Australian Jewry 
was not so confident. Rabbi Freedman of Western Australia 
called on the Federal Government to include a clause in the 
criminal statute for the prevention of racial propaganda. 
He stated that 'there appeared to be a good deal of anti-
Jewish feeling in Australia' ,100 
A few months later, during the Victorian state 
election campaign, Australian Jews experienced a more 
practical demonstration of antisemitic propaganda. Unsigned 
handbills, urging electors not to trust Jews, trade with 
.. 
95. W.G. Selkirk, £12.·Cit., p. 24. 
96, Ibid., p. 24. There was widespread controversy over 
the appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as Governor-General 
in 1930, not because he was Jewish but ~cause he was 
the first Australian-born Governor-General. The other 
nominee for the position, Sir John Monash, was also 
Jewish. Alt~ough Isaacs particip~ted in Jewish 
affairs, he was regarded first and foremost as a 
great 'Australian' politician and judge. Zelman Cowen, 
Isaac Isaacs, Melb6urne, 1967, passim. 
97, W.G. Selkirk, £12.·Cit., p. 29. 
98 .. ~·, 15 January 1934. 
99. ~· 
loo. S.M.H., 6 November 1934. 
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Jewish firms or buy from Jewish shops, were circulated in 
st. Kilda electorate. 101 Archie Michaelis, the sitting 
u.A.P. member for St. Kilda and a spokesman for the Jewish 
community, blamed the Hitler propaganda machine and not his 
political opponents. He stated that the handbills 
represented an attempt 'to spread the ideas of Hitlerism 
among Australians and at the same time to prejudice his 
(Mr. Michaelis's) prospects in the election'.102 
Although pro-fascist newspapers attempted to 
justify antisemitism in Germany, they made few attacks on 
Australian Jewry. 103 One exception was the National 
Socialist, established in Sydney in 1936 as a 'paper devoted 
to the Hritisl1 ~ace and British culture'.1o 4 The National 
Socialist claimed that even British people now worshipped 
'the spirit and ways of the Jewish race•. 105 It accused 
Jews of having a 'grip on the English (and so our) press' 
and maintained that Australian newspapers were 'full of 
subtle propaganda for Bolshevism' .l0 6 
Australia's most consistent antisemitic 
commentator was Eric D. Butler•s 107 mouthpiece, the New 
Times, established in 1935 to promote the Social Credit 
101. The Times, 22 February 1935. The Times carried a fuller 
report of the affair than the Argus, 22 February 1935. 
102. Argus, 22 February 1935. 
103. This was particularly true of the Bulletin. See 
pp. 17-18. 
104. The National Socialist was edited by Alexander Rud Mills, 
a blatant antisemite. Mills later wrote The Odinist 
Religion overcoming Jewish Christianity, Melbourne, 
1939, in which he attacked Jews and denounced 
Christianity as 'Jew-worship plus· Self-renunciation'. 
(p. 8) 
105. National Socialist, February-March 1947. 
106. National Socialist, December 1936. 
107. Eric D. Butler has been one of Australia's most 
consistent antisemites. He has recently come to public 
notice as Director of the Australian League of Rights 
which promises to provide a solution to the rural crisis, 
just as Douglas Credit appealed to the victims of 
depression in the early 1930s. Butler's activities are 
discussed by K.D.Gott, Voices of Hate, Melbourne, 1965. 
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theories of Major C. H. Douglas. 108 According to Douglas, 
the basic problem facing industrial economies was the lack 
of purchasing power in the community. The banking system 
monopolized money and, by restricting credit, repressed the 
economy. Douglas introduced an antisemitic note into his 
writings when he alleged that the banking monopoly, the 
root of all economic and social evil, was controlled by 
Jewish financiers. 109 The New Times declared: 
Trace the money monopoly, the keystone of all 
monopolies, back to its source, and you arrive 
inevitably at Jewish headquarters.110 
From mid 1935 until the end of 1937, the New Times 
maintained a continuous onslaught against the Jews. It 
began by publishing six articles on the Protocols of the 
Learned Elders of Zion, which it described as 'the alleged 
Jewish plan to subjugate the world through the monopoly of 
money'.lll It did not claim outright that The Protocols 
were authentic but alleged that their importance ~ay in 
the uncanny way they forecast the manner in which 
the world is actually being enslaved in the interests 
of the international money monopolists.112 
In typical antisemitic fashion, the New Times attacked the 
Jew's monopolistic role in trade and commerce. 
he was the 'very deuce'; 
In business 
The knife is his weapon; the world is his oyster ... 
He is naturally the purveyor of shoddy, with 
centuries of bazaars and hawking behind him. He is 
the cut price specialist, and so t.he father of the 
sweat shop.113 
Even ih Australia, the Jew's influence and power' was 
108. Social Credit (also known as Douglas Credit) had a 
number of advocates during the depression of the 
early 1930s. The development o! the Douglas Credit 
movement in Australia is discussed by Baiba Berz"l:n·s, 
'Douglas Credit and the A.L.P. ', Labour History, 
17 (1970)' pp. 14.8-160. 
.. 
109. Douglas Credit Association, N.S.W., Major C.H. Douglas 
Speaks, Sydney 1933. 
110. New Times, 3 July 1936. 
111. N.BW Ti1nes, 12,19,26 July, 9,16 August, 13 September 1935. 
112. New T.i.me s, 26 July 1935. 
113. New Times, 3 July 1936. 
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ridiculously out of proportion to his numbers•. 114 According 
to the New Times, Australian Jews had gained virtually 
monopolistic control of many industries - softgoods, 
furniture, radio, motor cars, tobacco and brewing. They 
were the major money-lenders, controlled the retail trade 
and monopolized the press. 115 Melbourne business was, in 
fact, rapidly 'reaching a stage of becoming a Jewish 
monopoly' . 116 Jews were spreading their tentacles even 
beyond the city. In 1935 the New Times warneu that the 
'trickle ... along St. Kilda Road, has since become a 
progress like that of the locusts some months ago' .1 17 
Two years later it declared that the Melbourne suburbs had 
been 'ruined by Jews of Bourke Street, supported by the Jew 
sweat shops in the Balkan States of carlton•.118 
Local antisemitic outbursts were soon overshadbwed 
by renewed Nazi actions. 1938 was a crucial year for German 
Jews and also marked the first stage in the Nazi subjugation 
of Jews outside Germany. In March Hitler annexed Austria, 
increasing the Reich's Jewish popula~ion by about 
180,000.119 In mid-June, foreign press correspondents in 
Germany reported the intensification of antisemitic 
violence, arrests and boycotting of Jewish stores and 
factories.l 2 0 The revived antisemitic campaign culminated 
in a speech by Julius Streicher who declared: 
Only when the last Jew is dead - that is when the 
last bacillus of the disease has disappeared - will 
the sun shine again over the peoples of the earth. 12 1 
114. New Times, 12 July 1935. 
115. Ibid. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
On 3 July 1936 the New Times made an almost identical 
.allegation. 
New Times, 16 July 1937. 
New Times, 12 July 1935. 
New Times, 16 July 1937. 
J. H. Simpson, The Refuc;ree Problem, London, 19 39' p.154, 
estimates the number of Jews in Austria at 180,000. 
For example, Argus, 16,18 June 1938. 
121. Argus, 28 June 1938. 
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The latest reports provoked little reaction. 
Everything had been said - nothing could be done. The 
Hebrew Standard wrote resignedly: 'Protests are futile 
the Nazi Government is not perceptibly human•.~22 A Jewish 
correspondent to the Sydney Morning Herald thought it was 
'extraordinary how little publicity had been given in 
Australia to the almost unmentionable horrors •123 
Catholics did not agree that Nazi afttisemitism 
was receiving insufficient publicity. Their comments on the 
latest press reports of Jewish persecution marked the 
beginning of a contradictory response which crystallized 
after __ :t:he __ November pogrom_s. On the one hand, the Catholic 
press stressed that it deplored antisemitic terroris~ as 
'unchristian and barbarous• 124 and drew attention to the 
similar historical experiences of Catholics and Jews. 
Catholics were sympath~tic, stated the Advocate, because the 
Jews' 'ancient faith is the ancestor of our own' and because 
both faiths had a 'common enemy in the extreme nationalism 
which exalts race a'bove all spiritual values'. 
too had suffered: 
Catholics 
the 'Irish diaspora' ... have themselve·s known all 
too well the agonies of exi_l_ec_amid_p_eople 
contemptuous of their faith and nation.125 
At the same time, Catholi~s considered tha~ the 
pl~ght of the Jews was being overpublicized. They were still 
angry with the British and Australian press for their lack 
of support for the Nationalist cause during the Spanish civfl 
war. 126 The Catholic Freeman's Journal was 'astonished' 
122. ~., 23 June 1938. 
123. Victor M. Segel, letter to S.M.H., 7 July 1938. 
124. Advocate, 21 July 1938. 
125. Advocate, 14 July 1938. 
See also C.F.~., 7 July 1938. 
126. E.M. Andrews, £..!2.·.£!!·• pp. 82-93. 
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that the press was so concerned with the persecution of the 
Jews when 'fellow-Christians elsewhere have been subjected 
to torments much more savage'. It accused the British press 
of 'callousness and hypocrisy' in ignoring the persecution 
of Spanish Catholics and compared their situation with the 
lesser plight of German and Austrian Jews: 
at the worst they appear to suffer robbery, 
blows and personal ignomies, whereas the Catholics 
of Spain under the Reds not only lost their 
possessions, but their lives as well 127 
In any case, there were adequate explanations for 
antisemitic behaviour. According to the Advocate, the current 
anti-Jewish campaign in Germany was •erely a 'reappearance in 
an acute fo~m of the age-old problem of the Jew' who .. was.-a. 
'stranger and suspect in every land'. The Advocate alleged 
that·the··'Jew's presence and influence are secretly disliked, 
even by those who hate his persecutors'. Antisemitic feeling 
was caused.by the Jew's role in international finance and 
international revolution, his 'alien outlook and restless 
energies' and his 'characteristic nervous features of 
alternate se1f-assertion and servility ... ol28 
Within a few months, .the Nazi antisemitic campaign 
---reached its prP.::wi'!r cfl.mnx. on· 7 NOvember--1938 Hershel 
Grynspan, a young Polish Jew whose parents had been banished 
from Germany, shot Ernst Vern Rath, Third Secretary at the 
German Embassy in Paris. Vern Rath died on 9 November. On 
that night and the following day, the Jews in the Reich 
were subjected to a pogrom which overshadowed all earlier 
antisemitic violence. Nazi mobs burnt down or destroyed 
virtually ev~ry synagogue in the Reich, wrecked Jewish-
owned shops and factories and attacked Jews in the streets. 
Some 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration 
camps.129 
127. C.F.J., 7 July 1938. 
A similar view was expressed by Advocate, 21 July 1938. 
128. Advocate, 14 July 1938. 
129. Lionel Kochan, Pogrom 10 November 1938, London, 1957, 
p.11. The night of 9-10 November became known as 
Kristallnacht (Crystal Night) - the night of broken 
glass. 
. . 
The violence was again followed by 
legislation. 130 On 12 Novembe~ Goering began issuing 
3 8. 
decrees which put the pogrom on a leg~l basis. He directed 
Jews to repair the damage done to their premises, fore-
going all insurance claims. As 'punishment', they were 
ordered to pay an 'Atonement Fine' of one billion marks 
(.CA107,722,000) . 131 The Government prohibited Jews from 
participating in any commercial undertakings as managers, 
owners or executives, and compelled them to deposit all 
securities, stocks and bonds with a foreign exchange bank. 
Jewish children were dismissed from German schools and all 
radios and telephones belonging to Jews were confiscated. 
'rhe Government empowered local officials to exclude Jews 
from certain localities, taking the first step toward 
resurrecting the ghetto. The social'and economic ruin of 
the Reich's Jewry was virtually complete. 
The November pogrom set off a wave of revulsion 
throughout the world. According to Lionel Kochan, the 
'bulk of the press of every non-fascist country was loud in 
its expression of shock' . 13 2 In England and the United 
States, a 'mountain of denunciation and protest' came from 
all sections of the community. 133 President Roosevelt 
declared that the pogrom had .,deeply s-hocked ·public--opl.nion __ _ 
in the United States' and added: 'I myself could scarcely 
believe that such thinys could occur in a twentieth-century 
civilization' ,134 The British Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, expressed his 'deep and widespread sympathy 
130. The following is based on Institute of Jewish Affairs 
of the American Jewish Congress, ££..cit., pp. 21-23. 
131. Current Notes on International Affairs, 5 (1938), 
p. 336. 
132. Lionel Kochan, ££..cit., p. 125. 
133. G. Moltmann, 'America's reaction to 
pogrom', Wiener Library Bulletin, 16 
Lionel Kochan, op.cit., pp. 125-129, 
protests made bY-various sections of 
community. 
134. New York Times, 16 November 1938. 
the November 1938 
(1962) I P· 70. 
describes the 
the British 
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for those who are being made to suffer ... •135 and the House 
of commons passed a motion deploring the persecution.136 
The events of 9-10 November,. the billion mark fine 
and the American and British reactions were all headline 
news in the Australian press. The Jewish question was again 
the centre of world attention and the latest events called 
for comment and interpretation. Like Roosevelt, Australian 
commentators were indignant that such events could take 
place in the modern, supposedly civilized world.137 The 
pogrom presented 'a nauseating picture of twentieth century 
civilization' .138 What had happened to the Age of Reason 
and to the Rights of Man? Such inhumanity demonstrated a 
'sickening reversal of the theory of human progress' .139 
·i:"i:- did not belong to the modern enlightened world but to 
what people had come to regard as a 'barbarous and 
disgraceful past•l40 - to the Dark Ages and even to the 
days of Atilla.141 Commentators declared that the pogrom 
defied not only the theory of human progress but also the 
basic principles of 'elementary justice•.14 2 The Nazis were 
acting on a 'lower ethical plane than the anarchy of the 
Stone Age•. 143 They had, indeed, regressed to the animal 
instinctual level and their frenzy was like 'the animal lust 
seen in the red gl~r-.;- ·c,-f an iniu-riated ape's eyes'. -1-4-4 
The strongest protests again came from the labour 
movement, the Australian Jewish community and Christian 
135. 341 H.C. Deb. 5s. p. 503. 
136. Ibid., pp. 1428-1483. 
13 7. See cartoons, c.-M., 14 
C.-M., 17 November 1938 
138. D.T., 5 December 1938. 
November 1938 
(p. 41). 
139. Australian Worker, 16 November 1~38. 
140, Advertiser, 14 November 1938. 
(p. 40) and 
141. S.M.H., 12 Novemb~r 1938. D.T., 12 November 1938. 
142. Argus, 17 November 1938. 
143. Australian Worker, 16 November 1938. 
144. Statement by A.J. Dalziel, Honorary Secretary of the 
Legion of Christian Youth, Labor Daily, 
21 November 1938. 
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churches. The pogrom gave labour and communist supporters 
more ammunition for their onslaught on fascism. The 
Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. and the Melbourne Trades 
Hall council condemned the pogrom. 145 Communist front 
organizations took more direct action. On 17 November, 
members of the Spanish Relief Committee and the Australian 
League for Peace and Democra~y visited the German Consulate 
in Melbourne to deliver a note of protest but found 'nobody 
in attendance•. 146 The International Peace campaign urged 
a customs embargo on German goods until the persecution of 
the Jews ceased. 147 
The prime target for the anti-fascist left was 
tl1e German Consul-General -in Sydney, Dr. Asmis, who was 
finding it increasingly difficult to convince Australians 
of the peaceful and humanitarian motives of the German 
Government. The pogrom provided the left, especially the 
Labor Daily, with an excuse to bolster its campaig!: against 
Dr. Asmis and his alleged spy network in.Au;tralia. 148 The 
N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council passed a motion requesting 
the Federal Government to deport Asmis 'as a protest against 
the persecution of Jews by the Nazi Government in Germany•l 49 
and a meeting convened by the Bondi branch of the Australian 
Communist Party passed a similar resolution.150 
The left passed resolutions - the churches prayed 
for the Jews. Protestant churchmen condemned the latest 
antisemitic campaign;l51 the Evangelical Lutheran Synod 
145. ~., 12 December 1938. 
Labor Call, 15 December 1938. 
146. Argus, 18 Nov,:mber 1938. 
147. Argus, 26 November 1938. 
148. The Labor Daily began·its attack on 29 October and 
mounted an intensive campaign throughout November and 
early December. Asmis protested to the Prime Minister, 
Joseph Lyons, who expressed his 'regrets for this · 
irresponsible attack'. S.M.H., l December 1938. 
149. ~·· 18 November 1938. 
150. Workers' Voice, 8 December 1938. 
151. S.M.H., 21 November 1938. 
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denounced the Nazi actions as 'pagan•.152 Jewish 
synagogues conducted special services in. response to a 
request from the Chief Rabbi in London. 153 The Daily 
Telegraph carried the headline 'Weeping Jews sing hymns for 
pogrom martyres' when it reported the service held at the 
Great Synagogue in Sydney. 15 4 
The Catholic Church agreed that the pogrom must 
be condemned but accused 'the Left' of attempting to make 
political capital out of the Jews' sufferings. 155 Catholics 
continued to make a dual, contradictory response to Nazi 
antisemitism - a sympathetic reaction based on 
humanitarian Christian principles and a negative response 
in accordance with the Church's jealousy of the publicity 
being given to persecuted Jews, its hostility to communism 
and its antipathy to Judaism. 
First came the sympathy. The Catholic Freeman's 
Journal declared: 'the whole Catholic world sympathises 
with the Jews•l 56 and the Advocate stated that Catholics 
could have no sympathy with 'discrimination against a person 
beca_µ.i;e of his race 157 Archbishop Mannix pointed out that 
the 'Founder of the Christian religion himself was a Jew, 
and his mother was a Jewish maiden'. 
the One Eternal Father'.158 
All were 'children of 
Despite their professed sympathy for the plight 
of the Jews, catholic spokesmen considered that the press 
and public had overreacted to the pogrom. When the question 
arose as to whether the united states and British 
.. 
Governments should protest to the German Government, the 
Advocate wondered why no such protest had been made on behalf 
152. Argus, 18 November 1938. 
153. ~., 21 November 1938. 
154. ~·, 21 November 1938. 
155. Advocate, 5 January 1939. 
156. c. F. J. I 17 November 1938. 
15 7. ~dvocate, 17 November 1938. 
158. Advocate, 30 March 1939. 
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of the Catholics in Mexico and Spain whom, it alleged, had 
'suffered far more severely than the Jews in Germany•.159 
The Catholic Freeman's Journal again labelled British and 
Australian newspapermen as hypocrites because, although they 
registered 'such horror and anger' at Jewish persecution, 
they 'remained quite unmoved ... when the Catholic church 
and Catholic people in various countries have been 
ruthlessly attacked' . 160 It declared that: 
apparently in certain influential circles just now 
the Jews must be the only objects of world sympathy 
and woe betide he who criticizes them.151 
But Catholics did criticize the Jews, especially 
because of their alleged involvement with communism. The 
Advocate qualified its sympathy when ·it .. stated that there 
was no excuse for the Nazis' behaviour 'even to those who 
realize the dangerous influence of Jewish internationalism 
in world politics'.16 2 The Catholic Freeman's Journal 
praised a statement by Father Charles Coughlin, a pro-
fascist American, who associated Jews with the spread.of 
communist influence in Russia and Germany.163 
As well as being labelled communists, Jews were 
accused of being fundamentally different from the rest of 
the population. The Advocate declared that the Jews 
remained 'essentially alien and apart from the Gentiles 
linked both by blood and sympathy with their brethren 
throughout the world' .164 It accepted Hilaire Belloc's 
thesis that the only way of overcoming the antagonism 
c.roused by. the presence of Jews in the community was their 
recognition as a separate national group.16 5 According to 
159. 
160. 
161. 
162. 
163. 
1.64. 
165. 
Advocate, 17 November 1938. 
C.F.J., 17 November 1938. 
See also Catholic Worker, 3 December 1938, and 
Catholic Press, 29 January 1939. 
C.F.J., 19 January 1939. 
Advocate, 24 November 1938. 
C.F.J., 19 January 1939. 
Advocate, 24 November 1938. 
Hilaire_ Belloc, The Jews, London, 1922, pp. 3Pl4. 
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the Advocate, the 'peaceful separation' of the Jews was the 
auswar. They should be given their 'own special legal 
status' and not treated as ordinary nationals of a country.166 
Most other commentators who had expressed anti-
Jewish feelings were stunned into silence by the pogrom. In 
a supposedly civilized world, they could hardly approve of 
open physical violence and discriminatory legislation 
against a minority group. A week befo~e the pogrom, the 
Bulletin claimed that there had to be some reason for Jewish 
persecution and concluded that the Jew was to blame because 
he had 'isolated himself' . 1 67 The Bulletin's only response 
to the events of 9-10 November was Norman Lindsay's cartoon 
which concentrated on the billion.mark fine, not on the 
violent aspects of the pogrom.1 68 The New Times was 
strangely silent after its earlier tirade against the 
Jews.1 69 P.R. Stephensen's Publicist, organ of the 
Australia First movement, was less reticent and stated 
that the Jews were merely 'suffering a defeat in Germany' 
Despite the Jews' current plight, 
166. Advocate, 24 November 1938. 
167. Bulletin, 2 November 1938. 
168. Bulletin, 25 November 1938. See p. 46. 
169. See pp. 33-35. 
170. Publicist, l February 1939. 
The Publicist was established in Sydney in 1936. 
Its declared political objective was to 'encourage 
-in Australians a distinctive national culture by the 
specific propaganda of "Australia First"'. The 
Publicist claimed that it was not 'anti-Jewish'. 
However, Point 16 of its '50 Points of Policy for an 
"Australia First" Party After the War' stated that 
170 
it was 'For Aryanism; against Semitism'. Although 
the Publicist was extremely vo~al on the Jewish 
question .. it -exercised comparatively little influence, 
admitting that it had a 'small circulation'. 
(Publicist, 1 July 1936, 1 January 1939, 1 May 1940, 
1 January 1942). The Publicist's source of revenue 
was its proprietor, W.J. Miles. According to 
Stephenson, Miles lost about £2,000 a year on the 
venture. 
Paul Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 
Series 4 (Civil), volume 2, The Government and the 
People, 1942-5, Canberra, 1970, p. 719. 

their victories are greater than their defeats 
... and it is their shrewdness that enables 
them to present all their victories as the reward 
of merit and all their defeats as unjustifiable 
inflictions. 17 1 
In contrast to 1933, few Australians attempted to 
explain why the Jews were being persecuted. Most 
commentators now regarded antisemitism as a permanent 
feature of Nazi rule, partly as a political weapon and 
partly as an ideological belief.172 The ferocity of the 
47. 
latest outburst brought the question of responsibility to 
the centre of attention. Who was to blame for the pogrom -
the German Government, its Nazi followers or the whole nation? 
--The German Government denied its complicity- in--
the antisemitic violence and claimed that the events of 
Kristallnacht were caused by a 'spontaneous demonstration' 
which expressed the 'deep-rooted indignation of the 
German people' . 173 Lionel Kochan disagreed: 
There was nothing spontaneous about the pogrom. 
But nor was it wholly contrived and organised. 
Of necessity, a great deal had to be left to 
local initiative.174 
Australian commentators also rejected the official German 
statement but disagreed on the extent to which the 
Government was involved. The Courier-Mail gave the Nazi 
regime a passive role, blaiming it for 'condoning and even 
approving of what the mobs did•. 17 5 According to the .. 
Adve·rtisei:_, the Government had 'condoned •.. and possibly 
171. Publicist, 1 February 1939. 
172. Communists continued to regard Nazi antisemitism as 
a political weapon. to divert'the blame for the 
economic miseries of the workers. Workers' Weekly, 
15 November 1938. See cartoon p.48. 
173. Current Notes on International Affairs, 5 (1938), 
p. 334, quoting statement by 'Deutsche Nachrichten 
Bi.ire' (German Official News Bureau) of 
10 November 1938. 
174. Lionel Kochan, op.cit., p. 14. 
175. ~., 16 November 1938. 
• 
This 1s JVhy Hitler Attacks the Jews--
';;;, 
"'l'h~se sausages n1acle of \\'ood shavings, Herr Schultz. have got 
llll' stumped. I don't know whether to put them on !he stove 
or in the stove." 
Workers' Weekly, 18 November 1938. 
4 8. 
promoted' the outrages. 176 The Sydney Morning Herald 
revealed greater insight into the situation when it 
49. 
alleged that the Government had actually planned the pogrom. 
The 'uniformity of the excesses' clearly demonstrated that 
the pogrom was not a matter of 'sporadic mob violence, but 
of organized destruction planned while Vern Rath was dying'; 
the Government had seized on the incident as a 'pretext for 
a new campaign of terrorism and spoliation' .177 
Although there was some controversy on the role 
of the German Government, virtually all Australian 
commentators insisted that the general population did not 
approve of Jewish persecution. They ignored Roberts' 
assertion, made two years earlier but still in the public 
. eye , .. that the. mass .. o.f. th.e German people supported the Nazi 
antisemitic campaign. 178 After the November pogrom, few 
Australians could believe that a whole nation, even one 
constantly bombarded by antisemitic propaganda, would 
condone such inhumanity. 
Metropolitan newspapers, Catholic spokesmen and 
labour commentators all attempted to excuse the German 
people. The Courier-Mail stated: 
There mu·st be among the 80 1 000, 000 people now 
contained within the German Reich millions of men 
and women whose hearts and minds ~retest against 
what is being done in their name. 79 
The Sydney Morning Herald was more adamant and claimed that 
it had received reports of 'unrest and revulsion of feeling 
among the German people•.180 
catholic and labour spokesmen agreed that their 
fellow-Christians and fellow-workers were not responsible 
176. Advertiser, 14 November 1938. 
177. S.M.H., 12 November 1938. 
Lionel Kochan, op.cit., pp. 51-62, describes the 
major role played byG.oebbels in organizing and 
directing the pogrom. 
178. See pp. 28-29. 
179. ~·· 16 November 1938. 
180. S.M.H., 16 November 1938. 
See also~·· 11 November 1938. 
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for the persecution. The Catholic Advocate maintained that 
'no right-thinking person will accuse the German people of 
the crime' .181 The Labor Weekly claimed that 'ninety per 
cent of the German people do not approve of the anti-Jewish 
outrages' , 182 and the Workers' Voice declared that the 'mass 
of honest decent German working people took no part in the 
orgy 1 183 which had aroused their 'further hatred and 
loathing for the Nazi regime•. 184 All agreed that the 
pogrom was the work of the Nazi regime and its militant 
followers and that it was not supported by the mass of the 
German population. 185 They blamed the system, not their 
fellow human beings. 
The pogrom had a wider significance than the 
pli_ght. of.the Jews and the problem of attributing 
responsibility. Only six weeks earlier, Neville Chamberlain, 
the British Prime Minister, had signed the Munich Agreement 
with Hitler and promised British people 'peace in our time'. 
In Australia the Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, voiced his 
wholehearted support for Chamberlain's policy of appeasing 
Germany and the press and public were relieved that war had 
been averted. Australian opinion was not unanimous. Some 
people were ashamed at the abandonment of Czechoslovakia 
and the Minister for External Affairs, W.M. Hughes, together 
with the anti-fascist extreme left, denounced the 
Agreement. 186 
The pogrom caused Australian commentators, like 
their British counterparts, to have increasing doubts about 
continuing to appease Nazi Germany. According to 
E.M. Andrews, who analyzed the changing Australian attitude 
131. Advocate, 17 November 1938. 
182. Labor Weekly, 25 November 1938. 
183. Workers' Voice, 16 November 1938. 
184. Workers' Voice, 19 November 1938. 
185. Australian commentators who voiced antisemitic 
feelings had nothing to say on this question. 
186. E.M. Andrews, op.cit., pp. 138-149. 
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to appeasement after the Munich agreement, 
the main impact of the pogrom on Australian 
opinion ... appears to have been an increase in 
the distrust of Germany that had been growing 
since Munich.187 
Hitler had broken the basic rules of ethical conduct - how 
could other nations continue to take his promises seriously 
and treat him in accordance with the usual norms of 
international diplomacy? According to the West Australian, 
Hitler could hardly expect 'warm friendship and ready 
co-operation' if he violated 'the rudiments of decent 
behaviour' . 188 It declared: 
It is possible that the hopes and efforts towards 
European appeasement may have been weakened more 
by the recent brutal onslaught of German Nazism 
on the Jews than by the memory of specific acts 
of German aggression in international affairs 
during the past four years.189 
The Sydney Morning Herald, which had been more reluctant 
than most of the press to approve of the Munich Agreement, 
considered that the pogrom had 'struck a grievous, if not 
~ort~l, blow at the ~olicy of appeasement'. 
pessimistically: 
It wrote 
If the current atrocities in Germany were part 
of a calculated policy to destroy Mr. Chamberlain 
and the British 'appeasement' policy, they could 
not have been more timely and effective.190 
Other metropolitan newspapers agreed that the hope of 
appeasing Nazi Germany had declined drastically.191 
The problem of appeasement was basically one for 
the British Government but there was an associated question 
with which Au~tralia was more immediately concerned. 
187. E.M. Andrews, op.cit., p. 154. 
188. W.A., 14 Novemb"'lr 1938. 
189. ~., 17 November 1938. 
See also Advertiser, 17. November 1938. 
190. S.M.H., 16 November 1938. 
See also S.M.H., 12 November 1938. 
191. For example, Herald, 17 November 1938. 
D.T., 16 November 1938. 
Truth (Melbourne), 19 November 1938. 
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Australia held a mandate over the former German New Guinea 
and Hitler was demanding that all colonies taken from 
Germany after World War I should be returned to the Reich. 
Even the pro-appeasers in Australia had been doubtful 
about acceding to Hitler's colonial demands and their 
attitudes hardened after the pogrom. 192 The West Australian 
declared: 'nothing 
such as a return of 
is to be gained by concessions to them, 
colonies',193 and the Daily Telegraph 
headlined an editorial: 'Hitler helps us decide the 
colonial question•. 194 Most of the metropolitan press, as 
well as Catholic and Protestant commentators, expressed 
similar views.195 Australian opinion on the colonial 
question was summarized by Round Table: 
The antisemitic excesses in Germany caused 
opinior1 to l1arden ... Australia is solid 
against any return of mand?ted territory.196 
Shortly after the pogrom, Lyons finally announced that the 
Australian Government had no intention of handing over 
New Guinea to the Nazi regime.197 
If the November pogrom led many Australians to 
doubt the wisdom of the Munich agreement, it also gave 
added weight to the arguments put forward by the 
192. E.M. Andrews, op.cit., pp. 155-157, discusses 
Australian attitudes to colonial appeasement 
before the pogrom. 
193. W.A., 17 November 1938. 
·194. D. T. , 16 November 1938. 
195. For example, S.M.H., 12,16 November 1938. 
Advertiser, 17 November_ 1938. 
Herald, 17 November 1938. 
idvocate, 24 November 1'38. 
Church Standard, 25 November 1938. 
196. Round-Table, 29 r1939), pp. 412-413. 
197. Argus, 14 November 1938. 
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anti-fascist opponents of appeasement. 
Worker stated that the 
The Australian 
s 3. 
rulers of Germany ... should be regarded as 
strange perversions so far beyond the pale 
of humanity that no approach to them is 
possible.198 
It wrote of Munich: 'We know now what a fraud the whole 
affair was' . 199 The Communist press was particularly 
vocal. According to the Workers' Voice, the Nazis had now 
revealed their true colours and people were finally 
'beginning to see clearly .. the .. treachery and hypocrisy of 
Chamberlain's Munich Pact with Hitler'. Appeasement was 
a futile exercise - the sacrifice of Austria and the 
Sudetenland had 'clearly only inflamed the arrogance and 
savagery of the beast' . 200 
Labour and communist spokesmen also denounced 
the Australian Government for not protesting to Germany 
against the pogrom. The Workers' Weekly headlined an 
editorial: 'Lyons does not protest against Nazi pogroms• 201 
and the Labor Daily stated that, whereas Roosevelt had 
spoken o.ut against the violence, Lyons, 'class ally of 
Hitler, said nothing' . 202 The League for Peace and Democracy 
called on the Federal Government to protest to the Nazi 
·regime. 203 It was joined by trade union representatives, 
Catholic and Anglican spokesmen and a number of 'leading 
Melbourne citizens' who signed a petition urging the 
Government to make an official protest.204 
The Commonwealth Government did nothing. In 
Federal Parliament, W.J. Hutchinson, a member of Lyons' 
198. Australian Worker, 16 November 1938. 
199. Ibid. 
200. Workers' Voice, 19 November 1938. 
201. workers' Weekly. 22 November 1938. 
202. Labor Daily, 22 November 1938. 
203. Workers' Voice, 26 November 1938. 
204. Argus, 26 November 1938. 
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u.A.P., asked the Prime Minister whether he had received 
any information from the United Kingdom Government about a 
protest to be forwarded to the German regime. 
would he 
If so, 
associate Australia with the protest, and so 
give evidence of the disapproval of the whole 
of the Australian people of the measures 
adopted towards a minority population.205 
Lyons replied that he had received no such communication 
from the United Kingdom. He stated: 'Should the 
Commonwealth Government receive a communication that a 
protest is to be lodged, the matter will be given full 
. . ' 206 . 
consideration . There the matter rested. Australia was 
in Britain's hands - and Chamberlain did not want to 
jaopardize his appeasement policy. 
Four months later, in March 1939, Hitler invaded 
Czechoslovakia and appeasement was at an end. Australian 
commentators, like their European counterparts, were 
preoccupied with the explosive European situation and 
the plight of the Jews was overshadowed by the threat of 
war. So far as Australians were concerned, the 'Jewish 
problem' was now confined to the activities of the few 
refugees who were being admitted to the country. 
205. C.P.D. Vol. 158, p. 1757, 18 November 1938. 
206. Ibid. 
·-· .- I 
II~ '.1 
.. J 
[ 
l 
I 
I 
t' 
SS. 
Chapter 2 
Refugee Immigration 
The Jewish refugee problem was the practical 
outcome of the Nazi regime's anti~emitic policy. Refugees 
fled from Nazi territory as the persecution of the Jews 
increased in intensity and geographical range. The total 
number of Jewish refugees during the period of Nazi rule 
was approximately eight hundred thousand, of whom about 
half a million found refuge overseas. The United States, 
South America and Palestine absorbed ninety per cent of the 
Jews who emigrated overseas - about 190,000 went to the 
United States, 130,000 to South American countries and 
i20;000 to Palestih·e;· The two·major-Jewi-sh refugee centres 
in Europe were England and France, which admitted 6S,OOO 
and SS,000 respectively.l 
Australia played a minor role in the problem, 
admitting approximately 8,600 refugees. 2 This performance 
l. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, ~.cit., p.343, 
estimate the total number of Jewish refugees for the 
period 1933-1943 at 811,000. By 1943 the Nazi 
extermination campaign was in full operation and 
emigration had virtually ceased. Of this total, 
approximately 329,000 had left Germany, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia before the outbreak of war in 
September 1939. ibid., p. 32. 
2. Refqgee immigration into Australia: 
1933-37 600 (Estimate - see p. 59) 
1938 
1939 
1940-42 
Plus 
l,S56 
5,080 
482 
7,718 
913 
8,631 
(number of British refugee 
internees, shipped to 
Aus tr al i a __ ~n l,_!)_4_0 _ :i.J1 _tJ:i_EL_ ___ _ 
Dunera, who remained in 
Australia). 
(Source of all figures except that for 1933-37: 
Statement by A.A. Calwell, C.P.D. Vol. 190, p.430, 
6 March, 1947). 
(see page S6 for continuation of footnote 2) 
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revealed a dichotomy in Australian reactions to the Jewish 
question - a positive reaction to the German persecution 
of the Jews versus a negative response to the resulting 
refugee problem. When Australians were faced with the 
reality of Jewish refugee immigration, xenophobia and 
economic self-interest outweighed their humanitarian 
reaction to Nazi antisemitism. The admission of 8,600 
refugees was also insignificant in its numerical impact, 
adding little more than 0.1% to Australia's 1938 population 
vf just under seven million.3 Despite their small numbers, 
the refugees aroused a widespread reaction in Australia, 
partly because reactions were initially based on expect-
ations that many more were likely to be admitted. 
The emigration of refugees from the German Reich 
occurred in a number of phases, each following the onset 
of each new wave of Jewish persecution. The first phase 
began almost as soon as the Nazis came to power and took 
discriminatory action against the intellectual, cultural 
and professional classes. 4 Jews wishing to leave Nazi 
territory faced the problem of finding a country which 
would accept them as immigrants. The initial problem of 
resettling half a million German Jews was a relatively 
small one by historical standards. The united States 
absorbed a million and a half Jewish refugees from Russia 
found refuge throughout the world after the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution and subsequent Civil War. In the 1930s, 
No statistics are available on the religious 
affiliations of the refugees. Probably 80-85% were 
I Jews by religion (S.M.H., 14 July 1939) and the majority of the remainder was overwhelm~ngly 'non-Aryan'. So far as public attitudes were concerned, no discrimination was made between Jews and non-
____ 1_--------------~~;:~s-~~~d~:-~~~:=~~ -cJew-i-sh---ref-ugee s '-was used-t-o- ----------- ---- ---
3. According to the Census of 30 June 1933, Australia's 
population was 6,629,839. On 31 December 1938 it was 
estimated at 6,929,691. Commonwealth Year Book, 1939. 
The 8,600 refugees were supplemented in 1946-47 by the 
immigration of about two thousand surviving relatives 
of refugees. admitted to Australia before the war. 
See pp. 242,245. 
4. See pp. 10-ll. 
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refugees faced a different world situation. The 
traditionally liberal immigration policies of such 
countries as the United States, England and France had 
become increasingly restrictive after World War I, largely 
because of threatened unemployment. The United States 
reversed its traditional policy in its 1921 and 1924 
Immigration Acts and established immigration quotas which 
limited the annual immigration from Germany to just under 
26,000. 5 Economic depression from 1929 resulted in most 
countries stiffening their immigration restrictions. 
Western European countries were usually only prepared to 
admit refugees on a temporary basis and expected them to 
re-emigrate overseas, often after occupational retraining. 
The obvious haven for Jews was Palestine which, unlike 
most of the world, was experiencing a period of economic 
prospericy. Immigration into Palestine was controlled by 
Britain as the mandatory power but growing Arab political 
pressure led the Government to impose restrictions 
on immigration. 
Like most Western countries, Australia was still 
suffering from economic depression. The unemployment rate 
for 1933 was 25.1%, after reaching a peak of 30.0% in the 
second quarter of 1932.6 Although the Australian press 
and public had reacted strongly to the worsening 
persecution of Jews in Germany, they showed little concern 
about the resulting refugee problem.7 The initial interest 
in refugee migration to Australia came from overseas, 
where Jewish relief organizations were seeking countries 
of refuge for German Jews. In October 1933 the Jewish 
5. James Parkes, Antisemitism, London, 1963, p. 74. 
J.H. Simpson, The Refugee Question, (Oxford 
Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 13), Oxford, 1939, p.10. 
---------- -~---- --- ·····-Art·hur--o· .---Mo-r-s e-;---Wh-i-1-e----S-ix-Mi-l-li o n---Died_, ___ Lon_do_n , 
1968, p. 189. 
6. Commonwealth Year Book, 1934, p. 739. 
7. Australian newspapers carried London reports of the 
growing exodus of refugees from Germany but made few 
comments_. For example, Age, 6· March 1933, 
Argus, 3;7 Apri.l 1933, S.M.H., 29 November 1935. 
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question was taken up by the League of Nations. When the 
Minorities Committee appealed to League members to 
assist German Jews by offering them a home and employment, 
both Australia and New Zealand refrained from making any 
comment. Canada was £ranker and stated she was 'unable to 
accept any obligation to receive refugee immigrants•. 8 
The Chief Australian delegate, S.M. Br~ce, subsequently 
'intimated behind the scenes' that Australia was also 
11nwilling to accept refugees. 9 
When the position of German Jews worsened after 
the Nuremberg Decrees of September 1935,10 the Australian 
Jewish community took positive action to aid Jewish 
refugees. In April 1936 prominent Jews launched an appeal 
on b~h~lf of the recently established Council for German 
Jewry in London. Few refugees were entering Australia and 
the main initial aim of the local German Jewish Refugees' 
Fund was to contribute to the Council's fund to help 
German Jews emigrate to Palestine. Towards the end of 
1936 the Council advised that the funds should be retained 
in Sydney because the Federal Government had agreed to the 
admission into Australia of up to five hundred refugees 
a year. Early in 1937 the Australian Jewish Welfare 
Society, with headquarters in Sydney, was established to 
liaise with the Commonwealth Government on Jewish refugee 
lmmigrati-on a·nd -f '1ci li-ta te the entry, -establishment-and--
integration of suitable Jewish refugees. The A.J.W.S. 
and its prede-cesso1:, the German Jewish Refugees' Fund, 
8. Argus, 7 October 1933. 
9. S.M.H., 9 October 1933. 
Rabbi Freedman of Perth, who was also present at the 
League of Nations session, was approached by the 
London-based German Jewish Refugees' Committee about 
···-·pos·sib-:I:e--·open-i·ngsr--fo·r J·ew·i-sh-·re·fug·e-e·s in· Au·stralia~ · 
W.A., 4,5 October 1933. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, 
President of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain, 
stated that, although Palestine provided the only real 
answer to the refugee problem, he hoped that further 
outlets for refugees might be found in Australia and 
South Africa. Argus, 8 December 1933. 
10. Seep. 25. 
/'. 
'• 
, .. 
I 
' 
nominated at least four hundred of 
refugees who had entered Austialia 
the six hundred 
11 by the end of 1937. 
A new phase-of the Jewish refugee problem be0an 
early in 1938. In March, the Nazis occupied Austria, 
adding 180,000 Jews to the 360,000 remaining in Germany. 
59. 
They immediately applied their antisemitic policy to Austrian 
Jews and also implemented new, legislation against Jews 
engaged in business and commerce throughout the Reich. 12 
The worsening economic position of Jews in Poland, partly 
due to Nazi influence, added to the .refugee problem. 
Between 1927 and 1937, approximately 185,000 of Poland's 
13 three and a half million Jews left the country. As 
Nazi influence spread, the governments of Hungary, Rumania, 
Latvia and Lithuania adopted antisemitic policies and Jews 
became anxious to emigrate to Western Europe and overseas. 
The rush to escape from Nazi territory and 
adjacent countries came at a time when most governments 
11. H.S., 24 November 1938. 
:sail°l Symonds, 'Australia and the Refugees. A Reply' 
Australian Quarterly, 14, No. 1 (1942), pp. 67-72. 
Between 1933 and 1937 approximately 140,000 Jews 
left Germany. Mark Wischnitzer, op.cit., p. 30. 
Total net German immigration intol\u'S"tria during 
this period was 657. It is estimated that probably 
600 of t]-1esc immigrants were refugees. tThe 
overwhelming majority of emigrants from Germany 
after 1933 were refugees who left because of 'fear 
of persecution, or •.• actual persecution, on account 
of his race, religion, or political convictions'. 
Arieh Tartakower and Kurt Grossmann, ~.cit., p. 2.) 
In mid-1938 the A. J .W .s., which only aided refugees 
who were of the Jewish religion, stat~d that in the 
previous 2-3 .years it had assisted about 600 refugees. 
About two thirds of the total number of German 
immigrants in the period 1936 to mid 1938 arrived 
before the end of 1937. On this basis, probably 400 of 
the 657 German immigrants who arrived in 1933-37 were 
assisted by the A.J.W.S. Commonwealth Year Book, 
1934-1938. 
s.M.H., 7 July 1938. 
~·, 28 July 19 38. 
12. See p. 35 .· 
13. Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish 
Congress., ~.cit., p. 134. 
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were imposing further restrictions to protect themselves 
against an influx of refugees. 14 With entry to both 
European and overseas countries becoming more difficult, the 
refugees' interest in Australia increased. Austrian Jews 
regarded the United States and Australia as their most 
likely countries of refuge and queued outside the United 
states and British consulates in Vienna for information. 
According to the Jewish Telegraph Agency in Vienna, 
Australia had become the new 'land of promise' .15 Less than 
a month after the Nazi occupation of Austria, the British 
Consulate reported that it had already handed out 12,000 
application forms for entry into Australia, whilst a 
negligible amount of interest had been shown in other British 
territories . The Consulate advised applicants to forward 
. Joheir .completed appJ.ication forms direct to Canberra.16 
Jewish refugees who managed to gain temporary 
entry to Britain applied to Australia House in London. In 
February, before the Nazis occupied Austria, Australia House 
received about thirty inquiries a day from German Jews. 17 
By early April, approximately one hundred refugees a day, 
chiefly Austrian Jews, requested application forms for 
entry to Australia. According to press reports, most of 
the inquirers appeared to be 'good types and prosperous•. 18 
In mid-April it was reported that two thousand Austrian 
Jews had applied for entry permits.19 At the beginning of 
July, The Times estimated that six thousand German and 
Austrian Jews were seeking admission to Australia and claimed 
that the ~ustraiian Government was embarrassed by the flood 
of applications. 20 
• 14. Estimates of the number of Jewish .refugees from the 
( Reich in 1938 range as high as 140,000, equal to the 
I total--f.or-the .. previous- f.i-ve year-s-.-· ·Ar.ieh·-'l'·ar.takower and Kurt R. Grossmann, op.cit., p. 140. 
-·-·-· -----------rs-.---s-:M·:-H-:--;t-"A1rr-:r1.-i-9·3·0-.--------- ------------- ·---·-· 
Ii 16. Ibid. 
l Herald, 6 April 1938. 
17. S.M.H., 4 February 1938. 
18. Argus, 5 April 1938. 
19. Herald, 18 April 1938. 
20. The Times, 5 July 1938. 
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The Federal Government was still treating the 
refugees on the same basis as other 'white aliens', within 
the context of an immigration policy which was traditionally 
based on the maintenance of a homogeneous, predominantly 
Anglo-Saxon population. During the nineteenth century 
there had been limited non-British immigration, mainly of 
Germans, Chinese and Scandinavians during the gold rush 
era. 21 After World War I, especially between 1924 and 
1928, a substantial number of Southern Europeans migrated 
to Australia but British immigration accounted for over 
eighty per cent of. the total net immigration during this 
five year period.22 Immigration virtually ceased when 
economic depression struck Australia in 1929, resulting 
in heavy unemployment, and from 1930 to 1932 there was a 
ne£ i~mi~r~tion loss. I-twas no~ until 1936,-when the 
unemployment rate had declined to 12.2%, 23 that there were 
signs of revived interest in migration to Australia. 
Agitation had already commenced within Australia 
for the adoption of a positive immigration policy to solve 
the alleged problem of underpopulation. Against the 
background of an unstable international situation, 
politicians, press commentators and prominent members of 
the community warned that Australia must 'populate or 
perish'. Australians were living in a fool's paradis~ 
the overpopulated nations of the world were turning their 
'greedy and hungry eyes ... on this great undeveloped 
21. W.D. Barrie, Italians and Germans in Australia, 
Melbourne, 1954, pp. 32-46. 
22. Commonwealth Year Books, 1925-1929 .. 
Net Southern European immigration between 1924 and 
1928 totalled 27,422, comprising 19,319 Italians, 
4,1·6·4-·Greeks and 3,939 Yugoslavs. During·this five 
year period, there was a net immigration of 166,123 
British persons out of a total net immigration of 
199,482 (83%). 
23. Commonwealth Year Book, 1938. 
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country. •24 The supplementary argument for a larger 
population was that Australia was not exploiting its 
full economic potential. 2 5 
62. 
Where was Australia's increased population to 
come from? British immigrants had always been considered 
the most desirable but there was evidence that they 
would be difficult to obtain in the future. The British 
birth rate was declining and, as the standard of living in 
Britain improved and social security benefits increased, 
the prospects of emigration to Australia became less 
inviting. Northern European countries were also 
experiencing falling birth rates and it was gradually 
recognized that Australia would have to seek immigrants 
····from the overpopulated-countries ·cof Southern and Edstecr:n 
Europe.26 This was only an admission of what immigration 
statistics had indicated for some time. Between 1935 
and 1937 there was a net loss of almost four.thousand 
24. Statement by Lord Gowrie, Governor-General of 
Australia, S.M.H., 8 September 1938. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by:-
W. D. Forsyth, 'Populate or Perish', Herald, 
17,18,19 October 1938. 
Sir Hal Colebatch, Agent-General for Western Australia 
in the United Kingdom, S.M.H., 4 May 1936. 
S.M.H., 16 June 1937, 8 September 1938. 
Argus, 7 January 1938. 
25. The strategic and economic arguments for a larger 
po~ulation were put forward at : 
- The Summer School of the Australian Institute of 
Political Science held in January 1937. W.G.K. Duncan 
and C.V. Janes, (ed.), The Future of Immigration Into 
Australia and New Zealand, Sydney, 1937; 
- The British Commonwealth Relations Conference held 
in Septem~er 1938, Australian Supplementary Papers, 
Series A. 
26. W. D. Forsyth put this view forward. tentative·ly-in-
·~--'-Wfre·re~c-a·n--m-i-gra-n-t-s-be. obtained', Herald, 25 February 
1938, and 'Populate or Perish', Herald, 17,18,19 
October 1933. 
Round Table, 29 (1938), p. 170, stated decisively 
that the bulk of future immigrants would be Italian, 
Greek, Yugoslav and Polish. 
.•··· I 
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British persons compared with a net gain of almost seven 
thousand Southern Europeans.27 
The immigration of increasing numbers of Southern 
Europeans, compared with the loss of British persons, 
aroused a hostile reaction in Australia. The arrival of 
each ship carrying Southern Europeans led to a fresh outburst 
from persons who saw their Anglo-Saxon way of life being 
threatened by allegedly mentally and physically inferior 
foreigners who were unhygienic, could not speak English 
and were establishing communal settlements, especially on 
the canefields in North Queensland. 28 John· Curtin, Leader 
of the Labor Opposition, and J.C. Willcock, the West 
Australian Labor Premier, joined the chorus of agitation 
for government ac.tion against the so-called alien influx. 29 
In an attempt to increase British immigration, Federal 
Cabinet eventually decided on 4 March 1938 to establish a 
new assisted scheme for immigrants from the United Kingdom.30 
27. Commonwealth Year Books, 1936-1938. 
Net loss of British persons 3,751 
Net gain of Southern Europeans 6,845 
including 4,149 Italians, 1,845 
Greeks and 851 Yugoslavs. 
This buildup of alien immigration occurred despite 
government restrictions. Aliens had to possess at 
least £200 landing money (£500 until 1936) if they 
did not have an Australian guarantor and £50 if they 
were nominated by a person in Australia. 
According to government policy, they ware only admitted 
if they could be absorbed occupationally 'without 
detriment to Australian workers'. 
Statement by T. Paterson, Minister for the Interiar, 
C.P.~., Vol. 154, pp. 80-81, 25 August 1937. 
28. on 17 August 1937 the Otranto arrived at Fremantle 
carrying nearly 200 aliens amongst its passengers. 
109 of the ship's non-alien passengers forwarded a 
petition to the Prime Minister protesting against the 
29. 
30. 
-a-dm--i-s-s-i-o-n-o.f-So.u.the-r.n-E.ur.o.p.aan_s_t_o_A_u_s_t_r_a_U._a_,_TJui.Y 
claimed that the 'physique and mentality' of many of 
the imm":i:·gr·a·n-t-s·-wa·s--• bel·ow that required in Australian 
settlers'. ~M. H, 18 August 1937. When the 
Strathaird arrived at Sydney on 19 August, passengers 
complained that the foreigners on board were so 
unhygienic that other passengers had refused to remain 
with them in the public lounge. 
Argus, 20 August 1937. 
S .M. H., 19 August 1937. 
Argus, 5,8 March 1938. 
Argus, 20 August 1937. 
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63. 
British persons compared with a net gain of almost seven 
thousand Southern Europeans.27 
The immigration of increasing number~ of Southern 
Europeans, compared with the loss of British persons, 
aroused a hostile reaction in Australia. The arrival of 
each ship carrying Southern Europeans led to a fresh outburst 
from persons who saw their Anglo-Saxon way of life being 
threatened by allegedly mentally and physically inferior 
foreigners who were unhygienic, could not speak English 
and were establishing communal settlements, especially on 
the canefields in North Queensland. 28 Johrr Curtin, Leader 
of the Labor Opposition, and J.C. Willcock, the West 
Australian Labor Premier, joined the chorus of agitati_o_n 
for government action against the so-called alien influx.29 
In an attempt to increase British immigration, Federal 
Cabinet eventually decided on 4 March 1938 to establish a 
new assisted scheme for immigrants from the United Kingdom.30 
27. Commonwealth Year Books, 1936-1938. 
28. 
Net loss of British persons 3,751 
Net gain of Southern Europeans 6,845 
including 4,149 Italians, 1,845 
Greeks and 851 Yugoslavs. 
This buildup of alien immigration occurred despite 
government restrictions. Aliens had to possess at 
least £200 landing money (£500 until 1936) if they 
did not have an Australian guarantor and £50 if they 
were nominated by a person in Australia. 
According to government policy, they ware only admitted 
if they could be absorbed occupationally 'without 
detriment to Australian workers'. 
Statement by T. Paterson, Minister for the Interior, 
C.P.D., Vol. 154, pp. 80-81, 25 August 1937. 
On 17 August 1937 the Otranto arrived at Fremantle 
carrying nearly 200_aliens amongst its passengers. 
109 of the ship's non-alien passengers forwarded a 
petition to the Prime Minister protesting against the 
admission of Southern Europeans to_Australia. They 
claimed that the 'physique and mentality' of many of 
the immigrants was 'below that required in Australian 
settlers'. S.M.H, 18 August 1937. When the 
Strathaird arrivea at Sydney on 19 August, passengers 
complained that the foreigners on board were so 
unhygienic that other passengers had refused to remain 
with them in the public lounge. 
------------
29. 
30. 
Argus, 20 August 1937. 
S.M.H., 19 August 1937. 
Argus, 5,8 March 1938. 
Argus, 20 August 1937. 
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A week later, German troops occupied Austria 
and applications for entry to Australia started flowing in 
from Austrian Jews. The Federal Government refused to make 
any distinction between refugees and other 'white alien' 
immigrants. Its immediate concern was to subdue the 
agitation against Southern Europeans and, with the 
prospects of increasing British immigration, the time 
seemed ripe to impose stricter controls on aliens. On 
10 April the Minister for the Interior, John McEwen, 
announced that all aliens would in future have to provide 
certificates of health and character when applying for 
landing permits. At the same time, he stated that no 
special facilities would be granted for the admission of 
Jewish refugees and that each case would be considered on 
its merit~. 31 In a further statement on 4 May, he 
reiterated that, although there had been growing interest 
in the refugee problem since the German occupation of 
Austria, the Government would continue to admit refugees 
only within the framework of its 'white alien' policy. 32 
It was with this declared policy that the 
Government agreed to send a representative to an 
international conference on the refugee problem, propcsed 
by the United States after the German occupation of Austria 
in March 1938.33 Representatives of thirty-two countries 
attended the Conference, held from 6 to 15 July at Evian-
les-Bains in France. While most delegates expressed 
sympathy for the plight of the refugees, they were unwilling 
'• 
to make any positive obligations on behalf of their 
governments. The major excuses for restricting immigration 
were economic and racial: continuing unemployment and 
fears that an influx of refugees would create a minority 
31. S.M.H., 11 April 1938. 
32. C.P.D. Vol. 155, p. 785. 
33. New York Times, 25 March 1938. 
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group problem and stimulate antisemitism. 34 Lord Winterton, 
the British delegate, dispelled hopes that Britain would 
ease its restrictions on immigration into Palestine.35 
The United States promised to fill its German and Austrian 
quotas but stated that only half the quotas would be 
afforded to refugees. 36 The only positive outcome of the 
Conference was the establishment of a permanent 
Intergovernmental Committee, based in London, to investigate 
possible places of settlement for refugees and to attempt 
negotiations with the German Government on relaxing 
restrictions on the transfer of refugees' capital out of 
Germany. 37 It had little success. 38 
Australia was represented at Evian by Lieutenant-
r.olonel T.W. White, Minister for Trade and Customs, who had 
been in the United Kingdom since April attending the Anglo-
Australian trade negotiations with R.G. Menzies and 
39 Sir Earle Page. At a plenary session of the Conference on 
7 July, White outlined the Australian Government's attitude 
towards refugee immigration. In response to the French 
delegate's statement that the United States and Australia 
owed their development to migration from the Old World, 
White pointed out that immigration into Australia 
The Times, 9,11 July 1938. 
The Times, 7,16 July 1938. 
The Times, 11 July 1938. 
The German Government had imposed increasing restrictions 
-on the transfer of refugees' capital. From May 1934, 
they had to pay a 'flight tax' amounting to 25% of the 
value of their property. The remaining funds had to be 
deposited in 'blocked marks', the exchange rate for which 
.decreased from about 80% of their nominal valu• to 9~14% 
by the end of 1937. One of the reasons for Palestine's 
popularity as a country of refuge was that, through the 
'Haavara' agreement between the German Government and 
the Jewish Agency in Palestine, .a refugee could arrange 
for the export ~f German goods to Palestine and receive 
cash payment for them on his arrival. J.H. Simpson, 
The Refugee Problem, op.cit., p. 146. 
38. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, £12.,cit., 
pp. 416-420. 
39. T.W. White was M.H.R. for Balaclava (Victoria) from 1929 
to 1951. He was Minister for Trade and Customs 
1933-1938 and Minister for Air and Civil Aviation 
1949-1951. Fro.m 1951-1956 he served as Australian High 
Commissioner in London. 
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had always been predominantly British and that 'any large 
departure from this is not desired while British settlers 
are forthcoming' . He bluntly declared: 'as we have no real 
racial problems, wc are not desirous of importing one by 
encouraging large-scale foreign migration'. Australia 
admitted German and Austrian Jews on a pro rata basis 
comparable with any other country and could not do more. 
He then shifted the onus to other contries, expressing the 
hope that the Conference would find a solution to the 
'tragic world problem•. 40 
Although White's speech was later described as 
the most depressing at the Conference, 4 1 his contribution 
was comparable with that of most other delegates. But more 
... was .. e.xpected .of .An.stralia .. There_ was a .general feeling 
at Evian that, whilst Western European countries had reached 
saturation point, large empty countries such as Canada, 
Brazil and Australia had plenty of room for refugees. 42 
Australia, in particular, was singled out as the country 
with the greatest potential for refugee immigration. Both 
Canada and Brazil argued that they were forced to restrict 
all immigration because of continuing unemployment but the 
Australian Government had decided that the country needed 
more people and was pursuing a positive ~mmigration policy. 
Before he went to the Evian Conference, White made a number 
of speeches in the United Kingdom encouraging British 
emigration to Australia.43 
40. 
41. 
4 2. 
43. 
S.M.H., 9 July 1938. 
_hustralia's performance at the Evian Conference is 
discussed by David J. Benjamin, 'Australia and the 
Evian Conference', A.J.H.S., 5 (1961), pp. 217-219. 
'None to comfort the persecuted. The failure of 
refugee conferences'. Wiener Library Bulletin, 
15 (1961)' p.43. 
The Times, 8 July 1938. 
New Statesman, 16 July 1938. 
N. An~~ll ~~d o·. Buxt~n, You and the Refugee, London, 
1939, p. 227. 
Speech to the Royal Empire Society, The Times, 
18 May 1938. Speech to annual meeting of the 
Fairbridge Farm Schools, The Times, 30 June 1938. 
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67. 
received. 
White's subsequent speech at Evian was not well 
The Manchester Guardian stated that White 'went 
so far as to suggest that only Englishmen were wanted in 
Australia'. 44 It later commented that 'a certain amount of 
racial ancipathy' was apparent at the Conference and that 
this had been quite plainly expressed in White's speech.45 
Delegates at Evian and a number of prominent people in 
Britain considered that the situation presented a great 
opportunity for Australia to obtain immigrants, while at 
the same time helping to solve the refugee problem. The 
myth of empty spaces still persisted to some extent but 
it was also argued that refugee immigration would contribute 
to the country's economic development and security.46 
Norman Bentwich, one of the most prominent and active 
representatives of British Jewry, stated that there were 
thousands of refugees who had been engaged in secondary 
industry - just the people Australia said it needed. This 
was 'a case where the self-interest of the Dominions, the 
Imperial interest, and the spirit of humanity coincide' ,47 
Australia's performance at the Evian conference, 
together with increasingly frequent press stories about 
refugee arrivals 48 and reports that the Government had 
received six thousand applications for landing permits,49 
led to a public controversy on Australia's potential role 
in the refugee problem. Arguments that the Government should 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Manchester Guardian, 8 July 1938. 
Manche<>ter Guardian, 16 July 1938. 
The Times, 8 July 1938. 
S .M. H., 31 August 1938. 
Letter from o. Locker-Lampson, M.P., Manchester 
Guardian, 12 July 1938. 
Statement by Sir Percy Harris,·M.P., S.M.H., 
1 August 1938. 
47. Manchester Guard~an, 6 July 1938. 
48. For example, Argus, 11,31 May 1938. S.M.H., 31 May 1938. 
The amount of publicity given to the immigrants was much 
greater than that warranted by their numbers. In the 
first half of 1938, there was a net immigration of only 
229 Germans and Austrians, compared with 2,061 Southern 
Europeans. Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, 
1938. 
4S. see p. 60. 
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adopt a lenient policy towards refugees, both on 
humanitarian grounds and for the benefit of Australia, 
68. 
were opposed by claims that refugee immigrants would present 
an economic threat to Australians and disrupt the country's 
racial homogeneity. 
Advocates of a positive policy, headed by the 
Sydney Morning Herald and West Australian, were 
dissatisfied with White's statement at Evian that Australia 
was doing as much as it could. According to the Sydney 
Morning Herald, White had merely expressed a pious hope that 
the problem could be solved but had not offered any 
constructive suggestions. 50 The West Australian considered 
that humanitarian considerations were all~import~nt ~~d 
tha~ Ari~tralia should Le willing to share in solving --the-
refugee problem. 51 The matter became more personalized 
when letters from potential refugee immigrants flowed in to 
the press and business firms. After the Sydney Morning 
Herald printed a letter ftom a Viennese motor engineer who 
was anxious to make a fresh start in Australia, one reader 
offered to supply the required amount of landing money and 
a motor firm indicated that it would provide him with 
employment.52 A plea for help from six Jews in Austria 
prompted another reader to offer bed and board to at least 
one refugee.53 
If pure humanitarianism was an insufficient 
-
motive for action, there were also practical reasons why 
Australia should accept refugee immigrants. A chorus of 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
S.M.H., 9 July 1938. 
W.A., 11 July 1938. 
S.M.H., 8,9 July 1938. 
S.M.H., 5 July 1938. 
Doris Lockhead, letter to S.M.H., 9 July 1938. 
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Australian voices now joined those of overseas delegates 
at Ev1an: the plight of the refugees presented Australia 
with an excellent opportunity to obtain high quality 
immigrants. The Sydney Morning H~rald pointed out that 
this was, indeed, a unique chance 'to obtain some of the 
best stock and finest minds of Europe' .S4 Like Britain's 
Flemish and Huguenot immigrants, the newcomers to Australia 
would develop industries which would employ large numbers 
of local workers.SS The Melbourne Herald considered that 
this was the 'opportunity to obtain industrious citizens, 
who will become 100% democratic Australians' within a 
generation or two.S6 Letter-writers to the press hailed 
the potential contribution of Jewish scientists, 
technologists -and--Lntellectua-ls -to -tire quality of- -Australi-an 
life.5 7 But only the most ~dealistic suggested that 
Australia should provide a refuge for all who wanted to 
enter the country. The enthusiasm of the supporters of 
refugee immigration was modified by their insistence that 
Australia's living standards and racial homogeneity had 
to be safeguarded.SB 
The opponents of refugee immigration claimed that 
these two criteria - economic and racial - far outweighed 
humanitarian considerations and alleged benefits. As the 
number of refugee immigrants increased during the second 
54. S.M.H., 8 August 1938. 
S5. S.M.H., 18 August 1938. 
56. Herald, 14 October 1938. 
S7. A.O. Robson and Audrey Herborn, letter to S.M.H., 
4 August 1938. 
'Cooinoo', letter to S.M.H., 4 November 1938. 
'Australian Scot', letter to Argus, 15 July 1938. 
'Maccabean', letter to Argus, 39 July 1938. 
Ellen Smith, letter to Argus, 1 August 1938. 
58. S.M.H., 9 July, 8 August 1938. 
Statement by Professor S.H. Roberts, S.M.H., 
7 July 1938. 
Statement by W.D. Forsyth, Herald, 2S July 1938. 
Round Table, 29 (1938), p. 169. 
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70. ,, 
half of 1938, the focus of anti-alien hostility shifted 
from Southern Europeans to refugees.59 
Opposition to refugees on economic grounds came 
from interest groups which saw their privileged positions 
being threatened. Members of the professions, especially 
medical practitioners, were amongst the first to oppose the 
threatened influx of refugees. Unlike working-class groups, 
they had not been greatly affected by the earlier influx of 
Southern Europeans. Australian doctors followed the lead 
of their British counterparts in opposing the entry of 
refugee medical practitioners. Despite a shortage of 
doctors in country areas, they claimed that there was no 
room in Australia for more members of their profession. 60 
More than four hundred medical students in· Melbourri-e ··---~·----·-
expressed alarm that their future livelihood was being 
jeopardized and signed a petition opposing the immigration 
of refugee doctors. 61 The Australian Dental Association 
was similarly unsympathetic towards the immigration of 
refugee dentists. Some professions had a less negative 
attitude. The Institution of Engineers stated that there 
was a shortage of qualified engineers in Australia and the 
Royal Institute of Architects claimed that it would welcome 
a limited number of refugee architects.62 
59. 
60. 
61. 
6 2. 
In August 1938 net immigration from Germany, Austria and 
Poland was slightly less than Southern European 
immigration. By October, it was double the Southe~n 
-European figure. 
August: German, Austrian, and Polish 
net immigration 202 
Italian, Greek and Yugoslav 
net immigration 285 
Herald, 14 October 1938. 
October: German, Austrian and. Polish 
net immigration 491 
Italian and Greek net 
immigration 238 
(No figure was quoted for Yugoslavia 
which was only 39 in August) 
Herald, 8 December 1938. 
S.M.H., 29 July 1938. 
Argus, 27 July 1938. 
profession's campaign 
refugee doctors. 
See pp. 110-127 for the medical 
against the registration of 
S.M.H., 29 July 1938. 
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A wide section of the community expressed 
general economic opposition to refugees, often in the 
context of their negative reaction to immigration as a 
whole and to alien immigration in particular. Some 
71. 
letter-writers to the press took advantage of the growing 
publicity given to Jewish refugees to express their 
hostility to all immigration. When several correspondents 
claimed that Australians should show a humanitarian 
attitude to the Jewish refugee problem, 63 others alleged 
that their sympathy was misplaced and that charity should 
begin at home. Australians who were having a 'rough spin' 
should be helped before any more people were admitted to 
the country. 64 
The labo.1.,1r moyement WC\S opposed to _a_ll immigratie>n 
so long as Australia had an unemployment problem. Although 
the rate of unemployment was steadily decreasing, it still 
stood at 8.7% in 1938. 65 Labour newspapers and 
politicians had condemned the--:r-en·e-wi!r-·a[·a-ssisted _______ -------------
immigration from Great Britain. 66 They were particularly 
hostile to the immigration of aliens, whom they regarded 
as a threat to the high living and industFial standards 
of local workers. The Australian Worker claimed that 
aliens, especially Southern Europeans, were accustomed to 
poor economic standards and were prepared to work for low 
wages as 'sweated labour' .67 Like the Chinese and the 
Kanakas before them, foreign workers posed the threat of 
cheap labour. 
63. Edith Harrison Moore, letter to Argus~ 7 November 1938. 
Roy Menzies, letter to Argus, 10 November 1938. 
L.B. Dav!.es, ietter t-o Argus, 10 .November 1938. 
64. John Hines, letter to Argus, 4 November 1938. 
W.A.K. a'Beckett, letter to Argus, 9 November 1938. 
E. Warren Hull, letter to Argus, 12 November 1938. 
65. Commonwealth Year Book, 1939. 
66. Australian Worker, 12 January, 16 March 1938. 
Labor Call, 8 September 1938. C.P.D., 
Vol. 155, p. 1159, 12 May 1938. 
67. Australian Worker, 3 August 1938. 
See also Australian Worker, 20 April 1938. 
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Labour's attitude to the refugee problem was 
ambivalent. Although the labour press protested vigorously 
against Nazi antisemitic actions, it was more concerned 
with accelerating its anti-fascist campaign than expressing 
sympathy for the Jews and the refugee problem. 68 Trade 
unions and labour newspapers continued their tirade against 
alien immigration in general but had little to say on the 
question of refugee immigration. They could not consistently 
oppose fascism and Jewish refugees at the same time. While 
making few specific references to Jewish refugees, they 
used reports and statistics on increasing refugee 
immigration to substantiate their general campaign against 
the alleged influx of foreign immigrants. 
The Australian Worker used the rumour that a 
I 
-1s~ooo ton liner h~d been -chartered to bring- Jew~._sh.• ... 
-••'.-______ :_::: :::::: .:: :::  : : : '. ::: ::: ::" ::::' ::  :: :::: : : :  :::~:: :: : ' 
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menace the employment situation and undermine industrial 
conditions by working for 'less than ruling wage rates and 
under sweatshop conditions' . 69 Melbourne trade union 
leaders announced their opposition to the 'wholescale 
immigration to Australia from southern and central Europe' 
as a menace to working and living standard and demanded 
that Australia's immigration laws be tightened.70 
J.T. Lang's Century drew more specific attention to Jews 
71 
under such headlines as 'Influx of Jews may mean quota act'. 
The Century's policy was isolationist and virulently anti-
alien. Although it sensationalized the Jewish immigration 
question, it was using the issue basically to bolster its 
campaign against all alien immigration. 72 
68. Seep. 42. 
69. Australian Worker, 9 November 1938. 
70. S.M.H., 28 July 1938, 
See also Labor Call, 4 August 1938. 
71. Century, 15 July 1938. 
72. Century, 29 July, 21, 28 October 1938. 
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Labour politicians also used the Jewish refugee 
issue to denounce all alien immigration and were less 
loath than most of the labour press to make specific 
references to Jews. On 6 October, John Curtin, Leader of 
the Opposition, questioned the Federal Government on the 
number of Jews being admitted to Australia. 73 Senator 
J.I. Armstrong was more outspoken when, a week later, he 
alleged that 'hundreds of Jewish refugees [were] flooding 
Australia' and adding to the increasing unemployment 
problem. 74 
The extreme left vehemently condemned Nazi anti-
semitism but made few references to the refugee problem. 
Communists opposed all immigration; they considered it 
would help neither the Australian worker nor the newcomer 
but merely encourage intensified capitalistic exploitation. 75 
The Workers' Weekly diverted from this policy to attack the 
allegedly pro-fascist Lyons Government. It stated that the 
Australian Government had a duty to assist the victims of 
fascism to migrate to Australia and help maintain them in 
the community. 76 
Although the labour movement's opposition to all 
alien immigration was basically economically motivated, it 
had some racial dvertones. 'Central and Southern Europeans' 
were accused of being physically and mentally inferior and 
not readily adaptable to the Australian way of life. They 
grouped themselves into colonies, refused 
and printed their own newspapers. 77 
to speak English 
" 
These racial allegations did not come only from 
labour supporters but were expressed, to varying degrees, 
73. C.P.D. Vol. 157, p. 516. 
74. C.P.D. Vol. 157, p. 594, 12 October 1938. 
See also statements by A.S. Drakeford, member for 
Maribyrnong, C.P.D. Vol. 157, pp. 502-7, 
and J.J. Clark, member for Darling, C.P.D. Vol. 157, 
p. 622. 
75. Workers' Voice, 12 January 1938. 
76. Workers' Weekly, 26 August 1938. 
7 7. Australian Worker, 9 November 1938. 
Statement by F.G. Pratten, M.L.C., N.S.W., 
N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 156,. pp. 2511-3, 8 November 1938. 
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by most sections of the community. Like the economic 
arguments against Jewish refugee immigrants, opposition to 
them on racial grounds fell largely within a wider anti-
alien framework. Unlike the labour movement, many people 
approved of British immigrants but had doubts about aliens. 
They supported the views of organizations such as the R.S.L. 
and the Australian Natives' Association, which opposed alien 
immigration and to whom the priority was the maintenance of 
a 98% Anglo-Saxon population. 78 If British immigrants were 
not forthcoming, Northern Europeans should be admitted. 
Although many people considered that fair Scandinavian and 
even German immigrants were desirable and would prove highly 
assimilable, they usually placed German refugees - sometimes 
three-quarters German and one quarter 'Jewish' - in the same 
category as the allegedly dark-haired, dark-skinned Southern 
Europe<J.ns. When more discriminating commentators made any 
distinction between refugee immigrants and Southern 
Europeans, the refugees frequently came off best. Some 
people compared the two to demonstrate that Jewish refugees 
were at least preferable to Southern Europeans. 
declared: 
The Century 
78. 
79. 
It's not the race, but the type of alien that 
matters ... While the Jews are for the most part 
assimilable-and merge into a British community, 
the Southern Europeans are resisting all attempts 
to blend them into the national character.79 
R.S.S.I.L.A. Official Year Book, 1938, p. 168; 1939, 
p. 9 5. Br i a:n- Fi tzi:»at.ri°ck~--Australian Na ti ve s' .. 
Association 1871-1961. Melbourne, 1961, p. 39. 
Round Table 29 (1938), p. 168. 
The belief that 98% of Australia's population was of 
British stock had a strong influence on attitudes to 
alien immigration. This figure was a statistical 
'myth' as it included all people born in Australia · 
(including the children of fore~gn-born immigrants). 
_According to W.D. Forsyth, The Myth of Open Spaces, 
Melbourne, 1942, p. 175, the British proportion of the 
population was probably below, rather than above, 90%. 
Century, 28 October 1938. 
See also 'Two Orama Passengers', letter to S.M.H., 
30 July 1938, 
statement by Rev. J.T. Wynn, S.M.H., 28 July 1938, 
statement by A.M. Mactier at quarterly meeting of the 
Victorian Chamber of Agriculture, A.J.N., 
5 August 1938. 
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Although the refugees were regarded basically as 
foreigners, the reactions of some commentators appeared to 
have decidedly antisemitic overtones. The Bulletin was 
pro-fascist and anti-communist; nationalistic and anti-
foreign. It m~intained that many Jews were communists and 
stated that the admission of such person? had to be avoided 
at all costs. While claiming to have the greatest respect 
for 'Australianized Jews', it attributed refugees with 
undesirable Jewish as well as foreign characteristics, 
alleging that they would overrun the profession ~nd trades 
and create colonies 'of brooding aliens, ulcerated with 
hatred of the countries that had driven them out' . 80 
The Publicist and New Times were more blatantly 
antisemitic, in .keeping 1:.rith their a-t.ternpts to justif~l Na-zi 
antisemitism. 81 Like the Bulletin, the ultra-nationalist 
Publicist vigorously opposed all foreign immigration into 
l'.ustralia. But it showed no interest in the usual economic 
and racial arguments currently being put forward against 
refugee immigration. The Publicist constantly reiterated 
that there was no antisemitism without semitism and implied 
that the admission of internationalist Jewish capitalists 
and communists .would create a dangerous situation in 
Australia. It maintained that Jews were the 'worst of the 
foreign peoples' who could come to Australia. 82 The New 
Times alleged that Australia was in the throes of a vital 
struggle .against the international money power and stated 
that Australia was not going to be made a 'rubbish heap for 
all the world's unwanted deportees' who were communists 
and sweaters of labour. 83 
80. Bulletin, 27 July 1938. 
See also Bulletin, 6,13 July, 3,17 August 1938. 
81. See pp. 34-5, 45. 
82. Publicist, 1 August 1938. 
83. New Times, 5 August 1938. 
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Sensationalist reports on Jewish refugees often 
made specific antisemitic comments as well as more general 
anti-foreign ones. The Sydney Truth denied that it was 
antisemitic and claimed that it merely wanted to protect 
Australian living standards. But its allegation that Jews 
would menace Australian 'race, blood and ideals' had a 
familiar Nazi ring. The paper called for an absolute ban 
on refugee immigrants whom it claimed were descending upon 
Australia from all directions ' in a veritable deluge of 
unwanted and unabsorbable Hebrews•. 8 4 The Melbourne Truth 
was similarly alarmist, claiming that Australia was being 
made the dumping ground for Jewish refugees. 'l'wo days 
after Kristallnacht, it alleged that millions of the 
refugees' co-religionists continued to live at peace in 
Europe and that Jews had left Germany because they were 
political agitators, not because they were being persecuted~S 
Australian Catholics, mostly Irish and working-
class, combined labour's economic opposition to refugee 
immigrat~on with anti-Jewish arguments similar to those put 
forward by the Bulletin. Catholic spokesmen agreed that 
Australia needed a larger population but asserted that, 
instead of financing immigration schemes, the Government 
should improve Australian living standards so that the 
population would stop committing 'race suicide' and would 
be encouraged to have larger familes. 86 Catholics also 
had a more immediate policy on the immigration question. 
In complete contrast to most sections of the community, 
they frowned on British immigration but supported the 
admission of Southern Europeans, allegedly .on the grounds 
of their greater suitability and higher fertility. 8 7 
84. Truth (Sydney), 16 October 1938. 
See also Truth, 9,30 October, 6 November 1938. 
The alleged deluge of Central and Eastern Europeans 
into Australia in October 1938, when ~ruth 
intensified its campaign against Jewish refugees, 
amounted to only 491 persons. Herald, 8 December 1938. 
85. Truth, (Melbourne), 12 November 1938. 
86. Advocate, 13,20 January 1938. 
C.F.J., 28 April 1938. 
statement by Archbishop Mannix, Advocate, 3 February 1938. 
87. Advocate, 13 January 1938. C.F..!i!_., 28 July 1938. 
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matter. 
Jewish refugee immigration was quite another 
Like labour newspapers, the Advocate alleged that 
Jewish refugees would flood the labour market, depriving 
Australian workers of employment and causing economic chaos.BB 
This argument carried little weight in view of the Church's 
encouragement of Italian immigration which had a much 
greater impact on the working-class labour market. Having 
condoned Italian immigration, Catholics did not generally 
use the usual anti-alien arguments that foreigners formed 
communal groups and would not adapt to the Australian way 
of life. Like the Bulletin and the Publicist, the Advocate 
warned instead that Jewish immigration would provoke 
antisemitism and also lead to an influx of communist 
revolutionaries. It summed up: 
Australia is able and willing to play her part, in 
-co11ab·aration with others, i-n seeki11g to find a 
solution to the problem of the refugees ... but not 
at the cost of creating new conflicts and miseries 
amongst her own people, or of strengthening 
subversive and dangerous elements of whose presence 
and power we have become only····too much aware in 
these latter years.B9 
Even Australian Jews revealed some conflict 
between their horrified reaction to the Nazis' antisemitic 
activities and their willingness to help their 
co-religionists. Australia had little history of anti-
semitism compared with Europe, but, with Nazi propaganda 
being spread throughout the world, the first concern of 
Australian Jews was self-protection. They feared that 
large-scale refugee immigration would provoke antisemitism 
and have an adverse effect on their own position in the 
community. After the German occupation of Austria, 
I.H. Boas, President of the Victorian Jewish Advisory 
Board, stated that Australian Jews were 'opposed to anything 
in the nature of-mass immigration from Austria or anywhexe 
else•.90 In addition, local Jewry .was dominated by 
Austraiian-born pro-British Jews who were well integrated 
BB .. Advocate • ... 14 _July 19:JE3.· _ 
B9. Ibid. 
90. S.M.H., 19 April 193B. 
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into the Australian community and shared its attitudes.91 
They constantly maintained that they were first and foremost 
loyal Australians and that Judaism was merely their religion; 
there was no conflict between the two. 92 To i6ese Jews, the 
refugees were just as much foreigners as they were to the 
rest of the population. 
feelings: 
Sir Samuel Cohen summed up their 
We know no other country. Our thoughts are 
British through and through ... nothing would 
be more damaging to the preservation of the 
freedom and civilization we are all privileged 
to enjoy, than to allow hordes of refugee 
European peoples to flock into this l~nd. 93 
The Australian Jewish Welfare S~ciety, of which 
Sir Samuel Cohen was President, recommended the admission 
of individual refugees only after ensuring that suitable 
employment was available. In mid 1938, before the influx 
91. Charles A. Price, Jewish Settlers in Australia, 
Canberra, 1964, analyzes the demography of 
Australian Jewry. He disproves the generally 
accepted view that Anglo-Jews and their descendants 
were predominant, if not dominant, in Australia 
until at least the 1930s. This view was generally 
held at the time, both by the general population 
and by official Australian Jewry (for example, 
statement by Rabbi I. Brodie that 'eighty per cent 
of the Jews living in Australia were of British 
descent', H.S., 21 April 1938). Officially, 
Australian Jewry came under the authority of the 
Chief Rabbi in London and Price states that the 
majority of Australian Jewish leaders were still 
Anglo-Jews or their descendants. P.Y. Madding, 
op.cit., pp. 32-40, discusses the dominance of local 
J;wr;-in the 1920s and 1930s by a 'patrician clique' 
of .conservative pro-British Jews. This dominance 
broke down to some extent in the 1940s when the 
Jews who had arrived from Eastern Europe during the 
1920s, together with the pre-war refugee immigrants, 
began to make their presence felt. (ibid., pp. 13-16) 
92. Seep. 17. 
9 3. Truth (Sydney), 7 August 1938. 
Sir Samuel Cohen was a prominent Sydney businessman 
and company director. Sixty-nine years old, he was 
one of the leaders of the 'patrician clique' which 
dominated the Australian Jewish community. Similar 
views were expressed by Rabbi L. Falk, S.M.H., 
31 October 1938. 
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of refugee Jews began in earnest, the Society claimed 
that it was placing about fifty Jews a month without 
taking employment from any Australian.94 When it was 
rumoured in August 1938 that the Government would grant 
landing permits to five thousand refugees in the current 
year, the Society launched an appeal for £50,000 within 
I ':1 -~-
the Jewish community. 95 It did not further risk controversy 
by appealing to the public for funds. 
The Jewish press defended the quality of Jewish 
refugees being recommended for landing permits and accused 
sensationalist journalists of failing to discriminate 
between Jewish refugee immigrants and non-refugee aliens 
such as Italians and Greeks when they alleged that aliens 
'threatened to engulf the community and ... undermine the 
high moral and physical standards which Australian men and 
women had built for themselves' . 9 6 Local Jewry was keen to 
protect practising Jews, in accordance with its assertion 
that Australian Jews belonged to a religious, not a racial, 
group. Rabbi Falk accused the press of confusing Jewish 
refugees with other non-Aryan immigrants and declared that 
Australian Jews were getting the blame for immigrants who 
were 'not Jews at all' but merely had a Jewish father or 
97 grandfather. 
The Commonwealth Government was faced with 
pressure from opposing directions. Sympathizers with the 
refugee problem urged the Government to formulate a 
specific policy towards refugee immigration and their 
opponents wanted a restrictive quota to control the flood 
of applicati0ns for landing permits. On 21 September 1938, 
94. S.M.H., 7 July 19 3 8. 
9 5. !:!...:...§..:_ ' 6 October 19 38. 
96. A. J. H., 4 August 1938. 
97. S.M.H., 31 October 19 38. 
/'" _ .. ---
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the Minister for the Interior, John McEwen, reaffirmed the 
Government's policy of admitting refugees within the 'white 
alien' framework and stated that it was against official 
policy to discriminate between aliens from different 
countries. 98 The Government was, in fact, admitting an 
increasing number of refugees within the scope of its 'white 
alien' policy: between July and October the number of Central 
and Eastern European immigrants doubled. 99 Despite this 
increase, the number of landing permits granted to refugees 
was negligible compared with the number of applications. 
Some refugees attempted to evade immigration 
regulations by booking passages to Australia as tourists; 
once they arrived they stated that they wanted to stay in 
Australia perman.ently. · rri··september·, the Go·v·er·nment 
attempted to stop this infringement of its regulations by 
requesting shipping companies not to accept bookings from 
Jewish aliens unless they held landing permits entitling 
them to permanent residence. Local Customs officials were 
instructed not to permit aliens to leave their ships in 
Australian ports unless they held landing permits. 100 
The Government's action was put to the test when 
the N~w Holland arrived at Brisbane, en route to Sydney 
and Melbourne, on 5 October. On board were twenty-seven 
German, Austrian and Czech 'tourists' who did not possess 
landing permits but who admitted that they wished to remain 
permanently in Australia. Customs officials refused these 
people permission to leave the ship. On 6 October the 
daily' pres• gave wide covering to the plight of the twenty-
seven refugees. 101 The Government's refusal to allow the 
refugees to land had .overtones of the drama of illegal 
98. C.P.D., Vol. 157, p.11. 
99. Net German, Austrian and Polish immigration: July - 236 
October - 491. 
S.M.H., 3 September 1938. 
Herald, 8 December 1938. 
100. S.M.H., 6 October 1938. 
101. For example, Courier-Mail, Argus, Herald, S.M.H., 
6 October 1938. 
Ironically, the Niew Holland arrived at Brisbane on 
Yorn Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. 
/ 
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Jewish migr~nts to Palestine being stranded at sea within 
sight of the promised land because of the British Government's 
restrictive immigration policy. 
Sympathy for the refugees was no doubt aided by 
a press photograph featuring some of the illegal immigrants. 
Instead of conforming to the public image of the physically 
and mentally inferior 'Central and Southern European' or 
the arrogant Jew, they looked almost like a group of 
ordinary Australians.102 One of the Australian passengers 
on the ship claimed that the refugees were fine people 
who would make good citizens; an official of the shipping 
company stated that they were all well dressed and most 
spoke good English; the press reported that they nearly all 
possessed at least the required £200 landing money.103 
Official circles did not give public reaction a 
real chance to develop. By the time the Niew Holland 
reached Sydney on 7 October, the Government had &cided to 
grant temporary permits to enable the refugees to remain in 
Australia for three months. At the end of that period, the 
Government would review their cases and consider allowing 
the refugees to remain in Australia permanently. The 
Commonwealth Government also took the entire blame for 
the affair. McEwen explained that, when his Department 
had written to shipping companies and Australian customs 
officials, it had overlooked persons already at sea. 
Subsequent a~ending instructions had not reached Customs 
o~ficials before the Niew Holland arrived at Brisbane. 104 
The twenty-seven persons on the Niew Holland 
were ~pparently not the only refugees who succeeded in 
entering Australia without the necessary authority. 
102. C.-M., 6 October 1938. 
103. Argus, 6 October 1938, S.M.H., 8 October 1938. 
104. C.-M., 7 October 1938. 
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The following January, the Government announced that about 
fifty persons who had been given provisional three-month 
landing permits were to be allowed to remain in Australia 
permanently. 105 
Increasing internal and external pressure was 
brought to bear on the Australian Government when the 
refugee problem intensified in late 1938. The German 
occupation of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia in October 
added a further 25,000 Jews to Nazi territory. 106 Crisis 
point came in November with the events of Kristallnacht 
and afterwards. 107 The refugee problem took on a new sense 
of urgency as refugees fled in pan~c from Nazi rule and as 
the Gestapo forced mass deportations of Jews to 'no-man's 
lands' on the German border. Western European countries 
set up emergency transit camps for refugees and the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees vainly tried to 
find countries where they could settle permanently. 
Less than a week after Kristallnacht, the Herald 
claimed that 60,000 refugees were seeking entry to 
Australia.l08 Overseas hopes that Australia would accept 
more refugees were backed up by intensified local agitation 
for a more liberal refugee policy. The Sydney Morning 
Herald asserted that Australia must take its 
international responsibility for the refugee 
share of the 
109 problem 
and the West Australian pointed out that there was little 
sympathy overseas f6r Australia's 'rather "prickly" attitude 
to immigration. ,llO The League of Nations Union, the South 
105. Argus, 9 January 1939. 
106. Mark Wischnitzer, op.~., p. 195. 
107. See pp. 37-8. 
108. Herald, 16 November 1938. 
This was probably an exaggeration. In February 1939, 
the Department of the Interior reported that it had 
received 40,000 applications for entry permits. 
Seep. 93. 
109. S.M.H., 18,24 November 1938. 
110. W.A., 23 November 1938. 
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Australian Branch of the League for Peace and Democracy, 
representatives of the Church of England and Lutheran 
churches and a group of residents of Poowong, Victoria, 
all urged the Government to liberalize its policy. 111 
Even the consciences of some members of the 
labour movement were affected. The Australian Worker now 
argued that 'Australia must do something' and, in accordance 
with its hostility to both fascism and Southern Europeans, 
claimed that Jewish refugees were at least preferable to 
alien fascist 
't 112 communi y. 
immigrants who were dangerous elements in the 
E.J. Holloway, Labor member for Melbourne 
Ports in Federal Parliament, urged the Government to 
establish a small quota for suitable refugees who could 
111. Herald, 17,18 November 1938. 
A.J.H., 27 November 1938. 
S.M.H., 18 November 1938. 
W.A., 19 November, 1 December 1938. 
The supporters of Jewish refugee immigration included 
the Evangelical Lutheran Synod and the United 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. (Herald, 17 November 
1938). This was one of the few occasions on which 
non-Jewish Germans in Australia commented publicly 
on refugee immigration. At the time qf the 1933 
Census, there were about 17,000 German-born persons 
in Australia. Many Australians had German ancestry; 
the number of German-born in Australia had reached a 
peak of almost 45,000 in 1891, The growing hostility 
of Australians to the Nazi regime in the 1930s put 
German-Australians in an awkward position. The Nazis ·· 
attempted to spread their propaganda amongst Germans 
throughout the world and German clubs in Australian 
cities came under Nazi dominance. Most Germans in 
Australia preferred to keep out of the public eye. 
Their continued identification as Germans centred on 
the religious activities of the Lutheran Church, not 
on the activities of German natiqnalists. It was 
the refugees' Australian co-religionists, not their 
~ellow-countrymen, who became involved in their 
immigration and settlement. W.D. Borrie, ~.cit. 
pp. 158, 193, 213, 219. 
112. Australian Worker, 23 November 1938. 
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be absorbed into the community. 113 Like Holloway, most 
refugee sympathizers still stressed that Australia must 
not lose its head and cautioned that a mass influx was 
out of the question because of the likely economic and 
racial repercussions.114 
The latest outburst of Nazi antisemitism and the 
resultant public reaction had largely stunned anti-refugee 
opinion into silence, at least for the time being. A few 
commentators indicated their continuing opposition to 
refugee immigration by suggesting that the onus was on 
other countries to accept refugees. The Argus stated that 
the problem was one for Europe, not Australia. 115 'Let 
Uncle Sam do it', declared the Bulletin. 1 1 6 The Catholic 
Advocate continued to warn that Australia would face 'fue 
peril of Anti-Semitism' if large numbers of refugees 
continued to be····admi tted. fl 7 
Most Australians thought that the Federal 
Government should at least formulate a specific policy 
towards refugees. The Government was thinking along similar 
lines. When Cabinet discussed the matter, members were 
concerned about the likely political reaction from the A.L.P. 
if Australia admitted large numbers of refugees and 
apparently offered widely divergent views on the problem. 
According to the Herald they agreed on one thing - Australia 
could not continue to remain aloof. 118 
policy. 
Within a week, Australia had a refugee immigration 
On 1 D•cember, John McEwen, Minister for the 
Interior, announced in the House of Representatives that 
113. C.P.D. Vol. 158, p. 1850. 
1 l 4 . W .A., 2:r-November J: 
Advertiser, 18 November 1938. 
115. Argus, 17 t~ovember 1938. 
116. Bulletin, 23 November 1938. 
117. Advocate, 24 November 1938. 
11$. !'erald, 23 November 1938. 
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15,000 refu~ees would be admitted 'over a term of three 
years'. He stated that the size of the quota had been 
influenced by two factors: the necessity that the 'existing 
standards of living should not be disturbed' and 'for 
reconciling with the interests of refugees, the interests 
of Australia's present population and the people of British 
race who desire to establish themselves in Australia'. 
Refugees would still be admitted in accordance with the 
principles governing the 'white alien' policy; each 
immigrant had to be of good character and health and 
possess the required amount of landing money - C200 if he 
did not have a guarantor and £50 if he was nominated by a 
person or oganization in Australia. To quieten economic 
opposition, McEwen emphasized that only people who would 
'not disturb existing labo_ur ... i::onditio_ns' would _be. admitted 
and that t11~ Goverrimcrlt would gi?v•e special consideration to 
'individuals who have the capital and experience necessary 
for establishing and developing industries not already 
catered for ... '. On the racial aspect, he stated that 
refugee immigrants should be 'distributed as widely as 
possible throughout our country in order to facilitate 
their assimilation into our population' . 119 
Even the Government admitted that the new policy 
was of little significance. McEwen stated that the quota 
would mean 'some increase, but not a very great increase, 
of the rate at which permits have been issued to people 
during the last six months' . 120 As the granting of permits 
had accelerated durinq the six months period, the number 
granted in more recent months was, in fact, equivalent to 
an annual rate of over five thousand. The admission of 
119. C.P.D.Vol. 158, pp. 2534-6. 
120. 1,736 landing permits were issued to refugees during 
the final quarter of 1938, representing an annual 
rate of over seven thousand. These permits were 
issued before immigration statistics were affected 
by the upsurge of applications after the November 
pogrom and before the new policy was implemented. 
Statement by J.A. Carrodus, Secretary, Department of 
the Interior, Argus, 7 February 1939. 
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five thousand refugees per annum was similarly insignificant 
in comparison with the Government's attitude to other non-
British immigrants. At the peak of pre-depression alien 
immigration in 1927, the net immigration of Italians, Greeks 
and Yugoslavs reached almost nine thousand. 12 1 More recently, 
the net immigration figures for Southern Europeans were 
slightly under four thousand in 1937 and over four thousand 
in 1938. 122 
The Federal Government's decision to establish 
a refugee quota served three purposes. First and foremost, 
it provided a means whereby the Government could control the 
increasing flood of applications by rejecting the majority 
even though the applicants conformed to the usual 'white 
alien' requirements. Second, the mere announcement of a 
specific quoJ:_a, ___ _lj_m_i_ted in size and surrounded by economic 
- ·----- ----------··-- -·--·- . - . . - --·-- ---
safeguards, satisfied all hlt extreme viewpoints in 
Australia. Third, so far as Australia's reputation was 
concerned, it was a gesture to overseas expectations that 
Australia would play a positive role in the refugee problem. 
Britain. 
The announcement had the desired effect in 
According to The Times, Australia had made a 
'characteristically generous contribution to the refugee 
problem. ,1z 3 The Observer was more ecstatic, claiming that 
the Commonwealth Government's decision was a 'striking 
illustration of how a noble compassion can circle the globe~ 124 
121. Net immigration of Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs for 
1927: 8,808. Commonwealth Year Book, 1928. 
122. 1937: 
1938: 
Net Southern European immigration 
Argus, 12 April 1938. 
Net Southern European immigration 
Argus, 9 February 1939. 
3,942 
4,640 
(The Commonwealth Year Book does not give the total 
number of Southern European immigrants but tises the 
classifications Italian, Greek, Yugoslav and 'other 
European'.) 
123, The Times, 2 December 1938. 
124. Observer, 4 December 1938. 
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British commentators reali~ed that Australia's three-year 
quota of fifteen thousand refugees would do little towards 
solving the refugee problem and considered that it was 
significant chiefly as an example to other countries. The 
Times hoped that other governments would follow Australia's 
example 125 and British government spokesmen praised the 
Australian decision as 'a practical lead to other nations•.126 
Refugees who had found a temporary home in 
Britain responded enthusiastically to the announcement. 
Although the annual quota of five thousand actually 
decreased the rate at which refugees would be admitted, 
the amount of publicity given to the announcement in the 
British press created the feeling that Australia had opened 
its gates to the refugees. The Melbourne Herald's 
correspondent reported that there wer~ 'scenes of joy' in 
London after evening newspapers publicised the Government's 
decision. On the following day, thousands of refugees 
visited Australia House in person, made written or telephone 
enquiries 
newspaper 
and even approached Australian businessmen and 
offices. 127 
To the German press, the announcement was only 
further evidence that Nazi Germany was not the only country 
which did not want Jews. Nacht Ausgabe ridiculed the 
15,000 quota and claimed that Australia was capable of 
absorbing at least thirty million settlers. It stated 
that the reason for the small quota was that the 'fine 
gentry of Sydney and the six other large towns only want 
British settlers' .128 
In Australia, the Government's announcement 
satisfied all but extreme opinion on the refugee question. 
125. The Times, 2 December 1938. 
126. ~rald, 2 December 1938. 
127. Ibid. 
128. Reported in S.M.H., .5 December 1938. 
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Most pro-refugee enthusiasts were content that the Government 
had recognized the existence of the refugee problem and 
had formulated a specific policy towards refugee immigration. 
The opponents of refugee immigration were satisfied that the 
small quota would prevent a flood of re·fugees ·into A·us-t-ral·i-a---······-··-·------
and that the country's economic standards and racial 
homogeneity would not be disturbed. 
The Sydney Morning Herald and the West Australian, 
the two most consistent advocates of a positive refugee 
policy, commended the Government's action but considered 
that it was the least Australia could do in the circumstances. 
Both regarded the 15,000 quota as an experiment rather than 
a fixed policy and suggested that the quota might be 
enlarged in the future. 129 Like The Times, the West 
·Australian .considered that .Australia's examJ>l.e._.sJ:i.o.uld be 
useful 'in persuading other countries to do their part' .130 
The Sydney Morning Herald was less optimistic and doubted 
whether Australia's contribution lived up to world 
expectations. 131 Letter-writers to the press congratulated 
the Government on its decision and stated that its 
humanitarian policy would also bring economic and 
strategic benefits.132 
If the new policy satisfied most advocates of a 
sympathetic attitude towards refugee immigration, it also 
largely silenced opposition from both the right and the 
left. Even the Bulletin and the Sydney Truth, two of the· 
most outspoken anti-refugee commentators, stated that they 
were satisfied with the quota - provided it was rigidly 
enforced.133 The Bulletin still warned that refugees must 
129. S.M.H., 3 December 1938. 
W. A., 5 December 1938. 
130. ~·· 5 December 19 38. 
131. S.M.H., 3 December 1938. 
132. 'Australian Native', letter to Argus, 8 December 1938. 
'L.B.D.', letter to Argus, 13 December 1938. 
I. Wilbe, letter to S.M.H.,.22 December 1938. 
133. Bulletin, 7 December 1938. 
Truth (Sydney), 4 December 1938. 
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be completely integrated into the 'generally happy 
Australian scheme of things' if the growth of antisemitic 
feeling was to be prevented. 134 
divided. 
Labour reaction to the new Governemt policy was 
The smallness of the quota and its safeguards 
were partly successful in subduing labour fears of economic 
competition from refugees. The Leader of the Opposition, 
John Curtin, welcomed McEwen's statement and said that 
the quota appeared to be a reasonable one. He expressed 
his confidence that the Government would not allow 
Australia's economic or social standards to deteriorate.135 
The Secretary of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council 
stated that he had no objection to the scheme but both the 
N-.s.w. E"xec-.:1-tive· of the· A.L.P. and the Victorian Trades 
Hall Council disapprove~ of the new policy.~36 The division 
in the labour movement's reaction was reflected at the 
All-Australian Trade Union Congress held in March 1939. 
The congress reaffirmed its opposition to state-aided 
immigration but agreed that steps should be taken to 
'assist in the rescue of refugee victims of Fascist 
ter'rorism'. Several delegates did not agree; they claimed 
that the destitute position of many Australian families 
should be improved 'before even refugees were admitted to 
Australia' .137 
The labour press was placed in a difficult 
position. It had bitterly attacked the latest outbreak of 
Nazi antisemitism and could not consistently oppose the 
admission of some of the victims. 138 In opposing 
134. 
135. 
13G. 
137. 
138. 
Bulletin, 21 December 1938. 
c.P.D. Vol. 158, p. 2536. 
S.M.H., 2 December 1938. 
-s.t.l.""H., 3 December 1938. 
Labor Call, 15 December 1938. 
Argus, 9 March 1939. 
Seep.42. 
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immigration, especially that of aliens, labour newspapers 
had previously used refugee statistics to bolster their 
campaign. As they could not comment on the new specific 
policy towards refugees within the general context of 
alien immigration, they tended to report the Government's 
announcement without making any comments.1 39 Labor Call 
was not worried about inconsistencies; it reiterated the 
old cry that 'charity begins at home' and ~laimed that 
Australia's unemployed deserved first consideration 
because they were refugees in their own country. 140 
Cathdlics had similar misgivings about the new 
policy but generally considered that the smallness of the 
quota safeguarded Australian workers. Archbishop Mannix 
welcomed the Government's decision and urged Australians 
to give the refugees a kind reception. He also hoped 
that they would be absorbed 'without disturbing the 
economic conditions of the country' and stated that the 
Government had the obligation to find jobs for both 
unemployed Australians and refugees. 141 The Catholic 
Freeman's Journal was less enthusiastic and claimed that 
thousands of Australians on the bread line were 'watching 
the flow of newcomers with a jealous eye'. It would be a 
pity 'if the nice feeling about the Jewish migrants' was 
spoilt because of competition for employment. 142 
Protestant churchmen, who had voiced few comments 
during the controversy on refugee immigration, also reacted 
favourably to the new policy and were active in providing 
139. Australian Worker, 7 December 1938. 
Worker (Brisbane); 13 December 1938. 
140. Labor Call, 8 December 1938. 
141. Advocate, 8 December 1938. 
142. C.F.J., 8 December 1938. 
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aid for non-Jewish refugees. 143 The Anglican Church 
standard was not so sympathetic. It stated that Australia 
already seemed to have plenty of Jews and that, at times, 
Melbourne looked 'virtually like a new Jerusalem'. Unlike 
most commentators, who stressed that aliens should integrate 
into the general population, the Church Standard asserted 
that there was plenty of room in Australia for Jews so long 
as they remained segregated and claimed that the average 
Australian was 'far too "feckless'' to hold his own against· 
a designing Hebrew' . 144 Although most catholic and 
Protestant spokesmen were keen to show the debt of 
Christianity to Judaism, the Rev. B.H. Dewhurst of the 
Holy Trinity Church, Ararat, declared that Jews should not 
be admitted to Australia because their principles 'were 
diametrically ~pposed to the teachings of Jesus Christ' as 
well as to 'the traditions of the British people'.145 
While the Government's announcement had satisfied 
most viewpoints, it also brought extreme arguments to a 
head. The correspondence column of the Argus was filled 
with comments on the Government's decision until the 
editor closed the discussion after about a fortnight. 
Readers' reactions to the fifteen thousand quota mirrored 
the range of opinion expressed since the issue had become 
a controversial one. Extreme pro-refugee enthusiasts 
argued that the quota was grossly inadequate both on 
humanitarian grounds and in view of Australia's declared 
need for a greater population.146 Their opponents 
expressed the usual economic and racial arguments against 
143. The Church of England and most of the nonconformist 
churches were repreaented on the Victorian 
International Refugee Emergency Council (V.I.R.E.C.), 
established on 5 December 1938 to aid non-Jewish 
refugee immigrants. 
V.I.R.E.C., Refuge, Melbourne, 1939. 
144. Church Standar~, 2 December 1938. 
145. Argus, 20 December 1938. 
146. 'Admirer of Enterprise', letter to Argus, 8 December 
1938. 
'Loyal Aussie', let~er to.Argus, 10 December 1938. 
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the admission of refugees and frequently confused the 
issue 0£ refugee immigration with the general alien 
immigration question. Letter-writers adopted pseudonyms 
declaring their allegiance to Australia. Arguments 
ranged from 'Aussie's' economically motivated complaint 
that Australians were being forced on the dole while 
foreigners drove round in motor cars,147 to the racial 
claim of 'Pure British Australian' that Australia needed 
immigrants of good Nordic stock, not refugees.148 
'Australia First' was more spec·ific; he expressed the 
92. 
antisemitic outlook of the Publicist when he alleged that 
ftustralian living standards would be broken down by an 
internationalist financial clique.1 49 
The Jewish. community took he.ed oC_<>.].l comments 
but expressed little reaction to the Government's 
announcement. Since August, Jews had anticipated that 
five thousand refugees would be admitted in the current 
year and they were more concerned with r.aising funds t.'?., 
ensure that Jewish refugees would integrate quickly into 
the Australian community. At a meeting on 29 September, 
the A.J.W.S. in Sydney had launched an appeal for £25,000 -
within two hours £15,000 was subscribed.150 The Victorian 
Branch of the A.J.W.S. held a dinner on l December, arranged 
before the Government's announcement, at which 
Sir Isaac Isaacs launched the Victorian fund for £25,000. 
By the end of the evening, £17,000 was promised. 1 51 Within 
a week of the Government 1s ar1nouncernent, the objective of 
the A.J.W.S. Appeal was doubled. 152 · 
147. 'Aussie', letter to Argus, 8 December 1938. 
148. 'Pure British Australian', letter to Argus, 
10 December 1938. 
149. 'Australia First', letter to Argus, 13 December 1938. 
See also 'Another Britisher', letter to Argus 
5 December, 1938; 'Travelled', letter to Argus, 
15 December 1938; 'G.J.', letter to Argus, 
15 December 1938. 
150. H.S., 6 October 1938. 
151. A.J.H., 8 December 1938. 
152, A.J.N., 9 December 1938. 
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Government officials faced a formidable task in 
selecting refugee immigrants for Australia. In February 
1939, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, 
J.A. Carrodus, announced that the Government had received 
more than 40,000 applications in the previous eighteen 
months and was currently receiving 2,000 letters a week 
from potential refugees. He stated that approximately 
5,000 permits would be granted annually; the Government 
would not insist on the exact number being adher~d to so 
long as no more than 15,000 refugees entered Australia 
during the three-year period. 153 By the end of June 1939, 
the number of current applications had risen to approximately 
70,000. 154 
Most refugees applied for entry permits through 
------·--------
Aus tr al i an we 1 f a:·reagencTes ___ wnrch ·nomina tea-· person s---thcy- --·------
considered desirable, recommended their entry to the 
Federal Government and assisted them with employment on 
arrival. Branches of the A.J.W.S. in the state capitals 
dealt with refugees of the Jewish religion. In Sydney, 
the Catholic Migrants' Welfare Committee took responsibility 
for Catholic refugees and the European Emergency Committee 
looked after refugees, chiefly non-Aryan, who were neither 
Jews nor Catholics. The Victorian International Refugee 
Emergency Council coordinated the activities of churches 
and other organizations in Melbourne interested in the 
welfare of non-Jewish refugees, established branches in 
other state capitals and was affiliaten with the non-Jewish 
S~dney organizations. 155 
The Commonwealth Government selected refugees 
basically in accordance with its promise not to disturb 
economic conditions and granted permits chiefly to refugees 
with substantial capital and to skilled artisans. 1 5 6 Trade 
unions, which had been worried that refugees would compete 
153. S.M.H., 7 February 1939. 
154. S. M. H., 29 June 1939. 
155. S.M.H., 14 July 19 39. 
156. Statement by J.A. Carrodus, Secretary, Department of 
the Interior, s.M.H., 8 February 1939. 
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with Australian workers, now accused the Government of 
favouring non-workers. The Interstate Executive of the 
A.C.T.U. complained that refugee immigration was largely 
restricted to 'prosperous and middle-class people with 
capital and ready money, while persecuted trade unionists 
and workers generally .... are prevented from coming to 
Australia•. 157 John McEwen denied that there was any 
discrimination in favour of refugees with wealth and 
claimed that officials treated the applications of artisans 
just as favourably as those of men with capital. He 
admitted that the Government rejected applications from 
labourers, ordinary clerical workers and salesmen because 
there was already an excess of these people in the 
Australian workforce.158 
The alleged favouring of refugeies with suostantial 
capital was also criticized on the grounds that it led to 
the admission of the wrong type of person. some Australians 
claimed that shrewd refugees who were clever enough to 
convert their money into foreign currency were successful 
in obtaining landing permits, while the 'really decent 
people were left to rot in concentration camps. 1 59 
The Sydney Morning Herald supported this criticism and 
stated that the 'best type of refugee' frequently possessed 
'very little in the way of capital or worldly goods'. rt 
thought that 'character, ability and skill may well be 
deemed more desirable assets for our future citizens.160 
During 1939, Australians became preoccupied with 
their personal experience of refugee immigrants - their own 
fifteen thousand - and showed little interest in the 
worsening refugee problem. The German Government followed 
157. Argus, 9 March 1939. 
See also 'Perplexed', letter to S.M.H., 11 March 1939. 
158. S.M.H., 10 March 1939. 
159. Caroline Kelly, The European Refugee in New South 
Wales, 1938-1943, Canberra (Ministry of Post-War 
Reconstruction), 1943, p. 20. 
160. S.M.H., 30 June 1939. 
See also A.J.A. Fraser, letter to S.M.H., 15 June 1939. 
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up the excesses of Kristallnacht by completing the 
exclusion of Jews from virtually all professional and 
business occupations; less than two per cent of the Jews 
remaining in Germany and Austria had the right to 
employment. 16 1 Germany's occupation of the Bohemia-Moravia 
area of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 added a further 117,000 
Jews to Nazi territory, many of them already refugees from 
Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland.16 2 
Overseas commentators had initially commended 
Australia's willingness to accept 15,000 refugees and were 
mistakenly optimistic that other governments would be 
prompted to take positive action. But by mid-1939 there 
was a feeling that Australia should recognize the urgency 
of the situation and adopt a more liberal policy. In the 
House of Lords, the Lord Bishop of Chichester claimed 
that the decision of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council 
to admit refugees demonstrated that a more favourable 
attitude towards refugee immigration was developing in 
Australia. He expressed the hope that the Government was 
ready to increase its quota. 163 In the same debate, 
Lord Noel-Buxton declared that Australia's 'potential 
activity' in the refugee problem was very great. 164 In 
response to these comments, the Australian Prime Minister, 
R.G. Menzies, stated that the Commonwealth's refugee quota 
was a generous one and 'it was unlikely that any extension 
would be made to existing arrangements•.165 This reflected 
local feeling on the refugee question: Australia was doing 
its share and the existing quota was creating enough 
problems. 166 
161. J.H. Simpson, Refugees: A Review of the Situation 
since September 1938, London 1939, p. 26. 
162. Mark Wischnitzer, op.cit., p. 196. 
163. 113 H.L.Deb.53, p. 1036, 5 July 1939. The decision 
of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council was based on 
the wish to ensure that refugees observed industrial 
conditions. It did not mark the development of a 
new labour attitude towards refugees. See p. 103. 
164. Ibid., p. 1046. 
165. S.M.H., 8 July 1939. 
166. See ?P· 99-109. 
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The size of Australia's quota proved to be a 
purely theoretical question as the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939 put a virtual end to refugee 
immigration. On 14 September, Senator Foll announced 
that the immigration of refugees from enemy countries, 
from which most of them had been coming, would hence-
forth cease. 167 In a further statement on 22 September, 
he stated that refugees who had already received landing 
permits would still be admitted and that the cases of 
those temporarily resident in non-enemy countries would 
be considered on their merits.168 
Since 1933, approximately 7,200 refugees had 
been admitted to Australia, including 5,080 of the planned 
three year quota of 15,ooo. 1 69 Only a further 482 refugees 
arrived during the war, apart from the British internees 
shipped to Australia in the Dunera. 170 Australia's 
contribution was comparable to that of the other dominions, 
South Africa and Canada. Tartakower and Grossmann grouped 
the three countries together when they described the 
'insignificant part played by the British Dominions as 
167. C.P.D. Vol. 161, p. 530. 
168. Ibid., p. 1015. 
169. 1933-1937 
19 38 
1939 
600 
1-, 556 
5,080 
7,236 
(estimate - see p. 59) 
(Statement by Arthur Calwell, 
Minister for Immigratio~, 
C.P.D. Vol. 190, p. 430). 
(This total includes refugees who arrived in 1939 
after the outbreak of war. The majority had received 
landing permits before war commenced.) 
170. Seep. 55. 
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countries of reception for Jewish refugees'.171 Although 
Australia and the other dominions were expected to play a 
greater role because of their relatively small populations, 
their poor performance was only part of the world-wide 
failure to find a solution to the refugee problem. 
1-71. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, op.cit., 
p. 324. south Africa admitted about seven thousand 
refugees, the majority before the outbreak of 
anti-alien hostility and the spread of Nazi 
antisemitic propaganda led to restrictions on 
refugee immigration. Canada accepted approximately 
six thousand refugees, chi·efly wealthy industrial 
men. Canada's restrictive policy was largely the 
result of continuing unemployment in a rural 
economy which provided limited opportunities for 
urban settlers occupied in business, professions 
and trades. A vigorous campaign by Canadian pro-
refuge9 supporters was balanced by a history of 
strong antisemitic feeling. 
Ibid., pp. 324-9. 
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PART TWO 1939-1945 
'These refugees, who are largely of Jewish origin, are 
conglomerating in inner city suburbs, such as King's 
Cross, Elizabeth Bay and Rose Bay; they are adopting 
aggressive methods in busine&o; they are breaking our 
industrial laws; they are using unfair methods to 
defeat Australian competitors. 
Catholic Weekly, 28 September 1944. 
'The Jewish tragedy does not appear to have made a 
discernible dent in the minds of Christians in this 
country' . 
Australian Jewish Herald, 24 June 1943. 
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Chapter 3 
The Refugees in the Australian Community 
The refugees aroused an even greater reaction 
after their arrival in Australia than they had done as 
potential immigrants: Geographically isolated from Europe 
and with a history of little non-British immigration, 
Australians were inexperienced at dealing with continental 
Europeans. Still less were they equipped to deal with 
Et'.ropean Jews. If Australians lacked the sophistication 
of cosmopolitan Europeans, they also lacked their 
traditional anti-Jewish prejudices. The few Jews already 
in Australia had arrived from various countries - principally 
Britain, ... Germany and Eastern Europe - .as .part of .the general 
inflow of population. With few preconceived ideas about 
Jews as a racial or religious group, most Australians fell 
back on their tra_ditional xenophobic attitudes and directed 
the same anti-foreign and.economic accusations against 
Jewish refugees that they used against all non-British 
immigrants who settled in Australia. Their allegations 
provoked a defensiv~ reaction from the Federal Government, 
societies aiding refugees and other sympathi~ers. 
Like the Southern Europeans before them, the 
refugees were accused of failing to integrate into the 
community. In particular, they were criticized for 
congregating together in cities, especially in Sydney and 
Melbourne. Price's statistics on Jewish settlers indicate 
that, of the non-British Jewish males who arrived in 
Australia between 1931 and 1940 and were subsequently 
naturalized, 95% settled in the state capitals - including 
47% in Melbourne and 42% in Sydney. 1 A Sydney Morning 
Herald correspondent reported that some Sydney residents 
had complained th~t a Jewish colony was developing in the 
1. Charles A. Price, £.E_.cit., Appendix VII (a). 
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Kings Cross area. They accused refugees of not learning 
English and refusing to send their children to public 
schools. 2 
Supporters of the refugees denied that they were 
forming colonies. The Sydney Morning Herald, labelled by 
the Bulletin as the 'press champion of the refug~es' , 3 
claimed that it was natural for refugees to seek out their 
own countrymen on arrival. Together with letter-writers 
to its correspondence column,"the Sydney Morning Herald 
asserted that refugees were eager to learn English and to 
integrate into the community as quickly as possible. 4 The 
General Secretary of the A.J.W.S., F. Silverman, also 
denied the accusations and claimed that many people had a 
tendency to __ re_ga_rd all people of foreign appearance as Jews. 
He maintained that refugees did not want to form colonies 
and that they were only settling initially in Kings Cross 
because it was convenient and easy to obtain accommodation 
there. 5 
The A.J.W.s. encouraged refugees to settle in 
outer suburbs or, better still, in country districts. It 
persistently maintained that large numbers of refugees were 
going to the country and gave great publicity to the 
activities of Australian Mutual Farms Pty. Ltd., a company 
established by the Society. The company purchased a thirty-
acre property named Chelsea Park where former business and 
professional men and their wives were retrained as smal~ 
farmirs, orchardists, poultry raisers and domestic workers. 6 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
S.M.H., 13 June 1939. 
Bulletin, 22 February 1939. 
S.M.H., 20 June 1939. 
M. Kent Hughes; letter to S.M.H., 19 June 1939. 
Elsie Rankin, letter to S.M.H., 20 June 1939. 
A.R. Herborn, letter to S.M.H., 22 June 1939. 
S.M.H., 15 June 1939. 
6. H.s., 24 November 1938. 
8.M.IL, 3 December 1938, 10 January 1939. 
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Kings Cross area. They accused refugees of not learning 
English and refusing to send their children to public 
schools. 2 
Supporters of the refugees denied that they were 
forming coloniei. The Sydney Morning Herald, labelled by 
the Bulletin as the 'press champion of the refug.ees' ,3 
claimed that it was natural for refugees to seek out their 
own countrymen on arrival. Together with letter-writers 
to its correspondence column, ·the Sydney Morning Herald 
asserted that refugees were eager to learn English and to 
integrate into the community as quickly as possible.4 The 
General Secretary of the A.J.W.S., F. Silverman, also 
denied the accusations and claimed that many people had a 
tendency to regard all people of foreign appearance as Jews. 
He maintained that refugees did not want to form colonies 
and that they were only ·settling initially in Kings Cross 
because it was convenient and easy to obtain accommodation 
there. 5 
The A.J.W.S. encouraged refugees to settle in 
outer suburbs or, better still, in country districts. It 
persistently maintained that large numbers of refugees were 
going to the country and gave great publicity to the 
activities of Australian Mutual Farms Pty. Ltd., a company 
established by the Society. The company purchased a thirty-
acre property named Chelsea Park where former business and 
professional men and their wives were retrained as small 
farmers, orchardists, poultry raisers and domestic workers. 6 
2. S.M.H., 13 June 1939. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Bulletin, 22_February 1939. 
S.M.H., 20 June 1939. 
M. Kent Hughes •. _le!:._t:_~_to S. M. IL_J_.2~~!1_~ 19.39. 
Elsie Rankin, letter to S.M.H., 20 June 1939. 
A.R. Herborn, ·1etter to S.M.H.; 22 June 1939. 
s ·"~·, 15 June 1939. 
6. H.S., 24 November 1938. 
"S:M.e., 3 December 1938, 10 January 1939. 
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The society also organized the settlement of some two 
hundred Jewish refugees near Shepparton in Victoria.7 
J.. u .l • 
Mr. Silverman made the extravagant claim that the great 
majority of Jews were 'eagerly awaiting a chance to go to 
the country•·. 8 Rabbi William Katz, a German Jewish refugee, 
alleged that only four per cent of refugees entering 
Australia were farmers and even those trained at Chelsea 
Park moved to the cities after a short time.9 This was 
probably no exaggeration. According to Price, only 2.9% 
of gainfully employed Jewish immigrants (male non-British) 
settled on the land.10 
The A.J.W.S. realized that most refugees were, in 
reality, remaining in the cities and urged them to integrate 
into the Australian community. Local Jews were well aware 
that any adverse reaction to the refugees would have a bad 
effect on their own position. on their arrival in Australia, 
refugees received a card from the A.J.W.S. which told them: 
Remember that the welfare of the old-established 
Jewish communities in Australia, as well as of 
every migrant, depends on your personal behaviour. 
Jews collectively are judged by individuals. You, 
personally, have a very grave responsibility.11 
The Society organized meetings at which both Jews and non-
Jews gave advice to refugees; it arranged English lessons 
for immigrants with the Education Department and conducted 
lectures on Australian law and institutions. The Jewish 
press counselled refugees on how they could most quickly 
integrate into the community. In its weekly article for 
7. L.P. Fox, Australia and the Jews, Melbourne, 1939, p. 32. 
8. S.M.H., 12 July 1939. 
9. William Katz, And the Ark Rested, Sydney, 1966, p. 49. 
·• 10, Charles A. Price, 6p.cit., Appendix V. 
-·-·-··--"·-· ·.·-·--------- ··-··c-;:uc-o"li:ne····Jke·l-ly-,.···op:::-<;:i . .t .. , ... p.p ... 1.1.::.1.~L . .§ xamine d the 1 anding 
permits of some Of the' refugees who settied.Tn·1r:-s·:·w. 
Of a random sample of 1007 German and Austrian male 
refugees, 67 (6.7%) stated that they were farmers. 
11. 
Only 14 ( 1. 4%) of these actually settled on the land in 
Australia. 
S,M.H., 13 May 1939, 
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'New Australians', the Hebrew Standard advised refugees not 
to congregate in groups, not to read German newspapers in 
public and to speak English at all times. The long 
overcoats and brief cases which marked them as refugees had 
to be discarded. They Were not to haggle about prices, join 
any political organization or criticize the institutions of 
the Commonwealth and the British Empire.12 
D.R.B. Mitchell of the Commonwealth Investigation 
Service bluntly told a group of refugees in Melbourne that 
they had not been asked to come to Australia. He added: 
let me urge you to try to become Australians in 
your outlook, forget the habits and customs of the 
countries from which you have come, and try hard 
to adapt yourselves to the ways of Australia ... 
--,-try ,and imitate the, l:>E!haviour of good class 
Australian Jews and good class Austral!~~~ :,;, 
show your appreciation ... by becoming good 
citizens with an Australian outlook in social 
customs and business methods, in commercial 
morality and the great ideals that have made 
Australia what it is today.13 
The refugees' economic behaviour also came under 
strong attack, especially from labour and Catholic spokesmen. 
They were accused of buying up businesses in all the 
favourable locations and competing with Australians instead 
of establishing new industries as the Government had 
promised. Their alleged growing dominance of the retailing 
of cut-price tobacco and furs was particularly attacke~: 14 
As dmployees, refugees were accused of displacing Australian 
labour, which the Government claimed would not occur. 15 
Some retailers, especially Jewish ones, were blamed for 
dismissing Australians and employing Jews in their place. 
12. For example, ~·, 1 June, 20 July 1939. 
13~ A.J.N., 28'July 1939. 
14. C.F.J., 27 April 1939. S.M.H., 13 June 1939. 
'White Australia', letter to Argus, 29 July 1938. 
Statement by A.E. Green, M.H.R., A.L.P. member for 
Kalgoorlie, C.P.D., Vol. 160, p. 1966. 
15. StatemenL.by G~)'.1_._Martens, M.H.R., A.L.P. member for 
Herbert, at Australian Workers' Union Annual convention 
1939, Official Report of the 53rd Annual Convention,p.22. 
C.F.J., 20 July 1939: 
Century, 10 February, 21 April 1939. 
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T.J. Shannon, the A.L.P. member for Phillip in the N.S.W. 
Legislative Assembly, claimed that David Jones had replaced 
six Australians by refugees. The Managing Director 
emphatically denied the accusations and claimed that there 
were only three refugees on the staff of the firm. 16 
The major complaint against refugees was that they 
were not adhering to Australian industrial awards; they 
worked long hours for below award rates and under-cut their 
competitors. This accusation was directed particularly at 
refugees who were allegedly setting up backyard factories 
and competing in the clothing industry. 17 In an attempt to 
ensure that Australian awards were observed, the N.S.W. 
Trades and Labor Council recommended to trade unions that 
they should _admit worker refugees . 18 The unions complained 
that few refugees showed any interest in the trade union 
movement and Labor Call stated that, if refugees wished to 
prevent antisemitic prejudice, they should give positive 
evidence of their desire to conform to Australian 
industrial awards by becoming unionists.19 The 1939 Annual 
Convention of the Australian Workers' Union resolved that 
Commonwealth and State governments be request~d to compel 
all refugees to comply with Australian award conditions and 
wages. 20 
The Commonwealth Government adopted a conciliatory 
attitude towards complaints about refugees. The Prime 
Minister, Joseph Lyons, stated that he was 'in complete 
agreement with the Australian Workers' union in its desire 
16. N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 157, p. 3863. 
s.M.H., 4 March 1939. 
17, statement by C.G. Fallon, Secretary of the Queensland 
Branch of the A~stralian Workers' Union, at A.w.u. 
Annual Convention, 1939, Official Report of the 53rd 
Annual Convention~ p. 126. 
c.F.J., 27 April, 22 June 1939. 
18. S.M.H., 5 lo\ay 1939. 
19. Labor Call, 11 May 1939. 
20. Australian Workers' Union, Official Report of the 
53rd Annual Convention, op.cit., PP· 125-8. 
S.M.H., 18 February 1939. 
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to safeguard existing conditions•.21 After an enquiry into 
the allegations, the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior, J.A. Carrodus, claimed that there was no evidence 
th·at·-ref·ug-ees---w,e.r.e ... eith.er displacing Australian labour or 
contravening industrial standards. 22 To subdue complaints, 
the Government announced that future applicants for landing 
permits would have to sign a declaration to abide by 
Australian industrial awards. 
The commonwealth Government and the A.J.w.s. 
emphasized the positive economic effect~ which were 
resulting from the refugee programme. Departmental 
officials estimated that, during the three year period, 
refugees would bring £4,500,000 in new capital to Australia. 
New i11dustries were being established and modern techniques 
introduced. Refugees were manufacturing a new silk-finished 
woollen fabric, a previously unprocurable type of leather 
glove, steel tubing, fountain pens, lipstick containers, 
precision instruments and mechanical toys. 23 The Sydney 
Morning Herald and other refugee sympathizers reminded the 
public that the new skilled immigrants were helping to 
increase Australia's population and contributing to the 
country's development. They denounced the mistaken belief 
that immigrants ere a tea-·c:o·mp·et-i.-tion--for---emplo yment ___ an<:l_ _____________ _ 
pointed out that the 11,000 refugees who had settled in 
Britain had been directly responsible for the employme·nt 
of-15,000 British workers.2 4 
Controversy over the behaviour of Jewish refugees 
in the community came to a head in May 1939 when 
21. S.M.H., 15 April 1939. 
22. Argus, 2 May 1939. 
23. S.M.H., 4,17 February 1939. 
Argus, 31 August 1939. 
24. Rose Dornbush, letter to S.M.H., 10 February 1939. 
M. Broughton, letter to S.M.H., 27 March 1939. 
'M.L.D.'' letter to S.M.H., 4 May 1939. 
A.G. Huie, letter to S.M.H., 22 June 1939. 
Statement by ·or. Pilcher, Coadjutqr Bishop of Sydney, 
S.M.H., 5 July 1939. 
I 
I I: 7' ,_ 
I 
105. 
Sir Frank Clarke, President of the Victorian Legislative 
council, attacked the refugees on both racial and economic 
grounds_. In an address to the Malvern Branch of the 
Australian Women's National League, Sir Fran-k spoke of 
slinking rat-faced men under five feet in height, 
and with a chest development of about twenty 
inches, who worked in backyard factories in 
Carlton and other locations in the north of 
Melbourne for 2/- to 3/- a week pocket money and 
their keep.25 
------------
He criticized the hundreds of 'weedy Eastern Europeans' who 
were being admitted to Australia in accordance with the 
Government's policy to accept 15,000 refugees. Clarke's 
speech assumed racial overtones similar to those put forward 
in Germany by Streicher's pornographic Der Stlirmer when he 
stated that it was 
horrible to think that such people would want 
to marry Australian girls or even to bring 
their own undernourished and undeveloped 
women, and breed a race within a race ... 26 
He urged the Government ,to ensure that medical certificates 
issued to refugees gave details of their physique and degree 
of intelligence. Clarke alleged that 'British Jews would be 
_________ t_he ___ f_i_r,,_t_ _t_o ___ admit_ that- the-eastern Eur_opean Jew_ was 
deficient in some of the qualities that made citizens of the 
British Empire' and claimed that this was mainly the class 
of refugee which was currently coming to Australia. 
Clarke's economic accusation against refugee 
immigrants was that they were contravening industrial 
conditions by manufacturing clothing in backyard factories, 
paying below-award wages and undercutting other manufacturers. 
He qu~ted the case of a SydDeY department store which had 
25. Age, 9 May 1939. 
Sir Frank Clarke, businessman and politician, was 
educated at Scotch College, Melbourne University 
and Oxford. His family had had a long connection 
with the Victorian Legislative Council. Between 
1917 and 1923 he held a number of portfolios in-
the Victorian Government and from 1923 to 1943 
served as President of the Victorian Legislative 
Council .. 
26. Age, 9 May 1939. 
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contracted for the supply of 100,000 artificial silk 
women's undergarments at 7~d. each.27 
106. 
Clarke was not specific about exactly whom he was 
attacking. The ~' which gave the fullest coverage of 
the affair, alleged that his remarks were directed against 
refugees, especially Eastern Europeans.28 When an 
Australian Jewish Herald correspondent interviewed Clarke, 
he stated he had used the term 'Eascern European' but 
denied that he was referring specifically to Jews. The 
basic problem, he said, concerned all alien immigrants.29 
In a further statement, Clarke claimed that he had been 
referring mainly to Eastern Europeans, some of them semitic, 
but that he had not lntended to denounce Jewish refugees 
generally. 30 
Clarke's allegations aroused a widespread 
outburst of controversy. Most people thought that he had 
gone too far in his racial accusations. The Federal 
Government stated that the refugees being admitted were of 
a high physical and mental standard. 31 The Victorian 
Branch of th_e_ii.:-J:w.s. -,rn-d--the---V.LR._E~c:__.____pointed out that 
-----------~-----
the large majority of refugee immigrants were not Eastern 
Europeans, as Clarke had claimed, but Germans and Austrians.32 
Age, 9 May 1939. 
Ibid. 
A.J.H. 11 May 1939. 
~' 11 May 1939. 
Age, lo May 1939. 
Arg~, 10 May 1939. 
Immigration statistics be•r out this claim. Net 
immigration of Central and Eastern Europeans for the 
first half of 1939 was 3,836, of whom Germans and 
Austrians accounted for 3,238 (84%) and Poles for only 
608 (16%). These proportions are slightly distorted 
as no figures are available for other Eastern Europeans 
who were being admitted in small numbers. Quarterly 
Summary of Australian Statistics, 1939. According to 
Price's statistics on non-British Jewish naturalized 
males who arrived in Australia between 1931 and 1940, 
70.6% came from Germany and Austria (42.7% Germany; 
27.9% Austria). (See page 107) 
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They were of excellent physique and 
types ever to reach Australia' .3 3 
'among the best educated 
One writer to the Age 
commented that it was novel that men 'of small stature and 
circumference' should be regarded as undesirable types. 
Another stated that, although the influx of refugees caused 
some problems, these would not be solved by unscientific 
race 
'"'ere 
theories. 34 
Clarke's less stressed allegatlons that refugees 
undermining industrial conditions were taken more 
seriously by politicians and the press. Political parties 
used the affair to attack the Government. The United 
country Party called for an investigation into the 
administration of the Department of the Intexior, which was 
.0 c 
no longer under the control of its Mr. McEwen.~~ The··-L-e·ad·e·r 
of the Opposition, John Curtin, claimed that stricter 
Commonwealth supervision was necessary to ensure that 
ind~ktrial conditions were not undermined. 36 
Most commentators considered that Clarke's 
economic accusations were too sweeping and called for 
concrete evidence instead of vague accusations. 37 Labour 
spoke-;~pointe·a.··a-ift ___ th-at-·the-problem of non-,adh.ere_n_c_e to 
industrial standards was not a specifically Jewish one. 
J.C. Dillon, A.L.P. member for Essendon in the Victorian 
Legislative Assembly and a member of the Anti-Sweating 
League, claimed that sweating existed 'before there was one 
refugee in Australia and it had not been greatly aggravated' 
as a result of their arriva1. 38 The Leader of the Victorian 
Of the remainder, probably 20% came from Poland (Price 
quotes 17% for Poland and 3.2% f~r the Ukraine, of 
whom over 70% were from Lvov, at that time part of 
Poland), 3.3% from.Czechoslovakia, 2.8% from Hungary, 
and smaller numbers from Rumania, Latvia, Lithu~nia 
and other parts of Europe. Charles A. Price, £.E_.cit., 
Appendix II. 
33. Argus, 10 May 1939. 
34. L. Gillam, letter to Age, 12 May 1939. 
35. Argus, 10 May 1939. 
36. _Age, 10 May 1939. 
37. For example, A.A. bunstan, Country Party Premier of 
Victoria, Jl.rgus, 10 May 1939. Argus, 10 May 1939. 
38. Age, 11 May 1939. 
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Parliamentary Labor Party, J. Cain, expressed a similar 
viewpoint when he stated that the conditions Clarke had 
referred to 'were by no means new' . 39 The Clothing Trades 
union, most directly a~fected by Clarke's allegations, 
asserted that the sweating problem was not specifically one 
of Jews or Italians, Southern Europeans or Slavs, but 
involved large numbers of aliens who were not used to 
Australian standards of work and wages. M. Callard, 
Assistant Secretary of the Union, said that, so far as 
sweating was concerned, some Gentiles could hold their own. 4 0 
As the Age pointed out, there was a tendency in 
the community to confuse the two separate strands of 
immigration from Euro-pe --- the_ re_fu_ge_e_s from Nazism and 
normal immigrants, especially Southern European~. 41 The 
Jewish community was particularly anxious that this 
distinction should be made before people attributed blame 
to any one group of foreigners. A committee of Jewish 
manufacturers claimed that, to its knowledge, there was no 
sweating in any Jewish-owned factory. If specific cases 
could be pointed out, it wo_uld take immediate steps to put 
an end to such co~ditioris. 42 
After an enquiry, the Federal Government reported 
that its investigations had not substantiated Clarke's 
allegations. 43 The Victorian Premier and the Assistant 
Minister for Labor issued a joint statement declaring that 
thei~ investigations had likewise found no evidence of 
sweating in backyard factories.44 The report submitted 
to the Victorian Government suggested that work at night by 
sons and daughters of Jewish clothing manufacturers may have 
39. Argus, 10 May 1939. 
40. Age, 10 May 1939. 
41. ~· 12 May 1939. 
4 2. Argus, 15 May 1939. 
4 3. Argus, 27 June 1939. 
44. Argus, 30 June 19 39. 
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been the cause of Clarke's allegations.45 Clarke declined 
to make any further comment on the affair, apart from 
stating that it was not worth his while 'engaging in a dog 
fight on the issue'.46 
Labour and manufacturing were not the only 
occupational groups affected by refugee immigration. Whereas 
souchern European immigrants had been chiefly unskilled 
workers, a great number of the refugees from Nazism worked 
in the professions. The reaction of professional groups in 
Australia to the potential threat of foreign competition 
varied. Professional engineers and architects generally 
accepted qualified refugees and even enthused about the 
injection of new ideas into the local professional scene. 
~ 
The President of the N.S.W. Chapter of the Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects urged local architects to welcome 
refugee members of their profession as they would be an 
acquisition 'to the cultural side of Australian life•.47 
At the same time, employers of professional men 
were extremely sensitive to any accusations that they were 
giving preference to refugees over Australians. Although 
Ehere-was a shortage o( g~a~uate engineers in Australia, a 
controversy broke out when the Sydney County Council 
appointed an Austrian refugee to its engineering staff. A 
motion was put forward by Councillor Tresidder, condemning 
the appointment of a refugee instead of an Australian. It 
was narrowly defeated on the grounds that the refugee, a 
Dr. Difasendoif, had specialized qualifications not posses~ed 
by the Australian applicants for the position. But the 
Council reaffirmed its policy of giving preference to 
Australians over foreign applicants. 48 
45. Argus, 13 July 1~39. 
46. Argus, 27 June 1939. 
Clarke refused an invitation to speak to a meeting of 
the League for Peace and Democracy and also an 
invitation from Jewish manufacturers to inspect their 
factories and records. Argus, 7 June 1939. 
47. Architecture, 1 February 1939, p. 31. 
48. S.M.H., 8 March 1939. 
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so lucky. 
Refugees who worked in other professions were not 
Lawyers, teachers and dentists normally had to 
undergo retraining if they wanted to continue to work in 
their professions. The Musicians' Union refused to admit 
any person who was not a naturalized Australian.4 9 In most 
cases, little public fuss resulted from the imposition of 
these restrictions and the refugees, excluded from their 
own professions, duly came under attack when they began 
competing with Australians in retail and manufacturing 
businesses. 
Only the medical profession's attitude to refugees 
became a hotly debated public issue. Australian doctors 
represented an educated section of the cummunity w~th high 
ethical standards and a professed sympathy for humanity. 
They were one group which might have been expected to 
welcome refugees, especially highly qualified specialists, 
to their profession. The reverse was the case. The state 
branches of the British Medical Association adopted a 
narrow, parochial attitude towards the registration of 
refugee me~ical practitioners and behaved like working-
class trade unions in an effort to protect their sectional 
interests. 
There were sound reasons for the medical 
profession's feeling of vulnerability. Jewish ~actors, who 
had accounted for 10.9% of the German medical profession in 
1933,50 were one of the first groups persecuted by Hitler 
and sought refuge overseas. When refugee immigration to 
Australia began building up in 1938, Australian doctors and 
medical students agitated for the protection of local medical 
practitioners. The Medical Journal of Australia declared• 
49. The attitudes of the various professions to refugees 
in N.S.W. and Victoria are discussed by Caroline Kelly 
(op.cit., p. 27) and Ursula Wiemann (££.cit., 
pp. 150-151! respectively. 
50. G. Warburg, op.cit., p. 30. 
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Their plight is unfortunate, but, for the 
protection of the profession, and indeed, 
the people of Australia, th~y cannot be 
allowed immediate registration.51 
111. 
The registration of medical practitioners was a 
state matter, carried out by Medical Boards in accordance 
with State Medical Acts. State governments agreed that 
Australian doctors were entitled to protection and, where 
necessary, amended_!h:ir Medical Acts to prevent the 
registration of refugee medical practitioners. 52 The only 
graduates of non-Australian universities entitled to 
registration were those from countries which had reciprocal 
-arrangements _with Australia; in most states this meant the 
British Empire and Italy. Australian universities made 
limited concessions to refugee doctors who had to complete 
the last three years of the six-year medical course in 
Sydney, Brisbane and Adelaide and the last five years at 
Melbourne University.53 
The matter would probably have rested if there 
had not been a shortage of doctors in country areas. ln 
June 1939, the N.S.W. Legislative Assembly, under U.A.P. 
Premier B.S.B. Stevens, passed an Amendment to the Medical 
Practitioners' Act to enable some refugee doctors who were 
proficjent in medicine, surgery and midwifery, to be granted 
'regional registration 1 to practise in certain country areas 
which were without medical services. These 'region.al 
51. M.J.A., 31 December 1938. 
Medical students at Melbourne University signed a 
petition urging the Government to limit the 
re,gistration of foreign .doctors. Argus, 1 December 1938. 
52. (Victoria) Medical Act No. 4617 of 19 December 1938. 
(N.S.W.) Medical Practitioners Act No·. 37 of 
22 December 1938. In accordance with this Act, eight 
specially qualifi~d immigrant medical practitioners 
could be registered each year. 
(Queensland) Medical Act No. 10 of 9 November 1939. 
(Tasmania) Medical Act No. 53 of 6 December 1937. 
53. Sir James Barrett, 'Medicine in Australia and 
Refugees', Australian Quarterly, 12, No. 1 (1940), 
pp. 14-23. 
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registration' certificates were to be renewed annually and 
the doctors had to remain in the one country district for 
five years, after which they would be entitled to general 
registration.54 
The Victorian Government refused to follow the 
N.S.W. example, despite continuing complaints that many 
country centres were without medical services.SS country 
Party Premier A.A. Dunstan maintained that if there was 
any justification for maintaining expensive 
medical schools at Australian universities, 
then the doctors who graduated from these 
schools are entitled to protection.56 
·This was what .. the. B.M.A. wanted to hear. Dr. F.L. Davies, 
President of the Victorian Branch, maintained that 'if 
there was a living to be made anywhere, an Australian 
doctor would go there'.S7 A further expression of approval 
came from the Secretary of the Melbourne University Medical 
Students' Society.SB 
The Commonwealth Government, which had no say 
on the question of medical registration but controlled 
immigration, soon became wary about granting entry 
permits to refugee medical practitioners. Senator Foll, 
Minister for the Interior, stated that it was useless to 
54. 
SS. 
N.S.W. Medical Practitioners (Amendment} ~ct No. 5 
of 20 June 1939. 
Sir James Barrett, letters to M.J.A., 21 January, 
4 March 1939; 
Argus, 3 April 1939. 
Sir James Barrett, a former President of the Victorian 
Branch of the B.M.A. and Chancellor of Melbourne 
University, was outspoken on the shortage of doctors 
in country areas and agitated for the ~egistration of 
refugee doctors. 
56. Argus, 7· June 1939. 
Dunstan later refused to bring Victoria into line with 
the other states by decreasing the number of years of 
medical study which refugees had to undertake to 
qualify as Australi-an-·graduates. -Argus, 6 December 
1939. Sir James Barrett had endeavoured to have the 
question reopened by the Council of Melbourne 
University. 
57. Argus, 18 July 1939. 
58. Argus, 10 August 1939. 
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approve the admission of refugee doctors unless they could 
continue to practise. He condemned the B.M.A. 's attitude 
as 'very narrowminded 1 ; it :was 'scandalous that men with 
high qualifications, who would confer a great benefit on 
Australia, should be prevented from coming here•.59 
Victoria's Chief Secretary, Henry Bailey, retorted that the 
registration of doctors was a 'state matter and had nothing 
to do with Senator Foll or any other Federal Minister' .60 
There was no reason why Victoria should admit a 'flood' of 
refugee doctors to 'compete with doctors who have undergone 
years of training in our universities'. 61 In retaliation, 
Senator Foll pointed out that his Department had recently 
been forced to reject applications from twenty-nine well-
-qualified me di-cal· p.ract-It-.f-6n-e--rs·, .. a-es pi te the fact thn t 
outback Australia was 'crying out for medical services' .62 
The refugee doctor question became a public issue 
at the end of 1939, not in Victoria but in N.S.W. where the 
Government's attitude to refugee doctors had appeared to be 
more lenient. In late November, a number of State U.A.P. 
and Country Party parliamentarians complained that the 
Medi cal Pr ac-tition-ers-(Amen-dmEmt·)--Ac-t-,-pas.s.ed_in __ J_l,!ne, had 
- - ---- -------- - - ---·--.. 
not been put into practice. They alleged that the Medical 
Board had failed to deal with applications for regional 
registration from almost forty refugee doctors and had not 
approved- the--r-eg i strati on _of_ any __ !3peci?Ji_? tJ> -~_n_d_t:_r._ Ui_e _ 
provision that eight specially-qualified refugee doctors 
could he registered annually. 63 
So far as spokesmen for the medical profession 
were concerned, refugee doctors were no more welcome in 
59. Argus, 21 June 1939. 
60. Argus, 22 June 1939. 
i; 1. Ibia. 
6 2. Argus, 23 June, 25 July 19 39. 
6 3. -S.M.H., 22 November 1939. 
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country districts than in the cities. Dr. G. Moncrieff Barron, 
President of the N.S.W. Branch of the B.M.A., maintained that 
there was, in fact, no shortage of doctors in Australia. It 
would be difficult enough for future medical graduates to 
obtain practices and, with Australia at war, the B.M.A. had 
to protect the interests of local doctors on active service~ 4 
These arguments did not altogether explain the profession's 
opposition to allowing refugee doctors practise in areas 
where there were at present no medical services. One reason 
for this attitude was the fear that they would rush to the 
cities as soon as they had completed the required five years 
in the country. The more immediate reason was that the 
regional registration of refugee medical practitioners would 
undermine the profession's.attempt to obtain larger subsidies 
from the Government. Like foreign working-class immigrants, 
refugee doctors posed the threat of cheap labour. A 
Macquarie Street specialist pointed out that, if adequate 
subsidies were paid, there would be no shortage of medical 
services in the country. The present Government subsidy, 
guaranteeing a minimum annual income of £600 in some country 
areas, was inadequate.65 
The B.M.A. found a willing supporter in the new 
N.S.W. Premier, Alexander Mair, whose actions on the refugee 
doctor issue marked the beginning of a discriminatory 
--.·-po-1-i"t:y-- against- a-11 -refugee __ imrnig:i;apt.~ .. · .. 6 __ ~ Afte.r a Cabinet 
meeting on 5 December, Mair announced that, because 'the 
Empire had become engaged in war with Germany', Cabinet 
would not approve of 'the registration as a medical 
practitioner of any alien enemy of German nationality' . 67 
This argument was suspect because, at the same time, Mair 
submitted to the medical profession's agitation for increased 
64. S.M.H., 27 November 1939. 
65. D.G. Carruthers, letter to S.M.H., 29 November 1939. 
66. See pp.128, 137-140. 
In August 1939, Mair succeeded B.S.B. Stevens as 
Premier. of N.s.w., leadin~ a U.A.P./Country party 
coalition government. 
67. S.M.H., 6 December 1939. 
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subsidies. The guaranteed income for doctors in not more 
than fifteen country areas was increased from I: 600 to£ 1,000 
'in view of the difficulty of obtaining suitable medical 
practitioners in country areas where they are needed, and 
with a view to encouraging applications _from Australian, 
New Zealand, or British graduates'. The Government would 
appoint non-German refugee doctors only if there were 
insufficient applications from 'British' doctors. 68 
When challenged on the decision, Mair admitted 
that he considered it was the Government's first duty to 
'safeguard the interests of its own people', especially 
doctors who would be fighting overseas; 
it would seem to be extraordinary to allow 
a German refugee doctor to become so entrenched 
during the absence of the Australian doctor as 
to place the Australian at a disadvantage on his 
return.69 
If such a statement made Mair sound like an agent for the 
B.M.A., he also continued to justify the Government's policy 
on grounds unrelated to the economic interests of the 
medical profession. The 'determining fact' for the decision, 
he claimed, was that German refugee doctors were 'still 
nationals of a country with which Australia is at war'. 
They were 'enemy aliens' and 
unless we suppose them. to be differently 
constituted from ourselves, tl1eir hearts are 
still with Germany, and Germany's interests 
are theirs.70 
Mair knew that the Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, did not ·· 
support-this view. In response to a request for advice on 
the question of registering German refugee doctors, Menzies 
had stated that 'if these men were permitted to enter the 
~ountry they should not be debarred the right of earning a 
living' .71 Although Mair's use of the 'enemy alien' 
68. S.M.H., 6 December 1939. 
69. s.M.H., 11 December 1939. 
70. Ibid. 
71. Sun, 5 December 1939. 
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argument seemed in this case to be little more than a 
pretext for protecting Australian doctors, his later 
agitation against other refugees on the same grounds,. 
resulting in conflict with the Federal Government, indicated 
that it was at least a contributing factor to his decision. 
The B.M.A. applauded the Government's action and 
Dr. Moncrrieff Barron stated that, with the new guaranteed 
income of £1,000 per annum, he was 'confident that local 
doctors will fill vacancies in isolated districts•. 72 
outside the medical profession, the Premier and the B.M.A. 
had only a few supporters. With the interests of 
Australia's serving men at heart, the N.s.w. Branch of the 
R~s:L. praised the,decision and attempted to justify its 
stand on the alleged grounds that Australian doctors had 
returned from World War I to find their practices lost. 73 
The v·chemently anti-alren-S"\jdney Sun-ag·reed-·-that--it.-was .not 
at all unjust to 'give preference to our own Australian 
doctors in any employment offering'.74 
With U.A.P. and Country Party·parliamentarians 
and even Cabinet divided on the issue, Maii's firm line 
brought the threat of a Government crisis.75 
Herbert Fitzsimons, Minister for Health, had recommended 
that refugee doctors be granted regional registration and, 
according to rumours, threatened to resign if the scheme was 
not put into practice.76 When the decision was announced, 
72. D.T., 11 December 1939. 
~ Moricri;;ff Barron was right. On 9 January 1940 
Mair announced that applications had been received 
from 33 Australian and British graduates for 
appointment to fifteen country districts which were 
currently without medical services. S.M.H., 
10 January. 1940. 
73. S.M.H., 14 DE1cember 1939. 
74. ~' 6 December 1939. 
75. Sun, 5 December 1939. 
D.T., 6 December 1939. 
76. S.M.H., 6 De.cember 1939. 
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the u.A.P. member for Drummoyne, J.R. Lee, stated that 
private members were 'determined that Parliament shall be 
supreme, and not the B.M.A. or the Cabinet•.77 On 8 December 
he led a deputation of U.A.P. and country Party members to 
the Premier. 78 Mair stated that Cabinet would not reverse 
its decision and Lee threatened to raise the issue at the 
next session of the Legislative Assembly. 
angrily: 
He declared 
Hitler has nothing on the Premier, Mr. Mair, in 
his treatment of refugee doctors ... Hitler at 
least either puts them in concentration camps 
and feeds them, or drives them out of 
Germany.79 
Outside -Parliament, Mair's announcement unleashed 
a storm of condemnation. Many Australians did not approve 
of refugees or any other foreign immigrants competing 
--------econom-ica-1-1-Y- wi.th ..... Au.s-tr_a.Lia ns __ but __ they __ di_d ___ l}ot ___ s !O!e _ why 
medical practitioners, who •eemed to be doing much better 
for themselves than most Australians, should be singled out 
for special Government protection. The protest agitation 
was led by the usual refugee sympathizers, including 
Bishop C.V. Pilcher, other Protestant churchmen and the 
League of Nations Union. They were joined by the National 
Council of Women and the N.S.W. Housewives' Association. 80 
For a week after Mair's announcement, the issue 
was prominent in 1:he Sydney pres·s. The Sydney Morning rrerald 
continued its traditional pro-refugee policy in editorials 
condemning the Government's action.81 Until the end of 
77. S.M.H., 6 December 1939. 
78. S.M.H., 8,9 December, 1939. Q..:_!.., 8 December 1939. 
79. Daily News, 12 December 1939. 
80. S.M.H., 7, 8, 16, 18, 22 December 1939. 
D.T., 11 December 1939. 
Bishop c.v. Pilcher, Anglican Coadjutor Bishop of 
Sydnciy, was one of the refugees' most consistent 
supporters. See pp. 131, 134, 135, 162, 184, 198-9, 
276. 
81. s·.M.H., 7,11 De·cember "!939, 10 January 1940. 
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December, its correspondence columns published letters almost 
daily under the heading 'Refugee Doctors'. With only a few 
exceptions, the only letter-writers who supported Mair and 
the B.M.A. were Australian medical practitioners.82 The 
Sydney Morning Herald's enthusiasm for the refugee doctors' 
cause was only outweighed by that of the Daily Teleqraph 
which mounted an outspoken attack on the Government in news 
reports, editorial comment and cartoons. 83 Even Smith's 
weekly, which readily admitted that it had no sympathy for 
foreign immigrants, attacked the B.M.A.'s pressure tactics.84 
The labour press showed little interest in the issue, 
although Lang's vehemently anti-alien Century expressed 
sympathy for the plight of refugee doctors in the same 
article as it denounced any further alien immigration.BS 
Apart from the Sydney ~' few commentators were prepared to 
support the Government. The Bulletin, which normally .seized 
every oppor-t-unity-to-ai:t-ack-for-eTg-n-iliimlgranEs, ri·aa noth:Cng 
to say. 
The opponents of the new restrictions condemned 
the Government's and the B.M.A.'s attitudes to 'regional 
registration' in particular and took the opportunity to 
attack their policies on refugee doctors in general. Their 
immediate target was the Premier, who~e attempt to justify 
the decision on th·e grounds that German refugees were 'enemy 
aliens' was denounc~d as preposterous. According to the 
SyU.ney i•lorrilng Her·a·-ld ;·-·-rvlai-r h·a·d-a-dded 'in-s-u-1-t-'to-i-n-j-u-r-y-!_ ____ _ 
when he claimed that the refugees were still Germans at heart8.6 
82. Whether'or not the letters published by the S.M.H. were 
a fair sample of those received by the newspaper is a 
matter for conjecture. ·The S.M.H. usually gave a 
reasonably fair.hearing to both sides of the refugee 
question (for example, refugee immigration and the 
Kimberley issue, see pp. 205-8) in spite of its own 
pro-refugee policy. However, some doctors complained 
that their letters, later printed in the M.J.A., were 
rejected by the ~!:!.· 
-83. D.T., 7, 11 Decenlbe.r 1939. 
See also Sunday Telegraph, 10 December 1939, and cartoons 
D.T., 7 December 1939 (see p. 119), and Sunday Telegraph, 
lODecember 1939 (see p. 120). 
84. Smith's weekly; 16 December 1939, 6 January 1940. 
85. Century, 8 December 1939. 
86. S.M.H., 11 December 1939. 
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Sunday Telegraph, lp December 1939. 
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A letter-writer to its correspondence column wrote 
indignantly: 'if refugees~ nationals of Germany they 
would not be here•.B 7 Bishop Pilcher pointed out that 
Jewish doctors had been persecuted in Germany because they 
were .!:!.£! Germans; they were now being persecuted in 
Australia on the grounds that they~ Germans.BB The 
Sydney Morning Herald warned that the welfare of refugee 
doctors and country districts were not the only things at 
stake; so too was the reputation of the N.S.W. Government 
for 'both fairness and good sense•.B9 Worse still, the 
Government's discriminatory measures against a particular 
group of people laid it open to allegations that it shared 
'the intolerance and prejudice of the Nazis' 90 
The B.M.A. 's and the Government's claim that 
regional regiatration would adversely affect the livelihood 
of Australian doctors was denounced as being no more valid 
than the 'enemy alien' argument. As the Sydney Morning 
Herald and numerous letter-writers pointed out, refugee 
doctors working in country areas previously without medical 
services could sdarcely be accused of building up practices 
at the expense of Australian doctors serving in the forces 
or of competing with Australian graduates. 91 The problem, 
stressed the Daily Telegraph, was to provide medical services 
for sick people; the country needed doctors and refugees 
87. F.A. Keen, letter to S.M.H., 13 December 1939. 
See also Audrey A. Herborn, letter to S.M.H., 
9 December 1939. 
88. S.M.H., 7 December 1939. 
B9. S.M.H., 11 December 1939. 
A similar comment was made by Sunday Telegraph, 
10 December 1939. 
90. Sunday Telegraph, 10 December 1939. 
See also M. Kent Hughes and E. Bradley, letter to 
S.M.H., B December 1939. 
91. S.M.H., 11 December 1939. 
J.S. Needham, letter to S.M.H., 14 December 1939. 
G.L. McDonald, letter to S.M.H., 16 December 1939 
John Wattleworth, letter to S.M.H., 20 December 1939. 
l 
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92 
were prepared to go there. By paying larger subsidies, 
Nair and the B.M.A. were conniving to further the material 
well-being of Australian doctors and keep aliens out of the 
profession - at the taxpayer's expense. The new subsidy, 
guaranteeing an annual income of £1,000 in some areas, was 
93 
'a scandalous waste of public money'. 
Many people considered that the issue of 'regional 
registration' was only part of the wider refugee doctor 
question. These doctors were qualified professional people 
who had been forced to leave their own countries and had 
come to Australia to start a new life. If they had been 
permitted to enter Australia, theri surely they had 'the 
. h . ' 94 rig t to live ; 
travesty of social 
to deny them 
. t. ' 95 JUS ice . 
this right was 'a blatant 
What had happened to the 
British tradition of fair play to which Australians 
allegedly subscribed? 96 As many people pointed out, the 
Australian medical profession had exaggerated the 'threat' 
of refugee doctors. In N.s.w. there were 2,402 registered 
medical practitioners - and perhaps fifty refugees seeking 
registration. 97 Were the B.M.A. and its members really 
92. D.T., 7,8,9 December 193~. 
See also Sunday Telegraph, 10 December 1939. 
93. S.M.H., 7 December 1939. 
See also D.T., 7 December 1939; E.Watt, letter to S.M.H., 
8 December 1939. 
94. J.R. Lee, u.~.P. member for Drummoyne in the N.S.W. 
Legislative Assembly, D.T., 6 December 1939. 
Similar comments were expressed by: 
Bishop Pilcher, S.M.H., 7 December 1939. 
League of Nations Union, S.M.H., 8 December 1939. 
National Council of Women, S.M.H., 8 December 1939. 
N.S.W. Housewives' Association, S.M.H., 22 Decen1ber 1939. 
95. E. Watt, letter to~~., 8 December 1939. 
96. M. Kent Hughes and E. Bradley, l.etter to S.M.H., 
8 December 1939. F.A. Keen, letter to S.M.H., 13 December 
1939. 
97. D.T., 7 December 1939. 
ACCording to the N.S.W. committee of the Australian 
Society of Scientific Workers, there were 35 refugee 
doctors in N.S.W. S.M.H., 22 December 1939. 
Dr. Moncrieff Barron, President of the N.S.W. Branch of 
the B.M.A.,claimed that there were 55. S.M.H., 
27 November 1939. 
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'so afraid of the competitlon of a few qualified refugee 
doctors?' asked one letter-writer to the Sydney Morning 
Herald. 98 And where were the profession's high ideals of 
service to humanity? 99 The B.M.A. had 'done the medical 
profession a grave disservice' in attempting to 'conserve 
its sectional interests•lOO and had descended to the level 
of the 'most narrow-minded trade union', interested only 
k . 101 in money-ma ing. 
The refugee doctors'. supporters maintained that, 
in the long run, Australians would be the losers because 
they were being denied the services of talented medical 
practioners. 102 According to the Sunday Telegraph, a 
skilled doctor was 'an asset to the State whether he was 
born in Bondi or Berlin' . 103 Because of the medical 
profession's protectionist policy, one of Vienna's leading 
surgeons was sweeping floors in a Sydney factory and a 
German orthopaedic specialist was working in a bootshop. 
Other highly qualified refugee doctors were washing cars, 
cleaning windows and working as waiters. 104 
Australian doctors tried to justify their stand 
in the face of this onslaught. Dr. R.P. Melville, Secretary 
of the Sydney University Medical Society, reiterated the 
profession's economic arguments against alien medical 
practitioners. It was unfair that Australian graduates 
should have to compete with foreign doctors; they had 
enough difficulty obtaining positions with 'a modest income' 
The profession also had to ensure that Australian doctors 
who were serving.in the forces would be able to resume their 
f . h . t 105 armer practices on t eir re urn. 
98. 'Anti-Nazi', letter to S.M.H., 9 December 1939. 
99. Elsie w. Danger, letter to S.M.H., 25 December 1939. 
loo. S.M.H., 7 December 1939. 
101. Elsie w. Danger, letter to S.M.H., 25 December 1939. 
102. 'Architect', letter to S.M.H., 19 December 1939. 
103. Sunday Telegraph, 10 December 1939. 
104. John Wattleworth, let~er to S.M.H., 20 December 1939. 
D. T. , 8 December 19 39. 
Sir James Barrett, letter to ~~·I 10 February 1940. 
105. s .M. H. I 14 December 1939. 
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When this well-worn argument only brought forth 
further condemnation of the medical profession's 
selfishness, some Australian doctors attempted to discredit 
refugee practitioners in the eyes of the public. 'J'heir 
first step was to cast doubt on the professional standards 
of the refugees, whose training they alleged was inferior 
to that provided in Australian medical schools, which had 
the reputation of being amongst the best in the world. 106 
The N.S.W. Committee of the Australian Society of Scientific 
workers presented some specific facts to refute the 
allegations. It gave details of the thirty-five refugee 
doctors who were seeking registration in N.S.W. and 
concluded that their training in Germany and Austria was 
'practically i.dend.-cat-·in length ·and coil tent' ··yo· th., Sydney-
University course. Many refugee doctors had spent longer 
in residence and doing research work than Sydney University 
graduates. Of the thirty-five doctors, fourteen were 
specialists. 10 7 
The ethical standards of refugee doctors came 
under attack next. In a letter to the Medical Journal of 
Australia, Dr. w. Maxwell of Macquarie Street asked: 
can their identity be definitely established, 
and if so, the authenticity of their diplomas 
also? I am sure not.108 
Maxwell suggested that, amongst the refugees, there were 
'those who are not what they profess to be'. If this 
allegation was directed at only some of the refugee doctors, 
his next criticism affected them all. Refugee medical 
practitioners had an 'effrontery that is un-British'; 
possessed of what may be termed eastern 
European standards of ethics ... Our profession 
will not benefit, nor the public.109 
106. w. Maxwell, letter to M.J.A., 16 December 1939. 
they 
T.W. Lipscomb, letter to M.J.A., 20 September 1941. 
107. S.M.H., 22 December 1939. 
108. W. Maxwell, 9.£·,Cit. 
109, Ibid. 
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All this was too much for Dr. o. Kudelka, a former member 
of the Executive of the Viennese Medical Association, who 
~eclared that it was unfair 'to put forward general 
allegations of forgery and dishonesty against a whole 
profession' without stating some facts. Kudelka threw the 
anti-British accusation back in Maxwell's face; he hoped 
that the 'British sense of fair play' would enable refugees 
'to prove by deeds who they are' ,110 / 
Maxwell's issertion of British moral superiority, 
which had frequently been expressed by persons who opposed 
foreign immigration, was not isolated. Other doctors joined 
in and described the refugees as 'un-British' and 'anti-
___ B_ritish'. __ 111 ___ 'l'his __ had11othing to do with being at war with 
Germany and regarding refugees as 'enemy aliens' in the 
political sense. The refugee doctor was simply a foreigner 
with an alien outlook which was not in keeping with the 
medical profession's allegedly British ideals. 
Not all Australian doctors agreed with the 
professional and ethical allegations against refugee 
doctors or even with the B.M.A.'s general attitude on the 
issue. In letters to the Sydney Morning Herald they 
declared their opposition to the B.M.A. and bewailed the 
medical profession's apparent loss of ideals. 112 A medical 
student at Sydney University claimed that the opinions of 
Dr. Melville, Secretary of their Medical Society, were not 
shared by all students.113 
110. 0. Kudelka, letter to M.J.A., 13 January 1940. 
111. W.J. McCristal, letter to M.J.A., 20 January 1940. 
T·.w. Lipscomb, £12.·~it. 
112. C.E. North, letter to S.M.H., 15 December.1939. 
J. Edwards, letter to S.M.H., 18 December 1939. 
'Female doctor', letter to S.M.H., 22 Decemb-er 1939. 
113. 'Medical student', letter to S.M.H., 
21 December 1939. 
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Compared with the rest of the community, 
Australian Jews had little to say on the issue. They were 
still wary about laying themselves open to accusations of 
supporting their foreign co-religionists at the expense 
of Australians and preferred to let non-Jews agitate for 
the refugee doctor cause. 114 A few were prepared to attack 
the attitudes of the B.M.A. and the N.S.W. Premier. The 
Sydney Jewish News praised the Sydney Morning Herald's 
editorial comments and alleged that the B.M.A. 's action was 
based purely on motives of financial self-interest while 
the Government's discriminatory policy showed signs of 
growing racial antagonism' .1 15 The most outspoken Jewish 
commentator was Rabbi Max Schenk, who gave Australians a 
f ore·ta.S te·--0 f what ·they-·could ·expect·---i-£---they- dis er imina tad 
against refugees. Rabbi Schenk alleged that Mair's 
decision against regional registration was a 
most flagrant violation of decency and humanity 
as well as of fundamental Australian Law ... 
The B.M.A. stands condemned through the public 
utterances of its leaders as having violated, 
by their conduct, every canon of decency as 
well as their sacred oath of service to 
humanity. 116 
114. The reticence of Australian Jews to promote the cause 
of refugee doctors had been demonstrated during the 
debate on the Victorian Medical Act in 1938. 
Colonel Harold Cohen and Archie Michaelis had both 
expressed their sympathy for refugee doctors but 
maintained that the State had a duty to its own 
graduates. Foreign doctors should not be used to 
lower the standards of remuneration in country 
districts. - A.J.H., 8 December 1938. 
115. ·s.J.N., 15 December 1939. 
116. S.J.N., 5 January 1940. Part of Rabbi Schenk's 
statement appeared in the S.M.H., 23 December 1939. 
Rabbi Schenk frequently attacked the attitudes of 
Australians towards Jewish refugees. (see pp. 132,161) 
Schenk, the thirty-four year old Chief Minister of 
Sydney's Liberal Jewish Synagogue, was born in 
Switzerland and educated i~ the United States. An 
active Zionist, he was President of the Zionist 
Federation of Australia and New Zealand from 1945 
until 1948, when he returned to the United States. 
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These were strong words. The B.M.A. 's State President, 
or. Moncrieff Barron, retaliated by accusing Rabbi Schenk 
of 'a lack of moderation unparalleled in the expressions of 
a leader of a religious denomination in this country'. 
In no circumstances, he declared, would the B.M.A. agree 
to any measure which lets foreigners practise 
at the expense of Australians who make their 
sacrifices of serving in the forces.117 
Despite the general public outrage on the issue, 
some Australian Jews were still not prepared to criticize 
government institutions. An extreme example of this 
attitude came from an 'old Jewish resident' who considered 
that it was '~o~t r~grettable that a Jewish rabbi should 
attack the Government of this State'. Rabbi Schenk's 
comments 'were not in any way acceptable to the Jewish 
community of the city', whose head was Rabbi Falk, Senior 
Minister of the Great Synagogue.118 Rabbi Falk had his say 
when a non-Jewish Austrian refugee accused the B.M.A. of 
'anti-Jewish utterances' .119 In an apologetic letter to 
Dr. Moncrieff Barron, he refuted the refugee's criticism of 
the B.M.A. which, said Rabbi Falk, had 'among its members 
many Jewish medical men' .120 There was some truth in Rabbi 
Falk's criticism of the refugee's allegations; although 
the B.M.A. was vehemently pro-British and anti-foreign, at 
no time did it publicly oppose the registration of refugee 
doctors on the grounds that they were Jewish. 
While Australia's involvement in the war was used 
by the medical profession as an excuse to protect the 
interests of local doctors, it had a wide effect on the 
status of all refugee immigrants. The Federal Government 
classified refugees as 'enemy aliens' because .technically 
they were nationals of countries with which Britain was at 
\'lar. Under the National Security (Aliens Control) 
Regulations, enemy aliens were subject to increasing 
117. s.M.H., 25 December 1939. 
118. S.M.H., 26 December 1939. 
119. 'Austrian refugee', letter to S.M.H., 28 December 1939. 
120. S.M.H., 29 December 1939. 
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These were strong words. The B.M.A. 's State President, 
or. Moncrieff Barron, retaliated by accusing Rabbi Schenk 
of 'a lack of moderation unparalleled in the expressions of 
a leader of a religious denomination in this country'. 
In no circumstances, he declared, would the B.M.A. agree 
to any measure which lets foreigners practise 
at the expense of Australians who make their 
sacrifices of serving in the forces.117 
Despite the general public outrage on the issue, 
some Australian Jews were still not prepared to criticize 
government institutions. An extreme example of this 
attitude came from an 'old Jewish resident' who considered 
--th_a_t_ it-wa-s-- 'most--regrettable ·that ··a · J·ewish--·rabbi shou·ld ·· 
attack the Government of this State'. Rabbi Schenk's 
comments 'were not in any way acceptable to the Jewish 
community of the city', whose head was Rabbi Falk, Senior 
Minister of the Great Synagogue.118 Rabbi Falk had his say 
when a non-Jewish Austrian refugee accused the B.M.A. of 
'anti-Jewish utterances' .119 In an apologetic letter to 
Or. Moncrieff Barron, he refuted the refugee's criticism of 
the B.M.A. which, said Rabbi Falk, had 'among its members 
many Jewish medical men' . 120 There was some truth in Rabbi 
Falk's criticism of the refugee's allegations; although 
the B.M.A. was vehemently pr'o'-British and anti-foreign, at 
no time did it publicly oppose the registration of refugee 
doctors on the grounds that they were Jewish. 
While Australia's involvement in the war was used 
by the medical profession as an excuse to protect the 
interests of local doctors, it had a wide effect on the 
status of all refugee immigrants. The Federal Government 
classified refugees as 'enemy aliens' because _technically 
they were nationals of ~ountries with which Britain was at 
war. Under the National Security (Aliens Control) 
Regulations, enemy aliens were subject to increasing 
117. S.M.H., 25 December 1939. 
118. S .M. H., 26 December 1939. 
119. 'Austrian refugee', letter to S.M.H., 28 December 1939. 
120. S.M.H., 29 December 1939. 
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restrictions as the war progressed. They had to obtain 
permission to change their place of residence and even to 
leave the police district in which they lived. Without 
special authority they were not allowed to rent telephones 
or own motor vehicles, boats, cameras and. radios.1 21 The 
National Security (Land Transfer) Regulations prohibited 
them 
year 
from buying property or acquiring more than a five-
leasehold.122 
Not all enemy aliens were left at largei it was 
Federal Government policy to intern persons suspected of 
being engaged in subversive activities.123 With the fall 
of France and the entry of Italy into the war in mid-1940, 
some--l'..ustralians.---began--proclaiming that all -enemy alic:rns 
were a threat to the country's security and that they should 
all be interned. The agitation was led by the N.S.W. Premier, 
Alexander Mair, who was dissatisfied with the limited action 
being taken by the Commonwealth authorities. Mair constantly 
reiterated that, if he had his way, no enemy alien 'would 
be allowed to remain at large•.124 M.F. Bruxner, the N.S.W 
Deputy Premier and Leader of the Country Party, agreed with 
Mair and maintained that 'every enemy national is suspect 
and should be interned'.125 
The ory for the internment of all enemy aliens 
was taken up by returned servicemen's organizations and 
individual Australians. Some people questioned the refugees' 
121. Statutory Rules 1939, No. 88, 13 September, No. 95, 
21 September. 
Statutory Rules 1940, No. 44, 28 February, No. 66, 
22 April. 
122. Statutory Rules 1940, No. 141, 23 July, No. 148, 
26 July, No. 200, 12 September, No. 239, 1 Nove'mber, 
No. 265, 27 November. 
123. Paul Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 
Series 4 (Civil), Volume 1, The Government and the 
People, 1939-41, Canberra, 1952, p. 593. 
124. N.S.W.P.D. Vol 161, p. 8614, 16 May 1940. 
Mair agitated first for the internment of all Germans 
and, following the entry of Italy into the war, all 
enemy aliens. See also S.M.R., 13, 27 June, 
24 July 1940. 
125. S.M.H., 26 June 1940. 
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loyalty and alleged that there was a danger of a Fifth 
column in Australia. According to one letter-writer to the 
Sydney Morning Herald, many refugees had a guarded, even 
critical attitude to Australia and Britain, 'revealing 
obvious Nazi influences•. 126 Another maintained that Hitler 
only needed a few more victories and the harmless refugee 
would grow 'into a lord of creation ready to die for the 
Fatherland' .127 
Most of the advocates of internment considered 
that the danger cam~ not so much from genuine refugees as 
from Nazi spies who 'pose as refugees everywhere'.128 
Returned servicemen insisted that tne iss_ue_s-hould nat·~­
clouded 'by bringing up the question of re~ugees•.129 
According to John Black, Secretary of the N.S.W. Branch of 
the R.S.L., 
it would be far better to have 99 innocent 
enemy aliens in safe-keeping than to allow one 
guilty man to go free.130 
This was no time for 'sloppy sentimentality', declared 
Fred Aarons, President of the Exservicemen's War Emergency 
Association. The Government had to take 'total precaution 
against total risk in total war'.13l Smith's Weekly, the 
diggers' champion, agreed. 
there was 
Its headlines screamed that 
BUT ONE PLACE FOR ENEMY ALIENS 
THAT IS IN THE INTERNMENT CAMP132 
126. 'B.E.F. ', letter to S.M.H., 5 August 1940. 
127. N. Nairn, letter to ?.M.H., 1 August 1940. 
128. H.B; Yencken, letter to Argus, 8 July 1940. 
129. Statement by L.A. Robb, State ~resident of the N.S.W. 
Branch Of the R.S.S.I.L.A., S.M.H., 25 July 1940. 
130. S.M.H., 2 August 1940. 
131. S.M.H., 2 August 1940. Meetings of exservicemen's 
organizations passed resolutions demanding the 
internment of all enemy aliens: 
(i) The Exservicemen's War Emergency Association 
organized meetings at the Sydney Domain on 21 July 
(Argus, 22 July 1940) and in the Sydney Town Hall, 
(S.M.H., 25 July 1940). 
(ii)The Annual Conference of the Victorian Branch of 
the R.S.S.I.L.A., Argus, 22 November 1940. 
132. Smith's weekly, 16 November 1940. 
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some innocent aliens would have to suffer, lest dangerous 
ones escaped. There could be no doubt that 'Machiavellian 
minds in Germany seized on the opportunity to send agents 
throughout the world in the guise of refugees' .133 
Letter-writers to the press also stressed that Australia 
was at war and could not afford to take any risks. 1 34 
Refugees had to realize that they would be subject to 
suspicion and should 'suffer willingly such inconvenience 
as may be considered necessary in the interest of public 
safety' . 135 
Demands for the wholesale internment of refugees 
provoked a strong reaction from their traditional supporters, 
led by the Sydney Morning Herald and Bishop Pilcher, Anglican 
Coadjutor Bishop of Sydney. They continued to maintain that 
it was ridiculous to treat refugees from Nazi rule as 'enemy 
aliens 1 • There was simply no question of refugees being 
loyal to Germany and constituting a potential Fifth cblumn; 
they had been savagely persecuted by the Nazi regime and had 
every reason to wish for its downfall.136 One letter-writer to 
133. Smith's Weekly, 16 September 1940. 
134. 'Commonwealth', letter to Age, °1"2 July 1940. 
See also N. Nairn, letter to S.M.H., 1 August 1940. 
135. E. Hardy-Johnston, letter to S.M.H., 3 August 1940. 
See also H.B. Yencken, letter to Argus, 8 July 1940. 
136. S.M.H., 13,24 July 1940. 
Statement by Bishop Pilcher, S.M.H., 6 June 1940. 
Statement by League of Nations Union, S.M.H., 
23 May 1940. 
'Essex Exile', letter to S.M.H., 26 July 1940. 
H. Sloane, letter to S.M.H., 2 August 1940. 
The controversy became one largely 
(i) between the N.S.W. Government and the S.M.H., 
(ii) between individuals with opposing views, based 
on the correspondence column of the S.M.H, 
Neither the Daily Telegraph no.r the ~ showed any 
interest in the affair, apart from reporting 
Mair's and Bruxner's statements. 
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the Sydney Morning Herald commented that the refugees had 'as 
much if not more grievance against Nazism than true blue 
Britishers' . 137 In any case, the experiences of European 
countries showed that there were no grounds for fearing 
that Jewish refugees were potential Fifth Columnists; these 
people had come from the ranks of the high political and 
military command. 138 
The refugees' supporters admitted that a few Nazi 
agents had probably been admitted to Australia as refugees 
but maintained that this was no reason for making hysterical 
demands for their general internment. Australia should 
follow the British example and set up tribunals tu examine 
and classify refugees. 13 9 Any who were considered a threat 
to Australia's security should be interned without delay 
but the remainder had. a right to 'justice in a free 
country' and should not be stigmatized as enemy aliens.140 
The Sydney Morning Herald summed up the argument: 
The just procedure for the Federal authorities 
to follow would surely be to offer full 
opportunity for service to all able-bodied 
aliens who desire to make Australia their 
home and will swear allegiance to the King, 
and to intern all genuine suspects or 
disaffected foreigners, with a view to their 
later deportation.141 
Jewish refugees themselves vehemently opposed 
their classification as enemy aliens and constantly 
reiterated their loyalty to Australia and willingness to 
137. Albert Date, letter to S.M.H., 2 July 1940. 
138. Al.bert Date, letter to S.M.H., 9 July 1940. 
Vivian Santow, .letter to S.M.H., 6 August 1940. 
139. S.M.H., 13 July, 6 August 1940. 
Statements by Bishop Pilcher, S.M.H., 23 May, 
6 June, 4 July 1940. 
140. S.M.H., 13 July 1940. 
141. Ibid. 
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serve Australia in any capacity.142 'Give us a ''fair go'' 
and let us prove that, if we must be aliens, we are friendly 
and grateful ones', wrote one refugee in a letter typical of 
many published in the Sydney Morning Herald,143 
Archie Michaelis, M.L.A., President of the Victorian Jewish 
Advisory Board, told the Federal Government that refugees 
were anxious to show their loyalty by enlisting or doing 
war work. H~ wa~ advised by the Minister for the Army, 
Brigadier G.A. Street, that the enlistment of aliens was 
'not desirable for reasons which have been thoroughly 
examined' . 144 
Rabbi Schenk continued to be the refugees' most 
outspoken Jewish supporter, alleging that their treatment 
as 'enemy aliens' was a 'paradox and a tragedy' and 
'incomprehensible as coming from the kindly, hospitable 
and freedom-loving Australians'. Within a few months of 
the outbreak of war, some of these Australians were 
exhibiting characteristics similar to those 'which we are 
fighting to destroy in our enemy Nazism'. 
Federal Government: 
He challenged the 
if they are enemies, lock them up; if they are 
friends make them feel at home. This is nothing 
but elementary decency and justice.145 
Many Australian Jews did not approve of such 
outbursts by their coreligionists. The A.J.W.S., with its 
specially est"ablished Migrants' Consultative Council, 
claimed to be the official representative of all Jewish 
142. Paul Morawetz, letter to Argus, 19 April 1940. 
'Austrian', letter to S.M.H., 3 June 1940. 
'A grateful immigrant,-,-. letter to S.M.H., 17 June 1940. 
'Young New Australian~ letter to S.M.H., 15 July 1940. 
Groups of refugees frequently offered their services 
to the Commonwealth Government. See~., 
15 September 1939; S.M.H., 20 May 1940. 
143. Henry Goldschmidt, letter to S.M.H., 16 July 1940. 
144. A.J.H., 6 June 1940. 
145. S.J.N., 5 January 1940. 
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refugees. When war broke out, the A.J.W.S. and the 
aebrew Standard stressed even more than before that refugees 
should avoid making themselves conspicuous in any way. 
The refugees were told; 
In these strenuous times everyone is seriously 
worried and tempers are frayed. Be thoughtful 
... Thank God you are under British Rule!l46 
Even if refugees were not permitted to serve Australia, they 
could show their loyalty by contributing to the Lord Mayor's 
Patriotic Fund and to a special refugee fund to buy and 
equip an ambulance for the Australian Red Crcss.147 
-·Th·e·---A-·.-J--.;·W-.-s-.·-~in·s i·s ted- -that- any -a-ct-ion·-· o·n---- t·h·e·-·-
'enemy alien' question should be taken quietly by the 
Society through official channels. The growing rift between 
the Society and refugees who wanted more direct action 
became apparent when it condemned the independent action on 
the internment issue by individual refugees and small 
groups. The A.J.W.S. maintained that it was highly 
regarded by Commonwealth authorities and obtained a 
sympathetic hearing from them because it had refused 'to 
take violent stands and counsel direct action'. 
had to realize the 'necessity for patience•.148 
Refugees 
In response to the N.S.W. Government's 
agitation for the internment of all enemy aliens, the 
A.J.W.S. adopted the policy of presenting a united front 
to the Federal Government with the other refugee welfare 
societies and as many sympathetic church and community 
-leaders as possible. In a letter to the Prime Minister, 
------------------------
R. G. Menzies, the A.J.W.S. and the three other refugee 
welfare organizations in N.S.W. stated their conviction 
that the vast majority of refugees were loyal to the British 
146. H.S., 7,14,21,28 September, 5,12 October 1939. 
147. H.S., 11 July 1940. 
148. H.S., 8 August 1940. 
The relationship between the A.J.W.S. and refugees is 
discussed by Ursula Wiemann, op.cit., pp. 257-265, 
and P.Y. Medding, op.cit., pp. 163-164. 
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cause. Almost all .the refugees were of Jewish or partly 
Jewish blood and knew only too well 'that the victory of 
Hitler would mean the greatest blow to their race since t~e 
capture of Jerusalem by the Roman Emperor, Titus'. It would 
be a grievous injustice to intern refugees, whose offers to 
serve Australia should be accepted by the Government.149 
Senator H.S. Foll, Mini~ter for the Interior, 
was confronted with an even stronger contingent of refugee 
supporters - representatives of the four refugee welfare 
organizations and the Y.W.C.A., together with the N.S.W. 
heads of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational 
··----··-·-····--- .c::J1u:r;ch_eo;. The_ __ Il\_'3_mb_E!rs of the dep11t_a,t__ion suggested that 
the Federal Government should 
assert its position as the sole authority on 
questions of internment and take steps to 
control utterances on this question by persons 
or organisations without status in the matter.150 
Tribunals should be established to 'give judgment when any 
question of internment is raised'. Senator Foll was 
informed that refugees were prepared to serve Australia in 
any way - in the firing line, the transport services, the 
Army Service Corps or the Medical Services.151 
The agitation against demands for the general 
internment of refugees reached a peak on 1 August 1940, 
when Protestant church leaders joined with other non-Jewish 
149. H.S., 8 August 1940. The signatories of the letter 
were:_Saul Symonds, Australian Jewish Welfare Society; 
J. Williams, Continental Catholic Migrants' Welfare 
Committee; 
Dr. Lembergh, European Emergency Committee; 
Bishop Pilcher, Inter-Church Committee for Non-Aryan 
Christian Refugees. 
The Inter-Church Committee for Non-Aryan Christian 
Refugees did not play a part in recommending refugees 
for entry until mid 1939. It began operations in May 
1939 with an appeal for funds. S.M.H;, 6 May 1939; 
A.J.A. Fraser, Honorary Secretary, letter to S.M.H., 
15 June 1939. 
150. H.S., 8 August 1940. 
The interview was also reported in A.J.H., 1 August 1940. 
151. H.S., 8 August 1940, 
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refugee supporters - chiefly academics and heads of 
sympathetic communal organizations - in a public appeal 
'to all citizens of goodwi11•. 152 The appeal reiterated 
the usual pro-refugee arguments. It alleged that the 
majority of refugees, being the victims of 
the tyranny of the Nazi regime, are intensely 
eager for its overthrow. If Hitler were to 
win, these very refugees would again be the 
first victims of his persecution.153 
135. 
Australia could not afford to refuse the offers of hundreds 
of refugees who were anxious to serve in the forces. As 
there was a possibiity that the Nazis had smuggled some 
spies into Australia in the guise of refugees, tribunals 
should be established to 'ensure that only the genuine 
and loyal would be accepted for service'. The signatories 
152. S.M.H., 1 August 1940. 
The appeal followed the pattern of a similar statement 
made in the United Kingdom on 1 June 1940 by prominent 
Englishmen, including the Archbishop of York, as a 
protest against the propaganda being used to stir up 
suspicion against refugees. 
153. Ibid. The fourteen signatories of the appeal we~e: 
Rev. P.L. Black, President of the Methodist Conference 
of N.s.w.; 
Right Rev. E.H. Borgmann, Bishop of Goulburn; 
Right Rev. J.S. Moyes, Bishop of Armidale; 
Right Rev. P.A. Smith, Moderator of the N.S.W. Assembly 
of the Presbyterian Church of Australia; 
J. R. Firth, Chairman of the Congregational Union; 
Dr. H. Sydney Morris, Chairman of the European 
Emergency Relief Committee; 
Right Rev. c.v. Pilcher, Chairman of the Inter-Church 
Committee for Non-Aryan Christian Refugees; 
Sir Francis Anderson, President of the League of 
Nations Union; 
Miss Ruby Board, Presi~ent of the National Council 
of Women; 
Mrs. R.J. Lyons, President of the Young Women's 
Christian Association; 
Sir Mungo Maccallum, Professor Emeritus of English, 
University of Sydney; 
Professor Stephen Roberts, Challis Professor of Modern 
History, University of Sydney; 
Miss Sibella Macarthur Onslow; 
Charles Williamson. 
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called upon 
all men of good will to discountenance the 
campaign for the indiscriminate internment 
of all refugees as well as for other unfair 
treatment, and to discourage the spreading 
of baseless accusations and rumours which 
cause needless suffering.154 
136. 
In November 1940 the Federal Government 
announced that tribunals would be set up to give interned 
aliens the right of appea1.l55 This was only a partial 
response to the demands of the refugees and their 
supporters as no steps were taken to change the refugees' 
'e~emy alien' classification or to permit them to serve in 
the armed forces. Nevertheless, the new regulations were 
welcomed by the Sydney Morning Herald as a way of ensuring 
that the security of the country was 'reconciled with fair 
156 play to refugees'. In practice, the establishment of 
tribunals had little effect on the numbers interned; the 
total of 2,376 enemy aliens (including 574 Germans) who were 
interned when the tribunals were established had fallen only 
15 7 to 2,231 twelve months later. 
Some people considered that the establishment 
of tribunals was a waste of time and money. On 2 April 
1941, A.G. Cameron, a former Leader of the Federal Country 
Party, moved a vote of no confidence in the Minister for 
the Army, Percy Spender, because of his handling of the 
internment issue. Cameron alleged that the Co~monwealth 
had put itself in the 'hopelessly ridiculous position of 
appearing before a tribunal to defend its own actions•. 158 
154. S.M.H., 1 August 1940. 
155. S.M.H., 4,30 November 1940, 
Statutory Rules 1940, No. 269, 29 November 1940. 
156. S.M.H., 4 November 1940. 
157. Paul Hasluck, op.cit., p. 594. 
158. C.P.D. Vol. 166, pp. 552-6, 2 April 1941. 
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No-one seconded the motion. The Bulletin commended 
Cameron's stand and maintained that the appeal system was 
'absurd and dangerous'. Refugee immigrants had been 'flying 
from a political system, and there was nothing to show that 
any of them had lost his love of country•.159 Undaunted by 
the lack of response from other parliamentarians, Cameron 
brought the matter up again three months later when he moved 
a motion to disallow the Regulations establishing the 
tribunals. He claimed that the Government should not 'waste 
the taxpayer's money' on these people who 
did not come here from Germany because they had 
. any particular love for .2\.ustralia; some of them-
came here in order to save their own skins, and 
many of them came here because the Nazis wanted 
to plant them here.160 
W.J. Hutchinson, U.A.P. member for Deakin, seconded 
Cameron's motion but it was defeated. 
Most of the controversy on the internment of 
enemy aliens had been provoked by the N.S.W. Government, 
which had aroused the antipathy not only of refugee 
supporters but also of the Commonwealth authorities. When 
Mair and Bruxner demanded that all enemy aliens should be 
interned, the Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, stated that the 
Department of the Army had taken action 'in every case where 
there was reason to suspect that the security of the State 
was endangered ...• 161 Menzies added that he deplored 
. 
this constant activity of the N.s.w. Government 
in stirring up in the public mind a belief that 
dangerous aliens are left at large through the 
inaction of the Department of the Army.162 
In response to the Commonwealth Government's 
refusal to adopt a tougher attitude towards enemy aliens, 
the N.S.W. Government took action against them on matters 
159. Bulletin, 9 April 1941. 
160. c.P.D. Vol. 167, p'. R68, 3 July 1941. 
161. S.M.H., 27 June 1940. 
162. S.M.H., 28 June 1940. 
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within its own jurisdiction. Its decision not to allow 
refugee doctors to practise in country districts was 
followed by frequent refusals to grant and renew licences 
for business and such occupations as hawking and fishing.163 
The state Government also took a hard line on motor 
registration and car driving licences which, under 
commonwealth Regulations, enemy aliens could obtain only 
with special permission from the State authorities.164 
The refugees' supporters protested vigorously. 
When N.S.W. refugee welfare organization representatives and 
Protestant churc~ leaders met Senator Foll, Minister for the 
Interior, they alleged that the refugees' treatment as 
'enemy aliens' was causing their economic victimization. 
First, refugees were being dismissed from employment and 
refused jobs. They were not permitted to enrol at the N.S.W. 
Government Experimental Farm or the Hawkesbury Agricultural 
College and one of Sydney's leading public hospitals 
refused to admit refugees for nursing training. Second, 
refugees' applications for business and occupational 
licences were being rejected; for example, individual 
refugees had been refused licences to operate a bakehouse 
and a confectionary business.165 
The same group attempted to interview members of 
the N.S.W. Government but had no initial success. They 
forwarded a memorandum to the Premier and his Ministers 
complaining about the withholding of business licences and 
alleging that this would result in the overcrowding of 
occupations for which licences were not needed.166 On 
21 July 1941, a year less a day after their deputation to 
Senator Foll, they were received by W.E. Dickson, M.L.C., 
a representative of McKell's new Labor Government, and 
163. S.M.H., 20 July 1940, 11 January 1941. 
164. S.M.H., 11 January 1941. 
165. A.J.H., 1 August 1940. 
166 . .!:!...:..§_., 14 November 1940. 
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assured that their representations would be placed 'before 
the proper authorities•.167 
Mair's Government had caused a further uproar 
in November 1940 when it closed down English classes for 
refugees. According to the State Minister for Education, 
o.H. Drummond, it was 'not the Government's policy to spend 
money teaching enemy aliens the English language or any 
other subjects•.168 The Sydney Morning Herald reacted 
angily: 
If it is the purpose of the Premier and his 
Ministers to make every victim of Nazi tyranny 
regret having ever accepted the offer of asylum 
--·in· ·Au·strali·a·;·-· they sh·ould be we·1-1~pleased ··with -
their decision ... 169 
It denounced Drummond's argument as invalid because the 
refugees paid for their lessons and, if anything, the 
Education Department made a profit from the classes. 170 
Bishop Pilcher and Sir Francis Anderson conci'emned the 
Government's action as inhuman and contrary to its policy 
of assimilating all immigrants as quickly as possible.171 
According to Frank Louat, President of the Constitutional 
Association of N.S.W., the Government's decision had been 
prompted by resentment that its demand for the internment 
of all enemy aliens had been rejected by the Commonwealth 
Government. 172 
The labour movement had its own motives for 
joining the protesters. If refugees were unable to 
understand English, how would they become familiar with ·· 
Australian industrial conditions and wage rates? The 
President of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council, J.R. Hughes, 
stated that many of the people affected were 'notable anti-
Nazi fighters' and maintained that the authorities should 
make 'every provision to enable th~ refugees to accustom 
167. H. S . , 24 .July 1941. 
168. S.M.H., 6 November 1940. 
169. S.M.H., 7 November 1940. 
170. Ibid. 
171. S.M.H., 8 November 1940. 
172. Ibid. 
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themselves to Australian conditions•. 173 The Commonwealth 
Government agreed. Far from banning English classes, said 
senator Foll, the Government should teach refugees 'to speak 
English as quickly as possible ... in fact, they should not 
be allowed to speak any other language•.174 Mair retorted 
that, if the Commonwealth Government felt so strongly on the 
issue, it could set up its own English classes.175 
Despite its critics, the N.S.W. Government 
continued to agitate against refugees. When Bruxner again 
accused the Federal Government of laxity in dealing with 
enemy_a1iens, P_r_ime Minister Menzies assured Australians 
that dangerous aliens were not being left at liberty. Mair 
retorted that he 'refused to remain silent on the subject'. 
It did not seem consistent 
that we should send our sons overseas to fight 
Germans and Italians while in Australia large 
numbers of enemy aliens, who continue their 
allegiance to Hitler and Mussolini, remain 
free.176 
Mair had constantly refused to make any distinction-between 
refugees and other 'enemy aliens'. When questioned in the 
Legislative Assembly, he said that the term 'enemy alien' 
covered all unnaturalized Germans and Italians. 'What about 
refugees?', asked T.J. Shannon, A.L.P. member for Phillip. 
'They are all the same', replied the Premier.177 
While the controversy on internment proceeded, 
refugees also continued to be accused of introducing 
unwanted habits into the Australian way of life, displacing 
Australian workers and becoming prosperous at the expense 
of local businessmen. A novel accusation ag'ainst refugees 
173. S.M.H., 9 November 1940. 
174. Ibid. 
· l 7 5. S.M.H., 11 November 1940. 
176. s. M. H. I 29 November 1940. 
177. S.M.H., 8 November 1940. 
Shannon's question and Mair's reply were omitted 
from hansar~. N.S.W.P.D. Vol. 162, p. 818. 
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came to light in August 1940 when Smith's Weekly headlined 
a report: 
DIRECTOR OF HEALTH SOUNDS WARNING 
RISING INCIDENCE OF SYPHILIS 
DO REFUGEES ACCOUNT FOR IT?l78 
The article stated that Sir Raphael Cilento, Queensland's 
Director-General for Health and Medical Services, had informed 
the State Minister for Health of a sharp increase in syphilis 
in Queensland and other states during the previous twelve 
months. Because there had been an 'influx of large numbers 
of refugees' shortly earlier, Cilento reached the questionabl0> 
conclusion that the increase was 'tr~ceable to refugees who 
poured into Australia'. This did not, he added, necessarily 
mean that a very great number of refugees suffered from the 
disease but only that 'a proportion were syphilitic'. After 
all, many refugees had come from Vienna and that city was 
'the mo•t. dangerous of great capitals in the prevalence there 
of venereal disease' .179 
With Australia at war, the refugees were subjected 
to a number of new accusations. Many Australians resented 
the fact that the newcomers were not directly contributing 
to the war effort. One 'soldier's mother' complained: 
While Australian soldiers are going abroad to 
endure.all the dangers and horrors of modern 
warfare, aliens in Australia continue to live 
their prewar existence.180 
weapon. 
The refugees' economic accusers also had a fresh 
They alleged that refugees were taking advantage 
178. Smith's Weekly, 31 August 1940. 
179. Ibid. 
Sir Raphael Cilento, a specialist on tropical diseases, 
was Queensland Director-General for Health and Medical 
Services 1934-1945 and President of the Queensland 
Medical Board 1939-1945. According to .K.D. Gott,.£12..cit., 
p.8, he is one of Eric D. Butler's friends and admirers'. 
Cilento has been an active opponent of non-British 
immigration. His most recent outburst against the 
admission of allegedly inferior European immigrants was 
on 18 September 1971. In a recorded speech to an 
Australian League of Rights seminar in Melbourne, he 
declared that migrants 'should be examined for disease 
and weak blood in the same way as cattle imported into 
Australia'. s .M:ll., 20 September 1971. 
180. 'Soldier's Mother', letter to~· 9 September 1940. 
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of the situation to obtain the jobs of Australians who 
were on active service. The Catholic Freeman's Journal 
maintained that many refugees were 'waiting quietly to 
step into vacancies when Mr. Menzies sends a few more 
thousands of the native born to fight for this land of 
opportunity overseas•. 181 In a typical letter to the press, 
'Australia Fair' wrote to the Argus saying that it was 
'ironical that Australians go overseas to fight for freedom 
while these people work their way into positions thus 
vacated•. 182 
Australians· also resented the fact that .. many __ oL 
the refugees had become prosperous employers, not struggling 
employees. They were accustomed to non-Britishers - whether 
they were Irish, Italian or Chinese - moving into the inner 
working-class suburbs, occupying unskilled jobs and taking 
their place at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. In 
contrast, many refugee immigrants were middle-class, well-
educated and often had capital to invest. 183 They were 
accused of entrenching themselves in business while their 
Australian counterparts were sacrificing their financial 
interests to fight the war. The Catholic Freeman's Journal 
complained that many refugees had already become 'prosperous 
members of the parasitical class' and condemned them on the 
grounds, usually considered a point in their favour, that 
they were employing Australians in their factories.184 
181 C.F.J., 4 April 1940. 
l82. 'Australia Fair', letter to Age, 18 April 1940. 
See also 'British Aussie', letter to Aqe, 
25 January 1940. 
183. Ursula Wiemann (£12_.cit., p. 118) and.Caroline Kelly 
(op.cit., p. 12) analysed the occupations of refugees 
who settled in Melbourne and New South Wales 
respectively. Ursula Wiemann concluded that the 
refugees in Melbourne were predominantly middle class. 
Compared with other pre-war immigrants and Australian 
employment figures, a relatively high proportion of 
the refugees were employers, self-employed and 
professionals. According to Caroline Kelly, the 
majority of refugees who settled in New South Wales 
were engaged in commerce and secondary industry. The 
largest single groups, in descending order, were 
classified as commercial, engineering, manufacturing, 
technicians and tailors. 
184. C.F.J., 4 April 1940. 
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Australians became particularly indignant when any 
refugees made a show of their wealth. One letter-writer to 
the Age complained that they were buying up 'valuable flats 
and residentials in the best localities•.185 George Martens, 
A.L.P. member for Herbert in the House of Representatives, 
ridiculed the penniless image allegedly expounded by the 
refugees' supporters: 'what wonderful properties they have 
bought from their penury' .1 8 6 In London, Sir Norman Lindsay's 
son, Phillip, found Australian diggers 
cursing wealthy refugees flashing diamond rings 
and fur coats in their faces when their own wives 
--·-·-------------had-.. 1.i.ttle to. spend, and taki!lg _their homes and 
pushing up the rents.187 
In the face of this onslaught, refugees maintained 
that they were quite prepared to fight for Australia if only 
they were given the chance.188 Their supporters wondered 
what refugees were supposed to do: starve to death?l89 
They complained that because of the attitude of Australians, 
in particular the N.S.W. Government, many refugees were 
unable to find work and were almost destitute. Those who 
185. M. Trezise, letter to Age, 25 June 1940. 
Under the National Security (Land·Transfer) Regulations, 
refugees were not permitted to buy property or obtain 
more than a five-year lease after July 1940. See p.128. 
186. C.P.D. Vol. 165, p. 486, 5 December 1940. 
On 7 November 1941 Martens made a further complaint 
that.refugees were buying up blocks of flats and 
indulging in rent ~acketeering. 
C.P.D. Vol. 169, p.203. 
187. Phillip Lindsay, I'd Live the Same Life Over, London, 
1941, p. 119. Lindsay·mistakenly concluded that 
'Hitler's dirty propaganda had eaten even into that 
liberty-loving land'. It is likely that the same 
sentiment would have been expressed against any foreign 
immigrants who appeared to be wealthy. Because of the 
difficulty of transferri~g funds out of Germany (see 
p. 651, refug~1es often invested their money in diamonds, 
fur coats and furniture, giving the appearance of great 
affluence. 
188. H. Pollak, letter to Age, 10 September 1940. 
W. Cahn, letter to Age, 11 September 1940. 
189. 'Fair Australia', letter to Argus, 13 June 1940. 
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were being so strongly criticized for investing capital were, 
in fact, providing employment for Australians.1 9 0 
The internment controversy and accusations that 
refugees were benefiting economically while Australians were 
fighting a war had focussed increasing attention on their 
activities. ·such a situation was conducive to the outbreak 
of antisemitic propaganda but, at least in the early years 
of the war, most accusations directed against refugees were 
typical of those made against all non-British immigrants 
and were not specifically anti-Jewish. The newcomers were 
called refugees ( 'reffos' )"·or grouped together wi·th 
Italians as 'foreigners', rather than being identified as 
1 Jews'. To the agitators of widespread internment, 
refuge e.s _we re p_a tr io_ti c_G_ermans. be.f_ore .. th_e_y:_ .. w_e.r.e_p.e.r_s.e_c_uted_· _ .. --·-- ..... -----
Jews and tended to be accused of 'German arrogance' before 
being endowed with any traditi.onally Jewish characteristics~9l 
Apart from a small group of blatant antisemites, few 
Australians showed any susceptibility to Nazi antisemitic 
ideology, according to which Jews were internationalist 
capitalists or communists who manipulated national 
governments and aimed at world domination through control of 
the press and finance. There was even less evidence in 
Australia of the Nazis' racial theory which extolled the 
purity of the Aryan race and denounced the corrupting 
influence of Jewish blood. 
Australia's declared antisemites continued their 
tirade against the Jews, despite the fact that Australia 
was now at war with Nazi Germany, the Jews' persecutors. 
The Publicist claimed that Germany's rise to power 
had 'followed, or accompanied, the elimination of 
190. 'Do unto others', letter to Age, 28 June 1940. 
191. For example, 'Patriotic Australian', letter to Argus, 
29 July 1938. 
John Hines, letter to Argus, 4 November 1938. 
N. Nairn, letter to S.M.H., 1 August 1940. 
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were being so strongly criticized for.investing capital were, 
in fact, providing employment for Australians.190 
The internment controversy and accusations that 
refugees were benefiting economically while Australians were 
fighting a war had focussed increasing attention on their 
activities. ·such a situation was conducive to the outbreak 
of antisemitic propaganda but, at least in the early years 
of the war, most accusations directed against refugees were 
typical of those made against all non-British immigrants 
and were not specifically anti-Jewish. The newcomers were 
called refugees ('reffos') or grouped together with 
Italians as 'foreigners', rather than being identified as 
'Jews'. To the agitators df widespread internment, 
refugees were patriotic Germans before they were persecuted 
Jews and tended to be accused of 'German arrogance' before 
being endowed with any traditi.onally Jewish characteristics~9l 
Apart from a small group of blatant antisemites, few 
Australians showed any susceptibility to Nazi antisemitic 
ideology, according to which Jews were internationalist 
capitalists or communists who manipulated national 
governments and aimed at world domination through control of 
·the ·pres·s an·a ·finance. There--was even· less evidence in 
Australia of the Nazis' racial theory which extolled the 
purity of the Aryan race and denounced the corrupting 
influence of Jewish blood. 
Australia's declared antisemites continued their 
tirade against the Jews, despite the fact that Australia 
was now at war with Nazi Germany, the Jews' persecutors. 
The Publicist claimed that Germany's ris~ to power 
had 'followed, or accompanied, the elimination of 
190. 'Do unto others', letter to Age, 28 June 1940. 
191. For example, 'Patriotic Australian', letter to Argus, 
29 July 1938. 
John Hines, letter to Argus, 4 November 1938. 
N. Nairn, letter to S.M.H.·, l August 1940. 
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Jewish influence in that country'. The Jews' influence in 
Australia 'will weaken us; and some day we shall have to 
expel them from our midst•. 192 W.M. Hughes, Federal 
Attorney-General, condemned the Publicist for spreading the 
'propaganda with which Germany was trying to cloud the 
judgment of the world' and stated that such antisemitic 
articles were at least 'striking and convincing proof of that 
freedom of speech which the English enjoy'. 
Sir Archibald Howie, a former Lord Mayor of Sydney, commented 
mildly that 'to attack the Jewish people was in bad taste~93 
The Publicist retaliated with an article 'The Jews and 
Hughes', in which it alleged that both Hughes and Howie were 
'politically, crassly stupid' and declared: 'our taste is 
not pro-Jewish; and we are not afraid to say so' .194 
The. Publicist's next target was L.P. Fox, who 
defended Jewish refugees in a booklet Australia and the 
~· published by the League for Peace and Democracy. 195 
Fox had posed twenty-six questions on allegations against 
Jews in general and refugee immigrants in particular. The 
Publicist provided its own answers. These included: 
'11. '~·Jha.t are the Protocols of t11e Elders of Zion?' 
A brilliant exposition of Jewish aims and ways ... 
22. 'What should be our Attitude to Refugees?' 
Uncompromising hostility - the Germans are 
right in this ... 
26. 'What is the Solution to the Jewish Problem?' 
There can be none while a Jew lives •196 
The Publicist summed up its views on Fox and Maurice 
Blackburn, Labour M.H.R. for Bourke, who wrote a forward 
192. Publicist, 1 November 1939. 
193. D.T., 4 November 1939. 
194. Publicist, 1 December 1939. 
195. L.P. Fox, Australia and the Jews, Melbourne, 1939. 
196. Publicist, 1 February 1940. 
The Publicist devoted four leading articles 
to its attack on Fox's booklet, 1 February, 
1 March, 1 April, 1 May 1940. 
'• 
I 
for the booklet: 
Why is it Messrs. Fox and Blackburn seem 
To think that all the Jews are bosker Yids 
Without a spot of any mote or beam 
Of racial blemish? Not for all the quids 
146. 
Do they love the Jews! - on that we'll stake our shekels!-
For they are merely simple Gentile Gays 
Who love the Jew for being free of freckles -
and Fox and Blackburn still are only boys 
Who haven't realized that Britain's lack of friends 
Was caused by over-rating Jews for national ends. 197 
As ·-w·e 1-i-···a·s···-0-e-in·g ·· s tephe·n·s·e·n· 1 ·s··· mo·u th·p·i·e··ce ·;- ·t·he 
Publicist also published article~ by outsiders who expounded 
fanciful antisemitic theories. William Hardy Wilson, a 
well-known artist and architect, alleged that the Jews were 
the 'drone of humanity' whose instinct it was to 'dwell as 
a parasite•. In typical Nazi fashion, Wilson argued that 
Jews had organized the Russian Revolution and now aimed at 
world domination. In Australia they controlled the press 
and trade unions and influenced both Federal and State 
Governments. With the present Jewish influx into Australia, 
the country was proceeding closer to its fate: 'the hand 
of destiny slowly closes on this purposeless land' .198 
Alexander Rud Mills, who in 1936 had edited the short-lived 
National Socialist,199 wrote an outline for the Publicist 
of his recently-published book, The Odinist Religion 
Overcoming Jewish Christianity.200 If Jews were man's 
greatest enemy, Christians were little better because their 
religion was nothing more than 'Jew-worship plus self-
renunciation'. 201 
197. Publicist, l April 1940. 
198. ''l'he Jewish influx into Australia', Publicist, l 
November 1939. Wilson also wrote a pamphlet Solution 
of the.Jewish Problem, Melbourn~ 1941. 
Wilson, an architect and writer on colonial 
architecture, was also an enthusiast for Chinese art 
and culture. 
199. Seep. 33. 
200. Publicist, 1 January 1940. A.R. Mills, 
The Odinist Religion Overcoming Jewish Christianity, 
Melbourne, 1939. 
201. Publicist, l January 1940. 
' 
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P.R. Stephensen could also turn his hand to 
more academically worded arguments than those which he 
147. 
presented in the Publicist. As a former Queensland Rhodes 
scholar, he succeeded 'in having h~s article 'A reasoned case 
against semitism' published in the respectable Australian 
Quarterly. 202 Stephensen alleged that militant antisemitism 
was only a response to militant prosemitism. 
exclusiveness' was to blame: 
'Jewish 
They claim the right, not only to settle here, 
but to maintain themselves, in perpetuity, as 
a self-segregated .minority, of different .and 
distinct racial stock from the rest of the 
Australian community.203 
The Jews had to accept the remedy 'that the Jewish race 
should abolish itsel£ by becoming absorbed in the common 
stream of mankind'. If they did not, then others 'who are 
so rigidly excluded from the Jewish community, have at least 
a reciprocal right to exclude them from ours•.204 
The New Times continued to attack the Jews as 
internationalist capitalists and communists. 205 Eric Butler 
put forward his theory about the Jews in a pamphlet The Wa~ 
Behind the War. The present war, he maintained, was only 
part of a much larger conflict between the Judaic and 
Christian philosophies. The real enemy was International 
Jewry. Hitler was, in fact, conniving with the Jews and 
using their financial resources and agents.206 
Apart from the ut~erances of Australia's self-
confessed Jew-haters, the first signs of antisemitic 
agitation against the refugees had come from individual labour 
politicians who occasionally supplemented their anti-alien 
202. P.R. Stephensen, 'A reasoned case against semitism', 
Australian Quarterly, 12, No. l (1940), pp. 52-62. 
203. Ibid., p. 60. 
204. Ibid., p. 62. 
205. New Times, 22 December 1939, 12 July 1940. 
206. Eric D. Butler, The War Behind the War: The re!~ 
nature of the· opposing forces, Melbourne, 1941. 
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economic grievances with specific ant~-Jewish insinuations. 
In May 1939, during the debate on the N.S.W. Medical 
Practitioners (Amendment) Bill, James McGirr, M.L.A., 
claimed that Jewish refugees had already been 'able to 
manipulate the opinions of Governments and Parliaments'. 
He warned that the presence of refugees in the community 
might in time result in the growth ?f the conditions which 
currently faced Jews in Germany. 207 A.E. Green, M.H.R. for 
Kalgoorlie, claimed that he had 'no anti-Jewish feeling, 
and no racial hatred'. At the same time, he alleged that 
have the same ideas as Australians. Green accused Jews of 
trying to dominate Australian retail business and the 
Australian press and stated that, while there were enough 
exploiters 'amongst our own people', Jews were the 'kings 
of exploiters•.208 
While such antisemitic outbursts were initially 
spasmodic, the situation changed once Australia was at war. 
Doubts about the refugees' loyalty to Australia and 
accusations that they were taking advantage of the absence 
of Australian servicemen began to arouse emotional 
prejudices. From late 1940, commentators started noticing 
a growing antipathy to refugees as Jews. In September, the 
A.B.C. 's 'Watchman' warned about khe 'ugly antisemitism' 
which was prompting a 'whispering and libellous campaign' 
against Jewish refugees. Surely Australians did 'not want 
to.be accused of such a contemptible trait' as Nazi 
antisemitism which was only caused 'by jealous 
inferiority•.209 Four months later, author William Hatfield 
alleged that there was an 
207. 
208. 
209. 
210. 
insidious whispering campaign against the Jews 
Whenever two or three people exchange views or 
mere gossip ... there can be heard the unreasoning 
growl against the Jews.210 
N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 158, p. 4719, 17 May 1939. 
C.P.D., Vol. 160, P• 1965, 15 June 1939. 
~·· 5 September 1940. 
S . M _. H . , 8 Jan_uary 1941. 
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The Jew-haters were soon spreading their 
message. On 9 December 1940 an advertisement appeared in 
the Daily Telegraph: 
ANTI-JEWISH ASSOCIATION: All per9ons desirous 
of joining this Association please communicate 
immediately with Duncan Cameron, 3rd Floor, 
llc Castlereagh Street, Sydney ... 211 
When a Smith's Weekly reporter tried to interview 
Mr. Cameron, managing clerk for a firm of solicitors, he was 
told that the gentleman was out. 212 John Rosevear, Labour 
member for Dalley, drew Federal Parliament's attention to 
·······the notice ·and-·warned-that it- was· ·probably ·the forerurlner · 
of a Nazi organization. The Attorney-General, W.M. Hughes, 
promised to have the matter investigated.213 
In August 1941 Smith's Wee~ took the unlikely 
role of champion of the Jews, drawing attention to 'alarming 
evidence' of the activities of some of Hitler's 'brazen 
accomplices' who were defacing war posters in Sydney with 
antisemitic stickers.214 It later reported that 'a highly 
organized anti-Jew campaign had been secretly launched in 
Australia'. Roneod circulars, headed 'Gentiles Awake', 
were appearing in people's letter-boxes. 
were told: 
The recipients 
Thousands of Jew refugees have arrived in 
Australia and are still arriving, and very 
soon they get hold of all key positions ... 
All th~ money the Jews ever had has been 
stolen from Gentiles by such methods as 
usury, pawnbroking, hire purchase robbery, 
and international finance manipulation.215 
211. D.T., 9 Decemter 1940. 
212. Smith's Weekly, 21 December 1940. 
213. C.P.D. Vol. 165, p. 577, 9 December 1940. 
214. Smith's Weekly, 9 August 1941. 
Smith's Weekly was an extreme example of those 
commentators who were pro-Australian, pro-British 
and anti-foreign, but not antisemitic. It campaigned 
vigorously against Germans and Italians and demanded 
the intjrnment of all 'enemy aliens', including 
refugees. However, it jumped to the refugees' 
defence as soon as they were attacked as Jews. 
215. Smith's Weekly, 25 October 1941. 
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such material, wrote Smith's Weekly, smacked of the Nazi 
brand of antisemitic propaganda and was 'un-Australian•.216 
The nascent antisemitism in the community was 
soon overshadowed by Japan's entry into the war in December 
1941. The focus of Australian action switched to the 
Pacific and there were renewed demands for the internment of 
all enemy aliens. Smith's Weekly launched a scare campaign 
and wrote of 'our Fifth Column menace', although it was 
concerned primarily with the Italians in Queensland. 217 The 
Leader of the·Opposition, Arthur Fadden, urged that al"! 
enemy aliens should be interned because of the crisis.218 
Curtin's new Labor Government decided to make 
use of the refugees rather than intern them. On 21 January 
1942 the Minister for the Army, F.M. Forde, announced that 
refugees were to be 'given the opportunity of volunteering 
for service in labour units of the A.M.F.'219 Those who did 
not volunteer for service would be called upon to take some 
form of civilian auxiliary service. The refugees responded 
enthusiastically, stating that they 'warmly welcomed' the 
Government's decision and were delighted that they would 
be able to contribute to Australia's war effort. 220 
216. Smith's Weekly, 25 October 1941. 
217. Smith's Weekly, 14 February 1942. 
See also Smith's Weekly, 17,30 January 1942. 
218. s:M.H., 27 March 1942. 
219. Argus, 22 January 1942. 
Statutory Rules 1942, No. 39, 3 February. 
.. 
Overseas refugees from Britain and Malaya, interned in 
Australia on behalf of the British Government, were 
included in the new regulations. Argus, 29 January 
1942. In September 1940, over 2,500 internees had 
arrived in the 'Dunera'. The British Government later 
admitted that th~ majority should.not have been 
interned. The Australian Government refused to release 
them to work in Australia and, because of the shortage 
of shipping space, about 1,500 were still interned in 
August 1941. Although the affair created a scandal in 
the House of Commons, it aroused little interest in 
Australia. The 'Dunera Affair' is discussed by 
Ursula Wiemann, op.cit., pp. 69-112. 
220. A.J.H., 2~ January 1942. 
See also A.J.H., 29 January 1942. 
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According to the Hebrew Standard, 'hundrelcts eagerly rushed 
I 
to register to prove their willingness to be of useful 
service•. 221 The Minister for the Army wa~ not so ecstatic 
about the refugees' reaction. On 6 March he stated that a 
'surprisingly large percentage of refugees who had volunteered 
had immediately claimed exemption under the reserved 
occupations list•.222 Brian Fitzpatrick later claimed that 
virtually all the refugees registered for service. However, 
of the 3,489 volunteers, almost two thirds (2,288) obtained 
exemptions or were classified as medically unfit.223 
long. 
The refugees' self-professed delight did not last 
Shortly after formulating the new regulations, the 
Government also established a civilian labour corps, the 
Allied Works Council, to utilize the services of enemy aliens 
as well as refugees who had not volunteered. 224 The fact 
that refugees were to be conscripted on the same terms as 
enemy aliens caused a controversy when the A.W.C. called up 
many refugees who had already volunteered or had been 
exempted from service. Abram Landa, Labor M.L.A. for Bondi, 
protested to the A.W.C. in response to a request from the 
refugees' representative, the Migrants' Consultative 
Council~ 225 When he failed ·to ·gain any satisfaction from 
221 . .!:!...:....§.·, 12 February 1942. 
2;2. Argus, 7 March 1942. 
223. Brian Fitzpatrick, Refugees: Hitler's Loss our Gain, 
Melbourne, 1945, pp. 2-3. 
224. S~atutory Rules 1942, no. 86, 25 February. .. 
The Government also decided to use the services of 
refugee doctors, who had not been permitted to practise 
in Australia (see pp. 110-27). Persons with foreign 
medical qualifications could apply for a licence to the 
newly-established Commonwealth Aliens Doctors Board. 
'If so required by the Minister', these doctors were to 
'practise medicine in any locality or place, and under 
such conditions (if any) as the Minister directs'. 
Statutory Rules, 1942, No. 52, 11 'February. 
225. Abram Landa was the Labor member for Bondi in the N.S.W. 
Legislative Assembly 1930-1932 and 1941-1965. He then 
became N.S.W. Agent-General in London. Landa, a lawyer, 
also participated in Jewish affairs. In 1930 he was 
appointed the first President of the Young Men's Hebrew 
Association (Y.M.H.A.) and he was also an active Zionist. 
The Migrants' Consultative Council had been set up by 
the A.J.w.s. (see p. 132). 
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its Assistant Director, Lieut. Frank Packer, he made 
representations to the Army Minister, F.M. Forde. Landa 
pointed out that most of the refugees called up by the 
A.W.C. had already volunteered for A.M.F. labour units and 
were awaiting callup. Many others were working in protected 
industries and had been exempted from service. He alleged 
that the conscription of these men for civilian work at 
'scab rates' was a breach of the regulations.226 
Landa's action infuriated Frank Packer who, 
as well as being Assistant Director of the A.w.c., was also 
Managing Director of Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. which 
-- ····-··--·~--
published the Daily Teleg;~f,-;;:-- --on 29 July-h.is-newspa-per-'s ---
leading article was headlined 'Refugees who shirk duty' and 
alleged that many of the 250 refugee aliens called up for 
service with the A.W.C. had 'rushed off with great flurry 
to politicians and others with influence in the hope of 
getting released from duty'. Refugees who 
had behaved in this cowardly, skulking, ungrateful 
and foolish way ... befoul our hospitality by 
trying to chisel their way out of service to the 
country.227 
The editorial declared that 'any public man who listens to 
them and uses his power by trying to get them released from 
service' was little better.228 
.. 
L~nda retaliated with a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph which it did not publish. 229 - He alleged that 
the newspaper's statement had been completely misleading. 
It was not true that '250 refugee aliens' had been called 
up by the A.W.C.; the majority of those called up were 
enemy aliens such as Italians and Finns. Of the refugees, 
most had already voiunteered for the A.M.F. and were 
awaiting callup. If refugees worked for the A.w.c. for the 
226. s.J.N., 7 Au~ust 1942. 
227. D.T., 29 July 1942. 
228. Ibid. 
229. The letter was later published in the Jewish press. 
H.S., 13 August, 1942, S.J.N., 21 August 1942. 
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below-award rates being paid, they would only be accused of 
undermining Australian labour conditions. 
Packer of wanting 
Landa accused 
to take these men, who volunteered 'to give real 
service to the Army, and make them conscripts 
to break down Australian award rates of pay.230 
While some capitalists would like to see this happen, he 
was 'not going to be a party to this, nor is any Labor man 
or any Labor Union Secretary•.231 
Forde had informed Landa that refugees who worked 
in reserved occupations would n~t be called up automatically 
-~i -------bui: he -1<6-iiTa-noi: give an:/ guarantee on 
already volunteered for the A.M.F. 232 
refugees who -ha."d 
The dissension 
l 
i 
I 
between the A.W.C. and refugees continued and the matter 
came to a head in May 1943 when the Government announced 
that, in view of the shortage of manpower, it would conduct 
a largescale callup of enemy aliens and refugees for a new 
Civil Aliens Corps. 233 Landa and S.M. Falstein, Labor 
M.H.R. for Watson, made further representations to the 
Commonwealth Government and arranged for a deputation of 
leaders of the refugee welfare organizations and the Council 
of Civil Liberties to put their case to the Minister for the 
Army and the Acting Attorney-Genera1. 234 Bishop Pilcher and 
Cecil Luber, President of the Jewish War Services Committee, 
protested against refugees being called up to work alongside 
enemy aliens. 235 The A.J.W.S. maintained that refugees were .. 
quite willing to serve; they only wanted equal treatment 
with non-enemy aliens.236 The protesters were supported by 
the Sydney Morning Herald which claimed that every other 
country distinguished between refugees and enemy aliens and 
that the Government should release refugees from their 
230. 
231. 
2 32. 
H. S. , 
Ibid. 
Forde 
1943, 
13 August 1942. 
to Landa, 21 September 1942, and 18 January 
H.S., 28.January 1943. 
233. Statutory Rules 1943, No. 108, 3 May 1943. 
234, Smith's Weekly, 26 June 1943. 
235. S.M.H., 6 July 1943. 
236. S.M.H., 7 July 1943. 
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'callous official classification'.237 
Accusations of pressure resulted when the 
Government deferred the callup. Smith's Weekly alleged 
that the change of attitude could be traced to the 
representations made to the Commonwealth Government by the 
refugees' supporters. It complained that enemy aliens 
and refugees remained untouched while 'Australians by the 
thousand have been drafted into war factories or to CCC'. 
This was a 'state of affairs screaming aloud for 
explanation' . 238 In Federal Parliament, Percy Spender, 
U.A.P. member for Warringah, asked. the .. l?J: .. ime Ministe.:r. __ 
whether it was true that refugee aliens had been exempted 
from civil construction work after parliamentarians had 
made representations on their behalf.239 
The callup soon proceeded but the refugees' 
status as enemy aliens did not last much longer. In 
October 1943, the Federal Government finally amended the 
National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations to give 
refugees the new formal classification of 'refugee aliens'. 
In future, they would have similar status to the nationals 
of neutral countries. 24 0 Soon afterwards, refugees were 
permitted ·to apply for naturalization- on the-· same ·basis as 
friendly and neutral aliens. 241 The Sydney Morning Herald 
commented that it had 'taken the Australian Government 
four years to correct an injustice' against some thousands 
of refugees.242 
The use of refugees in the war effort had not 
saved them from cont£nuing attacks on economic grounds which 
237. S.M.H., 7 July 1943. 
238. Smith's Weekly, 3 July 1943. 
See also Smith's Weekly, 26 June 194 3. 
CCC - Civil Construction Corps. 
2 39. C.P.D. Vol. 175, p. 314, 24 June 1943. 
240. Statutory Rules, 1943, No. 263, 16 October 1943. 
241. H.S., 25 November 1943. 
242. S.M.H., 20 October 1943. 
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increasingly had anti-Jewish overtones. In mid-1943, the 
focus of anti-refugee agitation became centred on the 
Victorian town of Shepparton. The President of the local 
R.S.L., L.J. Michel, alleged that Jews were buying up land 
and that 'aliens and foreigners' were taking over the local 
cannery. Michel warned that the district would soon be 
controlled by Jews and declared that it made his 'blood 
boil ... to think these men are buying land while our men 
are fighting to keep the land free •243 The Annual 
Conference of the Victorian Branch of the R.S.L. passed a 
resolution declaring that it was 'profoundly alarmed at 
the disclosures ... which constitute a grave menace to the 
future settlement of servicemen now overseas' .244 Michel's 
allegations provoked a strong reaction from a local Jewish 
returned soldier, Max Upfal, who stated that it made his 
'blood boil to read such slanderous statements'. Was it 
Mr. Michel's 'welcome home for Jewish returned soldiers' 
to make them read articles 'that savour of propaganda in 
Nazi Germany?•245 
The local member of the Victorian Legislative 
Council, R. Kilpatrick, deplored the heat and prejudice 
which the controversy was generating and the fact that 
'there was an attitude of hostility to foreigners generally' 
in the area. He added: 
Don't let us be tainted with Nazism particularly 
in relation to the Jews, whos~ unspeakable 
sufferings in Europe demand of us as Christians 
that we give them succor here.246 
Kilpatrick pointed out that Kilpatrick, McLennan and Co., 
the auctioneering firm with which he was associated, had 
sold 84 properties in the Goulburn Valley during the 
previous twelve months. Only five of these had been bought 
2 4 3. SheEEarton News, 12 July 1943. 
244. A.J.H., 23 July 1943. 
245. SheEparton News, 15 July 1943. 
246. A.J.H., 30 July 1943. 
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by Jews, all of whom were 'old and respected citizens'.247 
Of tpe remainder, one property was sold to an Indian and 
the rest to Australians. 
The economic activities of refugees in the 
cities also continued to b~ denounced. In Sydney, Alderman 
L.E. Duff of the Woollahra Council precipitated a fresh 
anti-refugee attack when he accused refugee aliens of 
'stepping into shops and businesses emptied by call-ups of 
Australians' and of dominating 'one line of business after 
another', 24 8_ !,.i_]{e_ many Austr_alia_ns, Duf_t:_ re>sented t3_El _f_act 
that the newcomers were not the destitute refugees they 
were supposed to be: 
when we threw open our country to these so-called 
oppressed refugees, we didn't expect them to be 
arrogant, to get about in fine clothes while we 
wear patched ones, and to push our women off 
tram and bus seats while we stand.249 
Duff's outburst resembled Sir Frank Clarke's in that he was 
not specific about whom he was attacking. 25 0 Although he 
started off condemning 'refugee aliens', he went on to 
include Italian immigrants who had allegedly taken over the 
food trade, fishshops and restaurants. 251 
Trade unions were not interested in the 
refugees' behaviour on buses but they were quickly alerted 
by any mention of alien business activities. The Secretary 
of the Allied L-eather Trades Federation, C. Lynch, alleged 
that refugees had 'captured the handbag market'. They had 
'cashed in on the patriotism of our own people', taking 
advantage of the fact that most of the old established 
leather firms were engaged on defence contraqts. As well as 
profiting at the expense of Australian fiims, refugee 
handbag makers threatened to break down Australian industrial 
247. A.J.H., 30 July 1943. 
248. Sun, 24 August 1943. 
249. D . 'l, . , 24 August 1943. 
250. see P· 106. 
251. D.T., 24 August 1943. 
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conditions because a lot of their work was done at home. 
Lynch underlined the plight of refugee members of the 
professions when he claimed that 'scores of people who have 
never made a handbag before are employed - refugee doctors, 
dentists, lawyers and accountants. 252 
Duff's allegations also aroused the anti-·foreign 
instincts of Australian chauvinists. AccorC'.ing to the 
secretary of the N.S.W. Branch of the R.S.L., J.R. Lewis, the 
'rehabilitation of so many returned men will be seriously 
embarrassed by aliens' operations•. 2 53 H.R. Redding, General 
Secretary of the Australian Natives' Association, commented 
that aliens were 'still extending their tentacles' ,254 
Smith's Weekly joined in, dropping its pro-Jewish 
refugee stance and resuming its more familiar anti-alien role 
in a vicious attack on the refugees' business activities. 
'Refugees and other aliens' were accused of prospering at the 
expense of Australians through their 'underhand methods, 
business trickery, and refusal to conform to Australian 
standards'. They were evading Taxation Department requirements, 
keeping their transactions secret by means of mysterious 
financial linkups between businesses, internal financial 
arrangements and dummying. According to Smith's Weekly, it 
was high time that the Federal Government ordered 
a complete investigation into refugee and alien 
menace to Australian trade and living conditions, 
a menace that could quite easily develop into a 
real threat to the internal pace of the nation.255 
The Sydney Sun, which had given Duff's remarks 
wide publicity, took the opportunity to a~tack refugees on 
grounds which had little to do with the present allegations. 
It declared: 'no alien has any right to expect that he shall 
bring into this country an alien way of living which might 
252, D.T., 26 August 1943. 
253. ~' 24 August 1943. 
254. Ibid. 
255. Smith's Weekly, 4 September 1943. 
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degrade Australians•. 256 Like most people, the~ ignored 
the positive aspects of the 'alien way of living' which 
refugees had brought into the country. Far from degrading 
Australians, refugees were helping to civilize them. Refugee 
academics, musicians, dancers and artists were introducing 
Australians to some of the less tangible benefits of European 
civilization. 257 On the practical side, refugee engineers, 
scientists and manufacturers were contributing to Australia's 
war effort, developing the production of items ranging from 
fine cotton-wool to microscopes.258 
Few Australians were impressed. Instea~ they made 
increasing attacks on. the refugees as Jews, despite press 
reports that the Nazi regime was systematically exterminating 
--European Jewry·.- Tn·· s-eptember-1942-; the Austral-ian ·Jewish 
Herald complained that antisemitic literature was being 
disseminated amongst members of the armed forces and that it 
was provoking anti-Jewish incidents. 2 59 During 1943 there 
were frequent reports of physical assaults on Jews in 
Melbourne and damage to houses and other property.260 Before 
long, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, the 
antisemites' bible, was being distributed in the community 
and the Perth Daily News warned its readers to 'be on guard 
against mind-poisoners' . 261 
The effect of continuing anti-foreign 
allegations and antisemitic propaganda on Australians who 
were antipathetic to refugees soon became apparent. In 
256. ~' 25 August 1943. 
257. Ursula Wiemann, op.cit., pp. 289-290, 316-9, 
discusses the contribution of refugees to Australia's 
educational and cultural life. 
258. The refugees' contributions are outlined in two 
pamphlets published by the Jewish council to Combat 
Fascism and Anti-Semitism, Melbourne (seep. 160): 
Brian Fitzpatrick, Refuefees - Hitler's Loss our Gain, 
Melbourne, 1945, and Ernest Platz, New Australians, 
Melbourne, 1948. 
259. A.J.H., 3 Septembeic 1942. 
260. A.J.H., 17 June 1943, Argus, 28 June 1943. 
261. Daily News, 28 September 1943. 
See also S.M.H., 28 September 1943. 
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September 1944 the Catholic Weekly launched one of the most 
vicious attacks yet made on refugees in Australia by a 
commentator who was not a declared antisemite. It alleged 
that the refugees, who were 'largely of Jewish origin', were 
conglomerating in inner city suburbs •.. 
adopting aggressive methods in business 
... breaking our industrial laws using 
unfair methods to defeat Australian 
competitors.262 
These arguments had frequently been used by opponents of 
foreign immigration, a group to which Catholics did not 
claim to belong. But the Catholic Weekly's conclusion 
went far beyond the usual anti-foreign arguments and sounded 
like an extract from a speech by Hitler or Streicher: 
A terrible. problem ... is. growin13···in Australia·. ·· 
Its consequences ~ill be grave. It may take 
years to eradicate it. That is why urgent 
and intelligent Government action is needed 
... Unless they get to work quickly; Australia 
will suffer for generations from a ~ore that 
has brought untold suffering to diseased 
Europe. 263 
What was to be done about these increasing 
antisemitic attacks? Australian Jews were supersensitive 
to any public criticism of refugees but divided on what 
action to take. Official Jewish organizations had always 
tried to keep Jews out of the public eye because they 
feared that publicity would only provoke anti-Jewish 
feelings.264 Even when expressions of antisemitism 
increased during the war, they were loath to dispute the 
issue publicly. Many of the newcomers were less reticent. 
262. Catholic Weekly, 28 September 1944. 
263. Ibid. 
264. P.Y. Medding, op.cit., p. 70, calls this response, 
which lasted untill942, 'the fear of 
conspicuousness 1 • 
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As early as November 1941, the Australian Jewish Forum 
asked what was being done to fight antisemitism and 
complained that some Jews, for fear of disturbing their 
'sense of security', refused 'to take any action that might 
in their opinion focus the gaze of the world upon, and thus 
aggravate, the ''Jewish problem''' .265 
This difference of opinion became obvious in 
early 1942. When the Jewish War Effort Circle in Melbourne 
circularized Jews on a meeting about antisemitism, 
Jacob Jona, President of the Victorian Jewish Advisory Board, 
stated that such a meeting would 'undoubtedly do more harm 
than good in combating antisemitism'. He maintained that 
the Advisory Board was taking 'very effective action' to 
combat antisemitic activity but, in the interests of the 
Jewish people themselves, it was 'not advantageous nor 
politic to publish or broadcast what action had been 
taken. • 26 6 The meeting was held despite Jana's opposition 
and, in May 1942, the Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and 
anti-Semitism was established. The council viewed 'with 
great concern the rapid spread of anti-Semitism in this 
country' and considered that it was its duty 'to expose and 
combat anti-Semitism in any of its forms veiled or open' 
Anticipating cooperation with the anti-fascist left, it 
stated that it would 'help any Social or Political 
organization or Movement whose objects are to fight 
Fascism•. 26 7 With tho-Council in active operation, the 
Victorian Jewish Advisory Board could do little but endorse 
its activities. 268 
In July 1942 the N.S.W. Jewish Advisory Board 
set up its own ~rganization to combat antisemitism, the 
265. A.J.F., November 1941. 
The Australian Jewish Forum was established in 1941 by 
Dr. Isaac Steinberg and his supporters t.o publicize the 
Kimberley proposal and to keep Australian Jews informed 
of developments in European Jewish life. (see pp.202-3). 
266. A.J.H., 22 January 1942. 
267. A.J.H., 11 June 1942. 
26B. P.Y. Medding, op.cit., pp. 61-63, discusses the 
relations between the Council and the V.J.A.B. 
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Bureau of Jewish Affairs. 269 The Bureau's functions were 
to5ollect evidence of antisemitism and conduct a campaign 
of 'positive propaganda' . 2 70 In lectures and radio 
broadcasts, Australians were given the 'true facts' about 
the Jews. 271 Most Jews were still wary about entering the 
public arena and considered that such prosemitic propaganda 
had to be carried out in a carefully organized fashion, 
preferably with prominent non-Jewish Austrslians combating 
antisemitism with rational arguments. They deplored 
emotional public outbursts by Jews. When Rabbi Max Schenk 
launched an attack on Australians who were spreading 
antisemitic propaganda, his action was publicly condemned 
by Rab)J_i Jacob Danglow, Chie_f Minister _of th_<:_ St. K_:i,_l_(l~-- ______ _ 
Hebrew Congregation. The Sydney Jewish News commented that 
the Jews should do their 
utmost to avoid undesirable publicity ... 
Mending our own ways, such as quiet living, 
humbleness and the observance of Judaism in 
its proper sense will do much to combat 
Anti-Semitism and command the respect of our 
neighbours. 272 
In their agitation against antisemitism, Jews 
sought the backing of sympathetic Australians, especially 
Protestant churchmen. At the instigation of Rabbi Porush, 
the N.S.W. Council of Christians and Jews was established 
in March 1943 on the model of a similar organization in 
the United Kingdom. 273 Representatives of the Roman 
Catholic, Church of England and non~conformist churches 
~et under the chairmanship of Dr. Mowll, Anglican Archbishop 
of Sydney. The Council aimed to promote understanding and 
goodwill between Christians and Jews and,_ more specifically, 
to 'unite in a determined, effort to c11eck intolerance, 
269. H. S. , 22 July 1943. 
270. H. S. , 1 July -1943. 
271. IL S . , 5 August, 18 November 1943. 
2 72. S.J.N., 10 March 1944. 
273. H. S. , 1 July 1943. 
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persecution and unworthy recrimination'. Rabbi Porush, 
Bishop Pilcher and Father Hehir (representing Archbishop 
Gilroy) formed a sub-committee to study the problem of 
counteracting 'the common fallacies concerning Jews•.274 
They organized a series of seven broadcasts by both Jews 
and Christians who described the plight of European Jewry 
and explained why Christian principles were radically 
opposed to antisemitism.275 
In September 1943, a group of the Jews' usual 
Australian supporters - labour men, academics and Church of 
England spokesmen - formed their own prosemitic association, 
the Australian Council for Jewish Rights. 
object was 
Its primary 
to combat anti-Semitism as a movement which is 
opposed to all Christian and humanitarian ideals 
... to oppose discrimination against Jews in the 
economic, social or other fields.of .human activity.276 
The council, which was presided over by J.J. Maloney, 
President of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council, also 
agitated for the rescue of Jews from Europe and the opening 
of Palestine to refugees.277 
274. A.J.H., 8 October 1942, described the activities of the 
British committee. 
275. ~·, 4 November 1943. 
Rabbi I. Porush, 'The New South Wales Council of 
Christians and Jews (1943-1948), A.J.H.S., 6(1938) 
pp. 181-195. The activities of the Council are 
described in detail by Rabbi Porush, who has been 
Chief Minister of the Great Synagogue, Sydney, since 1940. 
276. H.S., 16 September 1943. · 
Maloney was appointed Australia's first Ministe,r to the 
u.s.s.R. later in 1943. 
The foundation members of the Council were: 
Bishop E.H. Burgmann, Anglican Bishop of Goulburn 
Bishop C. Venn Pilcher, Coadjutor Bishop of Sydney 
J.J. Maloney, President, N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council 
Jack Hooke, N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council 
Professor Ian Clunies-Ross, Professor of Veterinary 
Science, University of Sydney 
Miss Camilla Wedgwood 
Miss Aileen Fitzpatrick 
Miss c. Jollie Smith 
·C.C. Lazzarini, M.H.R., Labor member for Werriwa 
Dr. Maurice Laserson, Official Representative of the 
World Jewish Congress for Australia 
Miss Eileen Powell. 
277. See pp. 184-5. 
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Other organizations and individuals rallied to 
the Jews' defence. The Civil Rights Defence League 
established an aliens' subcommittee to counteract the 
'vicious campaign' against refugees.278 Australian 
communists declared that they were 'utterly opposed to 
discrimination against anyone because of race, creed or 
colour' and stated that the fight against antisemitism was 
a regular feautre of their work. 279 Well-known Australians, 
including Dr. C.E.W. Bean, ·Australia's official historian 
for World War I, and B!ian Fitzpatrick, historian and 
General Secretary of the Council for Civil Liberties, wrote 
articles and made speeches and radio broadcasts defending 
Jews in general and the refugees in particular. 2 80 Unlike 
the Catholic Weekly, Archbishop Mannix thought that 'there 
· 1-·----··-- -~----- \•ra·s·--r-oorr1 ·f o·r a--g-r e a·te-r- -deg-re e---o-f----k-in d-~-i-n-e s s---to·w a-r-d-s----th e---- . ... ----··--------------- --------· --·-----"---
1 
Jewish people'. 281 
The nascent antisemitism in Australia had provoked 
a large-scale prosemitic campaign by Jews and their 
supporters. Had they overreacted? At least one Australian 
Jew considered that the extent of antisemitism in the 
community was being 'grossly overstated' and that all the 
talk about the problem was 'doing considerable harm to 
ourselves and the community generally'. He ridiculed the 
attention being given to newspaper articles which seemed a 
little offensive to Jewish people and to the so-called 
antisemitic slogans on hoardings and fences: 
Surely you don't regard these childish writings 
as anti-Semitic! ... For goodness sake iqnore such 
stuff, laugh it off! To label such stuff anti-
semitic is ridiculous and will only encourage 
editors to write more rubbish about the Jews.282 
278. S.M.H., 23 October 1943. 
279. S.J.N., 23 February 1945. 
280. Dr. C.E.W. Bean, Article in Reveille, July 1943. 
Reprinted in H.S., 29 July 1943. 
Brian Fitzpatrick, A.B.C. talk reprinted in H.S., 
12 April 1945. 
281. Argus, 13 November 1944. 
282. 'Be Realistic', letter to A.J.H., 6 April 1944. 
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But with thousands of European Jews being exterminated 
daily by the Nazis and antisemitic propaganda spreading 
throughout the world, Australian Jews and their 
sympathizers were not in a laughing mood. 
.-·., 
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Chapter 4 
Extermination and Rescue 
The second world war gave Hitler the 
opportunity to put into practice an antisemitic policy 
aimed at the total destruction of European Jewry. Almost 
six million Jews died in the holocaust. 1 Despite the war, 
the outslde world had a reasonable knowledge of what was 
happening to Jews in Nazi-controlled territory a~d the 
Australian press kept its readers informed of the latest 
2 developments. Reports began with details of the 
3 
maltreatment of Jews in German concentration camps, the 
deportation 0£ German and Austrian Jews to the Lublin 
reservation 4 in Poland and massacres o~Po!ish Jews following 
the German occupation. 5 This was only the beginning. In 
mid-1941 the Nazi regime adopted its 'final solution' to 
the Jewish question - the extermination of the European 
6 Jews. The plan involved the systematic murder of Jews in 
1. 
2. 
The round figure of six million has become generally 
accepted. According to the Nuremberg Indictment, of 
the 9,600,000 Jews in territory which came under Nazi 
control, 5,721,800 did not survive. This figure is 
disputed by Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, New 
York, 1961, Appendix I, pp.489-501. According to 
Reitlinger's analysis, the total number of Jewish deaths 
was between 4,194,200 and 4,581,200. 
In Australia, the Jewish press fe~ture~ detailed reports 
of Nazi antisemitic activities throughout the war, 
illustrating that abundant information was available 
on the treatment of the Jews. Reports in the non-
Jewish_ press were spasmodic and not given particular 
prominence. 
3. ~., l November 1939. 
4. ~~·· 6 November 1939. One of Hitler's early 'solutions' 
to the Jewish question was to resettle Jews in the Lublin 
area of Eastern Poland. This plan was put into operation 
shortly after the outbreak of war b~t abandoned in 
April 1940, Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich, New York, 
1956, pp.228-237. 
5. ~·, 5 December. 1939. 
6 Gerald Reitlinger, op.cit., pp.80-83, and Raul Hilberg, 
The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago, 1961, 
pp.257-263, discuss the evolution of the plan. The first 
extermination centre, at Chelmno, was operating by 
December 1941, and another five (Treblinka, Sobihor, 
Belsec, Maydanek and Auschwitz) from the Spring of 1942. 
The activities of the _Einsatzgrup~ mobile killing units 
began when the German army invaded Russia in June 1941. 
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Russia and the Baltic states as the German army advanced 
east and the establishment of extermination camps in Poland 
to deal with local Jews and those deported from Northern, 
western and South-Eastern Europe. 
From mid-1942 the world gradually became aware 
of the extent of the slaughter. At the end of June the World 
Jewish Congress announced that one million Jews had already 
died, including 700,000 in Poland where there had been mass 
executions of deportees from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia 
7 
and Holland. A few weeks later, newspaper readers received 
first-hand reports of the round-up of Jews in Paris and their 
deportation east. 8 In December, a Note issued by the Polish 
-GoVer·nment ·in London ·:reve-aled the fufl details of the Nazis' 
mass extermination methods - machine gun, electrocution and 
poison gas - and stated that the victims included one third 
of Poland's three million Jews. 9 The British Government 
substantiated the statement in a report which systematically 
analyzed the fate of Jews in Nazi-controlled countries. 10 
The reports of the atrocities aroused little 
reaction in Australia. Dr. H.V. Evatt, Minister for External 
Affairs, announced that the Commonwealth Government 
'wholeheartedly associated itself' with a declaration issued 
hy the allied governments which condemned Germany's 'bestial 
Apart from an outcry 1 . f ld l d d t . . t. ' 11 po icy o co -b oo e ex ermina ion . 
7, Argus, l July 1942. 
8. Argus, 22 July, 13 August 1942. 
S.M.H., 7 August 1942. 
9, Argus, 12, 14 December 1942. 
S.M.H., 14 December 1942. 
The Note gave specific information that extermination 
camps existed at Treblinka, Belsec, S,ohihor and 
Chelmno, and that 80,000 Jews had been electrocuted 
at Belsec in March-April 1942. In the east, half the 
Jewish population of Lvov and 50,000 Jews in Vilna 
had been murdered, 
10. Persecution of the Jews (Conditions in Occupied 
Territories No. 6), London, H.M.s.o., Ministry of 
Information Pamphlet 70-421, 1942. 
11. s.M.H., 18 December 1942. 
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1 n the Jewish press, public reaction was limited to isolated 
12 
newspaper editorials and sympathetic comments. The few who 
did react did so with vehemence. If it had been diffic~lt 
to find words to describe Nazi antisemitic violence in 1938, 
the latest events were simply beyond description. The 
Australian Jewish Herald declared: 'No 
the magnitude of this great crime' • 13 
words ... can portray 
:· 
According to Rev. E.J. 
oavidson, the Nazis' 'crime against humanity beggars 
description' . 14 The Advertiser did its best to find 
appropriate words: 
The devil incarnate could not improve upon this 
man's atrocious proceedings .•. the lions of the 
Gestapo are infinitely more beastly and 
bloodthirsty than any ever bred in an African 
wilderness.15 
some 
,-------- - -· 
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In 1933 and 1938, commentators had drawn 
historical parallels between the Nazis' antisemitic 
activities and other instances of human persecution. But 
the latest events had no historical counterpart: they were 
unique. The Lord Mayor of Sydney, S.S. Crick, made a 
typical comment when he claimed that the atrocities had 'no 
parallel in the history of the world'. 16 According to the 
Australian Jewish Herald, 'nothing, not anything which has 
happened since men came 
. bl ' 17 terr1 e events .•.. 
out of the jungle, can parallel these 
Active protest followed the usual 
P.".:t:.t~.l'.'.n ._Jews organized public protest meetings in Melbourne 
-·- ·- -- --------- ---------·-·· ---- ---- --- ---- -- -·---- __ __!_ __ _ 
12. Of the major daily newspapers, only the Sydney Morning 
Herald, Advertiser and Courier-Mail commented on the 
revelations of December 1942. 
13. ~~., 10 December 1942. 
11, The Bermuda Conference on Refugees, Documents an·d Ess~-' 
issued by the World Jewish Congress (Australian Section) , 
Sydney, 1943, p.42. 
Rev. E,J, Davidson was the rector of st. James' Church, 
Sydney. 
15. Advertiser, 22 December 1942. 
16, H.S., 19 November 1942. 
l 7 A , J • H. , 4 March 194 3 . 
13 
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18 
and Sydney and joined their co-religionists throughout 
ld ' 1 d. f f t• d • I 19 h • • wor in a ay o as ing an mourning . C ristian 
20 
churches devoted a day of prayer to the Jews . 
Jewish commentators and their sympathizers 
soon realized that the atrocities had not provoked the 
reaction they warranted. The Australian Jewish Herald 
the 
bewailed the fact that the tragedy had not 'made a 
discernible dent in the minds of Christians in this country' 
It claimed that the reason for this situation was not 
'callousness and indifference' but the people's 'ignorance 
of the true position' and called for a 
to bring the truth home to Australians' 
'determined effort 
21 But Australians 
-ha(f .i:i.een--Informed of the Nazi extermination campaign. The 
fact that at least two million Jews were already dead was 
down in black and white, even if it had not made the 
headlines. 22 Rabbi Max Schenk alleged that Australians 
were 'indifferent and callous to the multiplicity of 
suffering• 23 and Bishop Pilcher claimed that many people in 
Great Britain and the Dominions 
24 
sympathy' . 
'seem to be lacking in 
• 
understanding and 
Sympathetic commentators tried to rationalize 
the lack of reaction in psychological terms. It was wartime; 
perhaps people were so accustomed to horror that they had 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
2 2. 
2 3. 
2 4. 
S.M.H., 11 November 1942, H.S., l~ November 1942, 
reported meeting held on l()"November in Sydney 
attended by 2,000. 
A.J.H., 24 December 1942, reported meeting held in 
Melbourne on 20 December, attended by 600. 
Al~l.lS, 14 December 1942, S.M.-H. I 19, 21 December 1942. 
S.McH .. , 26 March 1943. 
A.J.H., 24 June 194 3. 
S.M .. H.,, 21 December 1942. 
H. S. , 19 November 1942. 
S.M.H., 6 August 1943. 
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become immune to human suffering. Bishop Burgmann suggested 
that the community was 'so used to death and disaster that 
our minds are callous, our sympathies seared'. The stage 
had probably been reached where people read casualty lists 
'long after they have read the lottery list' . 25 According 
to Camilla Wedgwood, 'we have heard so much of horrors that 
26 
we are numbed t. 
Was the lack of reaction simply part of the 
total war environment or were other factors involved? People 
were accustomed to war deaths but the Jews were being killed, 
simply because they happened to be Jews, in accordance with 
-adel':ll:5er_a_te -p6Yl:cy- of extermination. 
simply 'too hideous to be credible' ; 27 
The whole business was 
to believe that one's 
fellow human beings could undertake such bestial activities 
1 b d h "t I 28 h f was eyon uman capaci y . It was only a s ort step rem 
finding the situation impossible to comprehend to denying 
its existence. After all, it was wartime, an occasion for 
atrocities propaganda as World War I had shown. Could the 
stories really be believed? Victor Bernstein later wrote: 
'many of us believed what we read and heard, some of us ••. 
refused to believe•. 29 The Perth Daily News tried to convince 
its readers that the reports ~ authentic. Although 
Austialians had made up their minds not to be fooled again, 
there was no reason to disbelieve reports when the Nazis 
25. S.M.H., 6 August 1943. Bishop E. Burgmann had been 
the Anglican Bishop of Goulburn since 1934 and 
frequently expressed his sympathy for the plight of 
the Jews. (See pp.135, 162, 175). 
26. H.S., 19 November 1942. 
Camilla Wedgwood, Principal of Women's College, Sydney 
University, and Lecturer in Anthropology, was the 
daughter of British Jewish sympathizer, the late 
Josiah Wedgwood. She was one of the most active 
campaigners for Jewish refugee immigration. (See 
pp. 162, 175, 184). 
27. Statement by Rabbi Freedma~, A.J.H., 21 January 1943. 
28. A.J.H., 4 March 1943. 
Similar comments were expressed by Daily News, 
27 November 1942, and H.P. Lazzarini, Federal Minister 
for Home Security,~.!...!!.·• 21 January 1943. 
29. Victor Be~nstein, Final Judgment, London, 1947, p.121. 
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themselves did not deny their truth. 30 But, as later events 
showed, people had to see to belive. 31 
Even if one did accept the news reports, the 
magnitude of the disaster was virtually impossible to 
comprehend. The Australian Jewish Herald admitted that it 
was difficult 'to feel the horror which is appropriate to 
the facts• 32 and others commented that such astronomical 
figures numbed the mind 33 and baffled the imagination, 34 
Professor Clu~~=-:__ Ro_ss_ summed up thi~commonly-ex_l?_ress_"9 
opinion when he claimed that the fact that the world was 
unmoved was 'explicable only by the inability of the human 
35 
mind to picture suffering and death on this vast scale', 
What was to be done about the situation? The 
emotions aroused were anger and hostility towards the Nazis 
rather than sympathy for the Jews. Violent action called 
for a violent reaction: the war effort must be increased 
and the Nazis crushed. In a letter of sympathy to Sydney's 
protest meeting, the Prime Minister, John Curtin, stated that 
30. Daily News, 27 November 19'\.2. 
31. See pp. 220-3. 
32 A.J.H,, 4 March 1943. 
--· 
33. Comment by H.P. Lazzarini, A.J.H., 21 January 1943. 
34. Statement by Sir Robert Wallace, Vice-Chancellor of 
Sydney University, The Bermuda Conference on Refugees, 
2-E.· ill·· p.46. 
35. Ibid., p.46. Ian Clunies Ross, Professor of Veterinary 
Science at Sydney University, was also a commentator 
on international affairs and an active sympathizer for 
the Jews. (See pp.162, 175, 184.) 
Ernest Hearst, 'The British and the slaughter of the 
Jews', Wiener Librarz_Bulletin, 21, No.l (1966-67), p.35, 
attributes British 'indifference' to the revelations 
to a 'decade of Nazi propaganda[whic~ had rendered 
large sections of the population ambiguous and far 
from sympathetic in their attitude towards Jews'. 
Although the spread of antisemitic propaganda in 
Australia and resentment towards refugees 
(see Ch.3) possibly modified sympathy to some extent, 
there is no evidence of Australians condoning the 
mass murder of European Jews. 
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the persecution of the Jews only illustra~ed 'the total 
nature of the struggle in which all free people are engaged 
0 gainst the savagery of Nazi aggression•.
36 In a similar 
message, Sydney's Lord Mayor, S.S. Crick, declared that there 
must be 'no appeasement or compromise or half-way measures 
in this grim fight for freedom•. 37 
Once the war was won, the Nazis must be made 
to pay for their actions. From all sections of the 
Australian community there was one cry: retribution. The 
- 38 
Nazis' 'day of reckoning' would come. 
--- -
The Advertiser 
.. warned _tha_t .. 'the __ price that will 
these horrid entertainments will 
ultimately .. he .. paid for_ 
39 be heavy' . Rabbi 
Fabian demanded an eye for an eye, insisting that the free 
nations of the world should 'mete out equal punishment to 
- 40 
those responsible'. Dr. Evatt, Minister for External 
Affairs, pointed out that Australia had formally endorsed 
the declaration of the British and American Governments 
that a War Crimes Commission would be established. He 
promised that the Australian Government would endeavour 
to 'ensure retributive justice is done to those responsible•. 41 
But who ~ responsible: how could any degree of retribution 
against a limited number of Nazis compensate for the mass 
murder of millions of Jews? According to the Courier-Mail, 
not only the Nazi leaders but the whole G·e·r·ma:n: ·natTOn :would 
have to pay: 
Hitler has loaded upon the ~erman nation, which 
accepted him as the embodiment of its will, a 
burden of infamy which will have to be carried 
through long years of peace. That will be part 
of the retribution to be visited on the Germans.42 
36. ~., 19 November 1942. 
37. Ibid. Alderman Crick, a former film director and 
Managing Director of Fox Films in Australia, 
convened the Sydney protest meeting. 
·I 
38. Message from H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, 
to Sydney protest meeting; ~· , 19 November 194 2. 
39. Advertiser, 22 December 1942. 
40. W.A., 17 December, 1942. Dr. A. Fabian was First 
Minister of the Adelaide Hebrew Congregation. 
41. ~·, 19 November 1942. 
42. £.:...!:!_., 22 December 1942. 
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Retribution after the war was all very well 
but by then it might be too late to save any of Europe's 
Jews. 'The proclamation of vengeance will bring back no 
single Jew from his nameless grave', wrote Victor Gollancz. 43 
sympathizers all over the world took up his cry Let My People 
9.£ and his plea for immediate action to save Europe's 
surviving Je\'lS .. In Britain, the House of 
resolution that rescue measures should be 
Lords passed a 
44 taken and the 
Anglican Archbishops urged the Government to find an 
imm-e·ai.a t e a Sy IUm for- l-efug-ees. 45 Ag i ta ti On- r·n ·--th·e- un_i.f ed-- -----------
.. States culminated .. in _a __ mass __ demon_s_tration ~n_ Madison Square 
Garden by thirty thousand people who demanded that the Jews 
46 be rescued from Europe. In Australia, leaders of the 
Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist churches wrote to the 
Prime Minister stressing the urgent necessity of 'consulting 
with the British Government with the intention of finding 
47 
some place of refuge for the Jews ••. ' • 
.... . 
Australian Jews acted promptly. United 
Emergency Committees for European Jewry were set up, first 
in Sydney and later in Melbourne and the other capitals, with 
the aim of taking 'all possible action for the rescue, relief 
and rehabilitation of Jews suffering under the Nazi terror' • 48 
These committees established contact with similar 
organizations in London and New York and attempted to arouse 
the consciences of local Jews and the Australian population" 
An article headed 'A call to Australian Jews' asked 'what 
can be done NOW?' and urged Jews to 'provide gladly and 
43. Victor Gollancz, Let My People Go: Some practical 
proposals for dealing with Hitler's m~ssacre of the 
Jews and an appeal to the British public, London, 1943, 
p .. 29. 
44. 126 H,L, Deb.5s, cols. 818-859, 25 March 1943. 
45· The Times, 25 January 1943. 
4 6. New York Times, 2 March 1943. 
47. ~:_!!.• • 18 March 194 3. 
48. !:!..:...§.. , 7 , 14 January, 11 February 1943. 
!!...:_J, H" 4 February 194 3. 
.. 
quickly every penny that is asked•. 49 In thi synagogue, 
Jews were read a 'pastoral letter to the heart of every 
Jew' in which they were summoned to assist their 'fellow 
citizens to understand the magnitude of this problem and 
l 7 3, 
the responsibility of the peoples of the world to contribute 
to its solution•. 50 The committees distributed copies of 
V1Gtor Gollancz's pamphlet to all Australians who had 
'anything to do with forming public . . • 51 op1n1on ~ 
Any action to save Europe's Jews had to be 
taken at a high official level. With public agitation 
mounting' the British and American· Government's agreecf to-
d iscuss the problem and each sent four representatives to 
52 
a conference at Bermuda from 19 to 29 April 1943. 
H.S., 18 February 1943. •· 
During 1943 Australian Jews were asked to contribute 
to a number of appeals which sought funds for the 
rescue and relief of European Jewry: 
'Rescue the Children' Appeal, launched in Melbourne 
in March and Sydney in May, sought to raise £50,000 
for the transport and maintenance of 150 children 
to be admitted to Australiao See pp.186-7, 
The Jewish People's Relief Fund was launched in 
Sydney in March and Melbourne in August (called 
the United Jewish· Re1ief-·Fund), This· fund· 
distributed money to the major relief agencies. 
There were two Zionist.organized appeals: 
Youth Aliyah, which collected funds for the 
establishment of Jewish children in Palestine, 
launched an Appeal in January 1943; 
che Jewish National Fund, which raised money for 
the redemption of land in P~lestine, launched an 
s.o.s. Appeal in Sydney in June and Melbourne in 
October. The Sydney Appeal clashed with the 'Rescue 
the Children' Appeal after the organizers of the 
two funds (the Zionist Federation and the A.J.w.s.J 
could not agree on the timing of their respective 
appeals. 
50, H. s., 18 March 1943. 
51. A.i.H., 15 April 1943. 
52 The Bermuda Conference is discussed in detail by Cyrus 
Adler and Aaron M. Margalith, With Firmness in the 
Right: American Diplomatic Action Affecting Je~ 
1840-1945, New York, 1946, pp.439-444, and Arieh 
Tartakower and Kurt R. Gro_ssmann, !'?.£. .. ~-, pp.420-6 .. 
~·-· 
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The American Joint Emergency Committee for· Eur·apea:A-·Jew.i:~h· 
Affairs submitted a twelve-point programme for rescuing the 
Jews. This reflected current thinking on the action that 
was necessary: negotiations with the Axis powers through 
neutral governments, the provision of refugee sanctuaries 
(especially the lifting of immigration restrictions in 
Palestine and the United States) and the shipment of food to 
Jewish ghettos in Nazi-controlled territory. 53 Apart from 
the opening and closing sessions, the Conference deliberated 
in secrecy,, A brief fidal communique merely stated that the 
__ c]eleg_a_tes had 'examined the refugee problem in all its 
aspects' and that they had been 'able to agree on a number 
of concrete recommendations' which had to remain 
f . d . 1 54 con l. entia • 
According to unofficial reports, the only 
positive decisions made by the Conference were to revitalise 
the Inter-Governmental Committee and take steps to remove 
Jewish refugees in Spain to North Africa. The delegates 
rejected the proposals that an approach be made to the Axis 
powers and that attempts be made to ship food to Jewish 
ghettos; they agreed not to discuss the sensitive question 
of increased immigration into Palestine and the United 
- ....... ·---55 -·· .. States. If dr~~tic·measures were needed to counter Hitler's. 
campaign to exterminate the whole of European Jewry, they did 
not materialize at Bermuda. 
53, The full text of the memorandum is quoted in The 
Bermuda Conference on Refugees,~· cit., pp.9-13. 
This programme of rescue was similar to those advocated 
by Victor Gollancz, ~"cit., pp.3-6, and the mass 
meeting in Madison Square Garden, New York, arranged 
h1 the American Jewish Congress. New York Times, 
2 March 1943. 
54. The text of the communique is quoted in Arieh Tartakower 
and Kurt R. Grossmann, £.12.· cit., Appendix IV, p.590. 
55. Ibid., pp.422-3. 
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Those yeople who had expected any positive 
results from the Conference were bitterly disappointed. 56 
According to the 
mockery and cruel 
London Observer, Bermuda had been 'a 
. ' 57 . Jest • Australian newspapers were not 
so forthcoming; they published the official communique but 
58 
made no comment. The Jews' sympathizers - the usual 
protestant churchmen, labour spokesmen and academics - spoke 
I at a public meeting called by the Australian Section of the 
I World Jewish Congress and contributed to its bookl3t on the 
----,1 ----~failure of Bermuda. 59 ._a_'moc:Kery_', writer Katherine Suzannah Prichard labelled 
I. 60 it a 'farce' and P,J, Clarey, President of the A.C.T.u., declared that its decisions 'cannot 
• accepted as the last word•. 61 
and should not be 
I 
I 
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56. The disappointed reactions of many people in the United 
Kingdom are discussed by G. Warburg, 'None to comfort 
the persecuted. The failure of refugee conferences. 
No refuge: Bermuda April 1943', Wiener Library Bulletin, 
15 (1961)' pp.44, 47. 
57. Observer, 25 April 1943. 
58. For example, §.M.H., Argus, Age, Advertiser, W,A., 
l May 194 3. 
59 .. The Bermuda Conference on Refugees, 2.E_· cit., p.45. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid., p.41. 
The Australian section of the World Jewish Congress 
organized a meeting on the Bermuda Conference on 
5 August 1943, Other non-Jewish speakers included 
J,J, Maloney, President of the N.S.W. Trades and Labor 
Council, and E.H. Burgmann, Anglican Bishop of Goulburn. 
S.M .. H., 6 August 1943. ~·, 12 August 1943. 
In the Bermuda Conference on Refugees, Documents and 
Essays, 2.E.• cit., there were ten 'statements by 
leading Australia~s': 
Anglicans Bishop c.v. Pilcher, Coadjutor Bishop 
of Sydney; 
Bishop E.H. Burgmann, Bishop of Goulburn; 
·------R-e-v:-... E .. H.-:--oav--rd·san·~ r·e·c·t·o·r· cff. st. James' 
Labour 
Spokesman 
Acade1nics 
Church, Sydney. 
p,J. Clarey, President of the A,C,T.U.; 
J.J. Maloney, President of the N.S,W, Trades 
and Labor Council. 
sir Robert Wallace, Vice-Chancellor of 
Sydney University; 
Ian Clunies Ross, Professor of Veterinary 
·····- s·c-i en c·e-,.- Sydney U-n-i-v-e-r-s-it-y-;. 
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The failure of the Conference caused the 
attitudes of many Australian Jews to turn from sorrow to 
anger. Europe's surviving Jews had simply been 'abandoned 
l d ' f . ' 62 h . d to tieir ire ate • Te Unite Emergency Committee for 
Suropean Jewry published a booklet And They Went Out Into 
The Wilderness which alleged that the delegates at Bermuda 
had done little to overcome the problems they faced. It 
-·concluded -tha-t-the- lack- ·of posit-tve--p-roposals 'may amount 
to washing our hands of the deaths of the four million men, 
women and children whose murder is already planned by 
Hitler'. 63 
Australian Jews refused to belive that their 
co-religionists in Europe could not be rescued. They reacted 
angrily when Osbert Peake, Under-Secretary of Stace for the 
Home Department, stated in the House of Commons that 
practjcally nothing could be done for the Jews until after 
the war; the Jews' salvation could only come with an allied 
. 64 
victory. The Australian Jewish Herald declared: 'this was 
not the voice of Britain', the nation which was 'first before 
all the world in her lustrous record of humanity and 
compa_5s_i9_n 1 .. __ .. 'I'.he_ e_!)d_of :the war might well be too late: 
-~---
Camilla Wedgwood, Principal of Women's 
College, Sydney University. 
The other commentators were writer Katherine Suzannah 
Prichard and Aileen Fitzpatrick, Director of the N,S.W. 
Board of Social Study and Training. 
62. H,,s., 26 August 1943. 
63, United Emergency Committee for European Jewry, And They 
Went out Into The Wilderness, Sydney, 1943. p.10. 
When Dr. Aaron Patkin, a leading Victorian Zionist, 
·reviewed the booklet, he stated that the 'authors 
have displayed rather too much iestraint'. Patkin 
alleged that the men of Bermuda stood 'in trial before 
the judgment of histpry as guilty men'; they were the 
'Pilates of Bermuda'. ~_!!., 24 June 1943. 
64. Statement on Bermuda Conference on 19 May 1943. 
389 H.C.Deb.5s. cols. 1120-1. 
How can we know, God forgive us, that calculated 
on the present rate of killings whether a single 
Jew will remain alive when victory comes?65 
European Jewry was being systematically 
annihilated. While the British and American Government 
177, 
representatives were meeting at Bermuda, a revolt broke out 
in the Warsaw_g_i,_.,_tj;o_, __ wh_o_s_e_ha.lLmlLl-ion- occupants had been 
····----------· --------
l 
reduced to about 60,000 by starvation, disease and 
--·deporfafio·n -i:o -labour and extermination camps. After 'a month 
of unparalleled terror', German troops virtually destroyed 
66 the ghettoo At Auschwitz, the crematoria were in operation 
to cope with an intensive programme of daily mass killings. 67 
When the Russian army advanced against the Germans on the 
Eastern front, it reported that virtually all Jews in former 
Nazi-held territory had been murdered. 68 In June 1943, 
65. A.J .. H., :nMayl943. 
66 '• 
A dissident Jewish- opinion came from Sir Isaac Isaacs, 
who broke off his campaign against 'political Zionism' 
(see p.185, n.100) for long enough to voice his support 
for British Government policy. Sir rsaac maintained 
that. the remarks made--in Jewish ·press -·a-rtic·le·s -on· the 
Bermuda Conference had given an 'inadequate and far 
from just' picture of the United States and British 
governments which had been represented at the Conference 
by some 'very eminent, men'. The-J:Ls.w. United Emergency 
Committee retorted that Sir Isaac's letter was merely 
'an apologia for the policy expounded by Mr. Peake' and 
quoted the views of various British newspapers and 
journals that the Conference had been a complete failur~, 
Sir Isaac continued to defend the British Government 
and challenged the committee to state what the delegates 
'failed to do or could have done'. ~·· 16, 30 September, 
7 October 1943. 
The revolt broke out on 19 April and officially ended on 
16 Ma.y. See Raul Hilberg, ££• cit., pp.317-327, and 
Gerald Reitlinger, ££• cit., pp.272-28L It aroused 
little publicity at the time but was later widely 
cornmemora ted ,, 
On the first anniversary of the beginning of the revolt, 
the Perth Daily News stated that it had been 'a 
proclamation of the unquenchable spirit, vitality and 
courage of the Jewish people'. Daily News, 19 April 1944. 
67 S-M-H.' 9 March 1943. 
, --~~~6~8~-~-::S:=M::::~~:--~~2,._,J,_.,n~nµe:_~l~q~4'-..2.3~·-~~--~~~~~~~-
-------.-
178. 
the ~dney Morning Herald published a report from The Times 
which seated that the German leaders were driving forward 
with their campaign against the Jews 'with even greater 
ferocity and more widely than ever before'. The net had 
spread to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, whose governments 
were being urged to deport their Jewish populations to 
Poland for . . . 69 exr-ermi.na ti.on~ 
Surely the world could not simply abandon the 
surviving Jews ....... I!ut_._h()."'_c_oul~ __ any of them be saved? Of the 
cwo associated problems - rescuing Jews from Nazi-controlled 
territory and finding a refuge for them - the first seemed 
the greatest hurdle. People continued to suggest that the 
allies should approach the German Government through neutral 
countries and urge them to release Jews, if need be in 
exchange for German prisoners of war. The Australian Jewish 
Herald tried to convince its readers that 'it would be 
possible to exchange German prisoners in our hands for Jews' 
Such proposals were based on desperation rather than realism 
and a writer to the Argus asked whether it was likely 'that 
the hard-hearted Pharaoh (Hitler) will willingly let this 
pe0ple go', The answer was 'no 1 g 71 
69. S.M.H., 2 June 1943. 
70. A.J .H., 27 May 1943. 
See also E. Singer, letter to Argus, 1 June 1943, and 
speech by J.J. Maloney, President of the N.S.W. Trades 
and Labor Council to meeting convened by the Australian 
Section of the World Jewish Congress on 5 August 1943, 
!!.::..§_., 12 August 1943. 
71. J. Robertson Smith, letter to Argus, 5 June 1943. 
According to G. Warburg, 'No refuge: Bermuda April 
1943', ~· cit., p.47, it was 'quite likely that, at 
least in 1943, nothing would have induced Hitler to 
allow the Jews in his power to escape extermination'. 
However, there was an exchange plan. Germany agreed 
to release 5,000 Jewish children in exchange for 
20,000 interned Germana. The British Government refused 
to release any Germans on the grounds that the children 
were not British nationals. Raul Hilberg, ~·cit., 
p. 72 L 
70 
179. 
If there was no chance of rescuing all the Jews left 
10 Nazi-controlled Europe, there did at least seem to be 
some hope for those in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. With 
the allies making gains against Germany, it might be possible 
to convince the axis satellites 
best interests to help "he Jews 
that it would be in their 
72 
escape. Where could they 
go? Most of Europe was controlled by the Nazis and overseas 
emigration was out of the question because of the war 
situat1onn There was one obvious place of refuge: Palestine. 
It was close to south-east Europe and it had a local Jewish 
community which was eager to welcome refugees. 
__ sol.u_t ion_.was not so .. simple: 
an issue in itself. 
But the 
Modern immigration into Palestine had commenced 
during the Russian pogroms of the 1880s and increased with 
the growth of the Zionist movement which urged a return to 
the Jewish homeland" In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour 
Declaration, viewing 'with favour the establishment in 
72. H.S., 26 August 1943. 
Raul Hilberg, ££· cit., pp.718-728 and Arthur D. Morse, 
££·cit., attack the British and American Governments 
for failing to make any serious attempt to save 
European Jews. The governments of Hungary, Rumania 
and Bulgaria were all reldctant to accede .. to German 
pressure to deport their Jews. The deportation of 
H~ri~~~ian Jews di~ not b~gin ~ntil April 1944 after 
Kallay's Government was replaced by a pro-German one. 
The victims included Jews in Transylvania which 
Rumania had ceded to Hungary. The Jews of central 
Rumania and Bulgaria survived the war but, in 1943, it 
seemed only a matter of time before they would be 
deported for extermination. The Rumanian Premier, 
Antonescu, agreed to a World Jewish Congress proposal 
to 'purchase' 70,000 Rumanian Jews. Nothing came of 
the plan, Morse, £.!?.· cit., pp.71-97, and Hilberg, 
£.!?.· cit., p, 721, blame the American and British 
Governments for the failure of the scheme; they would 
have the problem of 'disposing of' the refugees. 
Reitlinger, ££• @·• p.407, argues that the German 
Foreign Office undermined the plan. 
73 Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'. 
180. 
Immigration accelerated when the Nazi regime began 
persecuting Jews in Germany and between 1933 and 1935 
Palestine had almost 135,000 newcomers, compared with less 
than 19,000 in the previous three years, 74 This caused 
mounting opposition from Palestinian Arabs. The British 
Government, which held a League of Nations Mandate, wanted 
Arab quiescence in the Middle East to ensure the 
continuation of her oil supplies and the safeguarding of 
her strategic interests. In response to Arab disturbances 
and riots, increasing restrictions were imposed on Jewish 
. . 1 . 75 immigration into Pa estine. 
----- -- - -I _____ Britain'_s attempts to appease the A_rabs and 
I 
secure their loyalty against the Nazis culminated in the 
White Paper of May 1939 which restricted Jewish immigration 
to 10,000 per annum for the next five years plus an additional 
25,000 refugees. After that period, no further Jewish 
immigration would be permitted unless the Palestinian Arabs 
76 
agreed, These restrictions came at a time when thousands 
of Jews in Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland were trying 
to escape the 
the pogrom of 
Nazi antisemitic 
77 November 1938. 
legislation which followed 
73, The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, addressed 
to Lord Rothschild and'~igned by Britain's Foreign 
secretary, A.J. Balfour, is quoted in Re-adfng- No.-·2··; 
Oscar I. Janowsky, Foundations of Israel, Princeton, 
1959, p.135. 
7 1 J.H,. Simpson, The Refugee Problem, £.E.· cit., p.434, 
75. Immigration had already been restricted by Arab 
opposition: in 1922 'according to economic 
absorptive capacity' and in 1933 by the Immigration 
Ordinance which established restrictive schedules 
favouring immigrants with capital and professional men. 
After the Arab riots of 1936, a Palestine Royal 
Commission recommended that political and psychological 
considerations also be· taken into acco~nt in determining 
the level of immigration. 
Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, £.E.• cit., 
pp.56-60. 
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1939, Cmd.6019. 
The White Paper also restricted the sale of land to 
Jews and declared that an independent Palestinian state, 
in which Arabs and Jews would share in government, would 
be established within ten years. 
See p.38. 
l 
181. 
divided. 
Reaction to the White Paper was widespread and 
Australian newspaper readers were given full 
details of Britain's new policy, the hostile reactions of 
British and American Jews and the House of Commons debate 
78 
on the matter. Like the British press, Australian 
newspapers almost wholeheartedly supported the Government's 
decision and treated the political problem of British 
policy in Palestine as a separate issue from the situation 
of the Jews in Europe and their need for a country of 
79 
refuge. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, there 
was 'probably no practical alternative' . 80 The plight of 
the Jews could no_t_be_c_o_nsidered;_ it was just unfor-tunate ---------- -------
that they would suffer because of the immigration 
restrictions~; - •rhe Adver1:Ts.er recogn-ized that, 'however 
fair and reasonable', the White Paper only added 'to the 
plight of a people which has the sympathy of the whole 
civilized world•, 81 Although the West Australian hoped 
that Britain would compensate the Jews by pressing on with 
' the establishment of colonies 'in unoccupied corners of 
the empire' , 82 the decision had been made and the Jewish 
83 
community would be 'well advised to accept the hard fact'. 
Throughout the world, Jews - especially 
Zionists - ~ere fiercely antagonist to the new policy. 
The Jewish Agency for Palestine accused Britain of a breach 
of faith and of surrendering to Arab terrorism. In 
18. The Australian press gave the matter wide coverage. 
For example, ~., 19, 20, 22, 24, 25 May 1939. 
79. According to Andrew Sharf,£!<.· cit., p.187, 'the 
inclination [in Britain] to dissociate the problem of 
Palestine from that of the refugees ,,, became more 
and more striking, as the problem itself became more and 
more desperate'. 
80. S • M. H • , l 9 May 1 9 3 9 . 
see also ~' 22 May 1939; Argus, l June 1939. 
81 Advertiser, 19 May 1939. 
A similar co-mment wa-;;··made by s.-M.H., 19 May 1939. 
82, W.A., 19 May 1939. 
83, W.A,, 25 May 1939. 
II 
Palestine, Jews staged strikes and riots against the British 
84 Government. Some Australian Jews were in a dilemma. They 
had constantly maintained that there was no conflict between 
their national and religious loyalties and claimed that, first, 
and foremost, they were loyal Australians. 85 If they condemned 
the White Paper they might possibly be accused of disloyalty 
to Britain and the Empire. The Hebrew Standard denounced the 
Jewish rioting in Palestine and reiterated its 'abiding faith 
that the considered decision of the Government is invariably 
an attempt to act equitably and justly'. Australian Jews 
should 'watch and wait patiently, never swerving 
--,--- --1-oya-l ty-and-eea-1 ty_t_o-the -King' 86-- -------- --
from our 
This view was not shared by those Jews whose 
attention was focussed less on Britain and more on Europe. 
The Australian Jewish News declared that there had been a 
' . . f . t. • 87 grave miscarriage a JUS ice . 
Jewish Herald, the White Paper had 
According to the Australian 
'stunned men and women in 
every country who still believe in the power of an obligation 
and the binding character of a solemn undertaking•. 88 The 
Victorian Jewish Advisory Board, the official organ of Jewry 
in that state, expressed 'grief and disappointment' at what 
it described as the 'British Government's complete change of 
. d ' 89 att1tu e . 
84. W.A., 19 May 1939. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 
established under the League of Nations mandate, created 
a network of institutions in Palestine for the country's 
development as the Jewish National Home. 
85. See p.17. 
86. ~~·, 25 May 1939. 
Alfred Harris, editor of the Hebrew Standard 1895-1908 
and 1925-1944, was vehemently pro-British and anti-
Zionist. By the early 1940s he 'no longer mirrored the 
tbonghts, sentiments and-aspirations of the [Jewish] 
community'. Suzanne D. Rutland, Seventy Five Years: 
The History of a Jewish Newspaoer, Sydney, 1970, p.65. 
87. ··11.J.w.·, .9 June 1939. 
88, A.J.H., 25 May 1939. 
See also A.J.H., 1, 8 June 1939. 
89. Argus, 10 June 1939. 
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The restrictions imposed by the White Paper 
led to illegal immigration into Palestine which increased as 
the Nazis widened their antisemitic net during the war. 
The major escape routes were from Black Sea ports in Rumania 
and Bulgaria and along the Turkish coast to Palestine. 
Jewish refugees, crammed into decrepit ships, arrived in 
Palestine only to be interned or refused permission to land 
by the British authorities. In February 1942 the Struma, 
carrying over seven hundred refugees from Rumania, was turned 
back from Istanbul when the British Government advised 
Turkish officials that it would not issue the passengers with 
landing permits for Palestine~ - Shortly· -ifft-erwards, the 
Struma sank in the Black Sea, probably after hitting a mine 
or - b" i·ng · to·rpe·doed, an:d all except two ·of the pas·se·n,fer··5··were 
90 drowned. Pro-Zionist Jews all over the world were incensed 
at the British Government's lack of compassion. 91 In 
hustralia, they organized protest meetings at which speakers 
condemned the British Government's policy on immigration into 
1 t . 92 Pa es i.ne. The Sydney Jewish News declar.ed that the 
tragedy was an 'indictment of the inhumanity of an 
93 
officialdom submerged by red-tape'• 
The question of immigration into Palestine came 
to the fore in 1943 when there was renewed agitation to 
rescue some of Europe's surviving Jews. Idealistic Zionism 
90. ~·, 26, 27 February, 2 March 1942. 
Yl. The Times, 28 February, 9 March 1942. 
New York Times, 2, 9, 20 March 1942. 
92. Meeting in Melbourne, 26 April 1942, A.J.H., 
30 April 1942. 
Meeting in Sydney, 5 July 1942, S.J.N., 10 July 1942. 
Sir Isaac Isaacs, who supported British policy on 
Palestine and opposed Zionism, condemned the Sydney 
meeting, organized by the Zionist State Council of 
N.S.W., before it was held. Sir Isaac alleged 
that the meeting had been 'convoked for the purpose 
of condemning His Majesty's Imperial Government' 
and stated that extreme Zionists were only exploiting 
the disaster to strengthen a campaign 'that is to a 
marked degree unpatriotic'. ~·, 2 July 1942 .. 
93, S.JoN., 1 May 1942. 
I 
----·------
--1 
184, 
aside, Palestine seemed the only hope. The Jews' Australian 
sympathizers established Palestine Committees in Sydney, 
Melbour~e and Perth to promote the withdrawal of the White 
paper which decreed that immigration would cease in April 
94 1944. On the initiative of the Melbourne Committee, 
leading figures in Australian public, church and academic 
life sent a telegram to the British Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary urging that Bulgarian Jews be admitted 
to Palestine, the only possible place of refuge because of 
its geographical position. They also suggested that Britain 
should encourage 
95 ------~--of Jew.s_,_ 
the Turkish Government to permit the transit 
Other groups -fol lowed ·suit• - --At a ·meeting ·called· 
by the Australian Section of the World Jewish Congress, 
Anglican and labour spokesmen passed a resolution demanding 
'that the gates of Palestine be opened immediately and 
96 
widely to the entry of Jewish refugees'. The A.L.P. 
Federal conference, the Anglican Diocesan Synod in Sydney, the 
Australian Council for Jewish Rights and the N.S.W. Council 
94, The Chairman of the Sydney Committee was Bishop Pilcher. 
Prof. Ian Clunies Ross and Lady Anderson (wife of Sir 
Francis Anderson, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, 
Sydney University) were Vice-Chairmen. Members 
included the N.S.W. Premier, William McKell, and 
Attorney-General, C.E. Martin. 
The Victorian Committee was pres~ded over by Professor 
H.A. Woodruff. Its members included the Premier, 
A.A. Dunstan, the Lord Mayor, T. Nettlefold, the 
President of the A.C.T.U., P.J. Clarey and Dr. Mannix, 
Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne. 
Max Freilich, Zion in our Time, Sydney, 1967, p.94. 
~·· 20 January 1944. 
95. S.M.H., 30 June 1943. 
Signatories included the usual Jewish sympathizers: 
Sir Robert Wallace, Professor H.A, Woodruff, Walter 
Mu-rdoch, · Camil·la ·Wedgwood, ·Anglican Archbishops Lo Fai1u 
and Mowll, and Bishop Pilcher, as well as the Lord Mayors 
of Melbourne (T. Nettlefold) and Sydney (R.J. Bartley) 
__ and Archbishop Mannix. 
96. ~·· 12 August 1943. 
i 
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of Christians and Jews joined in the chorus. 97 Although 
Archbishop Mannix declared his support, some Catholics were 
unsympathetic. Father N. Hehir, the Catholic representative 
on the N.s.w. Council of Christians and Jews, resigned when 
the Council decided to agitate for the lifting of immigration 
restrictions into Palestine. He rejoined the Council only 
on the condition, imposed by Archbishop Gilroy, that it did 
not become involved in the Palestine issue. 98 
Most Australian Jews now considered that the 
desperate plight ()_f __ ~\l_rop_ea_n _Jewr_Y necessi1:_a1:ed_ tl1e ()J;lEH1_ip_g _____ _ 
of Palestine. The representative state Jewish organizations 
forwarded a joint _":esolution_ to __ the Federal Government asking 
it to seek the cooperation of 
Britain to renounce the White 
allied governments in urging 
99 Paper. One Jewish dissenter 
from the 'open Palestine' campaign was Sir Isaac Isaacs who 
was in the midst of a campaign against 'political Zionism' 
which brought him into conflict with Australian Zionists and 
especially with Professor Julius Stone. 100 Sir Isaac 
97. Argus, 17 December 1943. 
S.M.H., 11 November 1943. 
S.M.H,, 10 September 1943. 
Rabbi I. J?orush, 'The New South Wales Council of 
Christians and Jews', ~· cit., pp.189-190. 
See pp .161-.2. 
98. -~·' pp .--1-93·-·4 ... ·-- -· --
99. S.M.l!_., 3 December 1943. 
S.J.N., 3 December 1943. 
100. Sir Isaac Isaacs spent the early 1940s invoived in a 
campaign against 'political Zionism'. Sir Isaac 
maintained that Jews were nationals of the country in 
which they lived, that they were Jews only by faith 
and that there was no such thing as a Jewish national 
identity. His letters (usually taking up two riewspaper 
pages) and the replies of his Zionist critics were 
published mostly in t~e-Hebrew Standard whose editori 
Alfred Harris, supported Isaacs' views. The major 
controversies took place in August 1941 - January 1942, 
July-August 1942 and reached a climax in October 1943 -
May 1944. Isaacs_' _most vocal critig was Julius· Stone, 
-----Prores.sor-of -Inte~n,-,.ti·o,;ai. Law and Jurisprudence 
at the University of Sydney, who attacked Isaacs' views 
in a booklet 'Stand Up and Be Counted!' An open letter 
to the Rt. Hon. Sir Isaac Isaa~s on the occasion of the 
Twenty sixth Anniversary of the Jewish national home, 
Sydney, 1944. 
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criticized both his fellow-Jews and the N.S.W. Palestine 
committee. He claimed that unlimited immigration into 
Palestine was out of the question; the allies could not 
afford to jeopardize their ultimate victory by 'doing 
anything that would antagonise the world's huge Moslem 
186 . 
popu la ti on' . As a place of refuge for Jews, Palestine was 
che one place which was 'fraught with 
of the Empire and to the issue of the 
peril to 
' 101 war . 
integrity 
lines. 
The British Government thought along similar 
Although it did permit refugees to enter Palestine 
after April 1944 as part of the unfilled five-year quota 
o[ 75, 000, the White Pape<' officially remained in force. 
Britain's policy was supported by the Australian Government 
which refused to act on requests to urge the British 
authorities to lift the immigration restrictions. When the 
Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Dr. Mowll, advised the 
Government of the resolution passed by his Synod, the Acting 
Prime Minister, FoM• Forde, replied that 'action by the 
Australian Government designed to secure any modification 
of the present arrangements governing immigration to 
102 Palestine would not serve any purpose at this stage'o 
If Palestine could not be opened to Jewish 
refugees, where could they go? Australia could do little to 
help, There was a ban on immigrant·s froni ·eneni·y · co.untries 
and, in any case, transport in wartime was virtually 
impossible, Despite the difficulties, Australian Jews 
attempted to make some contribution. In March 1943, the 
Australian Jewish Welfare Society obtained approval from the 
Commonwealth Government for the admission of 150 children 
103 from Vichy France. The responsibility for the children's 
101. Argus, 13 November 1943. 
102. Rabbi Io Porush, 'The New South.Wales Council of 
Christians and Jews', £12.· ~., p.19L 
103. s .. M.H., 17 March 1943. 
!L.§_., 18 March, 15 April 1943. 
l 
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transport and maintenance in Australia was to be borne by 
the Society, which immediately launched a £50,000 'Rescue 
104 the Children' Appeal. Over half the target was raised 
at two functions held to open the Appeal in Melbourne and 
105 Sydney. The Government later approved the admission of 
a further 150 children but, because of transport difficulties 
and the war situation, nothing could be done to bring the 
children to Australia. 106 After the initial enthusiasm and 
fund-raising, the matter faded into the background until the 
end of 1944 when it appeared likely that transport would soon 
be available. A further appeal for £50,000 was launched in 
Victoria. 107 As the European war drew to a close the issue 
became absorbed in the general .question of .post-war r.efugee-
1rnmig ration., 
People outside the Jewish community also suggested 
that refugees should be admitted to Australia. Mrs. Jessie 
Street reminded the Commonwealth Government of its 
undertaking to admit 15,000 refugees and urged 'that 
immediate arrangements be made for the admission of the 
balance of 8,000 refugees'. She prompted the Government 
to make representations to Britain and the United States 
'to make available the maximum shipping space possible for 
104. Like other Jewish relief funds·,· the 'Rescue the 
Children' Appeal sought funds only from the Jewish 
community. The Appeal received great publicity 
in the Jewish press, with full-page advertisements 
being contributed by Jewish businessmen. This appeal 
had an advantage over other current funds (see p.173) 
it had the immediate object of rescuing a specific 
number of children and bringing them to Australia, 
offering a greater degree of personal involvement than 
more general funds aimed at rescuing 'European Jewry' 
or develciping land in Palestine. 
105. £16,500 was raised when the Appeal was opened in 
Melbourne (A.J .H., 25 March 1943) and £10, 250 in 
Sydney. (!.!._,£., 6 May 1943) 
106, S.M.H., 8 February 1944. 
107, A.J.H., 9, 16 February 1945. 
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108 the evacuation of European Jews'. The Bulletin was 
unsympathetic. It did not, it claimed, object to the 
admission of 150 children who would be brought up as 
'Australians of the Jewish faith, and not as brooding 
exiles'. But to admit 8,000 Jews, thereby diverting 
--shipping from ___ t:he--wa.r -effort, 
would be an act of madness The rumpus which 
attended the arrival of Maltese during the last 
war was nothing to what would happen if shiploads 
of European Jews were landed during this greater 
war.109 
lt was proba_bl_y right. --
During the war there was also an ambitious 
prcposul to permit Jewish refugees·to-·establisli-a group 
settlement in an undeveloped area of Australia. Jewish 
188. 
agricultural colonization schemes had been moderately 
successful in Russia and Argentina in the nineteenth century 
and, more recently, Palestine provided the shining example 
of what Jews could achieve on the land. When it became 
apparent at the lg39 Evian Conference that no country was 
prepared to accept significant numbers of Jewish refugees 
in accordance with normal immigration procedures, the idea 
of refugee group settlements was revived. The British and 
American Governments, as well- as Jewish colonization 
organizations, inquired into the possibilities of establishing 
___ refugee colonies in British Guiana-,- Tanganyi-ka,- Kenya; 
Rhodesia and the Dominican Republic. Little eventuated from 
th .. t'. 110 e1r inves igations. 
108. Bulletin, 23 February 1944. 
Jessie Street, Sydney feminist and leader of women's 
organizations, contested_ the 1943 Federal Elections as 
the endorsed A.L.P. candidate for Wentworth and was 
narrowly defeated. 
l09. Bulletin, 23 February 1944. 
110. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, £.E.· cit., 
pp.318-9, 329-331, 512. The Dominican Republic appeared 
to be the most promising. Its Government agreed to the 
establishment of a Jewish colony of 100,000 but, by mid 
1942, it numbered less than 500. The Nazi regime in 
Germany, as well as the -Polish Government, initially 
considered that group settlements might provide a 
solution to the 'Jewish problem' and investigated the 
possibilities of establishing a Jewish colony on 
Madagascar. Joseph Tenenbaum, £.E.· cit., pp.238-249. 
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When it came to finding undeveloped land on 
which to settle Jewish refugees, Australia was an obvious 
choice. Northern Australia was one big 'empty space' and 
had frequently been suggested as a suitable place for a 
refugee colony. During the Russian pogroms against the Jews 
after the 1905 Revolution, the Immigration League of 
Australia proposed that a Jewish settlement be established 
in Northern Australia but the proposal came to nothing when 
the London-based Jewish Territorial 
'd h h . bl 111 consi er t e sc eme practica e. 
Organization did not 
Shortly after Hitler 
began persecuting German Jews in 1933, the London Dail.i_ 
Herald reported that Sir George Pearce, Australian Minister 
for Defence, had shown interest in_a British suggestion 
that a large Jewish colony should be established 'in the 
undeveloped territory of North Australia' . 112 The 
following year, a visiting Polish Jewish poet, Melech 
Ravitch, suggested that German Jewish refugees be settled 
in the Northern Territory where, according to information 
he had received, the mineral, agricultural and pastoral 
resources were capable of supporting a population of one 
'11' 113 m1 .ion. 
111.. ~·, 6, 13 July, 21 September 1906. 
The Jewish Territorial Organization was established 
by Israel Zangwill in 1905 to found an 'autonomous 
colony under British auspices for the persecuted Jews 
of Russia and Eastern Europe'. ~., 21 September 1906. 
112.. ~ly Herald, 26 July 1933. 
Sir George Pearce, a West Australian Senator, was 
an enthusiastic advocate of Northern development. 
I.N. Steinberg, Australia - T~e Unpromised Land, London, 
1948, p.27. 
113. ~·, 15 January 1934. 
The Bulletin dismissed Ravitch's suggestion as a poet's 
fancy and reiterated its opposition to all foreign 
refugee immigration. Bulletin, 21 January 1934. 
" 
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Int~rest in establishing a refugee settlement 
in Northern Australia intensified after the Evian Conference. 
In September 1938, J.B. Cramsie suggested that 25,000 
Jewish families should be settled on Melville Island, north 
. 114 h 1 d of Darwin. T e proposa was enounced from all sides as 
'ridiculous• 115 and 'fantastic•. 116 John McEwen, Minister 
for the Interior, stated that it was dangerous to 'give the 
impression that the northern parts of Australia are capable 
. t d l . ' 117 l of carrying a remen ous popu ation . According to tle 
~ovelist Xavier Herbert, Melville Island was 'almost a 
desert in the dry season and water-logged during the 
1 . ' 118 seasona rains . Hans Klein, a representative in 
-~ustralia of a Jewish colonization organization, Encol, 
described the proposed site as 'an island of mosquitoes and 
snakes' and alleged that he would 'prefer to be in a Jewish 
cemetry in Vienna' . 119 
The Melville Island proposal was soon superseded 
by another scheme. A London-based organization, the Freeland 
League for Jewish Territorial Colonization, was seeking 
a suitable site in British territory for the establishment 
114. J.B. Cramsie, a grazier and ex-Chairman of the 
Australian Meat Council, made this suggestion in a 
speech to the Mj_].lio11s_ Cl_ub., Sydney, on.21 September 
1938. Argus, 22 September 1938. The Millions Club, 
which endeavoured 'to get millions of people to occupy 
the millions of vacant acres at piesent in Australia' 
(S.M. H., 2 December 1938), approved of the scheme in 
principle. Argus, 22 September 1938. After his 
Melville Island proposal came to nothing, or. Cramsie 
became an enthusiast for the Kimberley scheme. 
See pp. 202, 206. 
115, Statement by Xavier Herbert, S.M.H., 26 September 1938. 
116, Statement by John McEwen, Minister for the Interior. 
C.P.D., Vol, 157, p.107, 23 September 1938. 
117. Ibid. 
118. S.M.H., 26 September 1938. 
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120 
of a large-scale refugee settlement. rt had first 
approached Australian Government representatives in London 
in mid-1936 to inquire about the possibility of Australia 
121 
accepting Jewish refugees. Stimulated by the failure of 
the Evian Conference and the Nazi antisemitic pogrom of 
November 1938, the League investigated possible sites for a 
refugee settlement and decided that the East Kimberley region 
of North-West Australia offered the greatest potential • 
..... _________ __lj} __ Ma y __ l 9.3_9_,_the_.s ec-r-e-tar-y-o-f--·t he Freeland --
League, Dr. Isaac Steinberg, arrived in Australia to 
investigate the situation at first hand. 122 Before seeking 
approval for the schem-e from the Commonweal th Government, he 
conducted campaigns in Perth, Melbourne and Sydney to arouse 
public interest and support. In speeches, press interviews 
and articles, Steinberg outlined the Freeland League's plan 
to establish a Jewish refugee settlement on ~ome seven 
,_ 
million acres (10,900 square miles) of land in the East 
Kimberleys, inland from Wyndham and watered by the Ord and 
m· -----....·, -
120. The Freeland League for Jewish Territorial colonization 
was established in 1935, with headquarters in London and 
branches in Poland, France, Holland and the United 
States. The League was a revival of the Jewish 
Territorial Organization (p.189 n.111) but did not 
seek political autonomy for its settlement. J .. Steinberg, 
'A ~ewish Settlement in the ~i~berleys•; Australian 
Quarterly, 12, No. 1 (1940), pp.24-30. Steinberg's first 
initial was 'I' (Isaac), not 'J' as stated in the 
Australian Quarterly. 
121. Argus, 12 June 1936. 
122. Dr. Isaac N. Steinberg, a Russian Jew, was a graduate 
in Law of Heidelberg and Moscow Universities. At the 
time of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, he was a prominent 
member of the Social Revolutionary Party in Russia. From 
December 1917 to March 1918 he held the position of 
Minister of Justice in the short-lived coalition 
government of Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries. 
Steinberg spent some months in prison in 1919.when Lenin I suppressed the Social Revolutionari_e_s;_. He later moved ___ _ 
--,-----·------to-·Lithua:riTa----wl1erene-edited- the Vilna Jewish Review and 
then to England where he became involved with the 
acitivities of the Freeland League. 
I 
J 
I.N. Steinberg, In the Workshop of the Revolution, London, 
1955. 
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Victoria Rivers. 123 The lease-holders, Messrs, Connor, 
Doherty and Durack, were prepared to sell the land to the 
124 Freeland League. Initially, five to six hundred young 
colonists would undertake the pioneering work of building 
roads, housing, irrigation works and a power station. About 
50,000 refugees would eventually be settled in the area, 
the development of which would be based on a combination of 
the pastoral, agricultural and secondary industries. The 
entire scheme would be financed by a Jewish financial 
institution of the Freeland League. 
In his campaign to arouse public support, 
Steinberg stressed that the establishment of a Jewish 
settlement would not only contribute to solving the refugee 
problem but would also be of great benefit to Australia. 
lie was able to appeal to two arguments which already had a 
large following: the necessity of increasing Australia's 
population and the need to develop Northern Australia. 
Steinberg had done his homework well and repeated the current 
arguments that Australia needed a greater population for 
economic and strategic reasons and that non-British 
123. See map, p.193. 
The League's plans are described in detail in Steinberg's 
. memorandum to the Commonweal-th--Governme·nt in August -1940· 
requesting approval for the scheme, I.N. Steinberg, 
Australia - The Unpromised Land,~· cit., pp.154-8, 
They are also discussed in. s. Stedman, A Jewish 
Settlement in Australia, Melbourne, 1940, and 
J, Steinberg, 'A Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys', 
~·cit., as well as in press reports of Steinberg's 
speeches and interviews; for example, W.A., 21 July 
1940, Argus, 11 September 1939, S,M.H., 
13 December 1939. 
124. The Managing Director of the Company was Michael 
P. Durack, whose father had arrived in the Kimberleys 
with a herd of cattle from Queensland in 1882. About 
two million acres of the property were in West Australia 
and five million in the Northern Territory. In 1939, 
the property carried about 70,000 cattle and a white 
population of not more than 70, S.M.H., 14' December 1939. 
The proposed sale price was £180,000 Stg. G.C. Bolton, 
'A survey of the Kimberley Pastoral Industry from 1885 
to the Present', M.A. Thesis, University of Western 
Australia, 1953,. p.288. 
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East Kimberley region of 
area selected for 
north-west Australia, showing 
a Jewish refugee settlement. 
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s. Stedman, A Jewish Settlement in Australi·a, Melbourne,· 1940. 
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1 mmigration was necessary because British immigrants were 
unavailable. Here was Australia's opportunity to obtain 
industrious citizens at no cost. Unlike other European 
immigrants, t-he Jews had no political allegiance to any 
other country arid would quickly become loyal Australians. 
Steinberg also pointed out that the usual economic 
argument against immigration did not a~ply to a 
colonization scheme; the settlers would not be congregating 
in r.ities and competing--with !'.ustralians on the-la·bo·u-r-- · 
125 
market, 
· -Jewish refugees ·wouTd not· only increase the 
country's population: they would also help to populate 
Northern Australia. Steinberg had a receptive audience, 
Australians had been crying 'populate the North' since the 
beginning of the 1930s; 'fill the empty spaces' had become 
an adjunct to the 'populate or perish' slogan. With 
neighbouring countries suffering over-population problems, 
Australia could hardly expect to retain vast expanses of 
territory if it did not develop them. The cry became 
louder as Japan asserted its military strength: an empty 
North meant a defenceless North. Although many commentators 
attempted to explode the 'myth of open spaces', basically 
... ~n the_grounds that _Northern .Australia was.unsuitable .for 
white settlement, the enthusiasm of the optimists was not 
126 dampened. 
12 5 ,, J. Steinberg, 'A Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys', 
££· E2:.!·' pp.26, 30. 
126, In the second half of the 1930s, academics denounced 
the claim that Northern Australia could maintain a 
large white population. 
For example, Wynne Williams, 'Northern Australia: 
__ '!'_l1_e_ bogey of the empty spaces', Australian Quarterly, 9, 
No, 1 (19}'ff~ pp.30-39. 
S."M, Wadham, 'Australia's absorptive capacity - the 
.. 
primary industries',· in W.G.K. Duncan and C.V; Janes-·-----
(ed.), The Future of Immigration Into Australia and 
New Zealand,££· cit., pp.167-215. 
At the end of 1937 the Payne-Fletcher Commission 
reported that there was no prospect of the Northern 
Territory supporting a large population. The report 
recommended that the development of the area be based 
chiefly on sheep, not cattle. The East Kimberley area 
was one region suitable for sheep grazing; at the 
f - - -- , __ ., 
I 
195. 
The 'Kimberley scheme' soon became well-known 
to Australians, especially in the West. It aroused widespread 
interest and received greater support than normal refugee 
immigration had done in 1938. The pioneering of a remote 
part of the country appealed to the imagination of many 
Australians, who were prepared to be humanitarian so long 
as their own interests did not appear to be adversely 
affected. As Steinberg emphasized, refugees in the Kimberleys 
would not be competing with Australian workers. Nor would 
ways. And support for such a scheme would at least give 
Australians an easy conscience when they heard continuing 
stories of the Jews' plight in Europe. 
Before going to the eastern states, Steinberg 
spent over three months in Perth and the Kimberleys. Both 
the West Australian Government and the local press reacted 
favourably, if cautiously, to his proposals. A few days 
after he arrived in Perth, Steinberg discussed the scheme 
with the West Australian Labor Premier, J.C. Willcock, who 
d . . h. . . . 127 ft encourage him to proceed with is investigation. A er 
visiting the Kimberley region, Steinberg submitted an 
official proposal to Willcock who replied that the West 
Australian Government agreed in principle to the scheme and 
had 'no objection to the necessary approach being made to 
the Commonwealth Government'. Willcock added that a number 
of conditions would govern the establishment of a settlement. 
Government officers must first investigate the scheme to 
ascertain its soundness; they would have the final authority 
-- --- -- J __ ---- -- ---- -· 
present time the stations there were too large and 
insufficiently improved. 'Report of the Board of 
Inquiry appointed to inquire into the Land and Land 
Industries of the Norther~ Territory of Australia', 
Parliamentary Papers, No.4, 1937. The impossibility 
of any intensive development of Northern Australia 
--~as later systematically analyzed by W.D. Forsyth, 
The Myth of Open Spaces, Melbourne, 1942. 
127. I.N. Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land, £.E.· cit., 
pp.9, 14. 
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in selecting refugees and would supervise the development 
oE the settlement. All these officers would be paid by 
those in charge of the scheme and the Government would bear 
no expenses for the provision of public facilities during 
the first three years of the settlement's existence. 128 
The West Australian, the state's major 
newspaper, gave Steinberg similar encouragement. After 
weighing up the moral, economic and strategic arguments, 
--·-.i.t-cunc-1-u·d·e·d t·hat Atfstrarians 'Would not be j~;stifie«i-.i~ 
denying persecuted Jews' access to the territory but 
maintained that it was 'essential to proceed cautiously' 
with the settlement at an experimental level. 129 When 
Willcock replied to Steinberg, the West Australian commended 
the Government 'upon its favourable attitude' to the proposal. 
Showing increased enthusiasm for the scheme, it claimed that 
the introduction of men and money, under reasonable 
Government supervision, could 'produce nothing but economic 
benefit to the whole of Australia•. 130 
The West Australian backed up its editorial 
comments with a series of articles by well-known West 
Australians who urged people to support the scheme. 
Professor Walter Murdoch declared: 'Israel's extremity 
Australia's opportunity' and argued that the scheme 
warranted support 'on every ground, moral and material'. 
is 
If Australians were wise, they would.•seize the opportunity 
. I 131 d . w1t1 both hands'. Other commentators stresse particular 
128. ~·, 30 August 1939. 
129, ~·, 12 July 1939. 
130. W.A., 30 August 1939. 
The Daily News, Perth's evening paper, struck a 
discordant note when it labelled an editorial 'Dreamland' 
and concluded that the proposal was impracticable. 
· · ·······- Dat-1y-riews, l Juty .. i939·:·· ··liowe;ver, the Daily News 
later became more enthusiastic about the scheme and 
criticized people who opposed it. Daily News, 26 August 
1941. 
131 Walter Murdoch, formerly Professor of English at the 
University of Western Australia, was a prolific writer 
and broadcaster on social issues. He discussed the 
Kimberley scheme in an arti~le entitled •our Opportunity', 
~·, 15 July 1939. 
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factors. Writer Henrietta Drake-Brockman emphasized the 
humanitarian aspect and stated that the Kimberleys might 
turn out to be 'a veritable land of hope and glory' for 
132 desperate souls. The 'populate the North' advocates were 
quick off the mark in showing their enthusiasm. When author 
William llatfield declared that he favoured the scheme, he 
admitted that he had been 'hammering away about concerted 
action to populate the North for years' . 133 A former 
Legislative Assembly member for Pilbara, R.H. Underwood, 
considered that a Jewish settlement in the East Kimberleys 
woura-onl.yoe-tneoeginnrng-. He-e-11visag-ed ·a-c:naih- ac· ---- ----
settlements right across Northern Australia, the harnessing 
of the Indian Ocean tides for power and the development of 
--- ...... . . -· 1·34--
a great iron and steel industry in the North. 
After receiving a favourable response in Western 
Australia, Steinberg visited Melbourne and Sydney to arouse 
support for the scheme. His most active press supporter in 
the eastern states was the Sydney Morning Herald which 
continued its liberal policy towards refugee immigration. 
Here was an 'excellent opportunity to develop the economic 
resources of the vast, untenanted lands of the north-west' 
as well as stren~thening the 'strategical position of the 
135 
country'. In a later editorial the Sydney Morning Herald 
remembered the plight of the Jews and revised its message: 
this was the 'opportunity to serve both our own welfare and 
the cause of stricken humanity•. 136 In Melbourne, an Argus 
132. Henrietta Drake-Brockman, novelist, playwright and 
short story writer, praised the scheme in 'A Happy 
Haven? Exiles for our empty North', W.A., 8 July 1939 .. 
133. William Hatfield, 'Populating the North', W.A., 
27 July 1939. Hatfield (real name Ernest Chapman) had 
travelled and worked in Northern Australia. 
134 R .. H. Underwood, 'Populating the North, Encourage 
refugees and harness tides', W.11., 5 August 1939. 
Northern development was also-;;t°ressed by George 
F. ·Melville, 'The undeveloped North', W.A., 22 July 1939. 
Melville, who accompanied Steinberg to the Kimberleys, 
was an agricultural scientist who had formerly been 
employed by the Pastoral Research Trust and was 
currently a lecturer at the University of Western 
Australia. 
135. s:M.H., 14 December 1939. 
136_ S.M.H., 19 April 1940. 
Articles on the scheme appeared in S.M.H., 13 December 
1939, 17 Jan...::.ary 19•10. 
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correspondent described Steinberg as a man 'who is inspired 
with a dream of a populated north'. Although many Australians 
had dreamed the same dream idly, Steinberg's dream was 
'intensely practical ..• born of knowled .. ge and the· confidence 
137 
of vast weal th'. 
In Perth, Mel~ourne and Sydney, Steinberg 
organized the preparation of manifestos which urged the 
Aust_i::<lli.<iJ1 __ G_overnment and people to support the Kimberley 
scheme on economic, strategic and humanitarian grounds. 
The manifestos were signed by prominent Australians in 
business~ professional an~ ad~d~fuic life, Protestant 
churchmen and labour spokesmen. They included Sir Mungo 
Maccallum, ex-Chancellor of the University of Sydney and 
Sir Percival Rogers, the current Chancellor; 
Sir Robert Garran, a former Commonwealth Solicitor-General; 
G.J. Coles, Managing Director of the well-known company; 
Archbishop Le Fanu, Primate of the Anglican Church in Australia, 
and John Cain, Leader of the Victorian Parliamentary Labor 
138 Party. Whilst many people were prepared to put their 
names to the manifestos, Steinberg secured the continued 
backing and practical assistance of a small group of 
enthusiasts, including Bishop Pilcher, Dr. G.L. Wood, 
Associate Professor of Commerce at Melbourne University, and 
Sir Thomas Bavin, a Justice 
and a former Premier of the 
of the Supreme 
139 State. , 
137. Argus, 11 September 1939. 
Court of N.S.W. 
138. 14 persons signed the Perth statement, W.A., 
6 Septamber.1939, 46 the Melbourne manifesto, Argus, 
1 December 1939, and 55 the Sydney manifesto, S.M.H., 
19 April 194.o .. 
139. Steinberg described the support he received from these 
three men (as well, as the interest of Miss Rosa 
Macarthur Onslow) in a chapter entitled 'Four Australian 
Profiles' in Australia - the Unpromised Land,~· cit., 
pp.36-69. 
Bishop Pilcher, ~ho frequently expressed his sympathy 
for the plight of the Jews and defended Jewish refugees 
against their antagonists, became one of Steinberg's 
most consistent supporters. On 10 January 1940, Pilcher 
(contd. p.199). 
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As well as Bishop Pilcher, a number of 
prominent churchmen, espec.i.ally Anglicans, declared 
themselves in favour of the Kimberley proposal. Dr. Mowll, 
Archbishop of Sydney, wrote to Steinberg offering his 
'warmest support' and the manifestos' signatories included 
Dr. Le Fanu, Archbishop of Perth and Anglican Primate of 
Australia, Bishop Burgmann of Goulburn and Rev. A.E. Albiston, 
.President-General of the Methodist Church of Australasia. 140 
The Synod- of--the-A.nglican. 
141 
supporting the scheme. 
Diocese of Perth passed a motion 
Catholics were less sympathetic 
142 
and some spoke out agianst the propo.sal. The .usual 
exception was Archbishop Mannix who gave Steinberg his 'good 
wishes for the success of the scheme•. 143 
One of the most important groups to Steinberg 
was the labour movement, whiph had only recently voiced its 
opposition to all immigration on the grounds that the 
newcomers would comp~t~ with Australians for employment and 
undermine industrial standards. 144 An isolated group 
settlement was a rather different question and Steinberg 
tried to convince labour supporters that Jewish refugees in 
the Kimberleys would in no way affect workers in the rest of 
Australia. If this was the case, labour could afford to 
organized a meeting of leading Protestant churchmen in 
Sydney to discuss the scheme. S.M.H., 11 January 1940. 
On 23 November 1941 he gave a talk entitled 'Refugees' 
over 2CH in which hl?. urged li.steners to support the 
proposal. A.J.F., December 1941. Dr. G.L, Wood 
assisted in the production of the Melbourne manifesto 
and discussed the scheme in a shortwave radio broadcast 
to the United States. A.J.F., June 1942. 
Sir Thomas Bavin helped prepare the text of the Sydney 
manifesto and the collection of signatures. After his 
death in August 1941, the Australian Jewish Forum 
described him as one of the scheme's 'most ardent and 
active supporters'. A.J.F., October 1941. 
140. Argus, 1 December 1939. 
S.M.H., 1·9· April 1940.--
141. ~., 18 August 1939. 
142, see pp. 207-8, 210. 
143 §_~., 19 April 1940. 
144 See p.71. 
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adopt a consistent attitude to the Jewish question by 
extending its sympathy for the plight of the Jews to 
practical support for measur_es _ _t9 _e_g._s_e _the_r_e_f_u_g_e_e_pLO.blem~------­
Nestern Australia's Labor Government had already endorsed 
145 the proposal. The Trades and Labor Councils ~f N.s.w., 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania subsequently passed 
resolutions supporting the Kimberley scheme although some 
representatives, at least in Sydney and Melbourne, voiced 
----t-he-i-!' -oppos i t-ion~-~~ 6 . -The A. C. T. u. _ex pres sed __ i_ts ___ appr_Qy_a_l , ____ _ 
subject to the 
147 Government, 
safeguards suggested by the West Australian 
and a few labour politicians signed the 
Melbourne and Sydney 'f 148 man1 estoso 
Labour's hesitancy to give full backing to the 
Kimberley proposal was reflected in the labour press. 
did not oppose the scheme, it had little to say in its 
Ii it 
favour .. When the Westralian Worker published a report of an 
interview with Steinberg, emphasizing his assurance that 
there would be no threat to Australian workers, the Labor 
14 5. 
146. 
See pp.195-6. 
Labor Call, 7 December 1939, S.M.H., 19 January 1940, 
I.N. Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land, 
~· £..!.!.., pp.88-93, describes his address to the 
Sydney Trades and Labor Council and the heated debate 
which preceded the passing of the motion. 
14 7, Argus, 1 December 1939. 
148. Signatories of the manifestos included the following 
labour politicians: 
- Maurice Blackburn, M.H.R., who had recently written 
a forward expressing sympathy for Jewish refugees 
in L.P. Fox, Australia and the Jews, ~· cit. 
- Frank Brennan, M.H.R. 
- E.J, Holloway, M.H.R., and a member of the Executive 
of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, who had 
urged the Government to admit Jewish refugees to 
Australia (see pp.83-4). 
- John Cain, M.L.A. (Victoria), Leader ·of the Victorian 
State Parliamentary Party and later Premier of 
Victoria. 
- R.A. King, M.L.C. (N.S.W.) and secretary of the N.s.w. 
Trades and Labor Council. 
I. 
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Member for Canning in the West Australian Legislative 
Assembly, Charles Cross, retaliated with two vehemently 
149 
anti-refugee articles. The Australian Worker did not 
have any such misgivings and maintained that the scheme 
'should be welcomed and approved by humane workers in this 
. 150 
country . 
Steinberg had more success with the general 
--~ -A-u5tra 1 iancommuni tythan -wTth-hi;;-,;;,..::reli-gi~ni~-t:;;;-w-ho--w-~re ____ _ 
largely noncommittal or opposed to the Kimberley proposal. 
Jn Sydney, a number of his Jewish suppor~ers established a 
. b l . 151 d 1 d . pro-Kim er ey society an So omon Ste man, an active 
member of the group, wrote a pamphlet entitled A Jewish 
1 . l. t bl. . h h 15 2 A t. Sett ement in Austra ia o pu icise t e sc eme. c ive 
support also came from some individual rabbis, especially 
Leib Falk, Senior Minister of the Great Synagogue in Sydney, 
and Jacob Danglow, who urged worshippers at the St. Kilda 
Synagogue to 'manifest an intelligent and sympathetic 
interest in the movement•. 153 
149, Westralian Worker, 21 July, 15 September, 6 October 1939. 
cross maintained that a settlement should not be 
permitted because of the offensive behaviour of ~ewish 
refugees, especially in the United Kingdom. Apart from 
these articles, few people opposed the settlement 
because of the behaviour of other Jewish refugees. 
150. Australian Worker, 6 March 1940. 
The veteran editor of the Australian Worker, H.E. Boote, 
signed the Sydney manifesto ~n support of the scheme. 
151. S.J,N., 26 April 1940. 
152. 
The society called itself the 'Sydney Group of Friends 
of Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys'. The Group's 
President was Felix Freeman and its Secretary 
Julius Karpin. 
s. Stedman, A Jewish Settlement in Australia, ~· £i!:_. 
Like Steinberg, Stedman had spent the early part of 
his life in ~ussia. 
153. A.J.H., 5 October 1939. 
Rabbi Jacob Danglow, appointed Chief Minister of the 
St. Kilda Congregation in 1905 at the age of 25, signed 
the Melbourne manifesto. Rabbi Danglow was active in 
both Jewish and non-Jewish affairs. In 1935 he was one 
of the founders of the Australian Jewish Herald. He also 
served on the Federal Council of the Boy Scouts 
Association and as Vice-President of the Victorian Deaf 
and Dumb Institute. 
Rabbi Leib Falk, who had been Senior Minister of 
(contd. p.202). 
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Jewish newspapers gave the scheme varied 
publicity, The greatest support came from the Australian 
proposaL Like Steinberg's non-Jewish supporters, it 
stressed that a settlement in the Kimberleys would help 
to pioneer the development of Northern Australia as well 
as serving a humanitarian purpose. It optimistically 
declared that the local Jewish community would 'endorse 
--enfifU-si-asticarliT Tfie.-doiib°le- sid-ed-nature of Dr. Steinberg's 
154 
scheme'. The Sydney Jewish News made little comment but 
published the statements of Kimberley supporters whilst 
ignoring those of their opponents. 155 
Steinberg was not satisfied with the amount of 
publicity the scheme was receiving in the Jewish press and, 
tn February 1941, he and his Sydney supporters established 
th! . 1 h t l' . h 156 A 11 a men y JOUrna , t e Aus ra ian Jewis Forum. s we 
Sydney's Great Synagogue since 1922, signed the Sydney 
manifesto and was active in defending the scheme against 
its Jewish critics. See p. 205, n.167. 
154,, A.J.H,, 7 December 1939. See also reports A.J.H., 
3 August, 2 November, 9 November 1940, 11 June 1942. 
Two of the founders of the Australian Jewish Herald 
in 1935 and members of its editorial committee were 
Rabbi Danglow and Archie Michaelis, M.L.A., who signed 
the Melbourne manifesto ~h favour of the scheme. Max 
Freilich, ££· cit., p.75. 
For example, statements by: 
- J.B. Cramsie, ex-Chairman of the Australian Meat 
Council, S.J.N., 5 July 1940. 
Walter Bro;h~d, traveller and author, S,J.N., 
6 September 1940. 
Fred Alexander, Associate Professor of History, 
University of Western Australia, S.J.N., 28 February 
194L 
156. The most active contributors were Solomon Stedman, the 
journal's editor, and Julius Karpin, After Steinberg's 
deparLure from Australia in June 1943, they continued 
to promote the Kimberley scheme in the Australian 
Jewish Forum. Steinberg had also visited Tasmania in 
January 1941 to investigate the possibility of 
establishing a Jewish settlement in the undeveloped 
south-west of the State. His proposals were accepted 
in principle by the Labor Premier, Robert Cosgrove, 
but Steinberg did not proceed any further. 
I.N. Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land, 
~- ci~., pp.122-145. 
203. 
as promoting the Kimberley scheme, the journal had the 
broader aim of making Australian Jews conscious of their 
role in World Jewry by keeping them informed of the latest 
developments in Jewish life and thought in other countries. 157 
The Australian Jewish Forum complained about the relative 
lack of support for the Kimberley scheme from the mass of 
Australian Jews and their leaders compared with the 
enthusiasm of prominent non-Jewish Australians: 
- ·····--- ------ ----------
the least to be expected from Australian Jews 
is that they match the sincere and disinterested 
idealism of a Murdoch with a show of active and 
sympathetic irrterest.158 
It was not so much that local Jews had spoken out against 
the proposal; they had merely 'attempted to freeze [it] 
out of existence by s·urrounding it with a stony wall of 
silence•. 159 
Considering the previous attitudes of 
Australian Jews to refugee immigration, their silence on 
the Kimberley scheme was understandable. With antisemitism 
increasing throughout the world, many local Jew~ had been 
reluctant to see mar~ than a few refugees admitted to 
Australia .. Through their spok~smen, the Hebrew Standard 
and the Australian Jewish Welfare Society, they insisted 
that any refugee immigrants should disperse throughout the 
. 'bl 160 community and make themselves as inconspicuous as possi e. 
Concentrated settlement had to be ~~aided at all costs. In 
October 1938, when colonization schemes were being 
investigated as a possible solution to the refugee problem, 
the Hebrew Standard declared categorically: 'there cannot 
b . t l' • 161 e any group settlements of foreigners in Aus ra ia . 
157. According to s. Stedman, 'Dr. Steinberg in Australia', 
A.J.H.S., 5 (1961), pp.170-186, Steinberg considered 
that most Australian Jews were ignorant of the thriving 
Jewish culture, now threatened with extinctiori, -of 
Central and Eastern Europe. As well as writing for 
the Australian Jewish Forum, Steinberg attempted to 
arouse an awareness of Yiddish culture by establishing 
a Folk Centre in Sydney. 
158.. ~-~·, August-September 1941. 
159- A.J.F., February 1941. 
I 
I 
As the Kimberley scheme gained popularity, it modified its 
tone a little and put the onus on the Commonwealth Government 
which, it felt 'safe in asserting, [would] not permit any 
proJect to form a "cell'' of alien immigrants in Australia•. 162 
If some Jews opposed the Kimberley scheme 
because they were anxious about their own position in the 
1 
_______ ::_ommu n1-ty_, ___ o.ther s -re-j.e cted-i-t-on-ideol-og-ic a 1--gro und s-.--·Ma n y----- ---·-------
i 
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ardent Zionists considered that the one and only solution 
to the refugee problem was the establishment of a Jewish 
stat in Palestine and they opposed all other territorial 
colonization schemes on principle. 
President of the Victorian Zionist 
unenthusiastic about the Kimberley 
Dr. Aaron Patkir., 
Organizatiou, 
163 proposal. 
was 
Max Freilich, 
President of the N.S.W. State Zioni~t Council, later stated 
that the Zionist battle 'had to be fought on a 
front' - against Kimberley enthusiasts as well 
three-pronged 
. . 164 
as non-Zionists. 
Steinberg's supporters argued that a Jewish settlement in 
Australia was not incompatible with Zionist aspirations; 
Palestine could not absorb all the refugees and the immediate 
bl t . h l' 165 . . d pro em was o save Jewis ives. Some Zionists agree • 
Dr Leon Jona, President of the Zionist Federation of 
A I . d 1 d . d th lb . - 166 ustra ia an New Zea an , signe e Me ourne maniiesto 
and Rabbi Falk explained how he was able to reconcile his 
162. ~·, 2 May 1940, 
163 
164 
l65 
Attitudes were not clearcut.. Although many Australian 
Jews remained silent.on the Kimberley proposal, the 
Sydney and Melbourne manifestos contained the 
signatures of some Jews who might have been expected to 
oppose the scheme in view of their earlier caution 
towards Jewish refugee immigration. These included: 
- Sir Samuel Cohen, prominent Sydney businessman, who had 
declared that it was not in the interests of Australian 
Jews to support large-scale Jewish refugee immigration. 
!E_uth (Sydney), 7 August 1938. 
- Archie Michaelis and Colonel Harold Cohen, members of 
the Victorian Legislative Assembly, who had been wary 
about publicly advancing pro-Jewish refugee sentiments 
at the risk of appearing 'un-Australian'. For example, 
debate on Victorian Medical Act, A.J.H., 8 December 1938. 
A.J.H,, 15 January 1942. 
Max Freilich, ££· cit .• , p.86. 
For examnle. 1 ett:er frnm 1 Ri:>n H.::ani::i.m.::a,.., 1 ; " "'".,,..,..,...,.......,,,,. 0 +-,.... 
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Zionist beliafs with his support for the Kimberley 
167 
scheme. 
205. 
Outside the Jewish community, Steinberg's 
proposal provoked some opposition but not to the extent 
that ordinary refugee immigration had done in 1938. The 
most practical reason given for condemning the scheme was 
that it simply was not a feasible proposition. Experts 
and would-be experts took advantage of the latest 
9.P po r t.)lJl_~_ty to co nj;j._1:ui_13_t_b_e_i.r _ .d eb.a_te_oJL.N or the .t:.n..._ ____ .. -------·---------
development. The pessimists argued that the tropical 
climate, -wi-t-h a-·long---hot --season and a- brief 'wet', ·l"/as 
unsuitable for white settlement. Even if the region 
proved to be productive, marketing would be an 
168 lnsurmountable problem. Northern settlement had been 
tried and had failed. If rugged Australians were unable 
co overcome the obstacles, how could European Jews be 
expected to succeed? A West Australian 'Ex-surveyor' 
declared that 'such a splendid pioneering type as ''Paddy'' 
Durack', who had taken the first herd of cattle to the 
area, 'would be incomparably superior to the type it is 
169 proposed to settle there' . 
Enthusiasts for Northern development continued 
to maintain that the climate was bearable, the soil fertile 
and the rainfall adequate provided an irrigation scheme was 
established. Along with the development ~f the cattle 
167. A.J.F., June 1942. 
168. 
169. 
Rabbi Falk stated that there were two schools of 
Zionist thought on this subject. The one to which 
he subscribed advocated that Zionists should interest 
themselves in the Diaspora and believed that healthy 
Jewish communities overseas would aid the realization 
of Zionist goals. The other school believed that all 
efforts should be directed towards building up 
Palestine. 
The pessimists included: 
- C. Price Conigrave, journalist and author, who had 
led the Kimberley Exploration Expedition in 1910-11 
and was employed in the Northern Territory 
administrative service from 1913 to 1928. S,M.H., 
29 January, 8 February 1940. 
- A.P. Elkin, Professor cf Anthropology at Sydney 
University, S.M.H,, 20 April 1940. 
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industry. any number of crops could be grown - tobacco, 
cotton, rice, wheat, maize, peanuts, fruit and vegetables. 
With proper direction and 
ld t f . l l 7 0 scheme cou no ·ai . 
adequate financial backing, the 
Steinberg's supporters argued 
that even if there was some doubt as to the scheme's 
171 practicability, the Jews should at least be given a chance. 
After all, they were paying for the venture and, as 
professor Murdoch pointed out, 'no Jewish association is 
likely to throw millions of pounds into an experiment which 
is foredoomed to fail'. 172 
-····- ---·----·-----· 
--- ---·-----··--···· -
The scheme was also opposed on less practical 
by .... some of.the .. people. who ... had .dec.lared themselves 
against ordinary refugee immigration in 1938. With the 
labour movement endorsing the scheme, there was little room 
for opposition on economic grounds and anti-foreign arguments 
came to the fore. Individuals reacted to the favourable 
170. Most of the published views of 'experts' were favourable 
to the development of the East Kimberley region. For 
example: 
- A.C. Angelo, a pastoral inspector in the area, 
'Colony in the East Kimberleys', Walkabout, 
l April 1941, pp.10-11. 
- J.B. Cramsie, ex-Chairman of the Australian Meat 
Council, who stated that he had spent fifteen years 
in North Australia. S.M.H., 5 February 1940. 
- M.P. Durack, Managing Director of the company which 
intended selling land to the Freeland League (see 
p.1~2, n.124), who stated that he had spent 54 years 
in the Kimberleys and maintained that they would 
'grow anything'. S.M.H., 14 December 1939. 
- Lieut. Col. Geoffrey Drake-Brockman, Engineer for the 
North-West Public Works Department, Perth, since 
1927 and in 1940 President of the Institution of 
Engineers of Australia. Presidential Address to the 
21st Annual General Meeting of the Institution of 
Engineers, Melbourne, 17 March 1941. A.J.F., 
May-June 1941. 
(Lieut. Col. Drake-Brockman was the husband of writer 
Henrietta Drake-Brockman who had previously expressed 
her support for the scheme. see p.197.) 
- G,F, Melville, an agricultural scientist formerly 
employed by the Pastoral Research Trust, W.A., 
22 July 1939. 
171. ~ .. 12 July 1939. 
172. ~~-, 15 July 1939 . 
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comments expressed by the Sydney Morning Herald and 
\·/est Australian by declaring their views in the papers' 
correspondence columns which became lively forums of 
th . 173 debate on e issue. Organized opposition to the 
proposal came from the same sources as in 1938 and ranged 
from the Catholic press and conservative 'patriotic' 
associations to the anti-foreign Bulletin and the 
antisemitic Publicist. 
Some people suggested that, if the scheme was 
--------~ practicable; then the area should be developed by 
Australians: by 'people of our own colour, blood ties, 
ideals•, 174 If it had so much -race characteristics-and 
potential, why hadn't it been developed before? Catholics 
were still ostensibly concerned about the unemployment 
situation and the Catholic Freeman's Journal was 'shocked' 
that such a promising area should have remained vacant 
while 'tens of thousands of strong and willing Australians 
have been living on relief work and the dole'. If the 
picture was not overpainted, the Kimberleys 'should have 
been exploited long before this by the native born•. 175 
Supporters of the Kimberley scheme had a ready 
As the opponents of Northern development kept 
reiterating, Australians had failed in their attempts to 
173, Controversies developed in these newspapers' 
correspondence columns during Steinberg's campaigns 
in Perth(~., July-August 1939) and Sydney (S.M.H., 
December 1939 - April 1940). 
While the W.A. published a majority of pro-Kimberley 
letters, thOSe published in the S.M.H. were almost 
equally divided between supporters and opponents of 
the scheme. 
During Steinberg's campaign in Melbourne (September 
to December 1939), the~ and Argus made little 
comment on the Kimberley scheme and published only 
a few letters on the subject. · 
174- 'A Patriot', letter to S,M,H., 24 January 1940. 
l 7 5. 
See also George Buchanan, letter to S.M.H., 
23 January 1940; M.F. Watts, letter to S,M,H., 
22 April 1940. M.F. Watts was a regular contributor 
to the Publicist. 
C.F.J., 21 December 1939, 
A further editorial, along similar lines, appeared 
in C.F.J,, 25 January 1940. 
l 
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settle the North. Only the Jews had the finance and the 
incentive necessary to develop the region; they were 
desperate for a place of refuge and would be strongly 
motivated to make a success of their new life. 176 Many 
Kimberley enthusiasts went a stage further, drawing an 
unrealistic analogy between what Zionist-inspired Jews 
had accomplished in their Palestinian 'homeland' and what 
their co-religionists might achieve in isolated Northern 
Australia. 177 The Sydney Morning Herald claimed that the 
•c;ewish colonists in Palestine have sufficientl_x__proveo.:d::.....-----·-···------
that their race can ... make a success of agriculture even 
under the most unpromising conditions•. 178 
But would the refugees be content to remain in 
the settlement? Some Australians thought not. Isolation 
and boredom would drive them to the cities where they would 
cause the usual immigration 
employment and the creation 
problems - competition·for 
.f f . . t. 179 
o oreign communi ies. The 
Bulletin warned that 'most of the hardy pioneers would turn 
up in the cities if they had to burrow under the wire 
netting•. 180 Steinberg and his supporters denied that this 
would happen. The refugees would be happy to have found a 
place of refuge where they could build up a new future for 
themselves by their own 'sweat, labour and money', just as 
Jews had done in Palestine. 181 'That is bunkum', retorted 
182 the Catholic Press. 
176 .. ~·, 12 July 1939. 
'X.Y.Z. ', letter to W.A., 30 August 1939. 
Walter S. Bromhead, letter to S.M.H., 26 April 1940. 
Article by Walter MurdoGh, W.A., 15 ,July 1939. 
177, 'S', letter to~., 8 July 1939. 
178' 
179, 
18 0. 
Walters. Bromhead, letter to S.M.H., 26 April 1940. 
Article by Walter Murdoch,~., 15 July 1939. 
S,M.H., 14 December 1939. 
'Concerned', letter to~., 17 August 1939. 
Catholic Press, 28 December 1939, 25 January 1940 •. 
Publicist, l February 1940. 
Bulletin, 24 January 1940. 
181. Speech by Steinberg to State Executive, West Australian 
Branch of the R.S.L., ~., 11 August 1939. 
See also S.M.H., 13 December 1939. 
182. Catholic Press, 28 December 1939. 
See also Advocate, 14 September 1939. 
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Even if Jewish refugees were likely to succeed 
in developing the Kimberleys, there was a basic reason for 
opposing the scheme on a matter of principle. A Jewish 
group settlement would break Australia's tradition of 
maintaining a homogeneous, integrated, predominantly British 
fOpulation and avoiding the racial troubles experienced in 
t . 18 3 h . ' other coun ries. T e Graziers Association warned that 
184 
a refugee settlement would cause a minority problem. 
In an editorial headline, the Sydney ~ declared 
ca tegor icall y: 'we want no alien colo_n.i.e.s_'_. __ .All. immigran t.s---·-··· ---·-------
--- ------='-----
had to assimilate into Australia's population which was 
'pure Bi:itish, with but··a. -t-rifl-ei admixtu-re-oi European 
stock'. People again drew attention to the behaviour of 
Italians in Australia to demonstrate what could be expected 
of foreign Jews. According to the ~' the situation in 
coastal Queensland, where communities of Italians refused 
to learn English and retained the customs and thoughts of 
Italy, was 'a warning, and an excellent one, against the 
entertaining of any project of Jewish colonization•. 185 
The antisemitic Publicist took the 'alien 
colony' idea to extremes in a series of articles attacking 
the Kimberley scheme which, it considered, would represent 
. ' . 1. • 18 6 h a Jewish annexation of a portion of Austra ia . T e 
Publicist's major contributor, P.R. S~ephensen, alleged in 
an article in the Australian Quarterly that the creation 
183. This 'tradition' was something of a myth. There were 
communities of German,? in the Barossa Valley in 
South Australia and Italians in the Shepparton area 
of Victoria and on the North Queensland canefields. 
However, these communities had developed as a result 
of normal individual immigration and existed despite 
the Government's opposition to the congregation of 
aliens. (See p.211, n.191.) 
184, S,M .. H., 13 March 1940, 
185. §_~, 14 December 1939, See also·J;M. Williams, letter 
to W.A., 6 July 1939. 
ThiShad been common practice in 1938 during the 
controversy over refugee immigration. See pp.71-2, 79. 
186. Publicist, l May 1940. Other articles denouncing the 
Kimberley scheme appeared in Publicist, 1 February, 
l June 1940, 1 December 1941. 
•e;;--: • 
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of a 'ghetto-state' would be tantamount to a 'successful 
• • I 187 f h • alien 1nvas1on . I t e Publicist thought in terms of 
a Jewish invasion, the Sydney Catholic Press intimaied that 
a communist takeover was in the offing. 'Who is Dr. Steinberg?'~ 
it asked, 'the remarkable man who had successfully roped 
in the elite and the Red-raggers'. Was it true that he had 
been 'a high official in Soviet Russia during the Lenin 
,188 
regime? 
·--~T"'h~e. . ..s.c-h.eme-'-s...-s.u.p.po-r-te-,,.s-a-rgu·ed· that the·---- __ ..... 
settlement would~ be an 'alien colony'. It would have 'r .. ·--
E .no a~~1r•t1~ris to~ar~s politl~il ~~i~~omy but would be an 
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187. P.R. Stephensen, 'A reasoned case against Semitism'·, 
Australian Quarterly, 12, No.l (1940>-;··p-;61. 
This article was one of Stephensen's more academically-
argued productions. The Australian Quarterly described 
hi~ only as a 'former Queensland Rhodes Scholar' and 
did not mention his corinection with the Publicist or 
the Australia First Movement. The article appeared in 
the same edition of the Australian Quarterly as 
Steinberg's 'A Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys'. 
Steinberg later criticized the Australian Quarterly 
for giving space to Stephensen's 'reasoning' on the 
grounds that it was 'thus legalizing it ••• '. I.N. 
Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land,££• cit., 
p.96. 
188. Catholic Press, 2 May 1940. 
The Catholic Press published three long editorials 
(28 December 1939, 25 January, 2 May 1940) denouncing 
the Kimberley scheme. As well as attacking Steinberg 
personally, it dismissed the scheme as impracticable 
and used the occasion to mount a general attack on 
Jewish refugees for allegedly breaking wage awards and 
using sweated labour. 
Steinberg made no secret of the fact that he had been a 
member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in Russia 
and Minister of Justice in the coalition government 
after the Revolution of October 1917. (see p.191). 
These details were published in many articles about 
Steinberg and the Kimberley scheme. For example, 
J. Steinberg, 'A Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys', 
Australian Quarterly,££·~·· p.24. 
Smith's Weekly, 10 February 1940. 
According to Steinberg, his 'past' did 'the cause no 
harm, rather the reverse'. Political leaders took a 
sympathetic interest in his experiences in Russia and 
spoke to him 'as .a colleague'. I.N. Steinberg, 
Australia - The Unpromised Land, .9.E• cit., p.37 . 
211. 
integral part of the Australian Commonwealth. English would 
be spoken and Australian institutions introduced from the 
beginning. The refugees would quickly become loyal 
Australian citizens; they were of various nationali~1es 
and, unlike some European immigrants, would have no 
189 
allegiance to any other country. 'Do you imagine an 
Austrian Jew 
camp?' asked 
being homesick for 
190 Walter Murdoch. 
his dear old concentration 
-·----·------- ---T-h e-- c o-nt-r-ove-i-s y- co n-1: :tn:ue·a·-· bu 1:-;-rn-i:nei o ng-ru n , 
it was the attitude of the Commonwealth Governmeht which 
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r P.a JJ y _mattered_. ______ C.on.s id er ing Australia 1 s tr ad i ti en a 1 
immigration policy, the prospects of the Kimberley scheme-
being approved were not very bright. The Government had 
consistently maintained that immigrants must assimilate into 
the general population and that it opposed the congregation 
of. aliens in groups, let alone any deliberately contrived 
191 bloc settlement plan. On 1 December 1939 and again on 
17 May 1940, Senator H.S. Foll, Minister for the Interior, 
reiterated this policy in response to parliamentary questions 
on the possibility of a Jewish refugee settlement being 
established in the Kimberleys. 192 
189, Interview with Steinberg, S.M.TI., 13 December 1939. 
J. Steinberg, 'A Jewish settlement in the Kimberleys', 
££.· cit., pp.26, 30. 
S.M.H., 14 December 1939. 
Sydney manifesto published in S.M.H., 19 April 1940. 
~., 12 July, 30 August 1939. 
190. ~-· 15 July 1939. 
191. For example, statements by John McEwen, Minister for 
the Interior (W.A., 17 November 1938), and Joseph Lyons, 
Prime Minister-,-(S.M.H., 18 November 1938) in response 
to a British GovernmE-;t suggestion that a Jewish 
refugee settlement should be established in the 
Northern Territory. (~., 17 November 1938). 
In 1938 the Federal Government took steps to prevent 
the further congregation of Italians by refusing visas 
to those who wished to go to the Queensland canefields. 
£..,.R~· Vol. 155, p.785, 4 May 1938. 
192 C.P.D. Vol. 161, p.1921. 
C.P.D. Vol. 163, p.985. 
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Despite the Government's declared policy, 
Steinberg had built up a considerable following by the time 
he submitted his proposal to the Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, 
193 
1 11 August 1940. If Steinberg had aimed to ensure that 
the scheme was well publicized and supported before he 
approached Canberra, the Government's response was to play 
a delaying game. Steinberg had to wait four years for a 
definite reply to his proposal. In February 1941 he was 
advised that Cabinet had deferred consideration of the 
-----p r·opos-a-l--b e c a·irs-e-o·f-t h-e -wa-r-s·i t ua thrn.-~9.L.. s-t-e::tl\15 er g-·-reil e wed 
his application in the following November after Curtin's new 
J,ahor Government had taken office. 195 A month--later the 
Pacific war broke out and, with the European situation 
taking second place to Australia's own fight for survival, 
the Kimberley scheme faded into the background. 
Interest in the proposal revived at the end of 
1942, when the publication of details of the Nazi 
extermination campaign led to renewed efforts to find places 
196 
of refuge for Europe's surviving Jews. Such an emergency 
surely warranted bold government policies. In Melbourne 
and Sydney new committees - with old faces - were established 
to promote the 
it support for 
Kimberley cause 
197 the scheme. 
and the A.C.T.U. reaffirmed 
In a letter to the Prime 
Minister, the heads of the Anglica~, Methodist and 
Presbyterian churches urged that a decision be made 'in 
answer to the request that a considerable area in Australia 
be set apart as soon as circumstances permit for refugee 
settlement' and reminded the Government that the matter was 
198 
'immediately urgent'. 
193. I.N. Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land, 
~· cit., p.154. 
194, Ibid., p.158, 
i95. Ibid., p.159, 
196 See p.172. 
197 Argus, 4 November 1942. 
S.M.H. 21 January 1943. 
198 S.M.H., 18 March 1943. 
i The letter was signed by Archbishop Le Fanu, Anglican Primate of Australia, Rev. ·H,M. Weller, President-
213. 
Renewed public enthusiasm for the scheme was 
followed by renewed opposition. The annual conference of 
the Australian Natives' Association protested against the 
proposed settlement in accordance with its poli·cy of 
opposition to 
1 . 199 Austra ia. 
the establishment of minority groups in 
Despite the crisis, Australian Jews remained 
divided on the refugee question. Zionists were actively 
campaigning for the lifting of restrictions on immigration 
into Palestine and continued to denounce the Kimberley 
' 
.. _____ ,;_ch~-~6.: 2~ 0 __ B_i~J:i.o_J2__];'_1:_~_9_1'.6.1: plea_?ed wi_t:E__ the· .Je~i_,,;_)1 _p_e_<:>ple ___ ··-----
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'Lo close their ranks ... at this time of unexampled 
tragedy' an.a a_sk_ed_.them, in the 
201 thy fellow?' 
words of Moses-, 'wherefore 
smitest thou 
'Public opinion' on the Kimberley scheme was 
belatedly tested by Gallup Poll in September 1944. By this 
time the European war was drawing to a close and the focus 
had shifted from the immediate emergency of saving Jews 
from extermination to the long-term issue of post-war 
immigration. In response to the question 'would you agree 
to a Jewish settlement in North Australia?' 37% of the 
two thousand Australians questioned replied that they 
favoured such a scheme, 47% opposed it and 16% were 
d ·a a 202 un eci e • The reasons given for opposing or supporting 
the proposal were similar to those which had been expressed 
in the community four to five years earlier when Steinberg 
19 9. 
200. 
201. 
2 0 2. 
General of the Methodist Church of Australia, and 
the Rt. Rev. R. Wilson Macauley, Moderator-General 
of the Presbyterian Church of Australia. 
S.M.H., 4 December 1943. 
Zionist, 30 November 1943; 
Letter from Bishop c.v. Pilcher to A.J.F., February 
1944, in response to the above Zionist editorial. 
Australian Gallup Polls, August-September, 1944. 
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203 
was campaigning for support. According to the Australian 
Jewish Forum, the results were very encouraging because the 
question did not specifically mention the Kimberley district 
and 'a number of people were, no .doubt, misled ~nto thinking 
of the North where foreign settlements already exist•. 204 
In fact, slightly greater opposition to a Jewish settlement 
was voiced in Queensland, the state which had experienced 
the growth of Italian communities in the coastal canegrowing 
areas~ 
The deathknell for the Kimberley scheme came 
The 
C0~monwealth Government's decision was the predictable one. 
on 16 November 1944, the Acting Prime Minister, F.M. Forde, 
stated that his Government had approved the recommendations 
of its Inter-Departmental Committee on Immigration on a 
205 
number of issues including the Kimberley plan. This 
vague announcement was clarified with the publication of a 
statement by Steinberg, now in New York, that he had been 
advised by the Labor Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, that the 
Government 'was unable to depart from its long-established 
203. The most common arguments against a Jewish settlement 
were based on: 
(i) opposition to an alien settlement - for example, 
'concentrated national groups are not wanted' 
'let them be absorbe·d into the population' 
(ii) doubts as to whether the settlement would be 
successful: 
'they are not good agriculturalists' 
(iii) fear that refugees would not remain in the 
settlement: 
'they would soon migrate to the cities' 
The reasons given for favouring the scheme were the 
usual combination of humanitarian and pro-immigration/ 
pro-develop the North arguments; for example, 
'Australia needs immigrants; Jews need freedom' 
'Live and let live; we have not settled the North' 
204, A.J.F., October 1944. This revealed one of the pitfalls 
of pu.blic opinion polls: whether .the poll measures 
what it purports to measure. 
205, ~E· Vol. 180, p.1829. 
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policy regarding alien settlement in Australia•. 206 
The Government's attitude was praised by the 
Australian Natives' Association and John McEwen, Deputy 
Leader of the Country Party and a former Minister for the 
Interior. 2 07 Supporters of the scheme condemned· the 
decision. 208 The sidnei Morning Herald declared that the 
Government could not simply reject the proposal 'without 
. ,209 d h explanation or comment an t e A.C.T.U. passed a 
resolution asking the Government to reverse its decision. 210 
·-- --------,-
Sena tor Collings, Minister for the Interior, replied that 
the .. matter had been fully investigated and admitted 
that the 'Government's policy of avoiding community 
settlements had led to its rejection of the plan'. The 
lesson of Innisfail, Queensland, 'where the Italians print 
their own newspapers and have their own schools', had 
convinced the Government of the undesirable 
aspects of community settlement, which are 
completely out of character with the Government's 
policy of the complete integration of races 
permitted into this country.211 
The West Australian and the Perth Daily News retorted that 
Collings' comments on Italian communities were simply not 
applicable to a Jewish settlement: the refugees would be 
of different nationa·lities ·With--no.common language. and their 
children would be educated in Australian schools. 212 
206. W.A., 27 November 1944, 
Steinberg had left Australia in June 1943. On 15 July 
1944 the Prime Minister, John Curtin, advised Steinberg 
of the Government's decision but Steinberg did not make 
the letter public until after Forde's statement of 
16 November. Curtin's letter is quoted in 
I.N. Steinberg, Australia - The Unpromised Land, ~E· ~·· 
pp.165-166. 
207. Argus, l December 1944. 
208, For example, Bishop C.V. Pilcher, letter to S.M.H., 
9 December 1944; Dr. C.E.W. Bean, official war 
historian, letter to A,J,F .. , February 1945. 
209. S.M.H., 11 December 1944. 
210. S.M.H,, 9 December 1944. 
211. ~·, 12 December 1944. 
212. ~ .. 13 December 1944, 
Daily News, 13 December 1944, 
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The scheme's Jewish supporters were bitterly 
disappointed and Steinberg claimed that 'it was not the 
final decision of 
h . ' 213 sympat etic • 
the Australian peoplF, who were most 
Some Australian Jews were relieved. 
216. 
Alec Masel, President of the Zionist Federation of Australia 
and New Zealand, created a storm amongst Melbourne Jewry 
when he publicly declared that he supported the Government's 
. . 214 decision. The Australian Jewish Forum thought it was 
'a sorry spectacle indeed that when a project to help 
___ suffering_Jew_F_y __ i-"..__r~ject_e_Cl_. it is a Jew who exJ?resses 
215 ---------- ----
his pleasure'. Official Australian Jewry gave its final 
213. W.A., 27 November 1944. 
Julius Karpin, one of Steinberg's chief supporters, 
expressed a similar view. S.M.H., 9 December 1944. 
Steinberg did not give up. He continued to_ approach 
the Federal Government but the original decision was 
reiterated by Prime Ministers F.M. Forde on 10 July 1945 
and J.B. Chifley on 16 July 1946. I.N. Steinberg, 
Australia - The Unpromised Land,££· cit., pp.171-2. 
214. Sun {Melbourne), 18 November 1944. 
In accordance with the attitudes of many Zionists· 
(see p.204) Masel maintained that 'Palestine was 
the only place fo~ large-scale Jewish settlement'. 
His statement was supported by Dr. Aaron Patkin, 
President of the Victorian Zionist Organization, 
who had previously denounced the Kimberley scheme. 
(See p.204)A.J.H., 15 December 1944. Masel's ·s·tatement 
caused an angry debate in the Australian Jewish Herald, 
B, 15, 29 December 1944, 19 January 1945. · 
Masel explained that he was speaking as President of 
the Zionist Federation and not in his other official 
role as President of the victorian Jewish Advisory 
Board, some of whose members'threatened to resign if 
he did not make this clear. 
A.J.H., 29 December 1944, 19 January 1945. 
215, A.J.F., December 1944. 
See also A.J.F., February 1945. 
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verdict when the newly formed Executive Council of 
Australian Jewry declared at its first meeting in January 
1945 that it opposed the group settlement of Jews 
. l. 216 in Aus·cra ia. 
were 
So far as Steinberg and the Freeland League 
concerned, Australia remained 'the unprornised land•. 217 
216. H.S., 22 February 1945. 
This decision substantiated Senator Collings' statement, 
made as partial justification for the Government's 
rejection of the proposal, that 'the most important 
and influential of the Jewish organizations were 
opposed to any such scheme'. W.A., 12 Decernber-7944, 
s. Stedman, 'Dr. Steinberg in Australia', ££· cit., 
p.186, blamed the Jewish opponents of the Kimberley 
scheme for its rejection by the Commonwealth 
Government. Although a united Jewish viewpoint in 
favour of the scheme would have strengthened Steinberg's 
case, it seems unlikely that it would have affected the 
Government's decision. The Government admitted that it 
rejected the proposal primarily because of its opposition 
to alien bloc settlements and Collings probably made 
this comment in an attempt to shift some of the 
res pan s-i-b-i-1--i t-y .. --f-ro-nl-t-h-e---Go-v e-r-nme-n-t ··------ --------
217. The -East--K-irnberleys had to wait seventeen years for - the 
West Australian Government to begin a large-scale 
development scheme along the lines envisaged by the 
Freeland League. In 1961, the State Government, aided 
by a $10 million grant from the Commonwealth, commenced 
the first stage of the Ord River scheme. A diversion 
darn was built and the surrounding land irrigated for ·· 
agriculture, especially cotton-growing. When the West 
Australian Government wanted to begin the second stage 
of the scheme, it became involved in a controversy with 
academics and the Commonwealth Government on the economic 
potential of the region and the wisdom of devoting large 
sums of money to its development. At the end of 1967, 
the Cornmonwealch Government finally decided to proceed 
with the scheme, providng $48 million in grants and 
loans. The construction of the main darn was begun in 
1969, amidst continuing controversy, and completed 
before the 1971-2 wet seas6n. The success or failure 
of the Ord scheme is still a question mark. 
218. 
PART THREE 1945-1947 
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--··----··1- ·-- ---... · un~i~--y~·:-have··~-e-e~- the actual recorded pictures 
I~ of Buchenwald and Belsen you can't believe the • indescribable horror that has been happening in our time It isn't just a blood-curdling thriller; this is truth.' 
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Argus, 24 May 1945. 
'Ther~ is something grotesquely anomalous in the 
extraordinary picture of British people vainly 
clamoring for passage to Australia while hundreds 
of refugees, no doubt paying extortionate passage 
money, can reach this country in ships chartered 
by certain individuals or groups of people.' 
~· 12 February 1947. 
I 
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Chapter 5 
Victims, Criminals and Survivors 
Allied troops entered Germany in March 1945 
and it was not long before they found evidence of how the 
Nazi regime had treated the Jews. On 11 April American 
soldiers liberated Buchenwald camp where they found cartloads 
of unburied corpses and 20,000 starving and diseased 
• prisoners. 1 Four days later Belsen was taken by British ~ troops who __ diSCOc:JVeE_ed 3_, _ _Q_Q_Q_!2_C?_(l_i_e_§_ §w.£.J,_ting b_ur_i_a_l 2 __ an~ ______ _ 
----------,-·-------~;.-~00 surv~~~~s suffering from starvation and typhus; 
' ll within a few days an-other--i-3; 00"0 people had died. - Press 
l 
I 
-
._. 
I 
__J 
correspondents on the spot informed the world of the gruesome 
4 discoveries in graphic reports and photographs. Their 
revelations aroused a horrified reaction in Britain and the 
1- Herald, 28 April 1945. 
During the week before the Americans arrived, over 
28,000 of the 48,000 inmates were evacuated from 
Buchenwald to other camps in the south of Germany. 
Gerald Reitlinger, ££· ~., pp.463-5. 
2. Age, 21 April 1945. D.T., 21 April 1945. 
Press correspondents on the spot put the number of dead 
in the camp when British troops arrived at 3,000. 
According-·to Gerald Reitlinger, ££_.·cit.·-, ·p.4.66, the 
number was 13,000. This is possibly an error and only 
a repetition of the figure of 13,000 he gives for the 
·number of persons who died within a few days ·of the 
camp's liberation. 
3.- ~-· p.466-7. 
Jews were not the only inmates of these camps. They 
also contained some political prisoners and persons 
brought from occupied territories for forced labour. 
4, So far as the total number of deaths was concerned, 
these camps played a comparatively minor role in the 
Nazi extermination campaign. 51,572 died at Buchenwald 
and over 40,000 at Belsen, compared with an estimated 
840,800 at Auschwitz. (Reitlinger's estimate of deaths 
at Auschwitz is a low one compared with the Russian 
claim that four million died there.) Auschwitz had been 
liberated by Russian troops on 26 January 1945. However, 
it had already been almost completely evacuated and the 
Russians found only 2,819 invalid prisoners when 
they entered the camp. Gerald Reitlinger, ££· cit., 
pp.459, 461, 467. Buchenwald Camp: The Report of a 
Parliamentary Delegation, London, H.M.S.O., Cmd . 
6626, 1945. 
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united States and both governments sent 
to Germany to investigate the situation 
official delegations 
5 for themselves. 
Australian newspapers gave the revelations 
wider coverage than any other event in the history of the 
Nazi persecution of the Jews •. They published grim stories 
of the scenes which greeted allied soldiers and correspondents, 
details of the British Parliamentary Delegation's reaction 
to the 
'Beast 
an interview with Josef Kramer, the camps, and even 
6 
ofBelsen'. Special correspondents, who repo:..r_t:_e.::....:_d _____________ .. _ ... 
·----··----
.direct from-tlie_c_a .. iffps~aad.ed-their·o-;:;n comments. 'Come to 
Belsen and you will believe Ronald Monson anything', wrote 
7 
f o r t he Argus and the =D..:a:.;i=-· =1 ... y--'T=e-=l:..:e:cg=r-=a:.1P;:.;h:: . The §ydney Morning 
Herald's war correspondent, H.A. Standish, declared that 
what he saw at Belsen was 'complete proof 
we have read and heard about the • I 8 Nazis • 
of everything that 
The f i rs-t- ha-ad reports were supplemented by the 
shocked comments of Australian newspaper editors, who soon 
revealed their earlier doubts about the validity of the 
atrocity stories. According to the Argus, the allied invasion 
had revealed things 'that few would have believed. They were 
indeed unbelievable 1 • 9 The Mercury was still not sure that 
1 -----------;,-fi:-·-p:~~tralians were convinced and declared: 'many people 
beings I 
• 
I 
I 
..... 
only half-believe,· because they feel that no human 
10 
could do such things in the twentieth ?entury'. 
It took the photographs to make some Australians 
realize that the stories were true. Seeing was ·believing. 
5. The Times, 20, 23, 28 April 1945 . 
New rork Times, 19, 23, 25, 27, 28 April 1945. 
6. The.reports started on 21 April 1945, with details of 
the initial discoveries, and continued until 28 April 
when details of the British Parliamentary Delegation's 
report were published. 
7 
8. 
9 
Argus, 21 April 1945. 
~·, 21 April 1945. 
S.M.H., 21 April 1945. 
~rgus, 26 April 1945. 
10, Mercury, 23 April 1945 . 
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The number 
ne\Vspape rs 
and types 
' d 11 varie ~ 
of photographs published by individual 
One of the most gruesome, which not 
all newspapers printed, bore the caption 'emaciated bodies 
of the victims of Nazi bestiality flung into the burial pit 
at Belsen concentration camp•. 12 The most widely publicized 
photograph did not feature the victims themselves but 'some 
of the women S.S. guar~~ of Belsen concentration camp whose 
bestiality and brutality equalled that of their male 
13 
colleagues'. When E.N. West, a member of the Tasmanian 
House of Assembly, objected to the publication of the 
'horror p ic tur e~-.li1'"l:Tierf6b-art-·Mer c ury;-..1.1-ut-hers--retorted 
that it was the only way to force people to believe th~ 
reports. Acco,ding-to one -letter-writer~ there were still 
too many Australians who did 'not believe all that has been 
, , th . t • I 15 h t d written concerning e atroc1 ies . Anet er commen e : 
'How many times has one heard people say when just reading 
of such horrors, 'Oh, that's only propaganda! •, 16 
Australian Jews had no such doubts about the 
fate of their co-religionists in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
Throughout the war Jewish newspapers had published detailed 
lL Many newspapers published three or four individual 
photographs on different days. The photographs 
appearing in the. Sunday Sun ( 2 2 April 194 5 l , the 
Daily Telegraph (23 April 1945) and the Mercury 
(23 April 1945) had a greater impact because several 
were printed on one page. 
12 For example, ~' s.M.H., 23 April 1~45. 
13. For example, Age, Argus, D.T., Mercury, 24 April 1945, 
~,A., Advertiser, 25 April 1945. 
14. Mercury, 25, 26 April 1945. 
far 
The publication of the photographs in the Mercury 
resulted in an outburst of controversy. The newspaper's 
editor defended his action, maintaining that he was 
15. 
16 
not publishing the photographs for sensationalist 
purposes. (Mercury, 23 April 1945.) 
'Returned Soldier', letter to Mercury, 26 April 1945, 
'Old Anzac', letter to Mercury, 26 April 1945. 
Other letter-writers who defended the publication of 
the photographs included: 
'1st AIF', Mercury, 27 April 1945. 
'Contented Bill'. Mercurv, 27 April 1945, 
E'llTs.-E. Dean, Mercury, '30 April 1945. 
T.G. M·a·tthews, Mercury, 30 April 1945. 
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reports of Nazi atrocities. 
stat:ed: 
The Australian Jewish Herald 
The revelations which have stunned and shocked 
the general public come as no surprise to the 
Jewish people whose melancholy experience 
during more than ten years has stripped the 
present sensational exposures of any suggestion 
of novelty. 17 
Now, at last, even the sceptics were realizing that the 
stories 'were not fiction, or, at the best, highly coloured 
18 propaganda'. 
To date, the public's attention had been 
focussed on Belsen and Buchenwald, which played a 
comparatively minor role in the Nazi extermination campaign. 
Probably not more than one hundred thousand people died in 
19 these camps. If one could believe the current reports, 
then what about the earlier stories of the extermination of 
millions of Jews in Poland and Russia? When Australians 
expressed their shock at the horrors of Belsen and Buchenwald, 
a letter-writer to the Sydney Morning Herald reminded them 
that the death roll in Poland was over three million. He 
added: 
Our allies on the Eastern front must smile a 
little sardonically at the outcry over the 
horr.ors- o.f --the .death .. camps----in- Germany when 
they recall the scepticism with which Russian 
reports of similar atrocities on a large·scal~ 
in Russia were greeted.20 
But so far as Australians were concerned, the impact still 
came from stories and photographs of the individual dead 
and dying in the German camps. They could not comprehend 
more. 
The reaction to the revelations reached a 
climax a month later when two ten-minute news films of 
Belsen and Buchenwald camps were screened in Australian 
17. A.J,H., 27 April 1945. 
18. H.S., 12 April 1945. 
19. See p.219. 
20 S.M. H-, 23 April 1945. 
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cinemas along with such features as 'Shine on harvest moon' 
and 'Gnslight'. 21 The advertisements read: 
Extra! At beginning of all sessions! 
Atrocities in German prison and internment camps! 
(This is a Horror Film - Suitable for Adults.)22 
According to Douglas Brass of the Melbourne Herald, 'nothing 
more grisly and shocking' had ever been on public exhibition. 
He described the film: 
Dispassionately, it shows untidy piles of rotting 
bodies, charred skeletons in rough incinerators, 
torture gallows and bloodstained cudgels, mass 
graves of newly-dead and nearly-dead, twisted 
corpses of prisoners who were sprayed with oil 
and burned alive. It shows also the 'livjng' -
the emaciated bags of bones which were not yet 
cast among the heaps of dead,23 
If the press reports and the photographs had 
convinced most people that the reports of Nazi atrocities 
were not merely propaganda, the news films provided the 
final indisputable proof, Commentators on the films 
continued to stress one point: the stories were true. 
'Celluloid cannot lie', declared the Argus, urging people 
who still had 'any lingering doubt' to view the evidence 
24 for themselves. 
Should the public be shown such 'horror films' 
at a 11? According to the Argus, 'every adult in this 
community should witness it as a matter of duty•, 25 The 
Advertiser agreed and urged eve~~ Australian to 'steel 
himself to see the ghastly evidence•. 26 Letter-writers to 
2L The films were called 'Horror in our Times' 
(Gaumont News) and 'This is the German' (Movietone News) 
They were screened in all state capitals except Hobart 
for a week beginning 25 May 1945. The Hobart screening 
commenced on 2 June 1945. 
22, ~' 25 May 1945. 
23, Herald, 24 May 1945 .. 
See also Advertiser, 25 May 1945. 
24. Argus, 25 May 1945, 
.,See also Argus, 24 May 1945, 
25. Argus, 25 May 1945. 
26. Advertiser, 28 May 1945. 
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the press also declared that everyone should see the films 
so that they would be fully aware of the horrors which had 
been perpetrated and would oppose any attempt to grant 
27 Ger many a '.so ft peace' . 
Others maintained that such films should not 
be shown to the public. First, they argued that many people 
were going to see the films, not out of a sense of duty, but 
because of morbid curiosity. One letter-writer to the 
Herald claimed that the people queueing to see the newsreel 
were 'just those who, for their own sakes and the community, 
should be prevented from seeing the films•. 28 Commentators 
also questioned the motives for showing the films and 
•lleged that they would only arouse ~n-Christian feelings 
2g 
of hatred and revenge for the German people. With the war 
over, a positive attitude to Germany was needed. The 
Catholic Advocate maintained that there was 
no justification whatever for exhibiting this 
record of Nazi foulness before the Australian 
people, at a time when the only sane object is 
to rebuild the ruins of Europe ... 30 
A more controversial issue was the viewing of 
the films by children. Although advertised 'strictly for 
adults only', the films were screened during the school 
holidays when children made up the larger part of matinee 
audiences. some cinema managers refused to admit children, 
unless they were accompanied by an adult, until after the 
screening of the newsreel. Th~. Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne 
University, J,D.G. Medley, the Victorian Federation of 
Mothers' Clubs and the South Australian League of Women 
27 .. Philip Andrews, letter to Herald, 28 May 1945, 
'M.E.G.', letter to Herald, 31 May 1945. 
Arthur J. Richardson, letter to Advertiser, 28 May 1945. 
28. Mary Baker_, letter to ~ald, 28 May 1945. 
29. H. Sprigg, letter to Advertiser, 30 May 1945. 
Rar.hel Hendle, letter to Herald, 2 June 1945 .. 
30, ~cate, 30 May 1945. 
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voters all maintained that children under sixteen should 
not be admitted to the films because they might have a 
harmful effect on those of an impressionable age. 31 Some 
people were more specific and alleged that they would arouse 
the base human instincts of sadism and hate. According to 
the Advocate, the films would 'corrupt the emotions of 
h · 11 b b'd f d' d · l' • 32 yout , especia y, y mor 1 scenes o sa ism an anima 1ty . 
A letter-writer to the Advertiser agreed that they would have 
'a brutalising effect •.• on young, immature and sensitive 
. 33 
minds'. Others commented that they would sow seeds of 
hate against the Germans in a generation which was not 
responsible for the war. 34 
Some Australians disagreed. They argued that 
the films would have a beneficial effect on children by 
making them fully aware of the horrors of war and of the 
'useless and needless suffering war brings•. 35 This would 
be a 'powerful help in ushering in the desired age of 
36 
reason'. One returned soldier had a different motive. 
He maintained that all children from seven years onwards 
should see the films so that they would 'have it instilled 
into their young minds just what the Hun mentality is•. 37 
As a few people pointed out, the likely effect 
of the films on children - either positive or negative -
was probably being exaggerated. One commentator claimed 
that children would 
the day they viewed 
'not carry the memory of the films b'eyond 
38 them'. They were used to horror films: 
31, Herald, 28 May 1945. 
Advertiser, 30 May 1945. 
32. Advocate, 30 May 1945. 
33, Arthur J. Richardson, letter to ~dvertiser, 28 May 1945. 
34. Ada Bramham, letter to Advertiser, 28 May 1945. 
(Mrs .. l Ethel H. Fryer, letter to Advertiser, 31.May 1945. 
General opposition to admitting children to the films 
was expressed by K.C. Billinge, letter to Herald, 
31 May 1945, and 'A Mother', letter to Advertiser, 
31 May 1945. 
35. H, Coghlan, letter to Herald, 30 May 1945. 
36. 'Old Man', letter to Advertiser, 31 May 1945. 
37. W.A.R. Cameron, 1st A.LF., letter to Advertiser, 
29 May 1945. 
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. . . after seeing 'Zombies', 'Vampires' and 
murderers creep across the screen [they] 
will regard such sights as an object of 
interest rather than of terror. The 
horror p~rt of the film lies in the adult 
mind when one realises that such atrocities 
actually happen.39 
226 • 
The revelations at Belsen and Buchenwald had 
aggravated anti-German feeling and the earlier cry for 
retribution grew louder. 40 'This must be avenged', declared 
41 
the Argus, There was one problem: against whom should 
retribution be taken? Earlier, most people had put the 
blame solely on the Nazi regime and its evil ideology. 42 
But after six years of war and anti-German propaganda, there 
was an increasing tendency to indict the German people as 
a whole. They had elected the Nazis to power and had 
supported the rise of German militarism. 
Herald stated: 
The Sydney Morning 
These crimes against humanity •.. cannot be 
laid at the door of the few in authority; 
they are the responsibility of the whole 
community which tolerated them without 
protest for many long years .•. A whole 
nation stands today indicted with its Nazi 
leaders,43 
According to the Sydney Morning Herald, correspondents ·had 
f d ' . f . . . "lt' 44 oun no sign amongst the Germans o·.contrition or gui . 
The Courier-Mail maintained that, although Germans were 
·'pretending that they knew nothing' of the atrocities, it 
was 'more likely that these "innocents'' did not want to 
45 
know 1 ~ 
If the Nazis had their racial theory, Australian 
newspapers soon had their own. The German character was at 
39, 'Ninety-one', letter to Advertiser, 2 June 1945. 
40, See p.171. 
41, Argus, 25 May 1945. 
42. See pp. 23-5, 
43, S.M .. H., 21 April 1945. 
44. Ibid. 
~·, 21 F.pril 1945. 
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fault. The Sydney Morning Herald put the onus on the 'dark, 
barbarian recesses of the German mind• 46 and the Argus 
. 47 blamed the 'demon-ridden German soul'. According to the 
~~y_, the German was a 'pr imi ti ve and malignantly cruel 
savage ... underneaLh his veneer' and he had carried out the 
whole evil plan with 'Teutonic thoroughness-and logic'. 
In future, the human beings 
the icancerous German race' 
in the world would have to keep 
48 permanently under control. 
How could a whole nation be p~nished? Most 
commentators agreed that Germany must be given no chance of 
becoming a strong power again; there could be no mercy for 
the Germans and no talk of a 
. .. 4q 
'soft peace'. - The.reverations 
had ensured that 'no misplaced compassion for the German 
people will arrest the processes by which the augean stable 
50 
must be cleansed'. The Courier-Mail declared that, ·if the 
German people were to be 'recivilized', they must be forced 
to 'hear, r."~d- and see irrefutable evidence of the depravity 
of the Nazi regime'. Itr commended an American army commander 
who compelled several hundred residents 
Buchenwald camp and see the horrors for 
of Weimar to tour 
51 themselves. 
Labour and communist spokesmen denied that 
their fellow-workers could be held responsible. The evil 
was Nazism and its wicked ideology; the people to blame 
were the Nazis an~ th•ir original supporters - German 
capitalists and the middle classes. The Labor Weekly 
maintained that there was only one solution: 
Fascism must be abolished from the world for 
46. S.M.H., 21 April 1945. 
47, Argus, 26 April 1945, 
48. Me.r.cur~, 23 April 1945. 
49. S.M.H., 21 April 1945. 
Argus, 25 May 1945. 
50. Advertiser, 24 April 1945. 
51. ~--, 21 April 1945. 
52. Labor Weekly, 4 May 1945. 
'Nazism and 
' 52 ever . .. 
Similar views were expressed by Labor call, 26 April 1945, 
and Tribune, 26 April 1945. 
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Some Christian church leaders agreed. The 
Anglican Bishop of Tasmania, the Catholic Archbishop of 
Hobart and the President of the Tasmanian Council of Churches 
were alarmed at the amount of anti-German hostility aroused 
by the revelations and claimed that the atrocities could not 
'be laid to the account of the German people as a whole'. 
It was the Nazi regime, not the German nation, which had a 
history of 'brutality, of violation of human rights and 
liberties and of self-deification'. The future peace of 
the world would not be helped by indulging in the 
'unchristian emotion of hatred' and thinking and speaking 
53 
'in terms a~ revenge' . 
The church leaders' plea fell on deaf ears. 
Few people had any humanitarian Christian feelings left 
towards the Germans and they r-e-s-ponded angrily to the 
statement in letters to the Mercury, 'Turning the other 
cheek would be an act of mistaken charity', wrote one 
54 
correspondent. Another declared: 
The leaders directed the policy with 
ruthlessness, but it is the common German 
man who has done the actual murdering of 
millions of innocent people.SS 
The situation provided an opportunity for some people to 
express their general hostility towards the Germans. In 
'Aussie's' opinion, 'the only time a German is any good is 
when he is dead' , 56 
Regardless of the question of responsibility, 
it was those who were directly involved in the Nazi 
anti-Jewish campaign who would have to pay the price 
53. Mercury, 27 April 1945, 
The letter to the Mercury was signed by 
Geoffrey Cranswick, Bishop of Tasmania; E.V. Tweedy, 
Archbishop of Hobart; and Gordon Arthur, President 
of the State Council of Churches. 
5o'. William Michael, letter to Mercury, 30 April 1945. 
55. H. Warlow-Davies, letter to Mercury, 2 May 1945. 
See also w. Patman, letter to Mercury, 2 May 1945. 
56. 'Aussie', letter to Mercury, 2 May 1945. 
I 
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personally. Many people were demanding that swift revenge 
be taken against the Nazis and considered that the whole 
business could best be settled 'by the simple employment of 
57 
a hangman or a firing squad'. Such summary action had 
been taken by American troops when they liberated 32,000 
prisoners at Dachau at the end of April. Enraged by the 
sight of 'fifty truckloads of horribly emaciated bodies', 
they 'went through the camp shooting every German in sight 1 • 58 
Australian press commentators disapproved. They urged 
restraint, stressing that the victors must not descend to 
the bestial level of the Nazis; Germany's criminals should 
be tried fairly and legally. According to the Daily Telegraph, 
the.crials had to be 'carried out with the coldest regard 
for the processes of law and rules of evidence'. At the 
same time, they should be as 'swift and final as the 
59 gas-waggon 1 • 
The first to be tried were those who had been 
directly implicated in the atrocities. On 17 September 1945, 
a British Military Tribunal began its hearings at Ltlneburg. 
The defendants were forty-four Belsen camp officials, 
including nineteen women, who were accused of ill-treating 
and cau~ing the deaths of prisoners at Belsen and Auschwitz. 60 
When sentences were passed on 18 November, thirty of the 
defendants were found guilty and eleven, including three 
h b h . 61 women, were sentenced to fteat y anging. 
57. ~°' 30 May 1945. 
58. ~' 1 May 1945. 
59, ~·, 25 May 1945, 
Gl _ 
Similar views were expressed by~., 26 May 1945, 
Advertiser, 24 April 1945. 
~M., 30 May 1945. 
The so-called 'Belsen trial' received the greatest 
publicity of the trials of Nazi camp officials. only 
summary reports were published of the trials of 
officials at Dachau (S.M.H., 14 December 1945, 
28 January 1946), and Malthausen (S.M.H., 28 May 1947) 
by American Tribunals. Similarly brief mention was 
given to the trial of Rudolph Hoess, commander of 
Auschwitz from 1940 to 1943, who was sentenced to 
death by the Supreme Polish National Tribunal 
(S.M.H.,, 4 April 1947). 
S.M.H., 19 November 1945. 
The death sentences were carried out on 13 December 1945. 
,~ ...,. ____ , ____ . .,,...,,1.-
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The trial was a major news story in the 
1 . 62 Austra ian press. Witnesses and survivors told grim 
stories about Belsen and revealed the gruesome details of 
the Auschwitz gas chambers. Most of the attention was 
focussed on two figures who became known as the 'beast' 
and 'beastess' of Belsen. Josef Kramer, the commandant 
of Belsen and formerly in charge of Birkenau, was already 
63 
well-known to Australian newspaper readers. The 'blonde 
beastess' of Belsen was Irma Grese, an attractive twenty-two 
year old who had been one of Belsen's chief and most 
sadistic female guards. Both received death sentences. 
At the conclusion of the hearings, press 
commentators commended the 'scrupulous fairness of the 
trials' and praised the Tribunal for its patience in 
dealing with 'the vilest' of criminals. 64 The Courier-Mail 
stated that the sentences - death, varying terms of 
imprisonment and acquittals - showed that 'great care was 
taken to ascertain the 
culpability that could 
degree of responsibility and 
65 be attached to the accused'. 
According to the Daily Telegraph, the hanging of 'eleven of 
the most vicious criminals history has recorded' would at 
least 'help to assure 
just ended was not in 
humanity 
. ' 66 vain . 
that the ghastly war we have 
Some Australian Jews were 
not impressed. 'Why was no summary justice meted out to 
them?', asked the Sydney Jewish News. 
of the criminals had been 
Surely the guilt 
sufficiently established by the whole-sale 
murder of six million of our people. Yet 
these blood-besmattered criminals are given 
full freedom to plead justification for their 
foul deeds,67 
62. During the second half of September, most Australian 
newspapers featured almost daily reports ~f the trial. 
The publicity died down from mid-October. 
63. Birkenau was one of the Auschwitz extermination centres. 
64. Argus, 19 November 1945. 
See also S.M.B., 17 December 1945. 
65, ~·, 20 November 1945. 
66. Q..:..!·, 19 November 1945. 
67, S.J.N., 26 October 1945. 
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The Belsen trial was only the beginning. 
some of the smaller fish had been caught but the 'bigger 
criminals [had] yet to be tried•. 68 The ~.!2. declared 
that the atrocities perpetrated in the Nazi camps would 
have been 'inconceivable had not Germany been set upon 
her bloody course by those arraigned lieutenants of the 
master-chief' . 69 
On 20 November 1945, two d.ays after the 
231. 
sentences were passed on the Belsen camp officials, the 
trial of Germany's master criminals began at Nuremberg. 
Twenty-two of the surviving Nazi leaders, including Goering, 
Ribb en tr.op. and. Rosenberg, were tried by an International 
Military Tribunal set 
d . 70 France an Russia. 
up by Britain, the United States, 
Each defendant was indicted on some 
or all of four counts: the common plan of conspiracy, 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Nineteen of the defendants were tried on at least the 
71 fourth count. Although the anti-Jewish campaign was only 
one part of the Nazis' 'war crimes', it had aroused the 
greatest emotional reaction and cry for retribution. There 
could be no attempt to excuse the campaign to exterminate 
European Jewry as part of normal wartime activity. In fact, 
the onslaught against the Jews had nothing to do with the 
execution of the war, except that the situation enabled the 
plan to be pursued on a European-wide scale. 
68. £..,_!., 19 November 1945. 
A similar view was expressed by W.A., 24 November 1945. 
69. Herald, 19 November 1945. 
70. Martin Bormann waz tried in his absence. He was never 
found and was believed to have been killed on 
30 April 1945 during the Battle for Berlin. 
Gerald Reitlinger, op. cit., p.506. 
71, 'Crimes against humanity': (A) Murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation and othe~ inhuman acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or 
during the war; (B) Persecution on Political, Racial 
and Religious grounds in execution of and in connection 
with the common plan mentioned in Count One. Societe 
Egyptienne de Droit International,· International Military 
Tribunal, Indictment. Brochure No. 1, November 1945. 
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The Australian press stressed that the trial 
of the leaders of a beaten nation was an 'event of the 
greatest historical significance•. 72 According to the 
Advertiser, it was, indeed, the 'most sensational and 
significant cause celebre in history•. 73 Most newspapers 
agreed that the lack 
not be a deterrent; 
of precedent for such a trial should 
74 the Nazis themselves had no precedent. 
'Man.kind is the prosecutor', declared the Argus, 'and the 
law on which his indictment is based has behind it many 
centuries of decent human tradition•. 75 
As the trial dragged on month after month, it 
~06~ ldst it~·ne~s value. Sonie people, espei::fally Jews, 
On 21 March 1946, four months were becoming impatient. 
after the hearings commenced, the Hebrew Standard claimed 
that the whole business had degenerated into a 'legal farce'. 
The 'protracted hearings and the elaborate formalities' 
were merely givin~ 'evil men who deserve death yet another 
and an undeserved chance to ~ostpone their fate•. 76 But 
when the hearings finally concluded on 31 August, the Argus 
considered that the Tribunal's 216 sitting days had been 
77 time well spent. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, 
the trial had not been unduly protracted, considering the 
nature of the indictment, the number of defendants and 
the mass of evidence. 78 
On 1 October 1946, over ten months after the 
commencement of the hearings, the Tribunal finally handed 
down its verdict. Nineteen of the twenty-two defendants 
7 2. 
7 3 • 
74. 
75. 
7 6. 
77, 
7 8. 
~·· 24 November 1945. 
Similar views were expressed by 
Sun (Sydney), 21 November 1945; 
Advertiser, 21 November 1945. 
S,M.H., 20 November 1945. 
Herald, 22 November 1945. 
~·· 24 November 1945. 
Argus, 24 November 1945. 
~·· 21 March 1946. 
Argus, 2 September 1946. 
20 November 1945; 
24 November 1945. 
A similar view was expressed by Advertiser, 2 October 1946. 
b.M.H., 3 September 1946. 
See also C,-M., 2 September 1946. 
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2 3 3. 
were found guilty. Twelve, including Goering, Ribbentrop 
and Rosenberg, were sentenced to death by hanging and the 
remainder received prison sentences varying from ten years 
to life. Julius Streicher, the notorious Jew-hater, was 
the only defendant to receive the death sentence for being 
found guilty on the single count of 'crimes against 
. ' 79 Jrnmanity . 
Australian newspapers praised the patience and 
impartiality of the Tribunal. 'Never [had] accused persons 
been given a fairer or more patient hearing', declared the 
BO Sydney Morning Herald, The West Australian stated: 
The judicial __ processes __ \qere unimpeachable 
throughout the unexpectedly protracted 
trial. The terms of the judgment and the 
varying nature of the sentences themselves 
provide testimony to the conscientiousness 
and fairness of the Tribunal.Bl 
Australian Jews were not so happy. According to the 
Australian Jewish Herald, there could be 'few people to 
experience real satisfaction at the judgments'. 
indignant that 
men whose hands were steeped in blood have 
been allowed to go either scot-free or 
have been given sentences in no way 
commensurate with their crimes.82 
It was 
83 The eleven doomed men became the symbol of 
the end of the Nazi regime; all that remained was the 
79. Of the nineteen defendants who had been charged on 
Count Four: Crimes against humanity, sixteen were 
found guilty. According to Raul Hilberg, ££· cit., 
p.690, anti-Jewish action was an apparent factor 
.in the conviction of eleven men. (He excludes the 
missing Bormann from his list of defendants.) 
80. S.M.H., 2 October 1946. 
Bl. W.A., 3 October 1946. Similar views were expressed 
by D.T., 2 October 1946; Advertiser, 2 Octooer 1946-; 
S.M.H., 16 October 1946. 
82, A.J.H.,4 October 1946. 
See also H.S., 3 October 1946. 
83. Martin Bormann had been sentenced to death but was 
still missing. 
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84 hangman's noose. When the death sentences were carried 
out on 16 October, the world witnessed the 'ignominious end 
I 'l t . d . h' ' 85 of t1e vi es episo e in German istory . Few people 
doubted that the criminals deserved to die. 86 The Sydney 
Morning Herald wrote: 
lf the degenerate brutes who controlled the 
infamous Belsen camp deserved their fate, 
how much heavier a guilt lies on those who 
established such camps and gave the crimes 
there committed the imprimatur of the 
German state.87 · 
Retribution had 'finally overtaken the chief actors in the 
most horrible and destructive conspiracy in human annals' 88 
The Nazi leaders had paid their final debt to humanity. 89 
The Nazi criminals had been dealt with but there 
remained the problem of the survivors. A little over four 
million of pre-war Europe's ten million Jews were still 
alive. 90 Excluding Russia, there were about a million Jews 
in fopmer Nazi-controlled territory, most of them in 
84. Press cartoons Argus, 3 October 1946; C.-M., 
3 October 1946 (see pp. 235-6). 
See also~. 2 October 1946; S.M.H., 3 October 1946. 
85. S.M.H., 16 October 1946. 
Only ten Nazis were hanged. Goering evaded the 
hang~an's noose by taking a fatal dose of poison a few 
hours before the sentences were carried out. 
86. Catholic spokesmen·did not approve of the hangings; 
Archbishop Mannix claimed that they served no good 
purpose and that there was a danger of the men being 
raised 'to the ranks of martyrs in the German mind'. 
(Advocate, 16 October 1946.) The Advocate alleged 
that it would 'have been better policy to let these 
men wear out their lives in contempt, under conditions 
which made it impossible for them to do further harm'. 
(Advocate, 9 October 1946.) 
87, S.M.H., 16 October 1946. 
88. Advertiser, 18 October 1946. 
89 .. 
90. 
Cartoon in S.M.H., 17 October 1946 •. 
Similar views were also expressed by 
1946; C.M., 17 October 1946. 
See p.237. 
Herald, 16 October 
According to the Report of the Anglo-American Committee 
of Enquiry Regarding the Problem of European Jewry and 
Palestine, London, H.M.S.O., Cmd.6808., 1946, pp.58-9, 
the Jewish popula~ion of Europe was 9,946,200 in 1939 
and 4,244,600 in earry 1946; representing a loss of 
5,721,600 Jews. (see p.165 for other estimates of 
the number of victims) 
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Today's Armstrong "JOURNEY'S END" 
Argus, 3 October 1946. 
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END OF THE RAINBOW 
Cour~er-Mail, 3 October 1946. 
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THE ACCOUNT PAID 
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91 
cen.tral and Eastern Europe. As Hilberg states, 'many 
were dispersed; most were destitute, and all were insecure•. 92 
In April 1946, an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry 
estimated that as many as 
impelled to emigrate from 
500,JOO Jews 'might wish or be 
93 Europe'. In particular, there 
~as the problem of displaced Jews in allied occupied Germany 
and Austria. At the end of the war, the concentration camps 
~ontained about 60,000 Jewish survivors, mostly Poles and 
Hungarians. Their ranks were soon swollen by dispossessed 
Jews who flooded in from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Rumania. By the end of 1946, there were over 200,000 
d . h f d t . 94 displace Jews in t e western zones o Germany an Aus ria. 
The world was faced wi~R a renewed, if 
diminished, Jewish refugeee problem and few countries were 
any keener to admit destitute Jews than they had been before 
the war. Most war-torn Western European countries did not 
want immigrants and the United States maintained its 
95 
restrictive quotas. More than ever before, Palestine 
91. Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry ..• , 
~· cit., p.58. The largest centres of Jewish population 
were Rumania and Hungary, with 335,000 and 200,000 
respectively. 
92. Raul HU.berg, ~· cit., pp. 728-729. 
9 3. Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry • • • I 
~- cit., p.15. 
94. Raul Hilberg, ££··cit., pp.670, 730. 
95. 
About ninety per cent were in the American zone because 
the British refused to admit Jews to camps after June 
1946. The Americans took similar action in April 1947. 
Between 1945 and 1948 a quarter of a million Jews 
became displaced persons. 
Ibid., pp.730-2. 
The United States quota for the whole of Eastern Europe 
was less than 1,500 persons per month. (Raul Hilberg, 
~· cit,, p. 729.) According to Hilberg' s estimates 
(p.736), the displaced Jews eventually found refuge in: 
Israel: 
United States: 
Canada: 
Be 1 g i_!!!l!..: ____________ . 
France: 
Others: 
142,000 
72,000 
16,000 
8,000 
2,000 
10,000 
(the majority immigrated after 
the establishment of Israel 
in May 1948) 
(most arrived after the 
passing of the Displaced 
Persons Act in June 1948) 
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seemed the only answer to the refugees' hopes. The near 
destruction of European Jewry had intensified Zionist 
aspirations and most of the survivors wanted to go to 
239. 
Palestine. But the Palestine situation was fast becoming 
an international crisis, with Britain caught between the 
conflicting demands of Jews and Arabs. 
Immigration into Palestine was still restricted 
by Britain's 1939 White Paper, which had decreed that 75,000 
Jews would be admitted during the next five years and that 
there' could be no further immigration without Arab consent. 96 
The quota was not filled until the end of 1945 when the 
British Government agreed to let immigration continue at 
the rate of 1,500 per month. At the end of the war, Britain 
had refused demands from the Jewish Agency and a request 
from United States President Truman for the immediate 
admission of 100,000 displaced European Jews. It also 
rejected a similar recommendation made in April 1946 by the 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. 97 Zionists retaliated 
by stepping up the organization of illegal immigration into 
Palestine. In August 1946 the British began deporting 
98 intercepted illegal immigrants 
99 the Exodus story was born • 
to Cyprus and a year later 
96, 
97. 
98. 
99. 
See p.180. 
J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, New York, 
1950, pp.224-256. 
Between the end of the war in May 1945 and the 
establishment of Israel in May 1948, an estimated 
67,000 illegal immigrants arrived in Palestine. 
.. 
(Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism, London, 1951, 
p.197,) 16,000 intercepted illegal immigrants were 
interned on Cyprus. (Raul Hilberg, £.£•cit., p.734.) 
The Exodus 1947 arrived in Palestine from southern 
France in July 1947 with 4,550 Jewish refugees on 
board. They were taken back to France in British 
ships and, after refusing to go ~shore, shipped to 
displaced person camps in the British zone of Germany. 
• 
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Outside the Jewish community, only a few 
Australian commentators openly 
. . l t" 100 immigration into Pa es ine. 
supported large-scale 
In October 1945, the 
240. 
New south Wales Branch of the Australian Palestine Committee 
passed a resolution urging that 'the unjustifiabfe barriers' 
against Jewish immigration to Palestine should be removed 
and that certificates should immediately be granted 'to all 
displaced, stateless and non-repatriable Jews of Europe for 
entry into Palestine•. 101 Speakers at the meeting included 
such usual Jewish sympathizers as Bishop Pilcher (Chairman 
of the New South Wales Branch of the Cammi ttee) , Professor 
Ian Clunies Ross, Rev. E.J. Davidson and Jack Hooke of the 
N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council. 
The Australian press came out strongly in 
support of Britain's stand. It continued to regard 
Palestine first and foremost as an international political 
question which should not be confused with the refugee 
issue. According to the Advertiser, the 'plight of homeless 
European Jews [was) a matter of general concern, but it must 
102 be dealt with as a separate problem'. The Sydney Morning 
Herald stated: 
100. No attempt is made here to examine the growth of Zionism 
within the Australian Jewish community or the extent of 
sympathy for the Zionist cause in the general community. 
Like their co-religionists throughout the world, 
Australian Jews had become increasingly pro-Zionist 
during the war. In November 1943, the states' Jewi~h 
Advisory Boards (the representative bodies of the Jewish 
community until the establishment of the Executive 
Council of Australian Jewry in 1944) had called on the 
Australian Government to urge Britain to abandon the 
White Paper. (see p.185) When Sir Isaac Isaacs attacked 
Zionism i.n 1942-43, 'the great majority" of Jews .•. 
were opposed to his views'. Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs, 
Melbourne, 1967, p.225, 
101. !!..:.§.·, 18 October 1945. 
For earlier activities of Palestine Committee, see 
p. 18 4. 
102. Advertiser, 24 July_ 1946. 
Similar views were expressed by S.M.H., 19 November 
1946, D.T., 24 July 1946, Hera1a---:["January 1947. 
-. For ea·1·lier reaction to Palestine question, see 
pp.181-6 .. 
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If Europe's Jewish refugees could be succoured 
'in vacuo'; the problem would be quickly solved. 
But the hard truth is that every step taken to 
extend facilities for Jewish settlement in 
Palestine is not unnaturally regarded as a challenge 
to the rights and future of another proud and 
politically powerful people - the Arabs.103 
It condemned Truman's request that 100,000 Jews be admitted 
immediately to Palestine as 'thoughtless and ill-timed~. 104 
The Argus agreed that, 'however sympathetic the British 
Government may be towards them, it is impossible for it 
to admit 100,000 more of them to Palestine an they desire•. 105 
Australian newspapers did not support illegal 
immigration into Palestine or express concern when the 
British authorities began deporting illegal immigrants to 
Cyprus in August 1946. In December, a ship trying to reach 
Palestine was shipwrecked in the Dodecanese Islands and the 
refugees on board were supplied with food and clothing by 
British officials. The Advertiser commented. that this 
demonstrated the 'tolerance and charity of the British 
authorities against whom they conspired•. 106 While the 
deportation of the 4,550 Exodus refugees in August 1947 
raised a storm of protest in Zionist circles, especially 
in the United States, the Australian press expressed little 
. t 107 in erest ... 
If refugees could not be admitted to Palestine, 
could Australia do anything to help? The 'populate or 
10 3. S.M,H., 5 July 1946. 
104. ~· 
See also S.M.H., 10 September 1946. 
105, Argus, 24 July 1946. 
106, Advertiser, 11 December 1946. 
107. New York •rimes, 10, 11, 12 September 1947. 
The affair received reasonable coverage in the 
Australian press '(for example, S.M.H., 19, 26 July, 
23, 24 August, 9 September 1947). 
The reports were often associated with renewed threats 
of terrorism in Palestine and did not provok~ 
editorial comment. 
Australian Jews expressed-their sympathy for the Exodus 
deportees at a meeting arranged by the Central Zionist 
Committee of New South Wales on 31 August 1947. 
(~ .• 4 September 1947.) 
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242. 
perish' cry had been resumed with renewed vigour and 
Australia's vulnerability during the war had shocked the 
Labor Government into adopting a positive immigration 
108 policy In 1945 the Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, 
established the Department of Immigrat1on and appoi~ted 
1 11 . . l0 9 2 A t l 11 d Arthur Ca we as Minister. On ugus Ca we ma e 
his first Ministerial statement, declaring that Australia 
must increase its population for 'reasons of defence and 
for the fullest expansion of our economy'. Australia was 
a developing nation with an annual population absorption 
capacity of two per cent. With a current population of 
increase of one per seven million and an annual natural 
cent, the immigration ceiling would 110 be 70,000 per annum. 
Jewish organizations were hopeful that the 
Government's new policy would include some Jewish immigration. 
In February 1945 the Executive Council of Australian Jewry 
had requested the Prime Minister to admit Jewish immigrants, 
in particular the surviving relatives of refugees already 
On 22 August, Calwell advised Alec Masel, . 1. 111 in Aus tr a. ia • 
President of the E.C.A.J., that the Immigration Department 
was ready to consider applications from Jewish refugees 
in Australia for the admission of close relatives who had 
survived the war in Nazi-controlled Europe. 112 In October, 
108. Before the war, the Labor Party had consistently 
opposed immigrati~n because of continuing unemployment. 
It had been particularly hostile to the immigration of 
aliens, whom it feared would work for below award 
wages and break down Australian industrial standards • 
See pp.71-3. .. 
109. Immigrations matters were formerly handled by the 
Immigration Branch of the Department of the Interior. 
110. C.P.D. Vol. 184, pp.4911-2. 
111 P.Y .. Medding, ~·cit., pp.150-152, discusses the 
relations between the Executive Council of Australian 
Jewry and the Federal Government. 
In the 1940s, the domination of Australian Jewry by 
pro~Br~tish Australian Jews was gradually 
undermined by the 'democratization' of representative 
Jewish organizations and the growth of Zionism. Ibid, 
p.129. For example, in 1943, Alec Masel was President 
of the Victorian Jewish Advisory Board (the representative 
body of Vict6~ian Jewry) as well as President of the 
Victorian Zionist Federation. In 1944, he became the 
first President of the Executive Council of Australian 
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h• extended the provision to include relatives in shanghai 
and other Far Eastern areas as well as parents in any part 
·d 113 h h d t h · of t.he wor J .. T e sponsors a o guarantee t e:i.r 
relatives' maintenance for five years after their arrivai. 114 
Applications were to be initially processed by the A.J.W.S. 
1n Sydney and Melbourne and by Jewish Advisory Boards in 
other states before being forwarded to the Department of 
115 
rmm1grat1on for final approval~ 
To most Jews in Australia, and especially to the 
rre-war refugees, Calwell had become a friend and ally. 
Nasel stated that the Minister for Immigration 'had always 
proved himself most ready and anxious to assist our 
s\lffer1ng brethren in Europe' and praised him 'for his 
116 pto-Jewish sympathies'. A few Australian Jews continued 
to be wary about che possible adverse effects of refugee 
117 imm1grat1on. The Ho1brew Standard complained that not 
all the rafugees who had come to Australia before the war 
had accepted the obligations of Australian citizenship: 
There are far.too many cases of what 
Australians regard as Hun arrogance; 
too many instances of slick industrial 
and business trickery, and flaunting 
ostentation. U8 
Australian Jews had to maintain a •ceaseless vigil' on all 
. . 119 
self-defence'. 
Nor did all non-Jewish Australians support 
the Government's humanitarian action. With Australia short 
oi manpower and the Labor Government pursuing a positive 
imm1groc1on policy, there were no longer any economic 
----------· 
i 13. .§. .. c...L.~- , 5 Oc to be r 194 5. 
114, ~~·, VoL 186, p.42L 
11 5 . 
11 6 . 
l J -
11 ~ 
S J • N , , 5 Oc to be r 194 5. 
!:!.2·, 30 August 1945. 
For Auscrolian Jewry's anxiety about the effects of 
refugee imm1grat1on in 1938-9, see pp.77-9. 
!!.:_.§.·. 30 August 1945, 
A similar remark by a non-Jewish commentator would 
probobly have been condemned as 'antisemitic' by the 
Jewish p!ess~ 
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f . . . t' 120 grounds or opposing refugee immigra ion. The main 
criticism now came from Australia's patriots and 
nationalists, who approved of British immigration but 
opposed the entry of aliens: publications like Smith's 
weekly and the Bulletin and organizations such as the 
24 4. 
R s.L. and the Australian Natives' Association. They were 
joined by the Labor Party dissenter, J.T. Lang, who used 
121 both Federal Parliament and the Century as his forum. 
All were opposed to the Labor Party as much as they were 
to foreign immigration and they fr.equently used the refugee 
tssue as an excuse to attack Calwell and the Government. 
Smith's Weekly led the attack. In January 1946 
tt headlined an article 'Calwell in favour with 
Australian Jewry' and alleged that Jewish immigrants were 
receiving preferential treatment. While two thousand 
refugees were to be granted entry permits, Australian 
servicemen were still stranded in England and only a 'poor 
trickle of British brides' was arriving. 122 Calwell 
retorted chat the Government had accepted no resp6nsibility 
for providing shipping for Jewish permit-holders. Priority 
would be given to Australians who had lived in England 
during the war, together with British wives, children and 
fiancees of Australian servicemen. 123 According to Calwell, 
120. The economic fear that refugee immigrants would 
displace Australians had been strong before the 
war. See pp. 72-3. 
121. J.T. Lang, the controversial ex-Premier of New 
South Wales, became the Lang Labor member for Reid 
in Federal Parliament in 1946. He took every 
available opportunity to criticize Calwell and the 
Labor Party. 
12 2' 
123, 
Smith's Weel:_ly, 19 January 194 6. 
Smith's Weekly, 2 February 1946. 
The E.C.A.J. replied to Smith's Weekiy in a similar 
manner, ?.J.N., l February 1946. Calwell made it 
clear to the E.C.A.J. in his letter of 22 August 
1945 that the Government would'accept no responsibility 
for providing shipping facilities', s.J,N,, 31-August 
1945. Smith's Weekly was well aware of this fact 
because it quoted part of the letter which had been 
published in the Sydney Jewish News. 
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1 t w6uld be about two years before Jewish refugees could 
obtain transporto The issue of landing permits would at 
least enable them to leave the displaced person camps and 
124 gain entry to othe.r European countries such~s France. 
In March 1946, Calwell confirmed that he had 
given authority for the issue of two thousand landing 
125 permits to refugees. Four months later he told a meeting 
of Sydney Jews that the Immigration Department had recently 
'rushed through' the issue of these 
the loan of typewriters and typists 
permits, assisted by 
. 126 
from the EoC.AoJo 
The publication of this fact caused a fresh outburst of 
indignationo According to C.H. Marsden, Vice-President of 
the Overseas League, the Government was 'going out of its 
way to assist alien immigrants' instead of Britishers. 
Showing little appreciation of the wartime sufferings of 
European Jewry, he added: 
surely, after what the people of Great Britain 
have endured during the war years, it is up to 
our Government to give every assistance to 
enable those anxious to immigrate to Australia 
to do so before making rush arrangements for 
aliens.127 
If Calwell had typing problems, the Overseas League would 
'assist him with voluntary labour' • 128 
J.T. Lang, who poon became one of Calwell's 
most outspoken critics on the refugee question, also 
considered that the Government had acted in indecent hasteo 
'What's the hurry?', he asked. People in England, Ireland 
aqd Scotland were 'clamoring to come to Australia', but 
they were being told that they might have to wait 'two, 
three or four years' because of the shipping situation. 
Lang ~one 1 uded: 
124 
12 5. 
126. 
1 2 7 . 
128 
C.P.D. 
~· 
A.J.H.; 
S, M, H .. , 
Ibid. 
VoL 186, p.42L. 20 March 1946. 
12 July 1946. 
5 July 1946, 
" 
I 
- --~~f·::%F~{:~~;f:iE~!~'.\ti~fl£~1l 
~~ 
It seems that money is talking louder than 
anything else; It's swearing its head off. 
Presumably this immigration is permitted 
because it can be financed privately.129 
Lang was right when he suggested that refugee 
246. 
immigration was being privately financed. If the Commonwealth 
Government was unable to obtain shipping space for British 
immigrants, Jewish refugee aid associations were having 
130 greater success. The anticipated two-year delay did 
not eventuate when the American Joint Distribution 
committee and the Hebrew Aid Society chartered ships to 
bring Jewish refugees to Australia. The ships we~e usually 
old and overcrowded and the fares extortionate. 131 Despite 
the hardships, refugee arrivals began building up from 
September 1946. The first-immigrants, mostly German, 
Austrian and Czech Jews, arrived fifty to sixty at a time 
from Shanghai where they had sought refuge from the Nazi 
regime and had been interned during the war. 132 In 
November, a batch of 187 refugees arrived from Europe in a 
French ship, the Ville d'Amiens. 133 
Press reports of the refugees' arrivals 
provoked a new wave of indignation. The Bulletin wondered 
whether the refugee Jews were 'displaced or displacing' 
,• 
and insinuated that they were being given shipping priority 
129. Century, 5 July 1946. 
130. For details of the Government's immigration scheme, 
see f>p.252-3. 
131. The Hwa Lien, which arrived from Shanghai in January 
1947, was formerly a New Zealand inter-island ferry. 
l 3 2' 
]J3 
The advertised fare was £185, compared with the usual 
first class fare of £85. S.M.H., 11 January 1947, 
When the Monkay arrived from France in February 1947, 
the ~· reported that there had been a shortage of 
food and water. Most of the passengers had dormitory-
style accommodation in the afterhol.d. ~·· 12 February 
1947. 
S.M.H., 16 September 1946. 
~rgus, 30 September 1946 .. 
S.M.H., 14 October 1946. 
~-, 26 November 1946 .. I 
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over Australian and British subjects. 134 lt complained 
that Calwell would not make a precise statement as to the 
number of refugees he intended bringing to Australia. He 
'never gives the limit, if he has any, except the sky•. 135 
smith's Weekly also wanted to know just 'how many permits 
have been issued by the Department of Immigration?' It 
attempted to arouse a new 'alien influx' scare when it 
alleged that there were two thousand refugees with landing 
permits congregated in Shanghai waiting to come to 
136 Australia and more in Europe. 
Calwell's denouncers were joined by Ken Bolton, 
president of the N.s.w. Branch of the R.S.L. Bolton 
regularly attacked Calwell in his Sunday Telegraph column 
'Fighting On'. First, he expressed the R.S.L.'s 
traditional opposition to all foreign immigration, 
maintaining that Australia needed British and American 
immigrants rather 'than the type of European refugees 
137 Mr. Calwell is so anxious to bring into the country'. 
Having condoned some immigration, Bolton later contradicted 
himself when he declared that he cpposed refugee immigration 
because there were still twenty thousand homeless 
. . 1. 138 
ex-servicemen in Austra 1a: 'We don't want anyone in 
this country until we can house our own returned men and 
women' ~ 139 
The N.s.w. State council of the R.S.L. 
maintained its wartime attitude to refugees, passing a 
resolution of protest against the immigration of 'enemy 
134. Bulletin, 28 August 1946. 
See also Bulletin, 18 September 1946. 
135, Bulletin, 25 December 1946. 
136, Smith's Weekly, 23· November l.946, 
137. Sunday Telegraph, 17 November 1946. 
138, Sunday Telegraph, 8 December 1946. 
139, Sunday Telegraph, 22 December 1946. 
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aliens' from Bong Kong and Shanghai. At the same meeting, 
Bolton launched a specific attack on Jewish refugees. 
'Let's not beat about the bush', he said, 'they are German 
Jews of the same ilk as those who have come here before•. 140 
Bolton later defended his statement, alleging that he was 
'not prejudiced in any way against any racial or religious 
group' but he ~ 'unequivocally opposed to Australia being 
flooded with undesirable immigrants while thousands of 
h 1 t t h • 141 1 h d Britis peop e wan o come ere • Bo ton a gone too 
far for some members of the R.S.L, The Eastern Metropolitan 
District Council, which represented 24,000 of N.S.W, 's 
140,000 R.S.L .. members, 'emphatically disassociated itself' 
. 142 from his remarks. 
A more direct attack on Calwell was made by 
J.T. Lang, who grasped the opportunity offered by the 
arrival of a British ship, the Strathmore. The ship's 
passengers included two hundred refugees who had been 
picked up at Port Said. According to a Sydney Morning 
Herald report, other passengers were bitter that berths 
had been allocated to foreign immigrants 'when there were 
still many thousands of Australians stranded in London'. 
They also complained that the foreigners were ill-mannered 
•nd unhygienic and that they had turned the ship into a 
'Floating Tower of Babel' . 143 
In Federal Parliament on 7 November, and again 
on 14 November, Lang requested Calwell to 'lay on the Table 
of the House all the papers relating to the entry of 200 
•lien immigrants who arrived from the Middle East on the 
144 liner ~thmore.'. Calwell refused. A fortnight 
140, ~·, 25 Nov<imber 1946. 
141. ~ .. , 27 November 1946.. See p. 249 fo.r Daily Telegraph's 
cartoon comment on Bolton's outburst. D.T., 26 November 
194 6. 
142. ~!·, 30 November 1946 .. 
143.. §.~., 25 October 1946, 
144 f.P.,D,· VoL 189, pp.38-40, p.235. 
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later Lang repeated his request and took the opportunity to 
mount a general attack on the Government's policy towards 
14 5 
refugees. He alleged that former German and Austrian 
residents were 'coming to Australia in hundreds' while 
Australians were unable to obtain shipping accommodation. 
As soon as these aliens arrived in Australia, they were able 
to obtain houses and businesses. 
'Why is this Government interested in these 
victims who are wealthy and who have powerful friends?', 
asked Lang. He insinuated that he knew the answer when he 
proceeded to accuse the former Labor member for Reid, 
C.A. Morgan, of having conducted a racket in landing permits 
before the waro According to Lang, Morgan .had received 
signed blank application forms, together with £5 deposit, 
from intending immigrants. If Morgan succeeded in obtaining 
a landing permit he was paid a further £15. Having made 
these accusations, Lang stated that the papers relating to 
the Strathmore affair should be tabled 'so that we may be 
sure that all these unproper practices that occurred in the 
14 6 past, have ceased' • 
Calwell was furious and denounced Lang as 'this 
Australian "Julius Streicher••. 147 He repeated an earlier 
statement that the refugee~ were taken on board the 
Strathmore at Port Said to replace British officers and 
others who had travelled from England to take up positions 
in Egypt. According to Calwell, this was the only occasion 
on which aliens had been carried in a British vessel. All 
British ships were reserved entirely for the transport of 
British and Australian subjects. In response to Lang's 
request to make available the papers relating to the aliens 
145, C.P.D. Vol. 189, pp;744-748, 28 November 1946. 
146. ~-' p. 746. 
14 7 ' 
Morgan, the Labor member for Reid from 1940 to 1946, 
had lost his seat to Lang. 
~-' p.749, 
on 7 November 
Calwell's earlier statement was made 
1946. Ibid., p.39, 
e5u 
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transported in the Strathmore, Calwell sta"ed that their 
applications for entry permits contained personal 
information: 
surely that information is not to be made 
available to any muck-raking newspapei? 
surely it is not to be put on the table 
of his House for Fascist 'rags' like the 
Century to print for the purpose of 
blackmailing people ••. 148 
251. 
The parliamentary sitting became a fiasco when Calwell 
retaliated by accusing Lang of having received £20,000 
blackmail when he was Premier of N.S.W. With the House in 
149 
uproar, two non-Labor members were suspended by the Speaker. 
150 Lang's charges were subsequently denied by Morgan. 
The Opposition .attempted to hav.e -a- Royal Commission---investigate 
Lang's allegations but failed. 151 
To the Jewish press, the issue was a clearcut 
one: Lang was the villain and Calwell the hero. According 
to the Sydney Jewish News, the 'honours of the day went 
152 
undoubtedly to Mr. Calwell'. The Australian Jewish 
Herald heaped praise on the Minister for Immigration: 
The gallant stand of Mr. Calwell, in the 
face of a hostile barrage has been noted 
with admiration, not only by Jews but by 
all men who are not yet devoid of every 
humanitarian instinct. Mr. Calwell's 
action in admitting the newcomers represents 
at once a combination of statesmanship and 
humanity not often encountered today.153 
This was only the beginning. The outburst on 
the refugee question reached a peak in the first two months 
of 1947, as fresh shiploads of refugees arrived from Shanghai 
148" 
149. 
15 0 .. 
C.P.D. Vol, 189, p.750, 
The affair received wide publicity in the pre~s (for 
example, Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1946, Argus, 
29 November 1946) but provoked little comment. 
Argus, 30 November 1946. 
See also Morgan's letter to A.J.H., 13 December 1946. 
151, C.P.D, Vol. 189, pp.852-859, 3 December 1946·, 
152. S.J.N., 10 January 19.47. 
153. A.J,H., 6 December 1946. 
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and Europe amidst wild reports that there were thousands 
more to come .. When 306 refugees arrived from Shanghai 
in January in the Hwa Lie~, the usually reliable Sydney 
Morning Herald stated that a further two thousand Jews were 
t t f h h . 154 b 210 awaiting ranspor rom S ang ai. In Fe ruary 
155 
refugees arrived from France in the ~kay and there 
were reports that another 995 Jewish immigrants were already 
on their way from Europe in the Johan de Witt. 156 According 
to the Daily Telegraph, three Dutch liners, including the 
Johan de Witt, would 
Europe by the end of 
bring a total of 2,600 Jews from 
A . 1 157 pri • Lang's Century claimed 
to have information from an Australian official in London 
that six thousand-permi t,s, 
had been issued to refugee 
scare was on .. 
covering 
158 Jews. 
ten thousand people, 
The 'alien influx' 
Whilst Jewish immigration seemed to be thriving, 
the same could not be said for the Government's plan to 
obtain British immigrants. In March 1946 the Australian and 
i British Governments had signed an agreement for free and 
I. assisted migration to Australia but, because of the lack of shipping, the scheme could not immediately be put into ~ operation. 159 Virtually everyone now agreed that Australia 
I needed immigrants as a matter of urgency and Calwell was under strong pressure to take positive action. On 9 August 
·----- !--------1946, he said he hoped th~~ the scheme would be put into 
operation at the beginning of 1947, with 35,000 immigrants 
. . . th f. t 160 arr1v1ng in e irs year. After a conference between 
154. S.M.·H., 11, 15 January 1947. 
See also D.T., 29 January 1947. 
155, £.o.1'.., 12 February 1947. S.M.H., 12 February 1947. 
156, 
157. 
Argus, 10 February 1947. 
A Government spokesman stated that the number of Jews 
on board the Johan <le Witt was approximately 600, 
not 995. D.T., 10 February 1947. When the ship 
arrived in March, it carried 702 Jewish refugees. 
See p.275. 
£.o.1'.•, 11 February 194"7. 
158, Century, 3 January 1947. 
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Federal and State Immigration Ministers in Januar~ 1947, the 
Government announced that shipping accommodation for only 
about six thousand immigrants would be available in 1947. 161 
Commentators were quick to notice the apparent 
discrepancy between British and refugee immigration. If 
Jewish organizations could charter ships to carry refugees, 
why couldn't the Australian Government do the same for 
British immigrants? According to the West Australian, it was 
'at least peculiar that if these foreign vessels are 
available the Commonwealth has not been able to charter even 
one•.
162 The Courier-Mail warned that the apparent ease 
wich which Jewish refugees were obtaining transport, 
compared with British people, was likely to arouse anti-Jewish 
sentiments: 
.•• if the Government goes on pleading that 
it can do nothing to bring British migrants 
to Australia because of shipping difficulties 
frequent arrival of Jewish and other alien 
refugees must ~ngender a good deal of popular 
misgiving and prejudice.163 
This was not the only matter that was arousing 
hostility. Calwell had appealed for sympathy for the 
homeless and destitute survivors of Nazi prison camps. 164 
But the refugees comin~ to Australia, particularly those 
from Shanghai, appeared to be far from destitute. The 
Hwa Lien's arrival in Sydney at the end of January 1947 was 
greeted with press headlines such as 'refugees bring gold•. 
bars and diamonds•. 165 According to the Daily Telegraph, 
twelve of the Jews on b1ard had assets totalling between 
£160,000 and £180,000. One individual refugee was said to 
161. S.M.H., 17, 20 January 1947. 
The scheme was put into operation, on a limited scale, 
on 31 March 1947. 
···1Vi. ~·· 14 Pebruary 1947. 
163. ~·, 16 ,Tanuary 1947. 
164. C.P.D. Vol. 186, p.421, 20 March 1946. 
C.P.D. Vol, 189, p.748, 28 November 1946. 
lES. Arg_u_s, 30 January 1947. 
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have £50,000 in gold bullion, banknotes, diamonds, furs, 
t k . d 1 ti. 166 nylon s cc ings an c o ung. Smith's Weekly labelled 
the Hwa Lien the 'treasure ship' and complained that the 
refugees 
come ashore with money - and they go to 
ho~ses and flats ear-marked for them in 
advance. There are homeless Australians; 
but, apparently, there are no homeless 
refugees in Australia. Humanity, we remind 
Calwell, should begin at home1167 
Calwell tried to dispel the rumours that 
Australia was about to be flooded with refugees from 
Shanghai and Europe. He maintained that in Shanghai there 
were two hundred, not two thousand, refugees waiting for 
transport to Australia, bringing the total number of 
168 landing permits granted there to seven hundred. The 
Daily Telegraph report that three Dutch ships had been 
chartered to bring 2,600 Jewish refugees to Australia was 
169 
also vehemently denied by Calwell, who later alleged 
that the story had been 'concocted in the Sydney office 
of the Daily Telegraph as 
passions of racial bigots 
part of a campaign to arouse the 
170 
and to embarrass the Government.' 
Calwell was becoming extremely angry at the continuous 
onslaught against him and, in Federal Parliament on 6 March, 
he accused the press of printing 
exaggerated and untruthful riews reports ••• 
Some of the most·extraordinary and brazen 
inaccuracies seen in many years have been 
spread by certain newspapers during recent 
weeks in alleged news statements on this 
question of refugee aliens.171 
166, 12.!..!·, 30 Janua.ry 1947. 
167. Smith's Weekly, 22 February 1947. 
168. S.M.H., 22 January 1947. 
169, .!?..!.!·• 12 February 1947. 
170. 
1 71. 
s.*.H., 12, 15.February 1947. 
C.P.D. Vol .. 190, p.434, 6 March 1947. 
According to Calwell, this allegation had been 
included in his press statement of 11 February which 
~enied the Daily Telegraph report but it was not 
~~inted by the press. 
C.P.D. Vol. 190, 6 March 1947, p.433. 
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According to Calwell's version of Australia's migration 
statistics, the allegations of a refugee influx 
were simply untrue. During 1946, 34,500 persons had 
entered Australia, of whom 28,000 were Australian or other 
British subjects. Only two per cent of the total - seven 
172 hundred persons - were refugees. The ships in which 
the Jews were coming to Australia were quite unsuitable for 
British immigrants. 173 
Calwell also made some compromisen. On 23 January 
1947 he announced that no more landing permits would be 
issued on purely humanitarian grounds to relatives of 
refugees already in Australia. Approval of applications in 
the future would depend more on the intending immigrant's 
ability to contribute. to Australia's economic wellbeing. 
Landing permits granted to refugees on the continent were 
to be stamped 'not valid for transit via the United Kingdom' 
to ensure that ships leaving Britain would be filled by 
Australian or other British persons. 174 When criticism 
of Jewish immigration persisted, Calwell announced that, 
in future, no ship leaving a continental port would be 
175 permitted to allot more than 25% of its berths to refugees • 
172. S.M.H., 24 January 1947. 
Calwell's statistics were accurate in that they 
specified the number of arrivals, not the excess of 
arrivals over departures. In fact, the number of 
arrivals (34,890) was greatly exceeded by the number 
of departures (50,038), resulting in a net population 
loss. Although 27,789 persons of British nationality 
arrived in Australia, 37,295 left the country. 
(Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, 1947.) 
On the other hand, the seven hun6red refugees who 
arrived in Australia came as p•rmanent residents. 
Calwell was also rather evasive when he stated 
that seven hundred refugees had arrived up to the 
end of 1946. By mid-February 1947, 'l,300 odd' had 
arrived (statement by Calwell, S.M.H., 14 February 
1947) and, when the Johan de Witt reached Sydney in 
March carrying·702 Jewish ref-ugees, the total number 
of refugee arrivals reached 2,000 •. On 13 February 1947, 
the Hebrew Standard stated that, with the arrival of the 
Johan de Witt, most of the landing permits issued by the 
Government would have been utilized, 
173. S.M.H., 11, 15 February 1947. 
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Calwell's assurances failed to quieten his 
critics, whose alleged concern about the lack of British 
immigration was supplemented by specific attacks on refugees -
both as aliens and as Jews. According to the Bulletin, 
Jewish immigration was fraught with dangers. If foreign 
Jews were introduced in numbers sufficient to swamp the 
Australian-born Jewish community, the country would soon 
have an alien problem on its hands. 176 The Bulletin also 
renewed its pre-war claim that many Jewish refugees were 
communists. 177 Its attack on the association between 
Calwell and the refugees was particularly vicious. Calwell, 
the Minister for Immigration, became 'Calvell', the Jews' 
compatriot. 178 In cartoons, he was portrayed with a 'Jewish 
nose', playing a Jew's harp and helping sinister-looking 
foreign Jews reach the promised land of Australia while the 
native-born and Britishers were being kept out. 179 
Smith's Weekly also continued its anti-refugee 
campaign and suggested that Calwell's immigration plans had 
broken down in every department except one -
the influx of refugee Jews It is ironic 
to hear Calwell talking of his difficulty in 
getting shipping space for British migrants 
when International Jewry is chartering ships 
to carry out one of the biggest migrations in 
modern history.180' 
Smith's Weekly ridiculed Calwell's claim that only 25% of 
berths in foreign ships would be allocated to Jews. 
it said, the refugees and their sponsors had been 'far 
176. Bulletin, 19 February 1947. 
177. Bulletin, 29 January, 19 February 1947. 
178. Bulletin, 8 January 1947, 19 February 1947. 
179. Bulletin, 4 December 1946, 22 January, 5, 19 February 
1947. (See pp. 257-60). See also Bulletin, 11 December 
1946, 7 May 1947. 
150. Smith's Wee~, 22 February 1947. 
See alao cartoon Smith's Weekly, 25 January 1947, 
(See p.261). 
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Bulletin, 4 December 1946. 
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THE EVER~BLIGING SENTRY. 
"When the Hwalicn berthed at Darwin nearly 500 'European' refugee immigrants 
swarmed along the wharf and overran the town. They are a section of more than 2000 
'European' immigrants in Shanghai who have been granted permission to land in Australia." 
"Halt! Who goes dere ?" 
"Anodder five hundred of your Jewish broteges." 
"Pass, vriendrs ! All's vell." 
Bulletin, 22 January 1947. 
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THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE. 
Bulletin, 5 February 1947. 
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THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE. 
Bulletin, ~February 1947. 
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1° Au STRALIA \ 
Numbers, '47 (33 in the Original). 
"An<I )• 1!,.11 ,j,•poH«1 th• inh~l.il•nh of th~ !.nd, •n<l ,1.,~11 lhrr<in• for I 1,~., "'"" '"" 1lo. !ono! '" p.,.,.,, ''" 
Bulletin, 19 February 1947. 
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ALL ABOARD FOR ARARAT (Victoria),· 
Smith's Weekly, 25 January 1947. 
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cleverer than Calwell .•• and more liberally supplied with 
h h h h ' '181 the cas t at c arters s ipsl 
After the parliamentary f.iasco, Lang used the 
century for most of his future attacks on Calwell, whom he 
labelled the 'Minister for Reffos•. 182 The Century's 
front page was half-filled with headlines which screamed 
'Calwell's Reffo Scandal', 'Calwell's New Australians', 
183 
and 'Reffo Stench Grows'. While British, Danish and 
American migrants were unable to obtain shipping passages, 
these refugees charter special v~ssels for 
their own exclusive use and walk ashore in 
Australian cities to join Reffo colonies 
that are to-day becoming characteristic of 
every large Australian city.184 
In keeping with his pre-war outbursts on Jewish immigrants, 
Lang alleged that, 'unable to speak our language, they 
congregate in self-contained colonies in the city area ... 
f h d ' . l 't ' 185 many o t em have embarke on parasitica pursui s . 
He also joined the ~ulletin in raising the communist bogey 
and claimed that Jewish immigration, which was being 
organized by an international Jewish organization, was a 
'planned invasion'~ Had Calwell, in fact, 'become the 
unwitting instrument whereby the Communist International 
d . . 1. '186 can ump its agents in Austra ia? 
Calwell was infuriated by the continuing attacks 
on his immigration· policy and took the offensive against 
anyone, regardless of political allegiance, who dared to 
criticize him ... In mid-February, F.J. Finnan, N.s.w, Labor 
Minister for Tourist Activities and Immigration, stated that 
he was 'perturbed at the very appreciable flow of aliens 
migrating to Australia, and the almost complete absence 
of sponsored migration of British subjects'. Finnan suggested 
181, Smith's Weekll:'._, 22 February 1947. 
182, s:entu-r_y_, 10 January 1947. 
18 3. Century_, 17, 31 January, 14 February 1947. 
184. Century_, 17 January 1947. 
18 5 ,, Centurl:'.., 13 June 1947. See also Centurl:'.., 4 April 1947. 
186 .. Centurl:'.., 21 Feb:ruary 1947. 
WWW e 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
., 
J 
that the Federal Government should consult the state 
authorities before granting landing permits because the 
states were responsible for housing and employing 
immigrants. This was the procedure followed in the case 
d .. h . t" 187 of sponsore Britis migra ion. 
Calwell now had a simple answer for anyone who 
263. 
attacked any aspect of his immigration policy: the critic 
was antisemitic. He quite irrationally alleged that Finnan 
was 
panderi-n-;; to cerfiiin interests directing 
the present campaign of hatred and 
bitterness towards the 1,300 odd survivors 
of German concentration camps and slave 
gangs and other victims of Hitler's policy 
who have arrived in Australia .•• 188 
According to Calwell, the N.S.W, Government's plans were 
not involved because housing for the refugees was being 
guaranteed by relatives. What was more, any suggestion 
that refugees were depriving Australians of accommodation 
was absurd 'and just another of the bogeys being circulated 
by the anti-Australian interests fostering the present 
• • • • I 189 
ant1-Sem1t1c campaign • 
Finnan replied that he was not at all disturbed 
by Calwell's 'abuse and his usual tantrums' and maintained 
that not one of his statements supported 'the allegation 
of anti-Semitic leanings',· All he objected to was the fact 
that alien immigration was taking place without 
consultation with the states. Finnan also criticized an 
editorial comment in the Sydney Morning Herald which implied 
l d b . 190 t1at non-British settlers woul e unwelcome in N.s.w. 
187, 
188. 
S,M,H., 13 February 1947. 
s .M.Il., l~\ February 1947. 
189. Ibid. 
190, S.M.H,, 14, 15 February 1947. 
The editorial, headed 'All should be welcome,' appeared 
in s.M.H,, 14 February 1947. 
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Ken Bolton, President of the N.S.W. Branch 
of the R.S.L., was Calwell's next target. In his Sunday 
Telegraph column on 9 February, Bolton ridiculed Calwell's 
announcement that a medical officer had been sent to London 
to check on intending immigrants: 
The joke of it is that most migrants seem 
to be coming from Shanghai, so my recommendation 
is that he sends a medical officer to that 
port to check up on refugees coming to 
Australia through this back door 191 
192 Calwell decided that Bolton's attacks had gone far enough. 
He wrote to the N.S.W. State Council of the R.S.L., asking 
whether comments made by Bolton in the Sunday Telegraph 
could be regarded as official declarations on behalf of the 
!Ls. W. Branch. The state Council subsequently informed 
Calwell that 'it fully endorsed all published statements 
193 by Bolton'. 
Calwell's action only provoked Bolton. At a 
meeting of the State Council on 23 February, he alleged 
that 'hundreds of refugee aliens are getting homes, 
businesses, cars and even telephones ahead of Australian 
ex-servicemen'e He also challenged Calwell's statement 
that rafugees comprised only two per cent of the total 
number cif persons who had arrived in Australia during 1946. 194 
Calwell made the predictable response, alleging that 
Bolton's behaviour was 'that of a political Jew-baiter's 
... His attitude is based on hysterical bias and bitter 
prejudice'. He offered to make available to the R.S.L. 
'facts and figures to terminate this vicious campaign ot 
mandacity and misrepresentation on the question of refugee 
' ' 19 5 1mm1grants 1 • The R.S.L. 's Federal Secretary, J.C. Neagle, 
191. Sunday Telegraph, 9 February 1947. 
Calwell had made this statement on 22 November 1946. 
C.P.D, Vol. 169, p.510. 
192. For Bolton's previous· criticisms of Calwell, see 
pp.247-8. 
193, D.T., 24 February 1947. Calwell had written to the 
N.S.W. state Council of the R.S.L. on 14 February. 
194. ~· 
195, S.M.H., 25 February 1947. 
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went to Canberra to take up the offer. 
So far, the major issue had been one of 
apparently thriving refugee immigration compared with 
265. 
negligible British immigration. Criticism had been directed 
primarily at Calwell for his alleged preferential treatment 
of Jewish immigrants and supplemented by anti-foreign, and 
occasionally anti-Jewish, asides at the refugees. Apart 
197 from declared antisemites such as Eric Butler, few 
Australians attacked refugee immigrants purely on the 
grounds that they were Jewish. One exception was 
1!.JJ. (Joe} Gullett, the thirty-two year old Liberal member 
. d 1 l' 198 11 h for Henty in Fe era Par iament. To Gu ett, t e 
refugees were simply Jews who possessed all the alleged 
undesirable characteristics of their race. He had already 
given an indication of his attitude in November 1946 when 
he denounced refugee immigration on the grounds that 
Australia should not be made 'the dumping ground for 
people whom Europe itself, in the course of 2,000 years, 
has not been able to absorb'. Gullett alleged that. the 
Jewish refugees who arrived before the war h~d set up 
'sweat shops ... cornered houses, and evaded income tax•. 199 
196. D.T., 25 February 1947. 
J,C. Neagle, General Secretary of the R.S.L. from 
1946 to 1955, was also a member of the Commonwealth 
Immigration Advisory Council from 1947 to 1955. Neagle 
refused to comment on the ·outcome of his visit to 
Canberra. (Argus, 27 February 1947). However, 
B.J. McDonald, Federal President of the Legion of 
Ex-servicemen, also examined the Department of 
Immigration's files and 'found that the statements by 
the Minister, Mr. Calwell, were quite correct'. 
S.M.H., 27 February 1947. 
197. See p.291. 
198. 'Joe' Gullett, son of the late Sir Henry Gullett 
(journalist, author and Federal parliamentarian} was 
educated at Geelong Grammar, the Sorbonne and Oxford. 
During World War 2 he served in the Western Desert, 
France, Greece and New Guinea, winning the Military 
Cross and rising to the rank of Major. Gullett was 
the Liberal member for Henty 1946-55 and Chief 
Government Whip 1950-55. From 1965 to 1968 he was 
Australian Ambassador to Greece. 
199, C.P,D. Vol. 189, p.661, 27 November 1946. 
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----. 
-~------· These were mild words compared with his outburst 
at the height of the anti-refugee agitation in February 
194 7. In a letter to the Argus, Gullett made a blatant 
antisemitic attack on the refugees. 
he began by attacking Calwell: 
Like many commentators, 
The arrival of additional Jews is nothing 
less than the beginning of a national tragedy and 
a piece of the grossest deceit of the Parliament 
and people by the Minister for Immigration and 
his Department. Mr. Calwell says that only close 
relatives of the Jews already here will be 
permitted to come, but this, of course, means 
nothing. By this means we could ultimately find 
ourselves with the Jewish population of the 
world. Others beside myself have repeatedly 
asked Mr. Calwell how many Jewish refugees have 
come into the country and how many he is prepared 
to admit. He has evaded the question and assured 
us that only a few have arrived - a mere 600 last 
year. All this time he and his department were 
secretly arranging without consulting Parliament 
or people, for more Jewish refugees to come 
here 
There was little new in this accusation. But Gullett went 
on to say: 
It is time to consider these refugees arriving 
from Poland and elsewhere purely on their merits 
as migrants and in an unsentimental light. In the 
last 50 years these people have swarmed all over 
Europe, coming principally from Armenia, Russia 
and the Balkans. We should remember that they 
are European neither by race, standards, nor 
culture. They are, in fact, an Eastern people. 
In 2,000 years no one but Britain has been 
successfully able to absorb them, and for the 
most part they owe loyalty and allegiance to 
none. They secured a stranglehold on Germany 
after the last war during the inflation period, 
and in a very large part, brought upon themselves 
the persecution which they subsequently suffered. 
In the United States they are enormously 
rife, especially in New York where there are 3~ 
millions of them; where they own practically 
everything, and where they are the leaders of 
the most violent anti-British campaigns: In 
addition, they are practically in a state of 
war with Great Britain in Palestine, and almost 
daily they carry out their murderous attacks 
and assaults against S"ritish subjects. 
I 
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One could respect them more if they who 
are so ready to flog professional soldiers of 
their old friend and ally had shown an equal 
determination and courage to the threat of 
extermination by Hitler and the Nazis. These are 
the people who, at the direction of international 
Jewish organisations, are being foisted upon us 
who are to become the dumping ground for the 
world's unabsorbable at the dictates of the 
Minister for Immigration. 
I believe that this is contrary to the 
desire of the overwhelming part of the people of 
this country, and if this policy is continued, 
we shall bitterly rue the day. 
I wish to make it clear that I ref er only 
to Jews from the Continent of Europe, not British 
Jews or Jews already in Australia. 200 
267, 
Gullett's letter provoked a storm of controversy 
and for six days the Argus printed two full columns of 
letters on the subject, representing the largest selection 
of viewpoints expressed at any one time on Jewish refugees. 
Other well-known people and organizations made press 
statements on the matter. While no official organization 
or political group declared itself in favour of Gullett's 
views, the Argus published as many letters from individual 
201 
supporters of Gullett as from his opponents. 
The pro-Gullett commentators included a 
number of ex-servicemen but the majority did not align 
themselves with any social or.political group. Some merely 
endorsed Gullett's comments: that's just what ' 2 02 we think' , 
200, Argus, 12 February 1947. 
201. Argus, 13-19 February 1947, 
This was a deliberate action by the Argus and did 
not necessarily reflect the number of letters received, 
The Argus stated that it was only publishing a 
selection of the letters received and that a 'fair 
representation' would be given to each side. (Argus 
14 February 1947). In fact, of the 49 letters 
published, 23 could be classified as pro-Gullett, 
23 as anti-Gullett, and three as ambiguous. 
202.. Mrs, N. Wilson, Argus, 13 February 1947, 
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They congratulated him on his 'fearless forthrightness' 203 
204 
10___!_;;..e.m-i-fl.g---ou t in to the open' on sue h an is sue and 
claimed that he had 'voiced the thoughts of most 
Australians' . 205 Gullett had, in fact, revealed 
not often displayed in Australian affairs in our 
one commentator was positively ecstatic: 
Mr, Gullett, a courageous young legislator, 
has performed a valuable public service by 
directing a flood of light on what promises 
'a courage 
t . ' 206 ime . 
to be a question of national importance •.• 207 
Other Gullett supporters took up particular aspects 
of Jewish immigration to vent their own opinions. Some 
restated the old argument that Australia wanted British 
immigrants, not foreigners. Like much of the press, they 
viewed with alarm the current 'influx of aliens' compared 
with negligible British immigration. 208 The traditional 
R S.L. attitude was expressed by twenty-two patients at 
the Heidelberg Military Hospital who wrote: 'There are 
countless thousands of good British stock whose one aim 
209 it is to migrate to this country' • 
For many letter-writers, though, it was not a 
matter of preferring British immigrants to foreigners but 
simply one of not wanting Jews. In the tradition of 
203 .. c.w. Wilson (ex-RAAP), Argus, 19 February 1947. 
204. Letter signed by 26 patients of Heidelberg Military 
Hospital, Argus, 15 February 1947. 
205. R ... Pierce, Argus, 17 February 1947. 
See also H.D, Dale, Argus, 17 February 1947. 
206, R.A. Barratt, Argus, 19 February 1947. 
207. Jas, Macalpine, Argus, 17 February 1947. 
See also M.B. Lamb, Argus, 15 February 1947. 
208. R. L. Phillip~, Argus, 19 February 1947. 
A .. A. Marriott, ,Argus, 14 February 1947. 
Norman Comper, ~~~· 13 February 1947. 
209. Argus, 19 February 1947. 
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~uropean antisemitism, they portrayed the Jew as the member 
of a closed segregated community, the economic parasite 
and the political revolutionary. Jews congregated in the 
cities where they had a 'tendency to segregate themselves 
from the rest of 
b •t ' 210 and ha i s • 
the community and adhere to old customs 
211 Australia needed 'real workers' who 
would 1 roll 
212 
spaces' 
up their sleeves and open our vast empty 
Everyone knew that Jews had 'neither the 
inclination nor aptitude for this sort of work•. 213 They 
contributed nothing to the country's economic welfare but 
led a parasitic existence, taking over businesses 214 and 
' aiming at the eventual control of the country, 'as they 
d d . h . f t . ' 215 have attempte to o so in many of t eir armer coun ries . 
Most Jews took their alleged 'cultural influence' only as 
far as manufacturing establishments, where they became 
'another link in the chain which is gradually tightening its 
strangehold on our industries•. 216 Politically they were 
'the spiritual fathers of Marxism' and aimed at destroying 
national and racial unity. 217 
Gullett and his supporters were attacked by the 
labour movement, Australian Jews and individual non-Jewish 
Australians. Calwell was having a busy week denouncing 
Bolton and Finnan and, for once, stated that he had nothing 
210. 
211. 
D. Crossley, Argus, ·15 February 1947. 
P,E, Grace, Argus, 14 February 1947. 
Y,V. Mcintyre, Argus, 17 February 1947. 
See also 
See also M. Cooper, Argus, 15 February 1947. 
212. P.E. Grace, Argus, 14 February 1947. 
213. M.R. Fairbairn, Argus, 18 February 1947. 
214. Kenneth Linden (Heidelberg Military Hospital), Argus, 
18 February 1947. 
See also R. Pierce, Argus, 17 February 1947, and 
J.A. Drake, Argus, 15 February 1947. 
215. Letter signed by 26 patients, Heidelberg Military 
Hospital, Argus, 15 February 1947. 
216. D. Crossley, .Argus, 15 February 1947. 
21 7 R.A. Barratt, Argus, 19 February 1947. 
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218 
to say. Other labour supporters took the opportunity to 
continue their political attack on fascism and its antisemitic 
practices. V,J. Doube, Gullett's Labor Party opponent for 
the seat of Henty in the previous Federal election, alleged 
that Gullett's statements were 'not only malicious and 
untrue, but are based on prejudice, and are Fascist in 
content'~ He challenged Gullett to a public debate on the 
Jewish immigration question but Gullett declined the 
' t' 219 1 . . d' invita ion. A reso ution expressing isgust at Gullett's 
'Jew-baiting activities' was passed by the Ballarat Trades 
and Labor Council, 220 while the Victorian Clothing Trades 
Union reaffirmed its hostility to antisemitism and urged 
all members to 'promote humanity and unity between 
Australians and new arrivals, irrespective of race or 
l ' . • 2 21 re igion . In cartoons published in Labor Call, Gullett 
b d d . d t' . 222 d' th was ran e as a Nazi an an isemite. Accor 1ng to e 
communist Tribune, he had linked himself, 'and the "Liberal" 
Party as well, with the world-wide anti-Semitic movement 
h . I . t d . . . . ' 223 w 1c1 is o ay attempting to revive Fascist teachings . 
Australian Jews were not content, as they often 
had been, to let sympathetic non-Jews defend their interests. 
Two Melbourne rabbis, the Victorian Jewish Advisory Board, 
Archie Michaelis M.L.A., Professor M.D. Goldman and other 
individuals who identified themselves as Jews reacted 
violently to Gullett's accusatibns. They were supported by 
218. Argus, 13 February 1947, 
On 14 February Calwell wrote to the N.S.W, State 
Council of the R.S.L. complaining about Bolton's 
pronouncements and between 13 and 18 February he 
had a continuing dispute with Finnan. See pp.262-4. 
219. Argus, 15 February 1947, 
220. ~· 
221. 
2 2 2' 
Argus, 18 February 1947. 
Labor Call, 20, 27 February 1947. 
223, Tribune, 21 February 1947. 
See pp.271-2. 
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LIBERAL ONE 
Labor Call 
' 
20 F ebruary 1947. 
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"De Oder One" 
-With apoloalo• to Lo11io Henion and Fru 
Labor Call, 27 February 1947. 
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a number of non-Jewish Australians, including Professor 
II.A· Woodruff and writer, Nettie Palmer. 
First of all, Australian Jews stated that they 
were insulted by 
between European 
Gullett's attempt to make a distinction 
d t 1 . 224 b . ld an Aus ra ian Jews. Ra bit Go man 
pointed out that, 
1 i ved in Europe: 
fifty years earlier, 91% of all Jews had 
.. , and we Australian Jews come from the same 
stock; the same stock which has produced such 
Australians as Sir Isaac Isaacs and Sir John Monash. 225 
Gullett's statements were denounced as 
factually inaccurate by Professor M.D. Goldman. Jews had 
not swarmed all over Europe after World War I; they had 
r.ot gained a stranglehold in Germany; they did not control 
226 the United States economy. No doubts could be cast on 
the allegiance or loyalty of Jews to the country in which 
they lived: 'they gave their lives in defence of a free 
Australia', wrote the President of the Victorian Jewish 
S . ' . . 227 ex- ervicemen s Association . Gullett had merely quoted 
'part of the Nazi defence of anti-Semitism'" According to 
A.R. Blashki, Honorary Secretary of the Victorian Jewish 
Advisory Board, 'his accusations, almost word for word, 
may be read in the original German in the pages of Mein· 
KamE! and Die Sturmer' . 228 
It was one thing for' a private individual to 
exhibit such 'ignorance and prejudice' but quite a different 
tt . h l d. d 2 2 9 ma er when an elected representative of t e peep e i so. 
224. Ivan Blaubaum, Argus, 14 February 1947. 
225. Rabbi L.M. Goldman, Argus, 13 February 1947. 
226. Professor M .. D. Goldman, Argus, 14 February 1947. 
Goldman was Professor of $emitic Studies at the 
University of Melbourne. until 1938 he had lectured 
in Berlin. 
227, Ben Green, President, Victorian Jewish ex-Servicemen's 
Association, Argus, 17 February 1947. 
228, Argus, 13 February 1947. 
229, L. Findlay, Argus, 13 February 1947. 
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Australians would 'rue the day' if its citizens continued 
to elect Members of Parliament who made such 'unreasonable 
th . . t. f ' 2 3 0 b. statements ... on e immigra ion o Jews , Rabi 
Sanger wanted to know whether Gullett was speaking as a 
member of the Liberal Party in 
his party did not support such 
Federal Parliament. 
231 
a statement? 
Surely 
The Liberal Party had little to say on the 
Jewish refugee question. The refugees had become associated 
with the Labor Government's immigration policy and, if it 
was not politic to wholeheartedly approve of refugee 
immigration, it was unhumanitarian to oppose it. In the 
pre-war period, it was the Liberal Party's predecessor, 
the United Australia Party, which decided to admit 15,000 
refugees and the Labor Party which had misapprehensions 
232 
about their entry. · When questioned on Gullett's statement, 
the Liberal Leader, R.G. Menzies, maintained that individual 
b . l d th . ' 2 3 3 party mem ers were entit e to eir own views. On 
being pressed for more precise details of the Liberal Party's 
attitude, Menzies made a statement which did little to 
satisfy Gullett's denouncers. Like many of Calwell's 
critics, Menzies said that he was disturbed at reports 
'which seem to indicate that Jewish refugees are experiencing 
less difficulty in migrating to Australia than people of 
the United Kingdom', who were entitled to preference. So 
far as the refugees themselves.were concerned, Menzies 
maintained that the 
danger of anti-semitism and racial prejudices 
would be increased, not diminished, if the 
Australian public felt that too great a proportion 
of Jewish refugees was included in our annual 
immigration figures. To refuse to recognise this 
fact would be to ignore a real public opinion.234 
According to Menzies, the ~efugees themselves were largely 
230. N .--Cameron, Argus, 19 February 1947. 
231. Rabbi H.M. Sanger, Argu~. 15 February 1947. 
232. See pp.89-90. 
233, A.J.H,, 14 February 1947. 
234. A.J.H., 21 February 1947. 
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to blame for any ill-feeling towards them. Aliens frequently 
contributed 'to prejudice and misunderstanding through their 
unawareness of Australian customs and standards'. After 
this onslaught, Menzies concluded on a surprisingly liberal 
note, condemning racial and religious discrimination and 
making a strong plea for tolerance of immigrants once they 
t 1 . •t• 235 became Aus ra ian ci izens. 
The public outcry aroused by Gullett's 
statements had not deterred the refugees' critics. Their 
next opportunity came with the arrival in March 1947 of the 
much-publicized Johan de Witt, the ship which had escaped 
the 25% quota and which Calwell had claimed was unsuitable 
.. h . . 236 for Britis immigrants. On board were 702 Jewish 
immigrants, the largest single group of refugees to arrive 
since the war. 237 This time it. was the Chief President of 
the Australian Natives' Association, P.J. Lynch, who led 
the attack. In his opening address to the Association's 
annual conference in Geelong on 17 March, Lynch stated: 
Just because some people cry loudly that we 
must populate or perish, it seems to give the 
idea to our Parliamentarians that we must 
flood the country with all sorts of humans, 
whether they be refuse of Europe or excellent 
British migrants.238 
Lynch added that he had 
noted with alar-m the statement by Mr. Calwell 
that the ships bringing the· refuse from Europe 
were not fit to bring out decent British 
migrants. If that is so, what comprises the 
cargo? Are they cattle, sheep or swine7239 
After the wide-spread controversy aroused 
by Gullett's statement the previous month, only a few people 
235. A.J.H., 21 February 1947. 
236. See p.255. 
237. S.J.N., 21.March 1947. 
238. Arqus, 18 March 194·7. 
239. Age, 18 March 1947. 
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showed any interest in Lynch's pronouncement. Australian 
Jews were the major reactors. Even ninety-one year old 
Sir Isaac Isaacs, who usually preferred to keep quiet on 
any controversial Jewish issue except Zionism, was provoked 
to retaliate. Sir Isaac, who had been a member of the 
Australian Natives' Association for over fifty years, 
objected to the refugees being described as 'refuse' and 
'swine' and stated that the ships, 'untidy as they might be, 
were probably a heaven after the cruel surroiiudings of 
240 the concentration camps'. The Australian Jewish News 
thought that Sir Isaac had 'replied perhaps too mildly' and 
considered it tragic that Lynch's 'violent utterances [had] 
not called forth a more active response from our liberal-
minded democrats' 241 According to the Victorian directors 
of the A.J.W.S., the dragging down of Australian standards 
would not be 'brought about by immigrants, as Mr. Lynch 
alleged, but by bigoted statements such as his own' • 242 
Apart from the specific reactions to Gullett's 
and Lynch's outbursts, denunciations of refugee immigration 
had provoked occasional retaliatory comments from the Jews' 
usual supporters - churchmen, academics and labour spokesmen. 
Bishop Pilcher was less vocal than he had been during the 
pre-war refugee controversy but. reminded Australians that, 
in 1938, the Government had promised to admit fifteen thousand 
refugees. Only about seven thousand had reached Australia 
before the war and many had been separated from their close 
relatives. The refugees who now wished to come to Australia 
were merely those who, having managed to survive the Nazi 
h 1 ' d ' . f . 1. 24 3 o ocaust, wanted to be reunite with their ami ies. 
The anti-refugee agitation provoked Archbisuop 
Mannix, who had always been rather more sympathetic to 
Jewish refugees than much of the Catholic press, to state: 
240. D.T., 19 March 1947. 
241_ A.J.N., 21 March 1947. 
242. Age, 19 March 1947. 
243, S.M.H., G December 1945. 
1947. 
See al so .§.~· 21 February 
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'for my part I would find it very hard to say one harsh 
word about them'. He hoped that Australia would 'receive 
all immigrants with open arms and give them a proper 
244 
welcome'. Archbishop Mannix's statement gave a clue as 
to why some other normally unsympathetic Catholics were 
concerned about the matter: they feared that antipathy to 
refugees might extend to other aliens, especially Italians, 
who would be coming to Australia under the Government's new 
immigration policy. The Catholic Weekly, which had 
previously haen one of the refugees' chief antagonists, 245 
expressed its alarm at the extent of feeling against Jewish 
refugees. It pointed out that Australians had never taken 
kindly to the influx of any national groups and compared 
the antagonism to Jewish refugees with that to Italians 
before the war. According to the Catholic Weekly, 
Australians should offer friendship 'to the newcomer, 
htl h b J Itl . G PoleorEngl'sh 1 • 246 w e 1er e e ew, a ian, erman, ~ 
One of the Jews' most consistent supporters 
was Brian Fitzpatrick, historian, publicist and General 
Secretary of the Australian Council of Civil Liberties. 
Fitzpatrick defended Jewish refugees in radio talks and 
in articles in Smith's Weekly which were strangely out of 
k ' ' h h t • , 247 eeping wit t e paper s own ~iews on the refugee question. 
Professor H.A. Woodruff, Chairman of the V.I.R.E.C., thought 
't 1 . " . . . 248 l was wrong to sing e out Jewish refugees ~or cr1t1c1srnB 
To the labour movement, and to Communists in 
' d h f . 249 particular, anyone who attacke t e refugees was a ascist. 
244, For Archbishop Mannix's earlier comments, see 
pp.13, 43, 90. 
Advocate, 19 February 1947. Also reported in ~~~ 
17 February 1947, 
245. See p.161. 
246, Catholic Weekly, 27 February 1947. 
24i, S.J.N., 9 August 1946, report of radio talk over 3XY 
Oll 20 .July 1946 '· 
Smith's Weekly, 9 March, 13 April 1946, 22 February 1947, 
Fitzpatrick's articles were published bearing the 
comment 'without prejudice to Smith's policy'. 
248, H.S., 13 February 1947, 
249. See p.270 for. the reaction of trade·-unions to Gullett's 
statement of 12 February 1947, 
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The Communist Tribune alleged that it was 'not hard to find 
the links between the anti-refugee campaign.and the 
. - . 
b . ' 250 anti-la or campaign . It accused Menzies of white-washing 
Gullett's 'Jew-baiting' and of repeating the 'lying inuendoes 
t . s . t ' 2 51 d. of the an i- emi es . Accor ing to the Tribune, J.T. Lang 
was little better. By attacking 'anti-fascist refugees', he 
1 'd" th f f . 252 d was on y ai ing e orces o reaction. Instea of 
denouncing refugee immigration, Australians should 'give a 
sympathetic welcome to those who suffered' under Nazism. 253 
But compared with the pre-war period, there 
were few expressions of sympathy for the refugees. A public 
opinion poll taken by Australian Gallup Polls in May-June 
1946, before refugees started arriving, suggested that 
Australians should have been more favourably disposed to 
Jewish immigrat~on. With the 'populate or perish' cry in 
full swing, nine out of every ten people questioned stated 
that they supported 'white immigration'. Britishers and 
Americans were considered the most desirable immigrants, 
followed by Dutch, swedes and French. Poles and Germans 
came next, ahead of Greeks and Italians. There was no 
reference to 'Jews' as a group and the criterion for 
preference appeared to be the traditional one ~f similarity 
. 254 
to Australians in appearance and habits. 
A rather different result was obtained almost 
a year later when, at the height of the anti-refugee 
agitation, Australians were asked about their attitudes to 
Jewish refugee immigration. The majority of people questioned 
apparently considered that, regardless of the need for 
immigrants, there were already sufficient Jewish refugees in 
the country. On being asked whether Australia should 
250. Tribune, 7 February 1947. 
251. Tribune, 18 March 1947. 
252. Tribune, 6 December 1946. 
1946. 
253, Tribune, 7 February 1947. 
See also Tribune, 3 December 
254. Australian Gallup Polls, May-June 1946. 
279. 
participate in a world-wide plan to take in some of the 
600,000 homeless Jews in Europe, 58% replied that i~ should 
not, 37% were in favour and 5% undecided. The poll found 
that neither sex, age nor political affiliation affected 
attitudes. While professional people were almost equally 
divided on the issue, two-thirds of semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers opposed any further Jewish immigation. 
Their main reasons - the 'acute housing shortage' and the 
opinion that there were 'enough foreigners in Australia 
already' - were similar to arguments expressed before the 
war and, unlike most other post-war anti-refugee comments, 
revealed continuing apprehensions about the economic effects 
f . . t' 255 o 1mm1gra ion. 
Public attitudes were no doubt strongly 
influenced by the daily press which, compared with 1938, 
showed comparatively little sympathy for the refugees. 
The Daily Telegraph, singled out by Calwell for particular 
attack, was.one of the few newspapers which pleaded for a 
tolerant attitude. 256 The most obviously changed viewpoint 
was that of the Sydney Morning Herald which, in the pre-war 
period, had consistently pleaded for a humanitarian approach 
to Jewish refugee immigration. Now it had little to say in 
the refugees' favour and reported their arrivals with such 
255. Australian Gallup Polls, March-May 1947. 
256. Daily Telegraph, 26, 29 November 1946, 18 February 1947. 
The Melbourne Herald also occasionally defended 
the refugees against their critics. Herald, 13 February, 
18 March 1947. 
Although the Daily Telegraph attacked Gullett and 
Bolton for their comments on Jewish immigration, its 
alleged humanitarian attitude did not extend to all 
displaced persons in Europe. Only three days after 
it made a plea for racial tol·erance (~., 18 February 
1947), the D.T. responded to a report that 
Australia might help solve the general displaced 
persons problem with a leader headed 'A plan to 
dump refuse of Europe in Australia' (D.T., 21 February 
1947.) 
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descriptions as: 'when the ship berthed at Darwin, ~undreds 
257 
of refugees swarmed along the wharf and over-ran the town'. 
One reason for the lack of sympathy for Jewish 
refugees was the concern at the lack of British immigration 
at a time when Australians had become obsessed with the 
need to increase the country's population. When newspapers 
denounced the Government for its failure to obtain shipping 
for British imreigrants, they used the comparative success 
of Jewish organizations as part of their attack. As the 
pressure on the Government to implement the scheme for 
British immigration increased, so too did the adverse 
publicity given to Jewish immigration. 
Jewish refugees also suffered because their 
immigration had become closely associated with Calwell, 
the Labor Minister for Immigration. Most of the daily press 
was politically opposed to Calwell and the Labor Party. 
Regardless of the British immigration issue, press 
commentators were not prepared to imply that they supported 
Calwell by continuing to express their earlier humanitarian 
views towards Jewish refugees. Calwell's attitude did not 
help matters. Although he was extolled by Australian Jews 
as their great friend, he probably did as much harm as 
good for the refugee cause. His intemperate outbursts and 
accusations of antisemitism against anyone who questioned 
any aspect of his immigration policy only alienated many 
Australians who might otherwise have spoken out in favour 
ai· the refugees. To do so was only to associate oneself 
with Calwell, with hi& irrational denunciations and even 
with his apparently unsuccessful policy on British 
immigration. 
257, S.M.H,, 15 January 1947. The S.M.H. reported the 
arrival of the Yunnan from Hong Kong on 14 October 1946 
with the headlines 'Jews run to Relatives. Excited 
Migrants', It stated: 'Three Customs officers chased 
the excited Jews down the wharf and tried to break 
up the clamouring throng at the gate .•. '. The~·, 
17 October 1946, alleged that the S.M.H. had 'deviated 
widely from what used to be a reputation for fairness 
and dignity' and 'shown ugly anti-Semitic tendencies', 
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281. 
There was another reason for the comparatively 
unsympathetic response to refugee immigration and for the 
vehemence of the opposition: the anti-British activities 
of Jewish terrorists in Palestine. Militant Zionist ex-
tremists - the Irgun Zvai Leumi and its fanatical offshoot, 
the Stern Gang - had been in open revolt against the British 
258 
since before the end of the war. They intensified their 
attack when the British Government refused to implement the 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry's recommendation of 
April 1946 that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine. 259 
For a while, the Irgun and the Stern Gang were joined by 
the Haganah, military arm of the Jewish Agency, whose main 
role was the organization of illegal immigration into 
Palestine. The Haganah would not condone the killing of [ 
! British personnel, and the extremists, who had originally 
i broke~ with the Haganah because of its moderate policy, soon l 260 r came to the fore. From mid 1946 until the adoption of 
~ the partition plan in November 1947, the Irgun and the Stern 
" [ Gang maintained a constant onslaught against the British. 
[ They blew up bridges, railway stations and workshops, cut 
[ railway lines and set fire to the Haifa oil refinery. In 
r more direct attacks on British personnel, they shot and 
kidnapped soldiers and police and blew up military depots, I police stations, airfields, buses and cars. 
(F-·-----1-9·4-6,-e-ig-h t y-B r-i-t-i-s h-so-1-d-i·ers-and-po·1-j;c·e-·11a·d-b·e en--k·i·1- i-ea--a·n a--
I 121 injured. 261 In February 1947, all British women and 
( children were evacuated ·f'rom Palestine. 262 
By the end of 
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Australian newspapers carried frequent reports 
of the terrorists' activities, giving the greatest amount 
of publicity to individual attacks on British personnel. 
258. During 1944 the Irgun attacked British government 
property in Palestine. The more extremist Stern Gang 
concentrated on assassinations and its pre-war acts 
culminated in the murder of Lord Moyne, the British 
Minister Resident in the Middle East, in Cairo in 
November 1944. 
259. See p.239._ 
260. The evolution and activities of the Haganah, Irgun Zvai 
Leumi and Stern Gang are discussed by J.C. Hurewitz, 
£!!• cit., passim. Menachem Begin, commander of the Irgun, 
gives a first-hand account of his organization's 
operations in The Revolt, New York, 1951. 
261. Argus, 2 January 1947. 
~:~ S.M.H 4 Februarv 1947, 
IT?,.N. 
282. 
The Irgun's most sensational single act occurred in July 
1946 when it blew up British military headquarters and 
civil government off ices situated in a wing of the King 
David Hotel in Jerusalem. Over ninety people - British, 
Jews and Arabs - were killed in the explosion. 263 None of 
the terorists' later attacks matched this one in ferocity 
but they received almost as much publicity. In December 
1946 terrorists flogged a British major and three sergeants 
and the following month they kidnapped a British officer and 
a judge. After a short lull in mid-1947, the Irgun hanged 
two British soldiers in reprisal for the execution of three 
. t b th .. h 264 terroris s y e Britis . 
The terrorists' activities were constantly 
denounced by the Jewish Agency, as the official Zionist 
body in Palestine, and by the Zionist Inner Council. 265 
Australian Jews, who were now largely converted to the 
Zionist cause, also vehemently condemned the anti-British 
attacks. After the King David Hotel affair, the E.C.A.J, 
expressed its 
terrorism and 
'abhorrence and condemnation of all acts of 
266 
outrage'. When the attacks persisted, it 
reiterated that it 'strongly condemned violence and 
__________ lawJ..essnes s_• _and_.dec.l.ar.ed-tha.t _ _!_Australian~J_e_w_i:_y_s_t_o_o_Q__f~o=r __________ _ 
I 
unqualified loyalty to the Crown and the Empire', 267 
The Australian ~~ess condemned Jewish terrorism 
in no uncertain terms. It had regarded the conflict between 
Jews and Arabs as an unemotional political problem but 
263. The Times, 3 August 1946. 
S.M,H., 23, 24, 25 July 1946. 
264. S,M,H., 31 December 1946, 28, 31 January, 31 July, 
1 August 1947. 
265. Argus, 11 September, 2 November 1946. 
266. ~., 25 July 1946. 
A.J.N., 26 July 1946, denounced the attack as 'an 
outrage'. 
25·7. S.M.H., 13 November 1946. 
JI 
I 
i 
283, 
terrorist assaults on British personnel were a different 
matter. According to the Sydney Morninq Herald, the attack 
on the King David Hotel was 'wicked and cowardly beyond any 
other deed of violence in the modern history of Palestine•. 268 
The Advertiser declared that it had been carried out 'with 
269 
ruthless contempt for the lives of innocent people'. 
When terrorists kidnapped Judge Windham in his own court 
in January 1947, the Advertiser stated that the present 
270 turmoil in Palestine was enough to horrify even Al Capone, 
In the following August, the West Australian alleged that 
the hanging of two British soldiers was the 'most bestial 
1 I • d b h . 271 of t e outrages yet committe y t e terrorists. 
Newspaper commentators described the terrorists' 
activities in terms similar to those they had used to 
denounce the Nazis' anti-Jewish campaign. ~fter the blowing 
up of the King David Hotel, the Courier-Mail headlined its 
editorial 'Jews match the Nazis' and alleged that the 
terrorists' use of 'mass murder' methods put them 'in the 
' ' ' 1 I 272 h t l' same category as Nazi war crimina s • T e Wes Austra ian 
described the hanging of the two British soldiers as 'the 
Jewish outrage• 273 and the Sun called it a 'crime against 
. . 27 4 
_____ _,uuma.ni_t_y_:_. ___________ _ 
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Above all, press commentators were indignant 
that the terrorists were attacking the British, 'the best 
friends Jewry has had 1 • 275 According to the~. no nation 
had 'done more to help the Jews' than Britain: 
268. 
269. 
270, 
271. 
2 7 2. 
273. 
274. 
275. 
S.M.H., 24 July 1946. 
Advertiser, 24 July 1946. 
Advertiser, 29 January 1947. 
W.A., 1 August 1947. 
c.-M., 24 July 1946. The term 11 mass murder 11 was also 
used by S.M~., 24 July 1946. 
~-• 1 August 1947. 
~. 1 August 1947. 
See also C.-M., 4 August 1947. 
~rgus, 30 January 1947. This view was also expressed 
by S.M.H., 26 July 1946, Advertiser, 24 July, 
13 November 1946, Herald, 1 January 1947, W.A,, 
4 January 1947, ~. 4 August 1947; cartoon in S.M.H. • 
27 July 1946 (see p.284). 
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284. 
27 ,T 11 l y 1946. 
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it would be difficult to find in history 
a blacker example of base ingratitude 
than that which has been furnished by the 
Jews of Palestine during the past year of 
misguided zealotry and exclusionism 
masquerading in the name of nationalism.276 
285, 
British soldiers were now being murdered by the very Jews 
they had fought to save during the war. 
asked: 
The Advertiser 
where is the Jew who does not know that 
not a single discoverable member of his race 
would be alive today, if Britain had not kept 
the flag of civilisation flying?277 
When the terrorists' attacks continued, there 
was a growing tendency to blame all Zionists and even 
Jewry in general. Although the Jewish Agency persistently 
condemned the terrorists' activities, most commentators 
maintained that it bore some of the responsibility. 278 
The Sydney Morning Herald reminded Australians: 
It was in the Agency's illegal army, the 
Haganah, that these sinister gangs first 
came into being, only breaking away when 
they found Haganah's pace too slow for 
them 279 
'Every big movement has its extremists', 280 declared the Age, 
The opponents.of Jewish refugee immigration 
used the terrorist issue to bolster their case. The 
Bulletin, in particular, invariably linked its condemnation 
of terrorism in Palestine with the question of Jewish 
immigation in~o Australia. As early as May 1946, it 
accused Calwell of admitting Jewish immigrants 'without 
276, ~· 1 Ja11uary 1947. 
277. Advertiser, 13 November 1946. 
See also Advertiser, 27 July 1946, Argus, 30 January 
1947, ~· 1 August 1947. 
278, For example,. Advertiser, 24 July 1946, ~· 1 January 
1947. 
279, S.M.H., 4 February 1947. 
280. Age, 4 August 1947. 
· ... 
28 6. 
making any known provision against the inclusion of the 
type of Jew whose ferocious hatred [of the English was] 
281 
no longer concealed'. When one of the first groups of 
refugees arrived from Hong Kong in September 1946, the 
Bulletin asked: 'Has any guarantee been required of them 
that they will not ''declare war on the 
' h d ' ' I 282 terrorists ave one in Palestine? 
British Empire'' as 
In the following 
April, it reported that 8,000 Jews in Shanghai had protested 
against the hanging of four terrorists in Palestine by 
the British authorities: 'Shanghai! Why that's the place 
from which Mr. Calvell [sic] is getting heaps of his 
283 11 reffos 11 1 • 
Smith's Weekly thought along similar lines. In 
a fictitious dialogue between two groups of Jews headed 
'Fugitives from the Stern Gang', it implied that former 
members of the Gang were now living in Australia. 284 
When the British authorities stepped up their deportations 
of illegal immigrants from Palestine, Smith's Weekly 
wondered how many of them would seek refuge in Australia 
and whether they would have been influenced by anti-British 
terrorist propaganda. There was 'no place' for such people 
in Australia: 'our friends don't have to be anti-Semites; 
b 1 h b .. h' 285 ut at east t ey must e pro-Britis • 
Three of the ~~fugees' individual denouncers 
Lynch, Lang and Gullett - also took advantage of the 
terrorists 1 activities. P.J. Lynch, Chief President of the 
281. 
282. 
283. 
Bulletin, 8 May 1946. 
Bulletin, 18 September 1946. 
Bulletin, 30 April 1947. 
Other articles linking Jewish refugees and terrorism 
were published in the Bulletin, 10 July, 31 July, 
25 December 1946, 8, 29 January, 19 February 1947. 
284. Smith's Weekly, 15 February 1947. 
?. 8 s . 
See also cartoon in Smith's Weekly, 25 Janu.ary 1947 
(p.261.) 
Smith's Weekl:l., 16 l'.ugust.1947. 
Smith's weekly, 31 May 1947, accused Australian Jews 
of raising funds to fight the British and urged the 
Government to inquire into t.he matter. The E.C .A. J, 
refuted the allegations. H.S., 5 June 1947. 
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28 7. 
Australian Natives' Association, claimed he was 'concerned 
to find that the same people who, in Palestine, murdered 
. 28 6 British soldiers, were coming to Australia'. J.T, Lang 
declared that Australia had 'no wish to import Zionist 
terrorism' and alleged that refugee immigration was being 
arranged by the same 'international Jewish organization 
. h . . 1 t" ' 287 that recently urged Jewis resistance in Pa es ine • 
In his controversial letter to the Argus, 'Joe' Gullett 
stated that Jews were 'practically in a state of war with 
Great Britain in Palestine, and almost daily they carry 
out their murderous attacks and assaults against British 
subjects'. These were the people 'who, at the direction of 
international Jewish organisations, are being foisted upon 
us .•• ' .
288 Some of Gullett's supporters claimed that they 
were opposed to Jewish immigration because of terrorism in 
Palestine. One commentator declared: 
I had favoured Jewish immigrants •.• But now 
I feel disgusted and my sympathies have been 
alienated by the condonation and/or carrying 
out of murders, floggings, kidnapping 289 
Another alleged that those responsible for the upheavals in 
Palestine were recent arrivals from Europe. Australia had 
'enough troubles •.• without importing more in the form of 
290 
refugee Jews'. 
A few people argued that there were no grounds 
for associating Jewish refugee immigrants with the terrorist 
activities of a few Zionist 'extremists in Palestine. The 
Daily Telegraph wrote: 
286. ~· 28 January 1947. 
287. 
288, 
28 9. 
290. 
For Lynch's earlier attack on refugee immigration see 
pp.275-6. 
Century, 17 January, 21 February 1947, 
For Lang's other attacks on refugee immigration see 
p'p-;·24 5-6, 24B-2 Si~ 
Argus, 12 February 1947. See pp.266-7 for full text. 
Will King (Heidelberg Hospital), letter to Argus, 
18 February 1947. 
J. Barnes, letter to Argus, 17 February 1947, 
I 
I 
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That there are terrorists in Palestine should 
no more influen~e our judgment of the Jewish 
race than the fact that English and Australians 
are in jail for bestial crimes should discredit 
all Englishmen and Australians.291 
288, 
Rev. L. Duff-Forbes, General Secretary of the Biblical 
Research Society, asked why all Jews 'should be stigmatised 
for the actions of the minority'. He reminded Australians 
that terrorism was 'deprecated and repudiated by world-wide 
Jewry, even in Palestine itself•. 292 According to another. 
of Gullett's critics, the allegation that Jewish immigrants 
would have terrorist sympathies was 'equivalent to saying 
that all Irish would be member~ of the I.R.A.•. 293 
The terrorists' activities in Palestine had 
aggravated the hostility to Jewish immigration and also 
contributed to the refugees being increasingly identified 
as 'Jews' rather than as 'foreigners 1 • By early 1947, some 
commentators were drawing attention to the growing signs of 
antisemitism in Australia. In mid-February, the Daily 
Telegraph warned that 'symptoms of racial intolerance' were 
developing in the community: 
For six years we fought the German Nazi Party 
because, among other reasons, its racial 
intolerance and inhumanity to the Jews had 
shocked our sense of decency and justice. And 
now some of us speak of the Jewish people in 
precisely the same terms as Hitler and his 
gang of ruffians used.294 
Some Australian journalists were alarmed by the 
anti-Jewish sentiments being expressed by their colleagues. '• 
In an article in the Journalist, official organ of the 
Australian Journalists' Association, Stuart Brown alleged that 
29L ~., 18 February 1947. 
2 9 2. H ~ S. , 13 February 1947. 
2 9 3. M • p ~ Leslie, letter to Ar9:US, 19 February 1947. 
294, D. T. , 18 February 1947. 
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289, 
some people and papers were 'deliberately inciting 
Australians' to antisemitism. He referred particularly to 
the cartoons published in the Bulletin on 5 and 19 February 
295 1947. Brown stated that journalists, according to their 
code of ethics, undertook 'to report and interpret with 
scrupulous honesty'. They were not always following this 
principle in their comments on immigration policies, accounts 
of refugee arrivals and cartoons. Brown urged the Federal 
Executive of the Australian Journalists' Association to 
conduct an investigation into antisemitism in the Australian 
296 press. The Executive subsequently appointed a sub-committee 
which investigated the allegations. 297 
A number of Smith's-weekly journalists did not 
approve of the anti-Jewish comments being made in Australian 
newspapers and journals, including their own. In a letter 
to the secretary of the N.s.w. District of the Australian 
Journalists' Association, they stated that they deplored 'the 
recent anti-racial trend, particularly anti-Semitism, of 
both daily and weekly newspapers in Sydney'. The journalists 
claimed that this trend did not 'represent the views of the 
vast majority of Sydney's working journalists', who took 
pride in the 'Australian reputation for fair play' . 298 
Apart from journalists, the main expressions 
of alarm at the growth of antisemitism came from the labour 
movement~ Before the war, labour had revealed a contradictory 
attitude towards the Jewish issue. While vehemently 
denouncing antisemitism as fascist and anti-democratic, its 
295. See pp.259-260. 
296. Journalist, February 1947. 
296. Australian Journalists' Association, N.s.w. District 
and N.s.w. Journalists' Union, Annual Reeort and 
Balance Sheet for year ended June 30th 1947, p.15. 
298. 
The sub-committee consisted of Messrs. Clive Turnbull, 
E.W. Tipping and G.W. Hutton. 
Journalist, May 1947. ···--···------·-
The Journalist did not publish the names of the 
letter's signatories. It is likely that they included 
Brian Fitzpatrick, whose own articles in Smith's 
Weekl~ expressed a viewpoint which was diametrically 
opposed to the paper's unsigned articles on refugee 
immigration. 
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290. 
opposition to all immigration on economic grounds made it 
d . t l. 299 apprehensive about the a mission of refugees to Aus ra ia, 
Now that a positive immigration policy had been implemented 
by the Labor Government, labour spokesmen felt free to 
denounce all those who revealed antisemitic tendencies in 
their condemnations of refugee immigration. 
According to Jack Hooke, Service Welfare Officer 
for the N.s.w. Trades and Labor Council, the prevalence 
of antisemitism was a sign of 'democratic decadence'. 
lt was 
appalling that racial intolerance, the crude 
credo of fascism, should have survived the 
holocaust of ideological warfare with such 
remaining vigor that it can become blatant 
while the ovens of Belsen are still warm.300 
The A.C.T.U.'s 1947 Congress resolved that it was 'the duty 
cf all trade unionists to expose and oppose anti-Semitism, 
whenever and however used, as anti-Semitism is anti-democratic 
301 in concept and purpose'. 
Australian Jews felt personally affected. They 
expressed alarm at the revival of antisemitism shortly after 
the war in Central Europe, the United States and even Britain, 
and became more anxious when antagonism to Jewish refugees 
and hostility to terrorism in Palestine threatened to provoke· 
. 'l 't t' . . l' 302 a simi ar si ua ion in Austra ia. In April-May 1947, 
the Australian Jewish Herald.published a series of three 
articles entitled: 'Anti-Semitism in Australia: Is there a 
303 problem?' The articles blamed the growth of antisemitism on 
299. see pp.71-73, 89-90. 
300, Labor News, December 1946. 
301. ~., 6 November 1947. 
Communists were particularly vocal. See Tribune, 
~5 February, 18 March, 5 August 1947. 
302. A.J.H., 14 December 1945, 28 June, 13 September, 
~8 October 1946, 31 January 1947, 
-·· 303 .. A.J .H., 18' 25 April, 2 May 1947" 
,, 
the less respectable sections of the periodical 
press, no-good politicians seeking notoriety and 
fascist spoils, as well as a number of individual 
misfits and frustrated men and women who are 
completely amoral and ready to go wherever the 
rewards look promising.304 
291. 
They maintained that the press campaign against Jewish 
refugees, 'originating partly in sensation-mongering, 
partly in real viciousness', had provoked a Jewish problem 
in Australia. Newspapers should not have given men like 
Gullett the opportunity to express opinions 'held 
independently of the refugees - and to justify them•. 305 
Judah Waten, Publicity Officer for the Jewish 
Council to Combat Fascism and anti-Semitism, asked 'Can it 
306 happen here?'. He was quite specific in naming the 
offenders: the publications Smith's Weekly, Bulletin, 
. 307 . . h New Times and Century wh1c were open avenues of 'fascist 
propaganda' and politicians Lang and Gullett who unashamedly 
made 'outright fascist utterances devoid of any truth', 
Waten concluded that fascism and antisemitism were 'real 
304. A.J.H., 18 April 1947. 
305. Ibid. 
306. A.J.H •. , 16 May 1947. A further article by Waten 
appeared in A.J.N,, 1 August 1947, 
307, The New Times had continued to make blatant antisemitic 
comments independent; of the refugee question and Jewish 
terrorism. (See pp.33-5 for earlier antisemitic comments.) 
In 1945, when there was still considerable sympathy for 
the Jews because of their wartime sufferings, the New 
Times published a long series of articles (almost week~y, 
January to November) on the Protocols of the Learned 
Elders of Zion. The series was entitled 'Master plan 
behind Hitler's plan' and alleged that Hitler had studied 
the Protocols and used the policies contained in them. 
In November 1947 these articles were published in 
Butler's book, the International Jew, Adelaide, 1947. 
Butler also attacked Jews in his weekly radio talks. 
over 3CS Colac. He told all Jewish organizations that, 
'as a loyal Australian whose forefathers pioneered this 
country for the British way of life', he regarded 'their 
protests against his alleged anti-semitism as an 
impertinence'. (New Times, 21 November 1947.) 
.--·; 292. 
threats to the people of Australia' and urged the Government 
to pass group libel laws as well as legislation 'banning 
propaganda inciting people to hatred of a particular race 
1 . . ' 308 or re 1g1ous group . 
In July 1947 Rabbi E. Berkovits of Sydney warned 
that 'anti-Semitism was manifesting itself in Australia•. 309 
It was not long before antisemitic words were being translated 
into action. In August, an anonymous telephone caller warned 
that an anti-Jewish organization planned to blow up Sydney's 
Great Synagogue during a special service for the Exodus 
deportees. No bomb was found but a guard was kept on the 
building during the . 310 l h service. A few weeks ater, t e 
Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and anti-Semitism stated 
that it had received reports of 'certain unpleasant incidents 
affecting Jewish people' on Melbourne trams. It asked Jews 
to notify the Council whenever such incidents occurred in 
311 future. 
Australian Jews found themselves facing the 
threat of a major outbreak of antisemitism. This did not 
eventuate because, by the end of 1947, the contlitions which 
had provoked anti-Jewish feeling had virtually disappeared, 
The focus began to shift from Jewish refugees in July 1947 
when Calwell, as Minister for Immigration, signed an 
agreement with the Interna-tional Refugee Organization for 
the admission of displaced persons from Europe. Provided 
the Organization could obtain shipping, four thousand 
displaced persons were to come to Australia in 1947 and 
t l . 312 h we ve thousand per annum in subsequent years. T e 
agreement was made for practical, not humanitarian, reasons. 
308, 
309. 
310, 
311. 
312. 
A.J.H., 16 May 1947. 
Like other members of the extreme left, Waten, the 
Russian-born Jewish novelist and short story writer, 
stressed the fascist aspect of antisemitism. 
S.M.H., 8 Jul.y 1947. 
S.M.H. I 30 August 1947. 
A.JoH~, 19 September 1947. 
S.M.H., 24 July 1947. 
293. 
Australia needed manpower for its factories, foundries, 
timber-mills, railways and power schemes. Except under 
special circumstances, the immigrants admitted under the 
scheme had tc do prescribed work for their first two years 
in Australia. By early 1948, Balts, Italians, Poles and 
Greeks were arriving in Australia. The immigrants faced 
some of the traditional hostility but this was modified 
by the large increase in British immigration. 313 Although 
Jewish refugees continued to arrive independently in ships 
chartered by Jewish organizations, they received little 
'publicity. 314 In January 1948, the Australian Jewish News 
noted that Jews were benefiting from the 'new welcoming 
tone' evident in press attitudes to all foreign 
' 315 immigrants. 
The second reason for antisemitism - Jewish 
terrorism in Palestine - had also diminished. In November 
1947 the United Nations finally approved the establishment 
of a Jew~sh state in Palestine, ending the need for continued 
terrorism against the British. Although Britain disagreed 
with the United Nations resolution, it relinquished its 
Mandate on 15 May 1948 and the state of Israel came into 
being. The Jews now faced the Arabs in a battle for survival 
and, so far as must non-Jewish Australians were concerned, 
313. After a slow start in 1947 (total number of permanent 
settlers arriving 'in Australia 31,765, including 
14,573 from Britain), immigration approached the 
70,000 target for the year 1948. Of the total number 
of 65,739 permanent settlers, 31,656 came from Brita~n 
and a total of 43,510 from British countries (including 
New Zealand and India). 
Quarterly Summary of Australian Statistics, 1949. 
314. For example, the Tidewater, which arrived in Australia 
in November, was chartered by the Hebrew Immigration Aid 
Society. The Society was indignant at the Government's 
insistence that only 25% of the pasengers could be 
Jews. (See p.255) In fact, the ship carried rather 
more than this quota (121 of the 353 passengers were 
Jews) • 
Argus, 6 November 1947, A.J.H,, 21 November 1947. 
Calwell haa defended his quota policy at a press 
conference in Washington when he stated that the 
chartering of a ship exclusively for Jewish refugees 
would be 'one of the worst things for Australian 
Jewry'. H.S., 21 August 1947. 
315. A,J.N., 2 January 1948. 
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the matter again became an -0nemotional political problem. 
In Palestine, the Jews had found the solution 
to persecution~ In Australia, they were again a small 
minority group in a country which was being opened to 
non-British settlers to an extent unparalleled in the 
country's history. 
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Conclusion 
The German persecution of the Jews and the 
refugee problem aroused conflicting reactions in Australia. 
Reactions to Jewish persecution - an external situation in 
which Australians were not involved - were guided by 
humanitarian principles. But reactions to refugee im-
migration - a domestic issue in which they felt directly 
involved - were based on self-interest, These different 
criteria provoked responses which, in both cases, were 
quite inappropriate to the significancP. of the situation. 
The comparative lack of reaction to Jewish 
persecution and extermination was inconsistent with the 
extent of the tragedy. Not only was the systematic slaughter 
of European Jewry taking place a long way away; it was 
;simply beyond the range of human imagination. Australians 
were still largely ignorant of large-scale human suffering. 
Even though they had just fought a war and many of their 
relatives and friends had been killed, their country had 
never been invaded and most Australians lacked direct 
experience df the horrors of war for civilians. Deaths 
resulting from battle with the enemy were one thing; the 
murder of innocent men, women and children was quite a 
different matter. Australians started to comprehend what 
had happened to the Jews only when they saw the evidence in 
photographs and new~ films: after it was all over. These 
gruesome sights brought them into direct contact with the 
evils of the outside world, shocking them for a moment out 
of their complacency and into an awareness of what human 
beings can do to one another. Their reaction was the basic 
instinctual one of persons ignorant of such horror: hatred 
and the desire for revenge rather than sympathy for the 
victims~ It was not a question of rescuing the Jews but 
of wreaking vengeance on the Nazis. 
If Australians underreacted to the persecution 
of the Jews, they overreacted to the refugee question. The 
amount of opposition to the admission of Jewish refugees was 
.1 r 
' 
out of all proportion to the small numbers involved. 
But to many people, the presence of refugees in the 
community was not a matter of numbers but of principle. 
29q,_ 
As foreign immigrants, refugees challenged the fundamental 
concept of Australia as an Anglo-Saxon society. Australians 
insisted that their population should be of basically 
Anglo-Saxon stock - whether they wanted their country to 
maintain its imperial ties with Britain or become an 
~ 
independent nation. In the 1930s and early 1940s, this 
concept was beginning to be challenged by the realization 
the Australia could significantly incre~se its population 
only by admitting non-British immigrants. But most 
Australians clung obstinately to their Anglo-Saxon ideal. 
The refugees, who threatened this ideal, bore the full 
weight of their ·anti-foreign hostility. 
Before the war, xenophobia was supplemented by 
~conomic self-interest. With the depression fresh in their 
m1nds, Australian workers were in no mood to face 
competition from any immigrants, let alone foreigners who 
had always posed the threat of cheap labour. Nor were 
professional people interested in sharing their economic 
privileges with alien newcomers. 
For all Australians, the keynote was self-
protection: protection against anyorie who threatened to 
undermine their Angl6-~axon society or their economic 
well-being. Australian Jews were no exception. Their 
religious affiliation with the refugees was outweighed b¥ 
fears for their own security and their personal 
identification with Australian economic and social interests. 
While the refugees suffered because of Australian 
attitudes, they also helped to change those attitudes. 
Their mere presence in the community aided the breakdown 
of Australian xenoph6bia, brought about by isolation from 
the outside world and its peoples1 Jewish refugees helped 
prepare the way for the acceptance of large numbers of 
foreign immigrants. When large-scale non-British 
/ .•" 
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immigration began in 1947, there was still some hostility, 
but anti-foreign prejudices had already been brought into 
the open and debated during the controversy on refugee 
immigration. 
Jewish refugees also helped to change the 
Australian image of Europeans. Few Australians had been to 
Europe. Their main recent experience of Europeans was of 
working-class, poorly educated, southern European immigrants, 
whom they readily branded as inferior beings. It was not so 
easy to see middle-class, often highly educated and cultured, 
Jewish refugees in the same light. Instead of bringing 
European peasant traditions to Australia, the refugees 
introduced Australians to some of the intellectual and 
cultural traditions of European civilization, as well as 
to its moderTh technology. 
But refugees also threatened to introduce some of 
the bad features of European society. Australians were as 
ignorant of European antisemitism as they were of European 
culture. With their own traditional prejudices against all 
non-British persons, they initially found it difficult to 
see the refugees as anything but foreigners. Even in their 
antisemitic outbursts, they generally used crude racial 
stereotypes only to bolster their usual anti-foreign 
arguments. They did the same for 'dagos' and 'wogs'. 
Through their experience with Jewish refugees, Australians 
became aware of the existence of European, and especially 
Nazi, antisemitism. A small group of local antisemites 
encouraged them to adopt these allegedly advanced, European 
ideas. A few people succumbed. But Australians lacked 
strong religious prejudices and could not see why anyone 
should be discriminated against because of his religion. 
Their experience with Australian Jews, especially famous 
men like Sir Isaac Isaacs and Sir John Monash, demonstrated 
that Jews were an integral part of Australian society. 
European antisemitism proved to be no match for traditional 
Australian xenophobia and the refugees were basically 
regarded as just another group of foreign immigrants. 
)' ,. 
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The refugees also had a wider significance. 
They made Australians aware of the personal results of a 
large-scale human problem which was the outcome of a 
declared government policy. If the photographs of Hitler's 
victims increased Australian awareness of t!1e outside 
world, the presence of refugees in the community gave them 
a sense of involvement in a major world event" For most, 
it was their only direct experience of Nazism" The 
refugees helped to break down Australian feelings of 
isolation and demonstrated that they could even play a 
role in world affairs. 
I 
I 
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